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Denmark appears to be on the verge of realizing an ideal-type parliamentary democracy in which voters, Parliament, & government are the principal agents. However, at least five broad traits of Danish politics problematize this characterization. First is Denmark's small size & international (eg, NATO, EU, & other organizations) constraints. Second is its post-World War II record of minority governance. Third, its Constitution permits & under certain circumstances demands the holding of referendums. Fourth is the influence of organized local & regional interests. Fifth, & perhaps most significant, is the function of Danish political parties. The delegation chain is examined in light of these five features. The conclusion comments on potential agency problems & offers recommendations. 1 Table, 57 References. K. Coddon

Describes delegation & accountability in France in light of the "semi-presidentialism" of the Fifth Republic. This regime combines a popularly elected President who holds considerable constitutional powers with a relatively conventional parliamentarism in which the Prime Minister and cabinet answer to the popularly elected legislative body, the National Assembly. The function of political parties, the operations of delegation, & the role of outside constraints are examined in terms of France's "hybrid" system. It is demonstrated that France's flexible political system is able to effect (& affect) a variety of combinations of state & partisan power under the presidential aegis. The parliamentary majority, the Prime Minister, the government, & the administration all function under the President's authority. The ideal chain of delegation & accountability is not evident. However, the chain is more closely followed when the President & National Assembly are of different political parties; then, the Prime Minister is dominant & government must collectively answer to the Parliament instead of the President. 1 Table, 36 References. K. Coddon

National chains of delegation & accountability in Western Europe's parliamentary democracies, primarily during the post-World War II period, are compared & contrasted. Twenty comparative tables & four figures are offered to describe these institutions. Sixteen of the 20 tables are based solely on the information given by our country experts; the other four tables are based on secondary sources along with constitutions, parliamentary standing orders, & other official records. It is shown that although the parliamentary chain of delegation & accountability is similar crossnationally, the parliamentary systems under consideration each have distinctive attributes. 20 Tables, 4 Figures, 170 References. K. Coddon

Describes the Belgian parliamentary system, with particular attention to how partitocracy shapes delegation & accountability. The Belgian partitocracy is shown to fall short of the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in a number of ways, given the influence of political parties in every step of delegation. Thus, many in the chain of delegation, including voters, MPs, ministers, & civil servants, function only as party agents. On a certain level, partitocracy is inevitable & even facilitates political stability. Yet partitocracy's costs are immense, & taken to an extreme, it has eroded political legitimacy & governability. Therefore Belgium has seen, mostly since the early 1990s, an incremental decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation & the gradual reacquisition of autonomy by some formal agents. Some of these developments will foster restoration of the unitary chain of delegation, while others strive to establish direct connections between nonappositive segments of the chain. 1 Table, 52 References. K. Coddon

Considers the focus of the comparative political economy literatures, stressing the positive issues of how institutions work & why, as well as the state of current empirical estimates of their impacts. Following an introduction on the political economy of institutions that contextualized the specialized & policy-focused research arenas, attention turns to discussing how, in institutional political economy, studies have coalesced around the concepts of credibility in monetary policy & centralization & transparency in fiscal policy. Demonstrated is the salience of relating policy outcomes to economic fundamentals as well as the ideological or redistributive pursuits of political actors (eg, parties, interest groups) & the institutional policy-making context. How transparency & credibility relate is addressed along with how the study of monetary & fiscal policy institutions might be integrated. J. Zendejas

Examines the 1978 establishment of an authentic parliamentary government in Spain. Since Spain's EU accession many citizens believe that the chain of delegation extends well beyond their national institutions, but that the same is not true of accountability. These issues of Spanish delegation & accountability are discussed in terms of political parties, the delegation process, & the external constraints of direct democracy, judicial independence, regional autonomy, & EU membership. The conclusion iterates the asymmetry between the chain of delegation & accountability in the Spanish parliamentary system. 1 Table, 49 References. K. Coddon

The article examines the nature of official accountability, with emphasis on the political environment of the UK. At present, the majority party in the Commons & town halls are at risk of being voted out of office. Measures should be taken to promote a more democratic system of government in GB. The author discusses accountability at four levels: (1) the roles of insiders (politically active citizens) vs outsiders, (2) the customer relations concept as applied to government, (3) the relationship between accountability & the decision making process, & (4) the right of formal review of official decisions. The author calls for an alliance between a new citizenship culture & the lobby for parliamentary reform. J. R. Callahan

The extent to which justice principles underlying the decision in the Nuremberg war crimes trial have been applied in subsequent war crimes prosecutions is studied. After critiquing realist positions on US military intervention in foreign nations, it is claimed that regionalism & globalization processes have damaged the feasibility of holding all state leaders accountable for criminal activity undertaken during times of war. It is argued that the notion of rendering state leaders individually accountable for war crimes essentially challenges the notion of state sovereignty; in addition, the issue of whether the Nuremberg guidelines should have been applied to US leaders immediately following the Vietnam War is considered. Several factors responsible for the re-surfacing of support for the use of Nuremberg tribunals during the 1990s are identified, resulting in the assertion that such an international court would be geopolitically convenient for trying war crimes. The pressures that global civil society have placed on international organizations to develop an international criminal court & the implications of a Spanish criminal court's attempt to extradite A. Pinochet, in 1998, for war crimes for the perpetuation of the Nuremberg philosophy are also considered. Future prospects for holding state leaders accountable for wartime criminal behavior are contemplated. J. W. Parker

Describes delegation & accountability in Luxembourg's parliamentary system. With an indirect chain of delegation & an acceptable accord with the singularity principle, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg thus bears several attributes approaching the ideal type of parliamentary democracy. Luxembourg is a unitary parliamentary monarchy with a unicameral parliament & has never invoked a referendum post-World War II. Yet several domestic institutions & policy-making processes veer away from the ideal type. Another constraint has been Luxembourg's engagement with international organizations & relations that continue to shrink its sovereignty & thus the importance of the national chain of delegation & accountability. The body of the article considers the country's political parties, delegation process, & extra-Parliamentary restraints, including the Grand Duke, the Belgian National Bank, the possibility of referendums, the Council of State, neo-corporatism, & the EU. 1 Table, 14 References. K. Coddon

Discusses delegation & accountability relationships in the Netherlands, which has been characterized both as a consociational democracy & a neo-corporatist system, each of which stresses the primacy of elites. Catholic, Protestant, & Socialist groups have established networks of subcultural organizations; this aspect of Dutch political culture is known as pillarization. Although the social pillars have largely declined in influence, their leaders still bear collective responsibility for governance in an environment of compromise & cooperation, working together in particular policy areas such as education & socioeconomic policy, often in tripartite advisory councils. The impact of Dutch consociationalism & neo-corporatism on political parties, legislation, voting, & the delegation process is described, followed by a discussion of external factors affecting delegation & accountability, including referendums, the judiciary, & the Netherlands' EU membership. The conclusion underscores key areas of deviation from the ideal-type chain of delegation & accountability. 1 Table, 34 References. K. Coddon

Questions concerning whether United Nations transitional administrations should consult local authorities in crafting transitional plans & should be legally or politically accountable for its actions during transition periods are considered. Scrutiny of United Nations transitional administrations consultation practices with local actors in the Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, & Kosovo is conducted to illustrate the difficulties arising from transitional authorities negotiations with local authorities & to indicate that prior agreement amongst international actors facilitated political transformation. Two aspects of the accountability of United Nations transitional administrations are then explored -- whether transitional governments are willing to acknowledge the military nature of its operations & how such administrations disregard of normative democratic principles hinder post-transition governance; cases involving the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo & the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor are studied to illuminate the legal & political accountability of transitional governments. It is concluded that the success of international intervention is contingent upon several factors, particularly the creation of military operations designed to properly transfer political authority to local actors. J. W. Parker