Suchergebnisse

Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.

This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability. As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "presidential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that purpose. The assumption resonates with the premise, familiar in constitutional theory, that majoritarianism is the hallmark of legitimate government. This premise, brought to the fore by Alexander Bickel, now is questioned among constitutional theorists. Moreover, majoritarianism is not enough to legitimate administrative decisionmaking under our constitutional structure for the reason that it does not reliably address the concern for arbitrariness. This Article argues for a more direct focus on the concern for arbitrariness-ana pproach that has at its core a concern for good government, not simply "accountable" government in the post-Bickel, majoritarian sense of that word. The Article demonstrates how a more direct approach suggests new possibilities for resolving the time-honored problem of agency legitimacy and new ways of understanding the perennial puzzles of administrative lawar.

Identifying and implementing incentives that give rise to a strong relationship of accountability between service providers and beneficiaries is viewed by many as critical for improving service delivery. How to achieve this in practice and if it at all works, however, remain open questions. Systematic evaluation of service delivery innovations to increase accountability can show what works, what doesn't and why, a first step to scaling up success. This paper discusses one such attempt: a randomized evaluation of a Citizen Report Card project at the community level in primary health care in Uganda. The Citizen Report Card project collected quantitative information on the quality and quantity of health service provision from citizens and public health care providers. This information were then assembled in "easy access" report cards that were disseminated, together with practical information on how best to use this information, in community, staff, and interface meetings by local community organizations in order to enhance citizens' ability to monitor the health care providers. The intervention improved both the quality and quantity of health service provision in the treatment communities: One year into the program, average utilization was 16 percent higher in the treatment communities; the weight of infants higher, and the number of deaths among children under-five markedly lower. Treatment communities became more extensively involved in monitoring providers following the intervention, but we find no evidence of increased government funding. These results suggest that the improvements in the quality and quantity of health service delivery resulted from increased effort by the health unit staff to serve the community.

This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.

This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.

The importance of good governance, specifically the presence of accountability among developing countries in managing development aid from official aid agencies, has been significantly recognized. The Republic of the Philippines has been struggling to address the issue of corruption not only in aid management but also in the government as a whole. The contribution of the accountability systems of a recipient government to address corruption in aid management and to make aid more effective is analyzed here.

Charter schools involve a trading of autonomy for accountability. This accountability comes through two forces—markets through the choices of parents and students, and accountability to government through the writing of contracts that must be renewed for schools to continue to operate. Charter schools are supposed to be more accountable for educational performance than traditional public schools because authorizers have the ability to revoke charter contracts. Here, I focus on one central component of accountability to government: performance accountability or accountability for educational outcomes to charter school authorizers through the revocation or non-renewal of charter contracts. In this paper, I suggest that contract-based accountability for educational performance in charter schools may not be working as proponents argued it would. This article explores some explanations for why there are very few examples of charter schools that have been closed primarily because of failure to demonstrate educational performance or improvement. Future work will need to test if these challenges for authorizers hold in a variety of contexts. The conclusion examines the implications of these findings for the future of charter school accountability.

South Carolina legislation calls for the Education Oversight Committee (EOC), working with the South Carolina State Board of Education, and a broad‑based group of stakeholders, to conduct a comprehensive cyclical review of the accountability system. The EOC and the South Carolina Department of Education convened the South Carolina Accountability Advisory Committee (AAC), comprised of members who represented the interests and priorities of various educational stakeholders in South Carolina. This report is a summary of the AAC's key findings and recommendations.

Title from cover. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for FY 1997-FY 1999 prepared by: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Chief Financial Officer. ; Combines six separate HUD financial reports, mainly internal office documents issued in looseleaf form: Chief Financial Officer's annual report; Report on compliance with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act; Secretary's semiannual report to Congress; Report on compliance with the Prompt Payment Act; Report on civil monetary penalties; and: Debt collection performance report (some are available in U.S. Government depository libraries on microfiche, under slightly variant titles). ; Latest issue consulted: FY 1997. ; UPDATED

The purpose of the Virginia Tech Center for Public Administration and Policy (CPAP) Roundtable Series for Leadership and Administration is to bring together the leading scholars, practitioners, students, and others for a stimulating conversation focusing on the exchange of ideas that will advance the knowledge and understanding of leadership in public administration through the sharing of research and experiences. For this particular session, Colleen Woodard moderated a discussion between John Rohr, professor at Virginia Techs Center for Public Administration and Policy, and Bradford Huther, President and CEO of the International Property Institute and retired member of the Senior Executive Service on the subject of Leadership and Accountability. The roundtable discussion focused primarily on defining accountability and what it means in the realm of public administration and politics.

The sole aim of media is to make as much money as they can. Or again, the media are to serve only the people in power, political or economic. If you agree to that, you might as well stop reading this. This issue ofPacific Journalism Reviewis predicated on the principle that media should serve the public. Journalists can only achieve that if they enjoy independence from financial and political pressures. It is not often enough underlined that they cannot enjoy that independence without the support of the public, the masses of voters and consumers. There is no way the profession can obtain public support unless it listens to readers/listeners/viewers— unless it is accountable to them.

Today, health is a human right in India, and the government is working hard for universalization of health services provision till the grassroots. Health without accountability is a challenging task in hand, and recently, state governments drafted a bill toward public health system to move in the strengthened direction of accountability mechanism. Accountability is the quality or state of being accountable, and it is an important component of the health-care reforms in India. This article provides more nuanced understanding of accountability which includes the specification of accountability, conceptual framework of accountability, and its potential approaches for how accountability is viewed today in India with reference to the Central, State, District, and other stakeholders. It examines the role of accountability in making accountable health plans, and its relationship governance/ownership structures as a key component of health-care reforms as improved accountability is a major element in improving the health system performance. The article elaborates on the definition of accountability in terms of answerability and sanctions and distinguishes the three types of accountability, namely financial, performance, and political/democratic. The article describes three accountability-enhancing strategies, namely reducing the pilferage, assuring acquiescence with procedures and standards, and improved learning from the past experience. The recent events in Indian health care put forward a serious issue on how accountability can be fixed if health mishaps happened and how we can make our health plans accountable to the needs and aspiration for the people of India. Overall, the accountability is discouraging and more needs to be done to enhance the accountability compliance in India.

Alberta has actively increased accountability for educational performance since the early 1980s through introduction of the student achievement and diploma examination programs, five evaluation policies, and public reporting requirements. In 1994, the government moved to province-wide planning for more and better reporting of infor- mation to enhance public accountability. Accountability focuses attention on performance, communicates how successful the performance is, and proposes strategies for improve- ment. In this article I describe accountability for K-12 education in Alberta, identifying policies, programs, and strategies that help ensure public accountability for educational results. I also describe Alberta Education's 1994 Three-Year Business Plan, which increases accountability for school jurisdictions and schools. L'Alberta s'emploie à mettre davantage l'accent sur la responsabilité eu égard au rendement scolaire depuis le début des années 90. C'est dans cet esprit qu'elle a mis sur pied des programmes d'évaluation des élèves et d'examen des diplômes, implanté cinq politiques d'évaluation et formulé des exigences pour ce qui est des rapports publics. En 1994, le gouvernement a opté pour une planification à la grandeur de la province afin d'améliorer qualitativement et quantitativement les informations communiquées. Parler de responsabilité, c'est mettre l'accent sur la performance, déterminer le niveau de réussite à cet égard et proposer des stratégies en vue d'apporter des améliorations. Dans cet article, l'auteure décrit la responsabilité face au public de la maternelle à la fin du secondaire en Alberta en identifiant les politiques, programmes et stratégies qui aident à assurer une responsabilité eu égard aux résultats scolaires. L'auteure décrit également le plan d'action global de trois ans mis sur pied en 1994 en Alberta, lequel augmente la responsabilité des juridictions scolaires et des écoles.

This article examines how one particular state institution, state attorneys general (SAGs), has operated within a unique set of institutional and political constraints to create state-based regulation with nationwide impact in policy areas including consumer protection, antitrust, environmental regulation, and securities regulation. This state-based regulation casts doubt on one of the principle rationales advanced in the Supreme Court's anticommandeering line of cases for limiting federal power; namely, that judicially-enforced limits on federal power enhance electoral accountability, a concept central to our democracy. If in the absence of federal regulation narrowly accountable state-based actors from a small number of states can create nationwide regulation in a non-legislative fashion, accountability cannot continue to be a coherent justification for a revival of judicially-enforced federalism. While this critique of accountability is not an argument for untrammeled federal regulatory authority, it does call into question the empirical accuracy of the Court's assumptions about how state and federal institutions interact with each other to promote democratic and constitutional values. This article will proceed in five parts. Part I will briefly review the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence in the last fifteen years, focusing on the accountability rationale for limiting the power of the federal government. The next three parts will examine the political and institutional environment that permits SAGs to cooperate in regulatory litigation. Part II examines the state-based institutional constraints under which SAGs typically operate. While SAGs have much in common with each other, the variations in these structures between states will in part account for the actual way in which any given SAG regulatory scheme evolves. Part III draws on empirical work by political scientists to explore the ideas developed in Part II in the context of the tobacco litigation of the 1990's. Part III also begins the discussion ...

Purpose - This paper attempts to replace the understanding of public sector accountability as a linear and hierarchical process with one in which accountability occurs within a network of social relationships. It associates the former approach with the introduction of New Public Management principles in Australian public administration. It investigates the effect of this on the ability of Australia's indigenous people both to access democratic accountability as citizens, and to develop their community organisations as service providers. Design/methodology/approach - The paper is based on field experience with aboriginal community organisations and critical assessment of the literature on this aspect of Australian public administration. Findings - The paper finds that New Public Management approaches in Australian public administration have not led to greater political accountability but the reverse. As a disadvantaged, culturally distinct minority, aboriginal people are the subject of, rather than partners in, accountability regimes which mire their community service organisations in reporting requirements at the expense of practical activity. In some respects Aborigines are dealt with as individual citizen/clients, at other times as a disadvantaged minority group, and third, as culturally distinct polities. Each of these approaches implies different forms of accountability both by Aborigines to the state and by the state to them. Research limitations/implications - This analysis is inherently interpretative rather than exclusively empirical. However, greater efficiency as well as culturally appropriate outcomes can be found by instituting regional regimes of reciprocal accountability. Originality/value - The analysis of developments in public administration is rarely brought to bear on Australian indigenous affairs.