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We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms attempting to influence businessmen- politicians through business proxies. In particular, when a politician controls a business, firms shift their spending towards the politician's business in the hopes of securing favorable regulation. We investigate this channel in Italy where government officials are not required to divest business holdings. We examine the evolution of advertising spending by firms between 1993 and 2009, a period in which Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We develop a theoretical model of this channel and, in the context of this model, hypothesize that firms shift their advertising budget towards Mediaset when Berlusconi is in power and that this shift is particularly pronounced for regulated rms. Consistent with these hypotheses, we document a significant pro Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising spending during Berlusconi's political tenure, and this pattern is especially pronounced for companies operating in more regulated sectors. Using these estimates, we estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this lobbying channel. These findings provide an additional rationale for rules on conflict of interest.

We analyze a novel lobbying channel: firms attempting to influence businessmen- politicians through business proxies. In particular, when a politician controls a business, firms shift their spending towards the politician's business in the hopes of securing favorable regulation. We investigate this channel in Italy where government officials are not required to divest business holdings. We examine the evolution of advertising spending by firms between 1993 and 2009, a period in which Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister three separate times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We develop a theoretical model of this channel and, in the context of this model, hypothesize that firms shift their advertising budget towards Mediaset when Berlusconi is in power and that this shift is particularly pronounced for regulated rms. Consistent with these hypotheses, we document a significant pro Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising spending during Berlusconi's political tenure, and this pattern is especially pronounced for companies operating in more regulated sectors. Using these estimates, we estimate that Mediaset profits increased by one billion euros during this period and that regulated firms anticipated sizeable returns, stressing the economic importance of this lobbying channel. These findings provide an additional rationale for rules on conflict of interest.

Do mass media bias content in favor of advertisers? If so, what market conditions limit or exacerbate this bias? We examine the relationship between advertising by auto manufacturers in U.S. newspapers and news coverage of car safety recalls between 2000 and 2014. This context allows us to separate the influence of advertisers, who prefer less coverage, from that of readers, who prefer more information about the safety risks associated with the recalls. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that newspapers provide less coverage of recalls issued by manufacturers that advertised more regularly on their pages over the previous two years. The effect is especially pronounced for more severe recalls, which are more likely to hurt manufacturers' reputations. Competition for readers from other newspapers mitigates proadvertiser bias, and competition for advertising by online platforms exacerbates it. We also present suggestive evidence that less news coverage of recalls is associated with more fatal car accidents. ; The authors thankfully acknowledge financial support from the University of Toronto, Brown University, Barcelona GSE, the Jean Jacques Laffont Digital Chair, MIT IDE, and LIEPP. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant 759885].

Die Studie untersucht das Werbespending-Verhalten von Werbetreibenden für Bewegtbildwerbung in klassischen und digitalen Werbekanälen. Der Schwerpunkt bisheriger Veröffentlichungen zu Video-Werbeplatzierungen liegt in den zyklisch erscheinenden Analysen zum aktuellen und geplanten Werbespending-Verhalten der Werbetreibenden. Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Studie hingegen erschließen die Einstellungen und präferierte Nutzung verschiedener Werbekanäle für die Platzierung von Bewegtbildwerbung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass mehr Werbetreibende Bewegtbildwerbung auf digitalen Plattformen nutzen als im klassischen Fernsehen. Dabei haben insbesondere die Social-Media-Kanäle (z.B. Instagram, Facebook) eine große Bedeutung, gefolgt von der eigenen Website und digitalen Videoportalen wie YouTube oder Vimeo. Bei den Kommunikationszielen und den Motiven für die Kanalwahl zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede beim Einsatz von digitalen Plattformen und der Nutzung von traditionellem TV. Grundsätzlich schätzen TV-Werbetreibende (= Einsatz von unter anderem klassischem TV für Bewegtbildwerbung) und digitale Werbetreibende (= ausschließliche Nutzung digitaler Bewegtbildkanäle für Platzierungen) die Effizienz und Bedeutung der Online- und Offline-Kanäle unterschiedlich ein, was letztendlich zu einer differenzierten Relevanzeinschätzung der Online- und Offline-Werbekanäle führt. Hieraus leitet der Artikel schließlich Managementimplikationen für Medienunternehmen ab.