Suchergebnisse

This article explores the significant role that the state is still expected to play in initiating and implementing the energy transition. In this regard, it is laid out in three parts. Part I focuses on the premise of the role that derives from constitutional law. This role is considered classic, because it is based on different functions of the state, and the legitimate constrain that distinguishes it from other social actors, including non-state actors. Tremendous materials are offered by the analysis either from the perspective of sociology or law studies when it comes to the specific situation of French-speaking African states. The scope of analysis is broadened with the energy law approach. With a focus on African English-speaking countries, the article examines both the way the state is enforcing statutes aiming to design its own transition scheme and exercising its discretionary power through its energy policy. Beyond the functions of the state—deriving from its sovereign power—these elements set out the direction in quest of a specific role the state can play in the energy transition as a process in Part II. As such, the energy transition, if it is to lead to coherent social change, requires strong and dynamic leadership, including clear, nuanced, and forward-looking direction on the broad sections of the overall process, and the environmental justice issues that necessarily cluster around them. For this reason, the role of the state is construed as both a steering role, and an integrative role for environmental, economic and social issues. Part III provides a rationale for the necessary and strong support of international cooperation—to the state—in order to achieve the paradigm shift smoothly. In Part IV, I emphasize the African Union's transition initiatives in the run-up to COP 25, which I hold out as an inducement for states' efforts. In fact, this article seeks to address these issues. Taken together, they could help build a coherent pattern of the role that African states play in the energy ...

: Indonesia has potential in cooperation on the intermission of UN peacekeeping tasks, although the need for UN intermission does not occur frequently (incidentally), but it needs to be prepared in order to anticipate opportunities and challenges in the development of the situation in UN PKOs, as has happened to the Indonesian Armed Forces Engineer Company Taskforce/Garuda Contingent. XXXII-C, through a decision-making mechanism based on the UN Resolution in UN PKOs to carry out the intermission of peacekeeping tasks from Haiti to Central Africa (2014-2015). The Kizi Taskforce TNI/Konga XXXIIC/MINUSTAH or Konga XXXVII-A/MINUSCA, can complete their duties as UN peacekeepers on duty at the UN Mission in MINUSTAH - Haiti and carry out UN Peace Task Intermissions in MINUSCA, in order to prepare missions in the African Republic Center (CAR). On this "rare" opportunity, the UN intermission process can be carried out properly through effective diplomacy and negotiations, so that the TNI/Konga XXXII-C Kizi Taskforce can carry out tasks in two different missions at once. And on this occasion, the researcher tries to explore the data in the form of a research entitled "Implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Taskforce; Case Study of Intermission of Satga IEC/Konga XXXII-C from Haiti to Central Africa (2014-2015)", In this study, I tried to explain the mechanism and implementation of the UN peacekeeping mission, accompanied by various challenges and obstacles faced in the area of operation. as well as the steps and efforts taken to overcome them, so that the task of ending the mission of the IEC/Garuda contingent in Haiti and the reopening of the UN mission in the Central African Republic can take place safely and smoothly. The researcher explored this research, considering that this form of intermission assignment rarely occurs, not only in the IEC Taskforce/Garuda Contingent, but also in UN peacekeeping operations.

If there was a referendum in Mozambique today, an overwhelming majority of the people would vote against their government having anything to do with the current model of democracy. They know all too well that there has definitely been a considerable welfare reduction to them as a result of the way this thing called "Representative Democracy" has been being played out in their country during the past decade. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Mozambican people if not, most African governments would prefer to see fundamental changes in their countries' relations with this Western model of democracy. There is a virtual consensus among the general public, vocally expressed in the local media, as well as among officials, who naturally prefer putting forth their views in more private settings, that the relationship between citizen and the democratic institutions has been detrimental to the country, that far from helping it to become politically and economically viable, these institutions have been capitalising on, exacerbating and perpetuating Mozambique's crisis. The research was based on participant observation, and it also involved a bibliographic review of relevant documents in the area of political participation, philosophy and other documents such as the 2004 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, Mozambican legislation, reports and research already published by other organizations.