Suchergebnisse

Analizirajući povijesnu građu i arheološka istraživanja, autorica prati gradnju gotičkog kaštela Kamerlengo u Trogiru, uz nove elemente o popravcima i dogradnji južne strane gradskih zidina. Prvi put donosi nacrte kaštela iz 1829. godine koji su pohranjeni u Državnom arhivu u Beču. ; The citadel in Trogir was built according to a plan by the new Venetian government at the beginning of the 15th century as a detached fort on the periphery of the fortified town. In the earliest documents relation to the planning of the Trogir castle and the preparations for the building there is mention of a fortilicio or arx. It was only several centuries later that the name of Kamerlengo, taken from the title of respected officials [chamberlain] of the Venetian Republic, became common. In documents of the late 18th century it is stated that the castellan and camerlengo had a dwelling in the northern set of houses within the citadel, today no longer in existence, which suggests that the name of the office became, over the course of time, a synonym for the Trogir town castle. Trogir 17th century historians Ivan Lucić and Pavao Andreis collected invaluable historical sources and evidence concerning the past of the city, particularly concerning the siege by the Venetian fleet. Documents provide precise instructions for the construction of the citadel founded on strategic analyses of the ground, access from land and sea and of directions from which attacks would be naturally frustrated. The Trogir naval siege, accompanied by bombardment of the city, was executed according to the decision of Doge Tommaso Mocenigo (1414-1423). As early as the 14th century there had been an attempt by Venice to master Trogir, that small but important Dalmatian commune. The conflict between the Genovese and the Venetians broke out in a sea battle off Trogir in 1378, for Genovese galleys commanded by Luciano Doria had taken cover there. Under the command of Admiral Vettore Pisani, the Venetian fleet bombarded the city from the sea and from positions on Čiovo island, with an attempt to make a seaborne descent on he mainland. However, the plan did not bear fruit, and neither did a renewed attempt by Venice to take Trogir in the following year. After the victory over the Turkish fleet at Gallipoli, on the bridgehead between Europe and Asia Minor in 1416, the Venetians soon gained control of cities on the entrance into the Adriatic. A second strategic point, in the northwest, consisted of Aquileia and the whole of the province of Friuli, which fell in 1419-1420. When Venetian government in Zadar had been consolidated, interventions in the commune centres in central Dalmatia were the next part of the Mocenigo programme to conquer the whole of the Adriatic basin. At Gallipoli, Pietro Loredan had made his name as commander of the fleet, and led it during the attack on Trogir during May and June 1420. The 14th century city walls with the towers at the rim, the monastery of St Nicholas, the cathedral and bell tower, the council chamber, city loggia and numerous palaces were seriously damaged. One of the first tasks in the organisation of the life in the city was the repair of the damaged walls and towers and the construction of the citadel, which was able to function as a separate fort. Immediately after Verona acknowledged Venetian rule in 1408, an office called provisores ad fortilicia was set up, part of the programme of which was to check out the condition of the defensive system in other conquered provinces as well. The Republic sent Picino its tried and tested fortification expert, who had achieved prominence in the construction of the Lido fort, which was in fact the bulwark of Venice, and from 1413 to 1428 was posted to Verona, where he ran the renovation of the citadel. In the edicts of 1422 and 1424, mention is made, in connection with the fortification of Verona, of magistri Picini ingenarii nostri and prothoingenarius ducalis dominii Venetorum. Working with him were masters Stefano and Giovanni of Cremona. On the orders of the doge, he occasionally arrived in Dalmatia as well; the sources refer to him in 1414 in Zadar and Šibenik as magistrum Pizinum, but his personal name is not given. In 1409, the Venetian government in Zadar built a fort at the south east of the city called Citadella. Not long after that the trecento city castle on the north east of the peninsula was reinforced after a detailed plan by Engineer Picino of 1414. It had a square ground plan with a polygonal corner tower facing onto the city, a barbican with a fortified belt of walls around the castle, which was accompanied by a wide defensive fosse. At the very beginning of August 1425 the doge constituted a commission the task of which was to make a decision about the best place for the construction of a citadel in Trogir. Magister Picino made use of the defensive mode adopted in the Zadar castle, where the site chosen was peripheral with respect to the existing structure of the town and adapted it to the position of Trogir port, the navigation channels and the shallows of the marine channel. Detailed instructions about the handling of the walls and towers in situ were given by Captain General of Adriatic Pietro Loredan, specifying which parts were to be demolished, which strengthened. At the beginning of September Trogir rector Detrico signed a contract with the stone carver Marin Radojev for the working of stone for the foundations of the citadel. With three stonecutters, Marin guaranteed to collect stone in the quarry and work the face of the ashlars, and bring them by ship to Trogir, to the site of the construction of the future citadel. The contract made it clear that what had to be built was a tower with 15-foot wide towers, making use in the fill and the outer face of the walls high quality mortar, as befitted the reputation of a good craftsman. A small chapel dedicated to St Mark, patron saint of the Most Serene Republic, was put up in the courtyard of Kamerlengo. Below the monumental relief of a lion was the coat of arms of the Tron family in a quatrefoil. Luca Tron had distinguished himself as the captain of a Venetian galley in the surrender of Korčula and the siege of Trogir, and was rewarded with the confidential office of city rector (1421-1424), the second in chronological order from the establishment of the new Venetian government. A Gothic relief of a lion with the initials DC and the coat of arms of the Contarini family was done after the capture of Trogir in the 15th century and placed in the chapel in memory of Doge Domenico Contarini I (1043-1071), who is mentioned in Venetian annals in the context of the taking of Zadar in the middle of the 12th century. The works on the construction of the castle went on slowly for the commune was not able to summon up funds enough from its own revenues and constantly repeated requests for aid. During a second visit to Trogir in 1424 Admiral Loredan toured the city with the commanders of the galleys and informed Doge Francesco Foscari of all he had observed. At the time of rector Jacopo Zorzi (1424-1426) work was continued on the construction of the citadel and the barbican was reinforced. The coats of arms of rector Jacopo Barbarigo (1426-1429) were incorporated into both towers on the eastern side of the citadel; as trophy heraldry, they must be considered indications of the time of the completion of the work on this part of the fort. An inscription mentioning some big works of 1425 during the time of Rector Jacopo Zorzi is built in over the eastern part of the portico of the cloister of the Dominican monastery. It needs connecting with the long stay of Pietro Loredan in Dalmatia; together with rector Zorzi and the galley commanders, he issued detailed instructions for the renovation of the Trogir walls and towers that had been damaged in the bombardment. A slab that records the rapidly completed works was probably incorporated into the curtain of the new wall in front of the monastery, and Loredan's coat of arms was built into the corner of the wall close to the gate of St Roch. In 1432 the city received aid from the Republic for continuation of works on the city walls, and in an edict of July 26, 1436, a decision to complete the citadel and renovate the city walls at places threatened with collapse was taken. Rector of Trogir Marco Zen (1435-1436) entered into contracts with the Zadar craftsmen Matej Radovanov and Šimun Bilšić about the construction of a vault over the cistern in the castello and of a new wall on the north and the east in the fosse. Detailed drawings of the city castello in watercolour are kept in Vienna (Kartensammlung des Kriegsarchives) and were done during the time of the Austrian government of 1829, when the moat was already filled up with building material from the demolished walls. A large tower in all floor plan levels and with cross sections and indications of dimensions is shown separately. At that time, throughout Europe, the defensive character of city walls lost their importance; the opening up of wide roads and promenades was encouraged; on the platforms of the bastions and along the onetime fortifications stretched parks and gardens. The ruinous state of the walls was an additional encouragement to the authorities to remove them, and Kamerlengo Castle, which had been registered in the exchequer, was in 1848 added to the demolition list. But unlike the citadel in Split and Zadar, which were partially demolished or integrated into later construction, the Trogir castle kept the original planimetry and volume. Although of modest dimensions, this fort acquired a symbolic level in the image of the city, dominating the city port like a lighthouse for all the navigational routes.

According to Nietzsche, the fundamental problem between a man and a woman is rooted in the denial of antagonism between them. The man believes that their relationship must be that of eternal hostile tension and unavoidable injustice. Nietzsche asserts that there must be a rank order, where scaling is related to the actions of taking, accumulating and becoming greater by gaining power and overcoming narrower interpretations. This rank scaling does not allow for identicalness and equality, which are signs of the shallowness of instinct and the loss of one's identity. Nietzsche endorses the difference and celebrates the otherness. Flourishing of an individual can never be interfered by the concept of equal relations. Nietzsche is convinced that people are different, and he advocates for agon (a power struggle) as a model of cultural and political relations. Since equality of human beings must consist of an equal amount of the same feature, Nietzsche sees this equality as being represented in the general will to power. Furthermore, the gender difference is also a socially constructed way of being. It is a creation of man's image of how the world should look like. If included in a therapeutic approach, this perspective can shed new light on possible interventions methods in psychotherapy and philotherapy alike. Sex and sexual relationships can be singled out as key problems that prevail in the core of motivation for seeking professional therapeutic help (psychotherapy), no matter what therapeutic approach is used in such practice. It is a topic that has insufficiently drawn on Nietzsche's legacy. The aim of this paper is to provide arguments that Nietzsche's perspective on "war of the sexes" sets a productive context for both psychotherapeutic intervention and for philosophical consultancy. ; Prema Nietzscheovu mišljenju, temeljni je problem između muškarca i žene duboko ukorijenjen u negiranju antagonizma među njima. Muškarac vjeruje da njihov odnos mora biti vječna neprijateljska napetost i neizbježna nepravda. Nietzsche tvrdi da mora postojati rangirajući poredak u kojem je skaliranje vezano za aktivnosti uzimanja, nakupljanja i postajanja boljim zadobivajući moć i nadilazeći uža tumačenja. Ovo rangiranje ne dopušta istovjetnost i ravnopravnost, što su znakovi plitkoće instinkta i gubitka identiteta. Nietzsche podržava različitost i slavi drugotnost. Uspijevanje pojedinca nikada ne može biti ometano pojmom jednakih odnosa. Nietzsche je uvjeren da su ljudi drugačiji i zagovara agon (borba moći) kao model kulturnih i političkih odnosa. Budući da se jednakost ljudskih bića mora sastojati od jednakog iznosa istog svojstva, Nietzsche tu jednakost vidi kao predstavljenu u općoj volji za moć. Nadalje, rodna je razlika također društveno konstruiran način bivanja. To je kreacija muške slike o tome kako bi svijet trebao izgledati. Ako se uključi u terapijski pristup, ova nam perspektiva može baciti novo svjetlo na moguće intervencijske metode u psihoterapiji i filoterapiji podjednako. Spol i spolni odnosi mogu biti izlučeni kao ključan problem koji prevladava u jezgri motivacije za traženje profesionalne terapijske pomoći (psihoterapija), bez obzira na to koji se terapijski pristup u takvoj praksi koristi. Tema je to koja nije dovoljno vukla iz Nietzscheove tradicije. Cilj je rada ponuditi argumente za to da se Nietzscheova perspektiva na »rat spolova« postavi kao produktivan kontekst za psihoterapijsku intervenciju i filozofijsko savjetovanje. ; Nach Nietzsches Ansicht schlägt das grundlegende Problem zwischen Mann und Frau ("Weib") seine Wurzeln tief in der Leugnung des Antagonismus zwischen ihnen. Ein Mann glaubt, dass ihre Beziehung eine ewige feindselige Spannung und eine unabwendbare Ungerechtigkeit sein muss. Nietzsche stellt die Behauptung auf, dass es eine Rangordnung geben muss, in der die Skalierung mit den Aktivitäten des Nehmens, Akkumulierens und der Verbesserung durch Machtgewinnung und Überwindung engerer Interpretationen zusammenhängt. Diese Rangfolge duldet keine Ausgleichbarkeit und Gleichheit, die Anzeichen für einen flachen Instinkt und einen Identitätsverlust sind. Nietzsche unterstützt die Verschiedenheit und feiert die Andersheit. Der Erfolg eines Individuums kann niemals durch den Begriff der gleichen Beziehungen beeinträchtigt werden. Nietzsche ist überzeugt, dass Menschen anders sind, und befürwortet den Agon (Wettkampf) als Modell kultureller und politischer Beziehungen. Da die Gleichheit der menschlichen Wesen aus einer gleichen Menge derselben Eigenschaft bestehen muss, sieht Nietzsche diese Gleichheit als vertreten im allgemeinen Willen zur Macht. Fernerhin ist der Genderunterschied gleichfalls eine sozial konstruierte Art des Seins. Es ist die Kreation eines männlichen Bildes davon, wie die Welt aussehen sollte. Falls diese Perspektive in den therapeutischen Ansatz einbezogen wird, kann sie neues Licht auf potenzielle Interventionsmethoden innerhalb der Psychotherapie und Philotherapie gleichermaßen werfen. Geschlecht und Geschlechtsverkehr können als Schlüsselproblem herausgeschält werden, das im Kern der Motivation dominiert, professionelle therapeutische Hilfe (Psychotherapie) aufzusuchen, ungeachtet dessen, welcher therapeutische Ansatz in einer solchen Praxis verwendet wird. Es ist ein Thema, das nicht zureichend aus Nietzsches Tradition stammt. Die Intention dieses Papers ist es, Argumente dafür zu liefern, Nietzsches Perspektive des "Geschlechterkrieges" als produktiven Kontext für psychotherapeutische Interventionen und philosophische Beratung aufzustellen. ; Selon la pensée de Nietzsche, le problème fondamental entre les hommes et les femmes est profondément enraciné dans le déni de l'antagonisme qui leur est propre. L'homme considère que leur relation repose sur une éternelle tension hostile et une inévitable injustice. Nietzsche affirme qu'un ordre de classement doit exister dans lequel la mise à l'échelle est liée à l'action de s'emparer, d'accumuler et de devenir meilleur en gagnant en puissance et en dépassant les étroites interprétations. Ce classement ne permet pas d'identité et d'égalité, signes d'un instinct superficiel et d'une perte d'identité. Nietzsche soutient la diversité et célèbre l'altérité. La réussite d'un individu ne doit jamais être perturbé par le concept d'égalité des relations. Nietzsche est convaincu que les gens sont différents et défend l'agôn (lutte pour le pouvoir) en tant que modèle pour les relations culturelles et politiques. Étant donné que l'égalité des êtres humains doit contenir une quantité égale de propriétés identiques, Nietzsche conçoit cette égalité comme présentée dans la volonté générale de puissance. En outre, la différence des genres est également un mode d'être construit socialement. C'est la création masculine d'une image sur le monde. Si on l'introduit au sein d'une approche thérapeutique, cette perspective éclaire d'un jour nouveau les possibles méthodes d'intervention en psychothérapie et philothérapie de manière égale. Le genre et les relations de genres peuvent être dégagés comme un problème clé qui prend le dessus au cœur de la motivation visant à rechercher une aide thérapeutique professionnelle (psychothérapie), quel que soit l'approche thérapeutique utilisée dans une pratique de ce genre. Ce thème n'a pas suffisamment été puisé dans la tradition nietzschéenne. L'objectif de ce travail et de proposer des arguments afin que la perspective nietzschéenne de « la guerre des genres » s'établisse dans un contexte productif pour l'intervention psychothérapeutique et la consultation philosophique.

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.