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[…] Britain supplied a meagre 0.9% of Latin America's imports, and received just 1.2% of its exports.[1] Dwarfed by the leading economic powers in the region (the United States and China), Britain also […]

Increased polarization in America has meant more political homogeneity across our digital, social, and civic spaces. But what about our workplaces, where so many Americans spend a bulk of their time?

Associate Professor of Finance at Chicago Booth, Elisabeth Kempf, has new data and research out looking at political alignment within corporate executive teams, and whether or how much it has increased over time. We sit down with Elisabeth to understand the factors which could be influencing this trend, legal structures that may or may not protect against discrimination based on political views, executive departures that may be politically motivated, and why we might care about political diversity in the workplace at all.

Link to paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3784969

I watched the Council of the Americas webinar with SOUTHCOM Commander Craig Faller and Civilian Deputy Commander Jean Manes, with Eric Farnsworth moderating. Some interesting discussion, with the kind of emphasis you would expect from SOUTHCOM. Here are my quick thoughts:Major issue is Chinese illegal fishing around Ecuador and Peru (see here for background). I have to wonder how much that could sour Latin American views of China. On Twitter, Tracy North notes that it also affects Nicaragua, which they did not mention. I don't know if that was intentional (because of politics) or not.Manes: the U.S. role in providing aid for Covid "hasn't been covered in the news much" but they keep careful track to make sure no other outside government (esp. China) does more. It's quite the cold way of looking at it--give more aid only if China does so first. The U.S. does not want other countries to "take advantage." I imagine Latin American leaders would not tend to view any Covid aid as "taking advantage." As for the news comment, it sounds in line with Trump but it's a constant in U.S. policy toward Latin America--the news is never quite positive enough of U.S. actions.Faller: can we even call the Maduro regime a "regime" because it's a small group of criminals. Well, they control the government, so yes, it's a regime. That was a surprising and uninformed offhand comment intended as an insult, I guess.Manes: the Colombia peace process is "on pause" because of Covid, at least until a vaccine, like other initiatives around the region. I get this, but one could argue it was already on pause before Covid because the Duque government is not committed to it, and the pandemic is just an excuse.Faller: U.S. training of Latin Americans has actually increased because of technology. That actually makes sense, because at the university we find larger meeting participation.Both Faller and Manes: U.S.-Brazilian relations at the military-military level are very good. I have not followed this, but it also makes sense--at that level it can transcend the politics of the particular government in power.Faller had a not-so-veiled threat to countries pursuing agreements with China: "Our ability to have a trusting relationship will be jeopardized." Such a threat really suggests weakness--China is making inroads and the U.S. cannot figure out how to address it.Manes: once someone decides to emigrate, you've already lost. You need to improve things at home. The big question, though, is how to deal with migrants when they reach the U.S. Her logic would suggest that just sending them home is a bad idea, though obviously that's not the Trump logic.Venezuela: not much new. Faller: the external actors there are the "intricate weave of a Persian rug." Weird way to put it, but whatever.No questions or discussion of Mexico. That surprised me. Mexico as a partner is more important than China as an adversary, I'd say. Update: I've been reminded via email that Mexico does not fall under SOUTHCOM. So this is worth mentioning. But it's weird to hear Central American migration kind of ending there. Subscribe in a reader

Not long ago, I wrote about how Trump pick for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Carlos Trujillo, was a bad choice. Now Chris Sabatini wrote what is like a companion piece, namely that Trump's pick to head the Inter-American Development Bank, Mauricio Claver-Crone, is a terrible choice.Plus, they are terrible in almost exactly the same ways. They are Marco Rubio-groomed ideologues with no experience, chosen solely with Florida electoral votes in mind. They are obsessed with Cuba and Venezuela, and can't seem to concentrate much on anything else.The White House's nomination of Mauricio Claver-Carone seems certainly informed by domestic politics — part of its strategy to win Florida's 29 electoral votes in November. Currently the senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council, Claver-Carone's previous experience was running a one-man lobbying shop for the U.S.-Cuba embargo. The underqualified candidate owes his meteoric rise from relative obscurity to his benefactor, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) — though the senator's patronage twice failed to get him appointed as assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, raising the question of why he should be in charge of a regional development institution at a time of unprecedented economic and social distress in Latin America.These are important jobs at any time, but especially now. Latin America is in crisis, and political hacks are just not the way to go. They seem guaranteed to focus on all the wrong things. Subscribe in a reader

I read Jorge Castañeda's America through Foreign Eyes, and since I was asked to review it, I will keep this brief and let you click on that when it's ready for clicking. Castañeda knows the U.S. very well, and is in a good position to tell us something about ourselves. And he clearly likes the U.S. a lot.The one point that the average American would do well to take from this book is the dangerous absurdity of exceptionalism. We think we're exceptional when we're not, often creating our beliefs by conveniently leaving out key facts. I mean, don't talk about democracy and equality unless you explicitly say you mean only whites. Castañeda, like so many others, is frustrated by these beliefs and sees them as an obstacle to Americans themselves.I will also say that Castañeda is optimistic about how we can change. He often seemed more optimistic than me. So I hope the outsider view is getting something I am missing. Subscribe in a reader

Interesting article in Politico about Marco Rubio's influence on Latin America policy, like the reference to him as the "virtual Secretary of State for Latin America." But something nagged me. Something seemed a but off about the influence. I mean, he's clearly influential, but...what? It finally crystallized as I thought about what Latin America policy would be like if Marco Rubio had no influence.The answer is barely different.He is viewed as having outsized influence on Venezuela and Cuba policy and keeping the administration centered on them. Makes sense. But in Venezuela, he's not getting what he wants, which is TPS and more interest in a military solution. He gets the oil embargo, I guess, but people like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo would've wanted that too. For Cuba, he's just getting establishment Republican policy, which would've been identical no matter what. Roll back Obama, love the embargo, no dialogue.He's seen as contributing to ignoring the rest of Latin America, especially Mexico. Well, OK, except that for Trump, U.S. policy toward Mexico is driven from within the White House and would've been like that no matter what. Remember how Kushner ignored the State Department and everybody else. Further, Trump doesn't care about the rest of Latin America, so I wonder whether anyone could've convinced him otherwise. Trump likes Rubio's obsession with Cuba and Venezuela because it's about his own re-election, and he doesn't care about Latin America policy not related to re-election. Do you really think that absent Rubio, Trump would care about South America? He insults Colombia, our strongest ally, all the time, and that's not because of Marco.This bring me to my next point. Rubio has been successful in getting his acolytes appointed to policy positions. I recently wrote about Carlos Trujillo in Global Americans. For Rubio, "personnel is policy," according to his office, and he pursues it with petty abandon. But in the Trump administration, the adage isn't true. Trump doesn't care what State Department officials say. However, they do have an impact on bilateral relations on the ground, and so can easily worsen them by showing ignorance about regional issues. I don't know if that's been the case or not.This is all one big counterfactual. Would there be dramatic differences if Marco Rubio were not involved so deeply? He's got influence, but how much does it matter except for his ego and his cronies? Subscribe in a reader

A few days ago I wrote about the Latin America part of the Democratic Party's platform. Now Juan Gonzalez, who as an Deputy Assistant Secretary of State was part of Latin America policy under Obama, writes in Americas Quarterly about what a Biden administration policy could look like.The main thing I like about it is that he brings Mexico front and center, whereas the platform actually doesn't even mention it. Mexico is our most important Latin American partner by far, and must be part of any discussion of trade, immigration and/or Central America. There is a lot of work to be done, and we need Mexico's help to do it.I also like that Colombia gets more attention, because the peace process needs support, and as he points out, we need to get beyond narcotization. He mentions helping with the exodus of Venezuelans, but I would also like the U.S. to be more publicly mindful of displaced Colombians as well.There is more, on Brazil, the Caribbean, climate, multilateral response to Covid-19, and even the simple task of not being a model of corruption. Just that would be nice.The great visibility of the United States makes us an example all over the world, for better or for worse. When we live up to our ideals as a nation, it bolsters civic-minded leaders elsewhere. But when our leaders deny facts and model corrupt behavior, it encourages actors who are anathema to our hemisphere's democratic progress and social advancement. The task of building back better requires us to find common cause in our shared prosperity, a renewed partnership on climate change, a resolve to guarantee the security of our citizens, and a sense of urgency toward realizing a shared vision of a hemisphere that is secure, middle class, and democratic. Subscribe in a reader

Here is a link to the latest draft of the Democratic Party Platform. Here is what I wrote about 2016 in Global Americans. The party is not paying much attention to Latin America, either then or now. Back then, I wrote that countries were just jumbled together. In 2020 they solved that problems by not mentioning countries at all. Mexico is not mentioned at all, even in the discussion of USMCA. I know, I know, the platform is just a basic document of values, with a lot of cooks making the soup. But as I noted last year, is it so hard to say we support the Colombia peace process and anti-corruption efforts in Central America, we value Mexico for everything, and the like?Below is the "Americas" section:Democrats believe the Western Hemisphere is America's strategic home base—a region bound together by common values, history, and vision of a more prosperous, democratic, and secure future. When the United States hosts the region's leaders at next year's Summit of the Americas—the first to be held here since the 1994 inaugural meeting in Miami—we will turn the page on the Trump Administration's denigration and extortion of our neighbors, and we will chart a new era of cooperation based on partnership and shared responsibility for the region we all call home. "Denigration and extortion." Strong, but accurate. I really don't like "strategic home base," which is militarist and imperialist. It's not our home--it's their home.Democrats will reaffirm the importance of North America to U.S. global economiccompetitiveness. We will ensure the USMCA lives up to its commitment to create prosperity for American workers, and we will strictly enforce compliance with its labor and environmental provisions. We will reinvigorate and build upon the North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza launched under the Obama-Biden Administration and work with our partners to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, which has caused the biggest economic decline in history across Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a funny paragraph, beginning with acknowledging Trump's passage of a new bill, then pivoting to an Obama policy as counterweight. The labor and worker language is like 2016, which also reflected Bernie Sanders' influence, but I feel like the wording is stronger now. Rather than coerce our neighbors into supporting cruel migration policies, we will work with our regional and international partners to address the root causes of migration—violence and insecurity, weak rule of law, lack of educational and economic opportunity, pervasive corruption, and environmental degradation. Rather than encourage climate denial and environmental devastation, we will rally the world to protect the Amazon from deforestation, protect Indigenous peoples, and help vulnerable nations in the Caribbean and Central America adapt to the impacts of climate change. And rather than imitate populist demagogues, we will link arms with our neighbors to realize our shared aspirations for the region's future. This is new and good. In 2016, Democrats framed immigration largely in domestic terms. Viewing it in structural terms, including climate, is a reality-based view, and very necessary.We will reject President Trump's failed Venezuela policy, which has only served to entrench Nicolás Maduro's dictatorial regime and exacerbate a human rights and humanitarian crisis. To rise to the occasion of the world's worst refugee crisis and worst humanitarian crisis outside a warzone in decades, the United States will mobilize its partners across the region and around the  world to meet the urgent needs of the people of Venezuela, and grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans in the United States. Democrats believe that the best opportunity to rescue Venezuela's democracy is through smart pressure and effective diplomacy, not empty, bellicose threats untethered to realistic policy goals and motivated by domestic partisan objectives. There are no specifics and Biden has never had any beyond doing mostly what Trump is doing without the empty threats. TPS is clearly critical, so a good step forward and he really needs to contrast himself in Florida on that issue.Democrats will also move swiftly to reverse Trump Administration policies that haveundermined U.S. national interests and harmed the Cuban people and their families in the United States, including its efforts to curtail travel and remittances. Rather than strengthening the regime, we will promote human rights and people-to-people exchanges, and empower the Cuban people to write their own future. This is an easy one. Obama started it, and Biden will get back to that point and move forward again. Subscribe in a reader

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, recently called for the end to all forms of violence and a return to peaceful dialogue in response to Colombia's recent protests by a wide range of civil society groups and trade unions disillusioned by the failure of the 2016 peace agreement to resolve the root […]

In Episode 76 of Understanding Latin American Politics: The Podcast, once again I join forces with the Historias podcast of the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies (which everyone should check out). I talk with Dustin Walcher, Jeff Taffet, Mary Rose Kubal, and Maggie Commins about the Trump administration's policies toward Latin America.You can find this podcast at iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, and anywhere else podcasts can be found. If there is anyplace I've missed, please contact me. Subscribe, rate, and keep 6 feet from it. Subscribe in a reader

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Michael Kozak, talked on-the-record about U.S. policy. Here is the gist:--The Bolivian coup government can delay the presidential election, no biggie.--The Cuba embargo is totally going to work. History tells us so!--Bolsonaro is, well, and Brazil, geez, they're tough, who the hell knows what's going on.--Nicolás Maduro won't face up to reality so we are kinda out of ideas.--Crap, you're going to keep asking me about Trump's comments and I sure as shit don't want to get into that, but some delays are OK and some aren't. Subscribe in a reader

I recommend Evan Ellis' post at Global Americans on his recently completed year at the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff. He now returns to the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. It is a useful read both for its insider look and its discussion of "why does this matter?"Here is a key point:The problem is also compounded by the fundamental orientation of the State Department to tell our partners what we think and want, rather than listening to what they think and want. While seasoned diplomats know better in their personal interaction, I observed the balance of the work that came across my desk to be about "transmitting" rather than "receiving." Every high-level meeting involves the preparation of "talking points" seeking to advance an agenda, too seldom did they include questions about what our partners thought or needed.This echoes Lars Schoultz's In Their Own Best Interest, where he questions all "uplifting" aid, the effects of which are never measured. We can check boxes on delivery and execution, but not on whether it actually makes lives better. Making lives better requires starting with what our partners actually want. This has often been true, but is accentuated in the Trump era.In my own work, I did not see substantial evidence that the strategy and policy documents of each organization are actively used as guides to action by the other, beyond superficial references to fundamental documents such as the National Security Strategy. I also witnessed and participated in the drafting of some interagency documents, but beyond the somewhat useful exercise of meeting and coordinating about their wording, I did not perceive that the result meaningfully impacted the direction of either state or the other U.S. government entities involved.This is clearly a Trump administration problem, though past administrations were clearly not immune.  Unlike the past, though, the essential problem now is that policy is made by tweet, with government agencies scrambling to interpret it just like the rest of us. How do you feel like you're doing something meaningful when the president ignores you?I appreciate these kinds of perspectives. As a side note, as he does not address it, I know a number of people who have moved from academia to policy making and back, and I know their view of of the relevance and accuracy of academic work changed dramatically. I have not felt great temptation to try the policy making world myself, even as I recognize that even in small doses it would make us better analysts. Subscribe in a reader

For more than half a century, the term "the American middle-class," has served as a political reference to white American upward mobility. This was less an artifact of particular calculations than one of historical experiences and demographic realities. Since at least the 1950s, Americans who were neither wealthy nor "disadvantaged" were, by default, middle class.…

Remarks prepared for P2PFISY
Panel Discussion, December 1, 2021

At a
conceptual level, CBDC is a compelling idea. It envisions everyone having an
account with the central bank consisting of a direct claim against digital fiat
currency that can be used as a safe and efficient form of payment. Since all
debiting and crediting of accounts occurs on the central bank's balance sheet,
all the costs and counterparty risks associated with intermediated payments is
eliminated. All individuals and businesses would have access to secure,
low-cost real-time payment services. Moreover, concerns over data privacy and
ownership can be dealt with directly and in a manner consistent with societal
preferences.

I have
nothing against a retail CBDC per se. Indeed, there may even be some merit to
the idea as a basic public option. But is it really something that is
essential? What existing problems is a CBDC supposed to solve that cannot be
solved through a wholesale-CBDC with supporting legislation?

A
wholesale-CBDC is an old idea. It is basically a proposal to permit free-entry
into the business of narrow-banking. Let Novi, Square, PayPal and other
reputable firms have Fed accounts. Let them issue "stablecoin" liabilities
fully-backed by interest-bearing reserves. Consider adopting the U.K.'s open
banking legislation. Let the private sector work its magic. What else needs to
be done?

Do we really
think that consumers would flock to CBDC for reasons of safety? Bank deposits
are close to fully-insured for most people, and all deposits would effectively
be fully-insured in a narrow bank. Do we think that big banks overcharge for
basic payment services? I see many online banks offering free checking accounts
and I see service fees generally declining over time—something that would be
spurred on with a wholesale-CBDC. I do see interchange fees in the U.S.
remaining stubbornly high. But I diagnose this as a by-product of American's
love-affair with the cash-back and rewards programs offered by credit card
issuers. I do not see how a CBDC is supposed to discourage consumers from using
cards that effectively pay them to spend money. (This seems to be less of a problem outside of North America.)

But more
importantly, do we want to rely on the government sector to deliver high-performance
customer service at the retail level and to keep up with technological advances
in the space? A well-functioning government is essential for a well-functioning
private sector (and vice-versa), but these two sectors should probably stick to their knitting. Let the
central bank handle monetary policy, bank supervision, lender of last resort
operations, and wholesale payments. Let the private sector handle servicing the vast, demanding and rapidly-evolving retail sector. It's a model that has proven to work best, in my view.

As for
financial inclusion, one should keep in mind that the most significant progress
along this dimension in recent years has been the outcome of private
initiatives, not state initiatives. Consider, for example, the hundreds of
millions people who now have access to digital payments thanks to M-Pesa, WeChat
and AliPay. Contrast this to the many developing countries that already have
CBDC issued by their state banks. If their state banks have not been able to
deliver on this score, what makes us think that retail-CBDC is essential?

In diesem Beitrag stellt Philipp Soos folgenden Text vor:Frank Kaltofen (2015): Die schwere Geburt einer Weltorganisation. Ein Blick auf die Gründungskonferenz in San Francisco; in: Vereinte Nationen 5/2015, S. 201-206, online unter: https://zeitschrift-vereinte-nationen.de/suche/zvn/artikel/die-schwere-geburt-einer-weltorganisation/.Für viele ist die Charta der Vereinten Nationen wohl der wichtigste internationale Vertrag, den es je gab. Der Weg dahin war aber sehr steinig, wurde aber von bereits vorhandenen internationalen Strukturen unterstützt. Dieser steinige Weg mündete schlussendlich in die Konferenz von San Francisco, welche 2 Monate lang, vom 25. April 1945 – 26. Juni 1945, andauerte. Der gewählte Artikel von Frank Kaltofen betrachtet den Prozess der Konferenz genauer und bietet damit Einblicke in die Zwickmühlen und Stolpersteine. 1941 wurde die Atlantik-Charta von den USA und Großbritannien verabschiedet für einen Weg zu einer besseren Zukunft der Welt. 1942 wurde die Erklärung Vereinter Nationen verabschiedet. Hier verbündeten sich 26 Staaten zum Kampf gegen Deutschland und dessen Verbündeten. Zudem gab es noch die Moskauer Erklärung der Außenminister und die Konferenz von Dumbarton Oaks. All diese Konferenzen und Erklärungen ebneten den Weg zur UN-Charta, welche im Gegensatz zum Vorgänger, dem Völkerbund, die USA bei der Nachkriegsordnung beteiligte. Vor der Konferenz in San Francisco gab es zusätzlich noch mehrere Gipfeltreffen zwischen den USA, Großbritannien und Russland, bei denen bereits viele Kompromisse ausgehandelt wurden. Man beachte, dass dies drei der fünf Vetomächte sind. Ohne Zugeständnisse und Kompromisse wäre dieses kollektive Handeln wohl kaum möglich gewesen. Die westliche Seite erhoffte sich durch die Kompromisse, mehr Kontrolle über Stalin zu bekommen, währenddessen dieser verlangte, dass alle 16 Sowjetrepubliken als eigenständige Mitglieder eingebunden werden. Grund dafür ist wohl die starke westliche Konfrontation in der UN, die Stalin fürchtete. Hier wollte er vorsorglich dagegenwirken. Stalin brachte auch ein, dass jeder Staat exakt eine Stimme hat. Dieses Thema konnte erst nach einer langen Zeit im Februar 1945 ad acta gelegt werden. Zu Beginn der Verhandlungen im April 1945 kam es dann zu einem kritischen Zwischenfall. Der Präsident der USA, Roosevelt, verstarb. Dieser hatte Russland vertraulich zugesagt, dass Belarus und die Ukraine als eigenständige Mitglieder bei der UN teilnehmen können. Russland drängte dementsprechend auch darauf. Amerika sah das zwar nicht so, konnte aber auf das Mitwirken von Russland nicht verzichten. Die lateinamerikanischen Staaten drängten aber dazu, dass Argentinien dafür auch einen Platz in der UN bekommt. Diese waren aus Kriegsgründen noch nicht in die UN aufgenommen worden. Diesmal wollte aber Russland im Gegenzug Polen dabeihaben, dessen Regierungsbildung zu dem Zeitpunkt zwischen den drei großen Mächten Großbritannien, Russland und USA stark umstritten war. Schlussendlich fand man keine Einigung und der Tauschhandel wurde nicht komplett durchgeführt. Polen durfte (zunächst) nicht teilnehmen, dafür Belarus und die Ukraine sowie Argentinien. Nach dem Geplänkel über die Teilnahme verschiedener Staaten kam es zum nächsten kritischen Moment. Man befürchtete, dass die Hauptmächte ihre Sicherheit nicht in eine unerprobte internationale Organisation legen werden. So wollten auch die kleinen Regionen als Bündnisse dagegenhalten. Man konnte befürchten, dass die Weltorganisation, durchsät von Ausnahmen und kleinen Bündnissen, an Bedeutung verliert beziehungsweise sogar überflüssig wird. Durch kleinteilige Verhandlungen kam man dann aber zur Übereinstimmung auf die Selbstverteidigung, bis der Sicherheitsrat eingreift. Als größtes und kontroversestes Thema kam dann der Streit um das Vetorecht. Hier protestierten die anderen Staaten vehement gegen die Vormachtstellung der Permanent 5. Man legte diesen also ein Fragenkatalog vor, um die gemeinsame Linie der P5 zu erfragen. Hierbei kam es zu Unstimmigkeiten, da Russland das Veto auch in aufkommenden Debatten bereits nutzen wollte, damit mögliche Ereignisketten nicht auftreten können. Erst durch den direkten Dialog mit Stalin, der dies als Nichtigkeit abtat, kam es zu einem Durchbruch und einer gemeinsamen Linie. Die letzte Hürde war dann noch das Zugeständnis der Vetomächte an die anderen Staaten, dass diese in der Generalversammlung alle Angelegenheiten der internationalen Beziehungen diskutieren können. In Dumbarton Oaks war noch vorgesehen, dass die Generalversammlung nur über die Themen Frieden und Sicherheit reden dürfte. Russland echauffierte sich über diese Änderung und wollte dem nicht zustimmen. Allerdings war dieses Zugeständnis nach dem Erreichen des Ziels Vetomacht nicht mehr abzutun. So konnte der russische Verhandlungspartner am Ende doch dazu gebracht werden, dem zuzustimmen. Kurz darauf kam es dann zur Ratifizierung der Charta! Schon zwei Jahre nach der Ratifizierung kam es wieder zu einer Diskussion über die Vetomächte, da das Veto zu exzessiv genutzt wurde. Man bat die Vetomächte, erst nach Kompromissen zu suchen, und sollten diese nicht erreicht werden, nur ihr Veto zu benutzen, sollten Kerninteressen einer dieser Mächte verletzt worden sein. Dies war allerdings nicht von Erfolg gekrönt. Allein die Sowjetunion nutzte das Veto in den ersten sechs Jahren mehr als 40 Mal. 1955 kam es dann erstmals zum Durchbruch, dass sich die USA und die Sowjetunion bei der Aufnahme neuer Mitglieder entgegenkamen. In den darauffolgenden Jahren und Jahrzehnten stieg die Anzahl an Mitgliedern stark an und die Mehrheitsverhältnisse in der Generalversammlung kippten. Vor allem die Zunahme an afrikanischen Ländern führte dazu, dass es zu einer Einigung kam, dass der Sicherheitsrat von 11 auf 15 Mitgliedern aufgestockt wird, damit die neuen Länder und Regionen besser vertreten sind. Nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts konnten zudem weitere Zugeständnisse gemacht werden und die Blockade durch den Sicherheitsrat ist nicht mehr so stark wie zuvor.