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Anti-competitive behaviour, despite helping its practitioners reap rich benefits, is generally believed to have adverse effects on the consumers and the economy as a whole. This paper studies anti-competitive behaviour with specific focus on the Indian Telecom Industry. With an extensive coverage of tacit collusion, predatory pricing and competition structures, this paper attempts to provide a strong economic explanation for why big telecom operators are inclined to involve in anti-competitive behaviour. Using concentration ratios, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and a unique measure of excess profits of individual firms, the paper tries to identify which firms have the potential to exhibit anti-competitive behaviour. Real cases of anti-competitive behaviour by firms are also documented. It is hoped that telecom regulatory and competition authorities will be more vigilant and use concrete information to act decisively and impartially.

More than a century elapsed between Australia's first legislative attempts to modify anticompetitive behaviour (the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906) and its most recent efforts to criminalise price fixing (Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009). After a burst of activity in the first decade of Federation, the intervening years saw only sporadic interest by governments to promote competitive markets, with limited impact until the late 1960s. This paper assesses the first period of Australia's attempts to promote competition. It traces the political, economic and social environments of anticompetitive business behaviour in Australia from 1901 up to World War I. We suggest that Australia's initial forays into regulating cartels were motivated more by protectionist aims than by efforts to increase competition, which in part also explains the next half‐century of legislative apathy towards anti‐competitive legislation.

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.

This title neatly and succinctly takes readers through ways to understand and interpret the label of 'antisocial' behaviour in a wider context, showing how it is socially, historically and culturally produced as well as understood in professional health and policing or correctional contexts