The author points out that in postcommunist countries, there is a genuine danger of postfascism, which is identical neither to classical fascism nor to neofascism, but shares certain fundamental common traits. Like in classical fascism, expansionism is particularly dangerous in postfascism. The author shows that the project of Greater Serbia is the very roots of the war in the entire territory of former Yugoslavia. Based on the tradition of Croatian antifascism, the author claims that the response to postfascism can only be democratic politics. Globally, it means that democratic countries cannot be morally neutral or passive toward manifestations of postfascism. The historical experience with fascism shows that diplomatic means are insufficient to thwart postfascist projects. Adapted from the source document.
For the political principle defining the political will of fascism, survival of a national state (regardless of whether it already exists or is to be formed; in the latter case, this gives legitimacy to antagonism) is sufficient reason for the unconditional imperative of political activity. The concept of the state underlying the political activity of fascism is solely an empirical notion or a sensory concept of community. Another more paramount reason is transcendental, unfeasible, as it were. According to the same nation-building principle, another nation, within & without a particular state, is a priori suspicious, since it must be striving to create its own state by encroaching on another nation's state. Thus, this fascist political principle, which wants to turn this nationalist maxim into a constitutive principle, cannot ensure either internal (ie, a state) or external peace & perishes in a civil or world war. For antifascist activity, however, it is not central whether it takes place in this or that state. The basis of antifascism is the concept of the state that, in its most positive & purest form, came to the fore in bourgeois political thought. In it, the central concept of the state, considering the rationale for the existence of a state, is clean-cut & thus, general, although a possible historical existence of a state is empirical & particular. The fundamental motive of antifascism is not national & patriotic but primarily moral & political, & possibly (derivatively) patriotic. Which state deserves to exist is determined by external social conditions for the realization of the concept of freedom. This makes room for the formation of broader multinational unions, even federal states. The world federation is a bourgeois political ideal, whose realization represents the ultimate purpose of world history. Adapted from the source document.
The author suggests that the Dayton peace accord is primarily an expression of the West's (particularly America's) strategic interests, both regional & global. Numerous political constellations that have surrounded the conflict in the former Yugoslavia can be explained away if this proposition is accepted. The lamentations that the recognition of Slovenia & Croatia was premature is an expression of the disgruntlement over the failure to incorporate the entire Yugoslav territory within the Western interest sphere & the consequent relinquishment of Serbia to Russia. In southeastern Europe, Russia has proved to be America's sole strategic ally. Americans, realizing that their strategic interests became vulnerable due to the European rivalries, decided to strike on its own. The Dayton constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina as a multicultural state is built on current political principles in line with the requirements of the moment, which include antifascism, anticommunism, antiterrorism, human rights, & multiculturalism. The author concludes that Croatian politics should fall in line with the strategic preferences of the West, which would enable it to accomplish its national interests. Adapted from the source document.
(Originally published in the collection Wirklichkeit als Tabu [(Reality as a Taboo) Munich: Oldenburg, 1986].) The author argues that the word homeland disappeared from the political language & that it has been replaced by the unpolitical word: identity. This raises a question: what is identity to a German if the state cannot provide it? The consequence of Hitler's legacy is that the tradition is troublesome so that the identity is now linked with the constitution. The author looks into the idiosyncrasies of the German constitutional/legal system by which the old state thinking has been replaced with the "constitutional thinking." In this way patriotism becomes "constitutional patriotism," & the constitution becomes the homeland. The consensus about the constitution -- the result of the general acceptance of antitotalitarianism -- was challenged by students in 1968, when this antitotalitarianism was replaced by antifascism. At the same time, however, an entire political culture of disobedience against institutions evolved, & declared the constitution the "system's life's lie." The system took a long time to recover, but it rehabilitated the state authority within a constitutional state. Nevertheless, this has not restored the individuality of German statehood, ie, the state does not become the homeland. Although the author is aware that this idea is outmoded, he nevertheless points out that the consensual base would be broader if Germans were allowed to be what they are by their history & their position, & not only what they should be according to the constitution. Adapted from the source document.
