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The problems connected with anti-trust policies in an economy based upon competition are many and varied. This collection of essays written from many points of view attempts to deal with specific issues related to general themes of government and private policy. The contributions consider such topics as anti-trust and national goals, administered prices, concentrations of market power, mergers, competition among commercial banks, problems of small business, transportation industries, exemptions from anti-trust laws, the role of labor unions, and international competition. It is not the purpose of this study to develop a uniform view on competitive policy; rather the participants are acknowledged experts who offer a broad spectrum of opinions and methods of analysis. They include economists, businessmen, labor representatives, and government officials. Originally published in 1965. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905

This volume provides a survey of recent literature on certain aspects of vertical restraints. The book will make excellent supplementary reading for courses in industrial organization and other fields dealing with antitrust issues and will also be of interest to lawyers, researchers, and policy makers

Resale price maintenance is a particularly dangerous vertical intra-brand restraint. Because of its direct impact on price competition, it is likely to harm consumers in a substantial number of cases. At the same time, RPM is likely to benefit consumers in a significant number of other cases. Given these mixed effects, the ideal legal standard would distinguish between those instances in which RPM is anticompetitive and those in which it is procompetitive. While Leegin thought that the full rule of reason could play this role, it did not acknowledge what every scholar who has looked at the issue has found—that the full rule of reason has operated in practice as a standard of virtual per se legality, absolving almost every restraint examined. This article proposes an alternative approach—a presumption of illegality combined with safe harbors—and explains why it is likely to produce better results at lower cost.