Latin America has played at all times a significant part in the foreign policy of the United States. Its geographical proximity, colonial descent, as well as common interests of all American countries toward the policy of the European colonial powers - these are historically primordial factors that have determined their relations. In course of time, as USA investments in Latin America grew, and the system of the political-military relations consolidated, also with respect to the USA global policy, the countries of Latin America got interrelated in a peculiar way with their northern neighbour. At present their mutual relations are noticeable at the arena of culture and propaganda. The present work perceives the cultural policy and foreign propaganda pursued by the United States as a broad complex of phenomena involving both the passage of wealth, values, and standars of culture, and the political purposeful persvasive actions, affecting the views, attitudes, and conduct of the pe.ople, as an instrument applied to put into effect the strategical aims of the. USA foreign polioy. At the same time it represents a stable integrator of the western hemisphere. The two decades (1960s and 1970s) of cultural policy and foreign propaganda discussed in the present work are' a period that allows to trace the characteristic manifestations, and to regard the trends appearing as the regularities of this sphere of social activity. The conception of tjie culture and propaganda influence, elaborated in the beginning of the 1960s has been modified in accordance with new occurrences taking place in Latin America, and with their perception by the particular administrations. The political function of this influencing, its aims,¡contents and implementing methods have not undergone any change. The work is composed of three fundamental sections - chapters. The first one "The determinants, and the programmatic directions of the USA culture-propaganda influence in Latin America" attempts to present the foreign policy programmes, and their stageB to define the place and role of the culture-propaganda influence in the USA strategies adopted to Latin America. Chapter two "The organization of the administration machinery" illustrates the extremely complex, multisectorial, and hierarchical system of the state and non-state organizations programming, coordinating, and implementing the actions under discussion. The third chapter "The forms, and techniques of the culture-propaganda influencing" describes the big business activity in Latin America in the field of mass-communication, its dominance at the information market, and its impact on the mass culture and education. Moreover the author discusses the state institutions activity in the field of radio, TV and film propaganda, face-to-face communication, bi-national centres and military schooling stations, as well as public utilities operation. Latin America constitutes too differentiated area to adopt preferential techniques to the entire region. Nevertheless the preference is noticeable. This refers to the radio-TV propaganda, face-to-face communication, bi-national centres operation, and arises from the influencies directing mainly onto middle classes predestinated to adopt foreign standards and values.
Rada Unii Europejskiej jest jedną z najważniejszych instytucji Unii Europejskiej. Ma złożoną strukturę i odgrywa kluczową rolę zarówno w stanowieniu prawa UE jak i jego wykonywaniu. Rada jest również forum, na którym państwa członkowskie mogą wyrażać i uzgadniać swoje interesy. Mimo to przyciąga mniejsze zainteresowanie ze strony badaczy niż na to zasługuje. Ostatnia monografia na temat Rady w języku angielskim ukazała się w 2006 roku. Od tego czasu prowadzono wiele badań nad różnymi aspektami działania Rady, a traktat z Lizbony wprowadził istotne dla tej instytucji zmiany. Choć w podręcznikach można znaleźć zaktualizowane rozdziały dotyczące Rady, brakuje szerszego przeglądu spraw, które powinna mieć na uwadze osoba chcąca badać tę instytucję. Niniejsza książka stara się wypełnić tę lukę, proponując szeroki choć zwięzły przegląd tematów dotyczących organizacji i działania Rady. Książka podzielona jest na pięć rozdziałów. W pierwszym rozdziale przedstawiono treść książki i omówiono metody i podejścia do badania Rady. Drugi rozdział przybliża złożoną strukturę Rady: jej liczne warstwy i aktorów instytucjonalnych, którzy je przekraczają. W trzecim rozdziale przeanalizowano rolę Rady w systemie politycznym UE, zwłaszcza jej relacje z innymi instytucjami. W czwartym rozdziale wprowadza elementy teorii negocjacji, które mają znaczenie dla Rady i podkreśla szczególne cechy podejmowania decyzji w tej instytucji. Ostatni, piąty rozdział podkreśla znaczenie czynników społecznych i personalnych dla funkcjonowania Rady – opisano w nim warunki i mechanizmy socjalizacji, która ma miejsce w Radzie. ; The Council of the European Union is one of the most important institutions of the European Union. It has a complex, multi-layered and multi-sectorial structure. It plays a crucial role in both legislative and executive policies of the Union and serves the Member States as a forum to express and negotiate their interests. However, it seems to draw less interest from the academic community than it deserves. The most recent monograph on the Council in English was published in 2006. Since then much research has been conducted on different facets of the organisation and functioning of this institution, and the Treaty of Lisbon introduced several important changes that affected the Council, especially its relationship with the European Parliament and the European Council. While there are some up-to-date introductory publications (mostly chapters in textbooks), what is lacking is a more extensive survey of the issues that should be the focus of attention to anyone wishing to study the Council. This book attempts to fill this gap, offering broad, yet concise overview of both the organisation and functioning of the Council. The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the content of the book and surveys the methods and approaches that might be applied in the study of the Council. The second chapter takes a closer look at the Council's complex structure – its many layers and institutional actors who cross them. The third chapter analyses the role of the Council within the political system of the EU, especially its relationship with other main institutions. The fourth chapter introduces elements of negotiation theory relevant to the Council and emphasises the specific features of the decision-making process in this institution. The final, fifth chapter stresses the importance of the social and the personal for the functioning of the Council by describing the conditions and mechanisms of socialisation that takes place within the Council's structure.
Although the value system has been discussed since the antiquity, the list of underlying values has not been available yet. Socrates elaborated on virtue, courage and justice, Plato was concerned about truth, goodness, wisdom, determination and temperance. Aristotle analysed ethical norms. Thomas Aquinas considered values to be perfection, which exists as absolute good. He distinguished prudence, justice, volitional morality, faith, hope and love. Jeanas-Jacquesas Rousseau tended to exalt ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and humanism and considered happiness, reason, sympathy to be underlying values, encouraged development of volition, independence and pro-activeness. The most relevant values for Immanuel Kant included reason, liberty, self-respect, honour, duty, autonomy, volition and goodness. The philosophers of the 20th century, for example, Max Scheler, made attempts to classify values. The Italian philosopher Battista Mondina stated that values can be of different levels (from the perspective of values not all the things and behaviour patterns are equal: some of them possess more value, whereas the others – less) and comprise a certain hierarchy. He presents a more detailed classification of values, which better complies with life and attitudes of an individual in the 20th century. In the end of the 20th century the researchers got an idea of creating a hierarchy of values relevant to a separate nation. The description of the project "Polish Axiological Dictionary", which distinguishes the values of importance to the Polish, can be considered an example. It is obvious that a unified conception of values did not exist: different authors treated values in a different way. The concept value is used in various meanings: as an aspect of world value, as attractive objects, life quality, valuable things or phenomena, behaviour norms which influence decisions. Values reflect what is most valuable for an individual from cultural, psychological, sociological, moral and esthetical perspectives. An individual is governed and guided by values; he/she lives for them. The values make up the core of every culture. However, the issue of values raises many questions. Firstly, does a canon of universal values exist? In fact, such values as motherland, patriotism, democracy and tolerance are important but are they equally important? Such daily life values as – work, career, and money – are conceptualised. The question arises if this has always and everywhere been like this? Are such values as family, marriage, child still relevant these days? Most likely for Lithuanians these values will hardly differ from common European or common human values but it is still interesting what is typical only of Lithuanians, what did they include into their value system adopting experience of neighbouring countries and what presupposed the meaning of words. Working on the book "Values in the Worldview of Lithuanians" an idea came to mind that following the concept analysis, attempts can be made to classify Lithuanian values. Various classification principles can be applied: Societal values: state, nation, motherland, language, freedom, land, work, commitment, justice, duty, honour, morality, the good, the beautiful, morals, etc. • Personal values: happiness, family, home, personal liberty, health, loves, etc. They can also be related to the individual's growth: • Values that build up the personality: home, family, nature, faith, work, morals, love – that is, everything, what a person gets in the family. • Values that improve the personality: state, nation, language, freedom, patriotism, empathy, tolerance, wisdom, etc. – that is, everything, what a person gets at school and in his/her further life. However, strict boundaries do not exist and cannot exist because a person functions as a member of society as well as a separate individual.
Although the value system has been discussed since the antiquity, the list of underlying values has not been available yet. Socrates elaborated on virtue, courage and justice, Plato was concerned about truth, goodness, wisdom, determination and temperance. Aristotle analysed ethical norms. Thomas Aquinas considered values to be perfection, which exists as absolute good. He distinguished prudence, justice, volitional morality, faith, hope and love. Jeanas-Jacquesas Rousseau tended to exalt ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and humanism and considered happiness, reason, sympathy to be underlying values, encouraged development of volition, independence and pro-activeness. The most relevant values for Immanuel Kant included reason, liberty, self-respect, honour, duty, autonomy, volition and goodness. The philosophers of the 20th century, for example, Max Scheler, made attempts to classify values. The Italian philosopher Battista Mondina stated that values can be of different levels (from the perspective of values not all the things and behaviour patterns are equal: some of them possess more value, whereas the others – less) and comprise a certain hierarchy. He presents a more detailed classification of values, which better complies with life and attitudes of an individual in the 20th century. In the end of the 20th century the researchers got an idea of creating a hierarchy of values relevant to a separate nation. The description of the project "Polish Axiological Dictionary", which distinguishes the values of importance to the Polish, can be considered an example. It is obvious that a unified conception of values did not exist: different authors treated values in a different way. The concept value is used in various meanings: as an aspect of world value, as attractive objects, life quality, valuable things or phenomena, behaviour norms which influence decisions. Values reflect what is most valuable for an individual from cultural, psychological, sociological, moral and esthetical perspectives. An individual is governed and guided by values; he/she lives for them. The values make up the core of every culture. However, the issue of values raises many questions. Firstly, does a canon of universal values exist? In fact, such values as motherland, patriotism, democracy and tolerance are important but are they equally important? Such daily life values as – work, career, and money – are conceptualised. The question arises if this has always and everywhere been like this? Are such values as family, marriage, child still relevant these days? Most likely for Lithuanians these values will hardly differ from common European or common human values but it is still interesting what is typical only of Lithuanians, what did they include into their value system adopting experience of neighbouring countries and what presupposed the meaning of words. Working on the book "Values in the Worldview of Lithuanians" an idea came to mind that following the concept analysis, attempts can be made to classify Lithuanian values. Various classification principles can be applied: Societal values: state, nation, motherland, language, freedom, land, work, commitment, justice, duty, honour, morality, the good, the beautiful, morals, etc. • Personal values: happiness, family, home, personal liberty, health, loves, etc. They can also be related to the individual's growth: • Values that build up the personality: home, family, nature, faith, work, morals, love – that is, everything, what a person gets in the family. • Values that improve the personality: state, nation, language, freedom, patriotism, empathy, tolerance, wisdom, etc. – that is, everything, what a person gets at school and in his/her further life. However, strict boundaries do not exist and cannot exist because a person functions as a member of society as well as a separate individual.
Although the value system has been discussed since the antiquity, the list of underlying values has not been available yet. Socrates elaborated on virtue, courage and justice, Plato was concerned about truth, goodness, wisdom, determination and temperance. Aristotle analysed ethical norms. Thomas Aquinas considered values to be perfection, which exists as absolute good. He distinguished prudence, justice, volitional morality, faith, hope and love. Jeanas-Jacquesas Rousseau tended to exalt ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and humanism and considered happiness, reason, sympathy to be underlying values, encouraged development of volition, independence and pro-activeness. The most relevant values for Immanuel Kant included reason, liberty, self-respect, honour, duty, autonomy, volition and goodness. The philosophers of the 20th century, for example, Max Scheler, made attempts to classify values. The Italian philosopher Battista Mondina stated that values can be of different levels (from the perspective of values not all the things and behaviour patterns are equal: some of them possess more value, whereas the others – less) and comprise a certain hierarchy. He presents a more detailed classification of values, which better complies with life and attitudes of an individual in the 20th century. In the end of the 20th century the researchers got an idea of creating a hierarchy of values relevant to a separate nation. The description of the project "Polish Axiological Dictionary", which distinguishes the values of importance to the Polish, can be considered an example. It is obvious that a unified conception of values did not exist: different authors treated values in a different way. The concept value is used in various meanings: as an aspect of world value, as attractive objects, life quality, valuable things or phenomena, behaviour norms which influence decisions. Values reflect what is most valuable for an individual from cultural, psychological, sociological, moral and esthetical perspectives. An individual is governed and guided by values; he/she lives for them. The values make up the core of every culture. However, the issue of values raises many questions. Firstly, does a canon of universal values exist? In fact, such values as motherland, patriotism, democracy and tolerance are important but are they equally important? Such daily life values as – work, career, and money – are conceptualised. The question arises if this has always and everywhere been like this? Are such values as family, marriage, child still relevant these days? Most likely for Lithuanians these values will hardly differ from common European or common human values but it is still interesting what is typical only of Lithuanians, what did they include into their value system adopting experience of neighbouring countries and what presupposed the meaning of words. Working on the book "Values in the Worldview of Lithuanians" an idea came to mind that following the concept analysis, attempts can be made to classify Lithuanian values. Various classification principles can be applied: Societal values: state, nation, motherland, language, freedom, land, work, commitment, justice, duty, honour, morality, the good, the beautiful, morals, etc. • Personal values: happiness, family, home, personal liberty, health, loves, etc. They can also be related to the individual's growth: • Values that build up the personality: home, family, nature, faith, work, morals, love – that is, everything, what a person gets in the family. • Values that improve the personality: state, nation, language, freedom, patriotism, empathy, tolerance, wisdom, etc. – that is, everything, what a person gets at school and in his/her further life. However, strict boundaries do not exist and cannot exist because a person functions as a member of society as well as a separate individual.
Although the value system has been discussed since the antiquity, the list of underlying values has not been available yet. Socrates elaborated on virtue, courage and justice, Plato was concerned about truth, goodness, wisdom, determination and temperance. Aristotle analysed ethical norms. Thomas Aquinas considered values to be perfection, which exists as absolute good. He distinguished prudence, justice, volitional morality, faith, hope and love. Jeanas-Jacquesas Rousseau tended to exalt ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and humanism and considered happiness, reason, sympathy to be underlying values, encouraged development of volition, independence and pro-activeness. The most relevant values for Immanuel Kant included reason, liberty, self-respect, honour, duty, autonomy, volition and goodness. The philosophers of the 20th century, for example, Max Scheler, made attempts to classify values. The Italian philosopher Battista Mondina stated that values can be of different levels (from the perspective of values not all the things and behaviour patterns are equal: some of them possess more value, whereas the others – less) and comprise a certain hierarchy. He presents a more detailed classification of values, which better complies with life and attitudes of an individual in the 20th century. In the end of the 20th century the researchers got an idea of creating a hierarchy of values relevant to a separate nation. The description of the project "Polish Axiological Dictionary", which distinguishes the values of importance to the Polish, can be considered an example. It is obvious that a unified conception of values did not exist: different authors treated values in a different way. The concept value is used in various meanings: as an aspect of world value, as attractive objects, life quality, valuable things or phenomena, behaviour norms which influence decisions. Values reflect what is most valuable for an individual from cultural, psychological, sociological, moral and esthetical perspectives. An individual is governed and guided by values; he/she lives for them. The values make up the core of every culture. However, the issue of values raises many questions. Firstly, does a canon of universal values exist? In fact, such values as motherland, patriotism, democracy and tolerance are important but are they equally important? Such daily life values as – work, career, and money – are conceptualised. The question arises if this has always and everywhere been like this? Are such values as family, marriage, child still relevant these days? Most likely for Lithuanians these values will hardly differ from common European or common human values but it is still interesting what is typical only of Lithuanians, what did they include into their value system adopting experience of neighbouring countries and what presupposed the meaning of words. Working on the book "Values in the Worldview of Lithuanians" an idea came to mind that following the concept analysis, attempts can be made to classify Lithuanian values. Various classification principles can be applied: Societal values: state, nation, motherland, language, freedom, land, work, commitment, justice, duty, honour, morality, the good, the beautiful, morals, etc. • Personal values: happiness, family, home, personal liberty, health, loves, etc. They can also be related to the individual's growth: • Values that build up the personality: home, family, nature, faith, work, morals, love – that is, everything, what a person gets in the family. • Values that improve the personality: state, nation, language, freedom, patriotism, empathy, tolerance, wisdom, etc. – that is, everything, what a person gets at school and in his/her further life. However, strict boundaries do not exist and cannot exist because a person functions as a member of society as well as a separate individual.
The Russian model of supervision and control of administration was introduced in the Kingdom of Poland concurrently with the reorganisation of the governorate and district administration after the January Uprising. The supervisory functions were taken over by the newly established bodies of the governorate and district administration of individual sectors of ministerial administration, for which the ministers residing in St. Petersburg were the final decisive body. On the other hand, the abolition of the Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland in 1867 entailed the final liquidation of the administrative justice system based on the French model, which had operated on these lands since the times of the Duchy of Warsaw. Its tasks were taken over by so-called "mixed offices" which filled the resulting gap only partially. Unlike administrative courts, these offices formed an integral part of the governorate administration, and their clerical staff as well as the bureaucratic method of operation compromised their judicial independence. Moreover, the procedure for dispute resolution in these offices had the character of an intra-administrative procedure which did not employ the concept of a party, and its discretionary course excluded the possibility of applying the principles of adversarial process, openness to the public or dispositiveness. The peculiarity of "mixed offices" in the Kingdom of Poland, resulting solely from political reasons, was the reduction of their staffing only to the bureaucratic element and full subordination of their substantive and formal side of the proceedings to the governorate authorities. As a result, the judicial activity of "mixed offices" in administrative matters in the Kingdom of Poland was much more dependent on the current policies of the tsarist authorities represented and supervised directly by the governors than in the interior governorates of the Empire. The combination of these factors with the discretionary rules of intra-ministerial proceedings applied in these offices deprived inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland of a guarantee of impartial defence of their rights and interests in disputes with the administration that was foreign and distrustful to them. ; Rosyjski model nadzoru i kontroli administracji został wprowadzony w Królestwie Polskim równocześnie z reorganizacją zarządu gubernialnego i powiatowego po powstaniu styczniowym. Funkcje nadzorcze przejęły nowo utworzone organy administracji gubernialnej i powiatowej poszczególnych pionów resortowych, dla których ostateczną instancją decydującą byli ministrowie rezydujący w Petersburgu. Natomiast zniesienie Rady Stanu Królestwa Polskiego w 1867 r. oznaczało ostateczną likwidację sądownictwa administracyjnego opartego na modelu francuskim, istniejącego na tych ziemiach od czasów Księstwa Warszawskiego. Jego zadania przejęły tzw. urzędy mieszane, wypełniając jedynie częściowo powstałą lukę. W odróżnieniu od sądów administracyjnych urzędy te stanowiły integralną część administracji gubernialnej, a ich urzędniczy skład osobowy oraz biurokratyczny sposób funkcjonowania wykluczał ich niezależność orzeczniczą. Ponadto tryb postępowania w przypadku rozstrzygania kwestii spornych w tych urzędach miał charakter postępowania wewnątrzadministracyjnego, które nie znało pojęcia strony, a jego dyskrecjonalny przebieg wykluczał możliwość stosowania zasady kontradyktoryjności, jawności czy dyspozytywności. Specyfiką "urzędów mieszanych" w Królestwie Polskim, wynikającą wyłącznie z powodów politycznych, było ograniczenie ich składu personalnego jedynie do elementu biurokratycznego oraz pełne podporządkowanie merytorycznej i formalnej strony postępowania ich kolegiów decyzyjnych kontroli władz gubernialnych. W rezultacie działalność orzecznicza "urzędów mieszanych" w sprawach administracyjnych w Królestwie Polskim była zależna w zdecydowanie większym stopniu od aktualnych kierunków polityki władz carskich reprezentowanych i nadzorowanych bezpośrednio przez gubernatorów niż w wewnętrznych guberniach Cesarstwa. Połączenie tych czynników z dyskrecjonalnymi regułami postępowania wewnątrzadministracyjnego, stosowanymi w tych urzędach, pozbawiało mieszkańców Królestwa Polskiego gwarancji bezstronnej obrony ich praw i interesów w sporach z obcą i z założenia nieufną wobec nich administracją.
The aim of the article was the analysis of the political thought of Unia Demokratyczna, Unia Wolności and Partia Demokratyczna demokraci.pl, that refers to one of fundamental pillars of the activity of this group, i.e. the past, and the influence of Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers' Defense Committee) and "Solidarności" (Solidarity) on the ideological heritage and functioning of UD, UW and PD. The focus was also put on the issue if, and in what way the leading figures of the analysed political subjects emphasised, in the new political reality, their origins while being in widely understood political opposition in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, and how the program content of KOR and "Solidarity" was reflected in UD, UW and PD statements. The research aim undertook within the considerations was verification of the following research hypotheses: 1) referring to the tradition of Solidarity in the communities of UD, UW and PD was treated as legitimization of power and social trust; 2) associating of UD, UW and PD with the tradition deriving from the period of political opposition was something artificial and created entirely for the purposes of the political campaign and treated as a marketing measure. Among the applied research methods a significant meaning had the analysis of the sources of political thought, including program documents, stenographs of conferences or numerous interviews, as well as the comparative method that served to compare positions of political parties towards particular issues. The conducted analyses imply that UD, UW and PD had different approaches towards the tradition of KOR and "Solidarity", which resulted from grading the political heritage and adaptability of these aspects of activities undertaken in 70s and 80s that suited the new political reality. In this sense the only acceptable form of emphasising the tradition of "Solidarity" in the political thought of UD, UW and PD was using it for promotional purposes in the period of political campaigns, with almost no reference to the tradition of KOR. ; Celem artykułu była analiza myśli politycznej Unii Demokratycznej, Unii Wolności i Partii Demokratycznej demokraci.pl odnosząca się do jednego z zasadniczych filarów działalności tego środowiska, tj. przeszłości, a zwłaszcza wpływu tradycji Komitetu Obrony Robotników i "Solidarności" na dorobek ideowy i sposób funkcjonowania UD, UW i PD. Uwagę skoncentrowano również na tym, czy i w jaki sposób czołowe postacie analizowanych podmiotów politycznych, podejmując aktywność w ramach szeroko pojętej opozycji politycznej w latach 70. i 80. XX wieku, akcentowały w nowej rzeczywistości politycznej swój rodowód oraz na ile treści programowe KOR i "Solidarności" znalazły swoje odzwierciedlenie w enuncjacjach UD, UW i PD. Celami badawczymi podjętymi w ramach poczynionych rozważań była weryfikacja następujących hipotez badawczych: 1) powoływanie się na tradycję "Solidarności" w środowisku UD, UW i PD traktowano w kategoriach legitymizacji władzy i społecznego zawierzenia; 2) utożsamianie się przez UD, UW i PD z tradycją wywodzoną z okresu działalności opozycji politycznej było tworem sztucznym stworzonym wyłącznie na potrzeby kampanii wyborczych traktowanym jako zabieg marketingowy. Wśród wykorzystanych metod badawczych istotne znaczenie odegrała analiza źródeł myśli politycznej, w tym licznych dokumentów programowych, stenogramów konferencji czy wywiadów, oraz metoda komparatystyczna, służąca porównaniu stanowisk partii politycznych wobec podejmowanej problematyki. Z przeprowadzonych analiz wynika, iż UD, UW i PD odmiennie podchodziły do tradycji KOR i "Solidarności", co wynikało z różnicowania dziedzictwa opozycyjnego i zarazem adaptowalności tych aspektów działalności z lat 70. i 80. XX wieku, które przystawały do nowej rzeczywistości politycznej. W tym znaczeniu jedyną akceptowalną formą eksponowania tradycji "Solidarności" w myśli politycznej UD, UW i PD było wykorzystywanie jej do celów promocyjnych w okresie kampanii wyborczych, przy znikomym wręcz odniesieniu do tradycji KOR.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The basic aim of the article is to address a question about the consequences of the crisis in Ukraine to the security policy of the United States in Europe. In order to fulfill this goal, the article analysis key elements of United States' foreign policy towards NATO members and Russian Federation.THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: This paper employs concepts of grand strategy; deterrence and security dilemma in order to explain the current strategic choices of the United States in Europe. It is based in the newest secondary sources as well as on primary ones including official speeches and documents of the Obama administration.THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The article is divided into three parts: first, explains terminology and necessary concepts applied in the paper; state of research and overview of subject literature. Second, summarizes United States foreign and security policies towards Europe and Russia till the break out of conflict in Ukraine in February 2014. The third, presents key strategic dilemmas US has faced since the beginning of the conflict.RESEARCH RESULTS: Conflict in Ukraine created the biggest diplomatic rift between US and Russia since the end of the Cold War and resulted in tightening of defense cooperation between NATO member states. The United States returned to the strategy of deterring Russia and reassuring its European allies.CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: There are at least three strategic dilemmas the United States faces in Europe: How to implement American interests in Europe with the heralded strategic rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific region; How to balance a need for more robust defense of NATO European members and a need to normalize relations with Russia; And how to keep NATO's relevance as an defense alliance in the times of financial austerity and threat diffusion. ; CEL NAUKOWY: Podstawowym celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie o najważniejsze następstwa, jakie przyniósł konflikt na Ukrainie dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Stanów Zjednoczonych w Europie. W tym celu analizie poddane zostały główne elementy polityki USA wobec europejskich sojuszników z NATO oraz Federacji Rosyjskiej. PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: Artykuł ten wykorzystuje koncepcje "wielkiej strategii", "odstraszania" oraz "dylematu bezpieczeństwa". Posługuje się analizą krytyczną najnowszych monografii i artykułów naukowych z dziedziny studiów nad bezpieczeństwem międzynarodowym oraz źródeł pierwotnych, takich jak przemówienia prezydenta Baracka Obamy czy strategie bezpieczeństwa narodowego USA.PROCES WYWODU: Artykuł złożony jest z trzech części. W pierwszej omówione zostały podstawowe kwestie terminologiczne, stan badań oraz koncepcje kluczowe dla tego artykułu: wielka strategia, odstraszanie i dylemat bezpieczeństwa. Druga część analizuje w syntetyczny sposób politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa USA wobec Europy i Rosji do lutego 2014 r. Trzecia część przedstawia dylematy strategiczne Stanów Zjednoczonych po rosyjskiej aneksji Krymu i trwającej wojnie we wschodniej Ukrainie.WYNIKI ANALIZY NAUKOWEJ: Konflikt na Ukrainie spowodował największe od zakończenia zimnej wojny zaostrzenie stosunków amerykańsko‑rosyjskich, a z drugiej strony przyczynił się do zacieśnienia współpracy obronnej w ramach NATO. Stany Zjednoczone wróciły do strategii, której centralnym elementem jest odstraszanie Federacji Rosyjskiej i podkreślanie gwarancji obronnych wobec europejskich sojuszników.WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE, REKOMENDACJE: Strategia Stanów Zjednoczonych w Europie stoi przed kilkoma dylematami: Jak połączyć amerykańskie interesy w Europie, przy jednoczesnym zwrocie Waszyngtonu w kierunku Azji i Pacyfiku? Jak zrównoważyć potrzebę obrony sojuszników europejskich NATO z jednej oraz naprawienie stosunków z Rosją z drugiej strony? Jak utrzymać prężny Sojusz Północnoatlantycki, stanowiący filar regionalnej architektury bezpieczeństwa w Europie, spełniając jednocześnie funkcje obronne wobec swoich członków? Wydaje się, że odpowiedzi na te pytania staną się udziałem dopiero następnej amerykańskiej administracji prezydenckiej.
In the 21st century, subversion understood as a foreign disruptive activity, has become an element of security policy and power politics in an environment where the direct use of force may be too risky. Though this term is well-known in humanities in Poland, it hasn't yet been translated and literally applied by Polish political scholars. However, states' repertoire includes measures that are a continuation or even a substitute of "war", and their very objectives are consistent with the logic of subversive strategies known in arts. As opposed to direct violence, such operations aim at maintaining conditions between political weakness and failure by targeting fragile areas. In this vein, subversion appears to become the first strategic choice of many states, including world powers. The author introduces the term to the taxonomy of security studies as he starts from a semantic theoretical reasoning (subversion as a covert and indirect strategy) and later answers how subversive strategies are implemented in Eastern Europe. In a specific geopolitical context, i.e. in the intersection of transatlantic/European security complex and post-Soviet area, subversion is part and parcel of the Kremlin policy towards Georgia and Ukraine, and recently the Republic of Belarus towards Poland. Therefore, subversive, "short of war" measures are intended to force competitors to make political concessions, which defines the Russian (in)security policy in its "near (and a bit further) abroad". ; W XXI wieku "subwersja" (subversion), tłumaczona jako zagraniczna działalność wywrotowa, staje się ważnym elementem polityki bezpieczeństwa i budowania stref wpływów w środowisku, w którym otwarte użycie siły może okazać się zbyt kosztowne. Choć pojęcie to jest dobrze znane na gruncie nauk artystycznych, w polskiej literaturze politologicznej nie pojawiało się dotąd w sposób dosłowny. Tymczasem w repertuarze państw pojawiają się środki, które są przedłużeniem, a nawet substytutem, "wojny", a których cel wiąże się z logiką strategii subwersywnych stosowanych w sztuce. W przeciwieństwie do otwartej przemocy takie operacje polegają na utrzymywaniu stanów pomiędzy słabością a upadkiem w drodze wykorzystywania newralgicznych punktów. Subwersja staje się dziś pierwszym wyborem strategicznym wielu państw, w tym mocarstw. Autor wprowadza pojęcie subwersji do terminologii nauki o bezpieczeństwie, wychodząc od rozważań natury teoretycznej (subwersja jako strategia pośrednia i niejawna), aby nieco później przyjrzeć się sposobom operacjonalizacji tych działań w regionie Europy Wschodniej. W konkretnych warunkach geopolitycznych, tj. na styku transatlantyckiego/europejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa oraz obszaru poradzieckiego, subwersja przejawia się w polityce Kremla wobec Gruzji czy Ukrainy, a ostatnio także Republiki Białoruś względem Polski. Subwersywne działania "poniżej progu wojny" mają prowadzić przeciwnika do politycznych ustępstw, definiując politykę (nie)bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej w jej "bliskiej (i nieco dalszej) zagranicy". ; В XXI веке «субверсия» (subversion), переводимая как иностранная подрывная деятельность, становится важным элементом политики безопасности и построения сфер влияния в среде, где открытое применение силы может оказаться слишком дорогостоящим. Хотя эта концепция хорошо известна в области искусства, до сих пор она не появлялась буквально в польской политологической литературе. Между тем в репертуар государств входят меры, являющиеся продолжением или даже заменой «войны», цель которой связана с логикой подрывных стратегий, используемых в искусстве. В отличие от открытого насилия, такие операции заключаются в удержании состояний между слабостью и неудачей, используя горячие точки. Сегодня подрывная деятельность становится первым стратегическим выбором многих стран, в том числе великих держав. Автор вводит понятие субверсии в терминологию науки о безопасности, начиная с теоретических соображений (подрывная деятельность как косвенная и неявная стратегия), чтобы немного позже взглянуть на методы реализации этой деятельности в регионе Восточной Европы. В определенных геополитических условиях, то есть на стыке трансатлантической / европейской системы безопасности и постсоветского пространства, подрывная деятельность проявляется в политике Кремля в отношении Грузии или Украины, а в последнее время также в Республике Беларусь в отношении Польши. Подрывные действия «ниже порога войны» призваны привести противника к политическим уступкам, определяя политику (не) безопасности Российской Федерации в ее «ближнем (и несколько дальнем) зарубежье».
Artykuł jest komentarzem do nowej książki Andrzeja Nowaka Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (Kraków 2015). Monografia ta daje nową analizę międzynarodowych aspektów wojny polsko-sowieckiej (1919–1920). Znaczenie tej wojny było i jest bardzo często spychane na margines historii Europy, podczas gdy były to zmagania decydujące dla przyszłości kontynentu europejskiego, a przede wszystkim ładu wersalskiego. Nie sposób sobie nie wyobrazić jego załamania i sowietyzacji przynajmniej wschodniej i środkowej części Europy, gdyby wojna ta zakończyła się klęską armii polskiej. Książka Nowaka nie jest jednak analityczną monografią wojny polsko-sowieckiej, lecz studium nad ustosunkowaniem zwycięskich mocarstw Zachodu wobec tego konfliktu. Wśród tych mocarstw decydujące znaczenie odrywała Wielka Brytania. Autor doszedł do przekonania, iż w polityce tej wolno widzieć prefigurację późniejszego appeasementu z lat trzydziestych XX w. Rząd Zjednoczonego Królestwa czynił w 1920 r. wszystko, aby doprowadzić do ugody polsko-sowieckiej, która w istocie rzeczy byłaby równoznaczna z hegemonią sowiecką nad odbudowaną Polską. Zwycięstwo armii polskiej w bitwie nad Wisłą udaremniło ten plan. Monografia ma w tytule sformułowanie "zdrada", ale książka – jak napisał we wstępie do niej jej Autor – nie jest "traktatem moralnym". Nie jest usiłowaniem sądu nad twórcami polityki mocarstw cudzoziemskich, które nie mają obowiązku służyć interesom Polski. Jest wyłącznie analizą pewnego zjawiska z polityki międzynarodowej. A zjawisko to nie jest zamkniętą kartą historii. Może się ono powtórzyć w naszych czasach. Książkę może spotkać zarzut, że jest polonocentryczna. Tak wszakże nie jest, bowiem Autor ma świadomość uwarunkowań polityki brytyjskiej i zawsze stosuje zasadę audiatur et altera pars. Książka Nowaka udokumentowana została nieznanymi (lub słabo zbadanymi) archiwaliami brytyjskimi. Autor wprowadza pojęcie brytyjskiego appeasementu wobec sowieckiej Rosji w roku 1920. Daje wnikliwą rekonstrukcję podejścia elit Zachodu do odrodzonej Polski, analizuje dzieje dwudziestowiecznej wyobraźni politycznej. Ukazuje także znaczenie polskiego zwycięstwa nad Wisłą w nowym świetle. Za jego sprawą ład wersalski został ocalony i uzupełniony pokojem ryskim (1921), czego często nie dostrzega historiografia narodów Zachodu. The First Treachery of the West. On the book by Andrzej NowakThe paper is a review of the new book by Andrzej Nowak Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (2015). The monograph provides a new analysis of the international aspects of the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1920). The conflict has often been marginalised in the history of Europe, while being decisive for the future shape of the European continent, and first and foremost for the Versailles governance. A collapse of the Versailles governance and sovietisation of at least Eastern and Central Europe are difficult to imagine but would have become a reality if the Polish-Soviet War had ended with a defeat for the Polish army. Nowak proposes a study of attitude of the winning Western superpowers to that conflict rather than an analytical monograph. Among the superpowers, Great Britain had the decisive voice. The author perceives the British policy as a prefiguration of appeasement applied in the 1930s. In 1920, the government of the United Kingdom used every effort to facilitate a Polish-Soviet settlement, what in fact would have turned into Soviet hegemony over reborn Poland. The victory of the Polish army in the Battle of Warsaw thwarted the plan. In spite of the word "treachery" in the title and as mentioned by the author in the introduction, the monograph is not a "treatise on morality". No attempt is made to judge the architects of foreign policies pursued by the world's superpowers, which have no obligation to serve the interest of Poland. The author merely undertakes an analysis of a phenomenon in international relations, which does not only belong to history, but continues to resonate throughout the world today. The book may be unfairly considered too Polocentric, yet the author shows awareness of the reality in which the British foreign policy was shaped, and always applies the audiatur et altera pars principle. The work is based on unknown or little examined British archive records. The author introduces the concept of appeasement towards the Soviet Russia in 1920. The book provides a thorough analysis of the attitude of Western elites to reborn Poland, and in this sense constitutes a review of the 20th century political imagination. It casts a new light on Poland's victory in the Battle of Warsaw. Owing to this victory, the Versailles governance was saved and strengthened by the Treaty of Riga (1921) – a fact which remains unnoticed in the historiography of Western nations.
Artykuł jest komentarzem do nowej książki Andrzeja Nowaka Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (Kraków 2015). Monografia ta daje nową analizę międzynarodowych aspektów wojny polsko-sowieckiej (1919–1920). Znaczenie tej wojny było i jest bardzo często spychane na margines historii Europy, podczas gdy były to zmagania decydujące dla przyszłości kontynentu europejskiego, a przede wszystkim ładu wersalskiego. Nie sposób sobie nie wyobrazić jego załamania i sowietyzacji przynajmniej wschodniej i środkowej części Europy, gdyby wojna ta zakończyła się klęską armii polskiej. Książka Nowaka nie jest jednak analityczną monografią wojny polsko-sowieckiej, lecz studium nad ustosunkowaniem zwycięskich mocarstw Zachodu wobec tego konfliktu. Wśród tych mocarstw decydujące znaczenie odrywała Wielka Brytania. Autor doszedł do przekonania, iż w polityce tej wolno widzieć prefigurację późniejszego appeasementu z lat trzydziestych XX w. Rząd Zjednoczonego Królestwa czynił w 1920 r. wszystko, aby doprowadzić do ugody polsko-sowieckiej, która w istocie rzeczy byłaby równoznaczna z hegemonią sowiecką nad odbudowaną Polską. Zwycięstwo armii polskiej w bitwie nad Wisłą udaremniło ten plan. Monografia ma w tytule sformułowanie "zdrada", ale książka – jak napisał we wstępie do niej jej Autor – nie jest "traktatem moralnym". Nie jest usiłowaniem sądu nad twórcami polityki mocarstw cudzoziemskich, które nie mają obowiązku służyć interesom Polski. Jest wyłącznie analizą pewnego zjawiska z polityki międzynarodowej. A zjawisko to nie jest zamkniętą kartą historii. Może się ono powtórzyć w naszych czasach. Książkę może spotkać zarzut, że jest polonocentryczna. Tak wszakże nie jest, bowiem Autor ma świadomość uwarunkowań polityki brytyjskiej i zawsze stosuje zasadę audiatur et altera pars. Książka Nowaka udokumentowana została nieznanymi (lub słabo zbadanymi) archiwaliami brytyjskimi. Autor wprowadza pojęcie brytyjskiego appeasementu wobec sowieckiej Rosji w roku 1920. Daje wnikliwą rekonstrukcję podejścia elit Zachodu do odrodzonej Polski, analizuje dzieje dwudziestowiecznej wyobraźni politycznej. Ukazuje także znaczenie polskiego zwycięstwa nad Wisłą w nowym świetle. Za jego sprawą ład wersalski został ocalony i uzupełniony pokojem ryskim (1921), czego często nie dostrzega historiografia narodów Zachodu. The First Treachery of the West. On the book by Andrzej NowakThe paper is a review of the new book by Andrzej Nowak Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (2015). The monograph provides a new analysis of the international aspects of the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1920). The conflict has often been marginalised in the history of Europe, while being decisive for the future shape of the European continent, and first and foremost for the Versailles governance. A collapse of the Versailles governance and sovietisation of at least Eastern and Central Europe are difficult to imagine but would have become a reality if the Polish-Soviet War had ended with a defeat for the Polish army. Nowak proposes a study of attitude of the winning Western superpowers to that conflict rather than an analytical monograph. Among the superpowers, Great Britain had the decisive voice. The author perceives the British policy as a prefiguration of appeasement applied in the 1930s. In 1920, the government of the United Kingdom used every effort to facilitate a Polish-Soviet settlement, what in fact would have turned into Soviet hegemony over reborn Poland. The victory of the Polish army in the Battle of Warsaw thwarted the plan. In spite of the word "treachery" in the title and as mentioned by the author in the introduction, the monograph is not a "treatise on morality". No attempt is made to judge the architects of foreign policies pursued by the world's superpowers, which have no obligation to serve the interest of Poland. The author merely undertakes an analysis of a phenomenon in international relations, which does not only belong to history, but continues to resonate throughout the world today. The book may be unfairly considered too Polocentric, yet the author shows awareness of the reality in which the British foreign policy was shaped, and always applies the audiatur et altera pars principle. The work is based on unknown or little examined British archive records. The author introduces the concept of appeasement towards the Soviet Russia in 1920. The book provides a thorough analysis of the attitude of Western elites to reborn Poland, and in this sense constitutes a review of the 20th century political imagination. It casts a new light on Poland's victory in the Battle of Warsaw. Owing to this victory, the Versailles governance was saved and strengthened by the Treaty of Riga (1921) – a fact which remains unnoticed in the historiography of Western nations.
The Republic of Belarus is a state that, through its location between the Russian Federation (RF) and the members states of the European Union (EU) and NATO, plays an important role in the security system in the region. On the one hand, through a number of dependencies it is closely related to the Kremlin authorities, on the other hand it tries to balance the influence of the larger neighbor through some steps towards closer cooperation with the West. Therefore, a closer look at the importance of Belarus in the European security system seems to be extremely vital, especially considering the current international situation – the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as the system of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation as a result of these events. The abovementioned examples clearly indicate the direction of actions of the Russian authorities, which are increasingly defending their own interests in the post-Soviet area. All those decisive actions, that were undertaken in order to prevent even the threat of losing influence, must certainly be important for Belarusian security policy.The purpose of this article is to define the role and place of the Republic of Belarus in the global security system. The study was conducted on the basis of Barry Buzan's theory, which links issues of national and international security, while paying attention to a number of interdependencies resulting from the globalization process. Therefore, both the internal determinants of the Belarusian security policy and international issues were analyzed, including the role of state and non-state actors, having a direct impact on shaping the global security system. The applied research method is a method of system analysis in its macro approach, which allows the presentation of the global security system as a series of separate, but closely related elements, additionally supported by a quantitative method in relation to the security system's conditions.As a result of the conducted research, the significance of the Republic of Belarus in the global security system was considered high, mainly due to the geopolitical location of that specific country. Following thesis was formulated on the basis of a number of factors, the most important of which are: 1) the remain of Belarus in the Russian sphere of influence, for which the Moscow authorities are not afraid to pay with numerous crises in the international arena (the case of Ukraine); 2) a high level of integration of both countries in the field of security policy; 3) the key significance of the government's rhetoric and political decisions in Minsk, relevant not only to the policy making of this particular country, but also to security in Europe. At this stage, however, it is difficult to talk about the Belarusian will to integrate with Western structures, because this step would, first of all, require significant internal changes, for which the regime of Alexander Lukashenko is not ready. In connection with the above, it is likely that Belarus will remain in alliance with the Russian Federation and that cooperation between the two countries will further tighten.Key words: Republic of Belarus; Russian Federation; NATO; Ukraine; security; armament. ; Republika Białorusi to państwo, które poprzez swoje położenie pomiędzy Federacją Rosyjską (FR) a państwami-członkami Unii Europejskiej (UE) i NATO, odgrywa istotną rolę w systemie bezpieczeństwa w regionie. Z jednej strony jest powiązane szeregiem zależności z władzami na Kremlu, z drugiej stara się równoważyć wpływy większego sąsiada kolejnymi ukłonami w stronę Zachodu. W związku z tym, bliższe przyjrzenie się znaczeniu Białorusi w europejskim systemie bezpieczeństwa wydaje się niezwykle istotne, szczególnie jeśli weźmiemy pod uwagę obecną sytuację międzynarodową – aneksję Krymu oraz konflikt na wschodzie Ukrainy, a także system sankcji nałożonych na FR w skutek niniejszych wydarzeń. Przytoczone przykłady jasno wskazują na kierunek działań rosyjskich władz, coraz silniej broniących własnych interesów na obszarze postradzieckim. Interwencje tego typu nie mogą pozostać bez wpływu na politykę bezpieczeństwa Białorusi.Celem niniejszego artykułu jest określenie roli i miejsca Republiki Białorusi w systemie bezpieczeństwa światowego. Badanie przeprowadzone zostało w oparciu o teorię Barrego Buzana, która wiąże ze sobą kwestie bezpieczeństwa narodowego i międzynarodowego, zwracając jednocześnie uwagę na szereg współzależności, wynikających z procesu globalizacji. Analizie poddano więc zarówno wewnętrzne uwarunkowania białoruskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa, jak też kwestie międzynarodowe, w tym rolę aktorów państwowych oraz niepaństwowych, mających bezpośrednie przełożenie na kształtowanie systemu bezpieczeństwa światowego. Zastosowaną metodą badawczą jest metoda analizy systemowej w jej ujęciu makro, pozwalająca na przedstawienie systemu bezpieczeństwa światowego jako szeregu oddzielnych, acz ściśle powiązanych ze sobą elementów, dodatkowo wsparta metodą ilościową w odniesieniu do uwarunkowań systemu bezpieczeństwa.W wyniku przeprowadzonych badań znaczenie Republiki Białorusi w systemie bezpieczeństwa światowego uznane zostało za istotne, głównie ze względu na położenie geopolityczne tego państwa. Niniejsza teza sformułowana została w oparciu o szereg czynników, z których najważniejsze to: 1) pozostawanie Białorusi w rosyjskiej strefie wpływów, której utrzymania władze w Moskwie nie boją się okupić licznymi kryzysami na arenie międzynarodowej (przypadek Ukrainy); 2) wysoki poziom integracji obu tych państw w zakresie polityki bezpieczeństwa; 3) kluczowe znaczenie retoryki i decyzji politycznych władz w Mińsku, mogących znaleźć przełożenie nie tylko na kształtowanie polityki tego konkretnego państwa, ale również na kształt bezpieczeństwa w Europie. Na obecnym etapie trudno jednak mówić o chęci integracji Białorusi ze strukturami zachodnimi, gdyż krok ten wymagałby przede wszystkim znaczących zmian wewnętrznych, na które reżim Aleksandra Łukaszenki nie jest gotów. W związku z powyższym prawdopodobne jest pozostanie Białorusi w aliansie z Federacją Rosyjską i dalsze zacieśnianie współpracy między oboma państwami.Słowa kluczowe: Republika Białorusi; Federacja Rosyjska; NATO; Ukraina; bezpieczeństwo; uzbrojenie.
The book contains a thorough analysis of the European Union institutional system as a specific, sui generis international organisation, in the context of its legitimization (its validity and legitimacy). The book is mainly theoretical. Primarily, the author aims at presenting a reliable depiction of the EU institutional system legitimization through the prism of the theoretical output concerning legitimization of the political power, including and accentuating the indicated specificity of the EU as a distinct international organisation. Secondly, he took into consideration the changes introduced into the legal foundations of the EU functioning, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty – the latest treaty reforming the structures of the Union. In the context of the main theme of the present study, these changes are important not only in terms of the EU institutions themselves, i.e. their competences and reciprocal relations, but also with regard to the fundamental change of the legal character of the EU, and the alterations introduced into the individual Union politics. Thirdly, the author attempts to present the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization in the special circumstances, i.e. in the situation of the most profound economic crisis that the EU members have faced since the beginning of the integration process. The EU is regarded as a specific structure, being neither a state nor a typical international organisation. Such an approach was the starting point for the main premise of the present book – the idea that the thesis about the deficiency of democracy in the EU, formulated in the literature on the subject and in the public debate, is a certain simplification, and the characteristic features of the EU and its institutions, which provoked the formulation of such a thesis, should be considered in a broader context, such as the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization and, alternatively, the deficiency of that legitimization. For the direct democratic legitimization is only one of many sources of legitimacy of the EU institutional system and of the Union as a specific international organisation in general – an extremely important source, perhaps the most important, yet not the only one. Thus, the legitimization of the EU and its institutions should be analysed in a broader perspective, which also includes other sources of legitimization – as it is done in case of every political power which, striving for its legitimization to be as strong as possible, attempts to derive it from the largest number of sources. According to the author of the book, to base the EU institutional system legitimization only on the grounds of the direct democratic legitimization characteristic of a democratic state, would be tantamount to a certain disruption of the right order. It would rather be a symptom of too advanced an integration on the "institutional" level in comparison to the extent of the "material" integration. Until the EU is a structure sui generis, in which case it is a combination of features characteristic of an intergovernmental, international organisation, a supranational organisation or a state, the nature of legitimization of this structure should also be specific. The most important role should be played by the democratic legitimization, which should be completed with other sources, owing to which the functioning of the EU institutional system, and the whole EU, could be recognised as legally valid. Apart from the main thesis also other theses and hypotheses are posed in the book. The first chapter is a certain theoretical introduction and a basis to the deliberations presented in the further parts of this study. In the first subsection, with reference to the literature on the subject, the problem of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, i.e. the concept, classifications and sources of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, have been synthetically depicted. In another part of chapter one, the author attempts to relate the problem of legitimization to the EU as a specific international organisation and to formulate his own definition of legitimization deficiency with regard to EU institutional system. Bearing in mind that the problem of legitimization deficiency in the EU (EC) has not been discussed on a larger scale until certain stage of development of integration process was reached, in 1.3. subsection, the author raises some questions concerning: the sufficiency of legitimization of the integration process during the first few decades after the Second World War, the grounds for that legitimization and the reasons why, at a certain stage of the EU (EC) development the legitimization of the Union's institutional system started to be considered insufficient, which was manifested in the opinions acknowledging the democracy and legitimization deficiency. The first chapter ends with a passage devoted to the importance of the EU institutional system legitimization, whereas the significance of legitimization to the political power and political institutions in general, consitutes its reference point. The second chapter (subsections 2.3.–2.8.) presents a synthesis of the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization, from the moment of the EC founding treaties ratification, till the time the changes pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty were introduced. The author focused here mainly on the competences of the particular EC (EU) institutions and their reciprocal relations, which should make it possible to observe two main tendencies in the dynamics of changes taking place in this field, and present its specificity and distinctiveness in comparison to the systems of democratic states. At the beginning of this chapter, a thesis has been formulated (simultaneously, becoming an extension of the attempt to determine why, at a certain stage of the integration process, the issue of democracy/legitimization deficiency started to be discussed – a question that was raised in the first chapter), which states that the legitimization of the EU institutional system will be sufficient, if the law regulations and political practice of their functioning are convergent with the level of advancement of the integration process in various spheres of social life; in other words, the "institutional" integration should correspond with the "material" integration (that is the Union politics). To that end, the author made an attempt to present, in a synthetized form, the development of the "material" integration (subsection 2.1.), which he completed with an analogical endeavour to illustrate the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization (subsection 2.9). For in accordance with the increasingly common approach, the EU institutions are treated as a system, the concept and principles of which have been presented in 2.2. subsection. In the third chapter, the author presents the EU institutional system in its current form, that is with the changes introduced under the Lisbon Treaty. Here, the selected aspects regarding competences and functioning of the particular EU institutions have been depicted, as well as the relations between them in the context of legitimization. Additionally, three selected problems regarding the EU institutional system have been raised, which are especially important in the context of its legitimization (the relation between the EU institutional system and the institutions of the EU member states, the question of transparency in the functioning of the EU institutions, as well as the Union budgets in the consecutive years). In the last subsection (3.9.) the specific features of the EU institutional system, significant in the context of its legitimization, have been identified. The fourth chapter is devoted to the functioning of the EU institutional system in the perspective of four basic sources of its legitimization, i.e. indirect and technocratic, direct and democratic, utilitarian, and one consisting of "values". The chapter ends with a conclusion outlining the specificity of the EU and its institutional system with regard to the sources of its legitimization, which is especially important in the context of the book's main thesis. The fifth chapter concerns the problem of legitimization of the EU institutions in the context of the economic crisis, which the EU member states struggle with since around the year 2008. The sixth chapter, in turn, regards the so called subjective (empirical, social) dimension of the EU institutions' legitimization, that is, the way this problem is perceived by the citizens of the EU member states. It has been based on the results of opinion polls conducted for the use of Eurobarometer, from among which these questions and answers were selected, which could be applied to illustrate the way the EU citizens perceive the Union institutions in the context of their legitimization. The closing remarks include the most important conclusions drawn from the conducted analyses and the potential reforms and modifications of the EU institutional system, which may allow for the reinforcement of its legitimization, primarily in its democratic aspect. The bibliography contains a list of sources which were cited and referred to in the book.
