For several decades, the territory of Ogaden in Ethiopia has witnessed bloody conflicts between various groups that have claimed control over this region throughout history. In this study, the authors analyze the sources of the incompatibility of the goals of the main actors, the escalatory event that resulted in open conflict, attempts at internal and external mediation and their success, and the success of attempts to de-escalate the conflict. The study reaches the conclusion that the domestic conflict over the status of the Ogaden province follows a logic that is common to most armed conflicts. Adapted from the source document.
This article provides an analysis of the of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, one of the hottest topics in international politics of the post-cold war era. Numerous books, articles, and Ph.D. thesis have already been written about UN peacekeeping operations. Although differing vastly in their scope and quality, most of the recent critiques have pointed out the pressing need to re-define and strengthen the cold war era concept of UN peacekeeping so that it becomes a viable conflict resolution method in the 21st century. Some scholars have, however, expressed serious doubts about the actual conflict resolution capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations. They argue that premature, short-tenn and under funded UN peacekeeping operations may well do more damage than good. One of the few things the majority of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners can nowadays agree on is that no UN intervention can bring peace to a place where it is not wanted.This article aims to enrich the current peace research by introducing an alternative analytical approach to the study of the UN peacekeeping. It is divided into seven sections. The introduction is followed by a theoretical section where I briefly summarize two basic theoretical approaches to the study of the UN peacekeeping (Conflict Management & Conflict Resolution). The third section provides an analysis of the changing nature of armed conflicts in the post-cold war period. The fourth section deals with the adjustments that were made to the concept of UN peacekeeping operations in reaction to the changes in the nature of current armed conflicts. The analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap is introduced in the fifth chapter, followed by the core section of this article -- the analysis of the United Nations peacekeeping using the analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap. The analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap was first introduced by Christopher Hill in 1992 as a handy tool for analyzing the evolving European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The unique advantage of this concept is that it provides a sensible assessment of both the actual and potential UN capabilities. By comparing these with the existing UN expectations, the Capabilities versus Expectations Gap analysis of UN peacekeeping enables us to sketch a more realistic picture of what the UN is capable of doing in the area of conflict resolution than that presented either by its more enthusiastic supporters or by the demanders among the UN Member States. Consequently, building further on this realistic picture of the UN conflict resolution capabilities, I attempt to answer the key research question of this article: Is the UN, with the current level of its conflict resolution capabilities, capable of providing high quality treatment to as many conflicts as it nowadays attempts to provide? Based on the findings of the Capabilities versus Expectations Gap analysis of the UN peacekeeping problematic, I argue that since the end of the cold war, the UN has several times attempted to carry out more peacekeeping operations than it was capable of performing well in light of the current level of its conflict resolution capabilities. In other words, the most important conclusion of this article is that there is a gap between the UN capabilities and expectations in the area of conflict resolution and that the only option how to bridge this gap in the foreseeable future is to decrease the excessive UN expectations to meet the currently available UN capabilities. As paradoxical as it may sound, in practical terms this means that the United Nations is nowadays more likely to succeed in meeting its basic function ("to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war") by carrying out fewer but high quality peacekeeping operations. Adapted from the source document.
This article presents an analysis of the civil war and subsequent developments in Nepal through the concept of the failed state. The aim of the article is to evaluate whether Nepal meets the criteria for being recognised as a failed state. In the first part, the conceptualization of the term failed state and its general definition are introduced. The second part of the article focuses on methodology. Finally, the main part of the article presents an analysis of Nepal through the concept of the failed state, following theoretical concepts developed by Robert I. Rotberg. The authors conclusion is that contemporary Nepal should not be regarded as a failed state. Despite the chronic internal weakness of the country and its institutions, whose functions are in many cases carried out by parallel institutions, it is not possible to say that such functions were completely missing. Instead, we can say that the functions of these institutions and structures are limited -- that is, that these institutions are performing their functions, albeit partially. In addition, the level of violence that occurs in some areas is not comparable with the period when Nepal was experiencing deep internal armed conflict. Adapted from the source document.
The application of Elias's Theory of civilization, in the field of international relations, is the theoretical concept of civilian power. In this analysis, I concluded that there are several attributes that allow the use of military force by civilian power. These attributes consist of: (1) using military force as a last resort for dealing with conflicts, and only when all other means have failed; (2) playing an active role in seeking non-militant ways of crisis resolution and military conflict prevention; (3) conducting only military operations that conform to international law and (4) that intend to support and defend human rights while (5) minimizing destruction and casualties, not only on its own side but also on the side of its enemy and finally, (6) having military operations (with the exception of self defense) take place in a multinational framework, which would not be used as a tool for unilateral policies. Adapted from the source document.
Year 2003 was meant to be the year that would change the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for good, but the violence continued on both sides. There was a new peace plan -- the roadmap -- & talk of a new Middle East. But as the year ended, the roadmap was not fulfilled. In an attempt to make the roadmap work, peacemakers invented a new post -- that of Palestinian prime minister. Mahmoud Abbas was the first man to try the new post. But he did not get very far. He spent most of his premiership in a power struggle with Mr. Arafat & he gave up. Last year a group of former Israeli officials & Palestinian ministers was promoting their own proposal the Geneva Accord. This plan details the exact dimensions of a two state solution. For now, it is just fantasy peacemaking -- but its backers are hoping that it could take hold as a serious alternative. Finally, there is the proposal which may be the most important of them all. Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has warned that he will impose what he calls his Disengagement Plan should the Palestinians fail to meet his demands for a new leadership & the dismantling of armed Palestinian factions. Ariel Sharon has decided to give the Palestinians a few months to comply -- he will not be any more specific than that. If they do not meet his terms & his timetable, he has warned that he will take unilateral steps to draw up his own borders & to impose a settlement in Israel's favor. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.
