The article deals with the Lithuanian Army Headquarters' defence plans for Klaipėda Region (Memel Territory) and Klaipėda City against Germany of the 1930s, providing options of implementation in the event of a military conflict between Lithuania and Germany. The article also provides the data on the Lithuanian armed forces at disposal in 1939, the size of the forces deployed in Klaipėda Region and on its borders, the Army Headquarters plans to use the said military forces, and the potential scenarios of the events. In terms of the military doctrine, an overview of the condition and its potential significance for the sea frontier defence of the Lithuanian Navy is given.
War has been an integral part of human history. The economical, political, social and technological advancement of society, has transformed primitive, tribal type wars into state waged wars that are highly organized and deadly. At the same time war appears to be taking new face. Today both states and non states wage war. Still ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, remind us that not all wars are fought among nation-states. Majority of wars in past three decades were not interstate, when at least in one fighting side it was something other than a military force, organized and operating under the control of national government. Almost all of these conflicts had the external intervention by other states. War against terrorism has showed that state owned armed forces meet new type of enemy in battle field. Not only armies and navies, but also local warlords, nets of terrorist groups and criminal gangs are the force that state militaries have to deal with. So the aim of this paper is to find out, how new warfare affects the international system and answer the questions what are the implications of the new warfare for the Armed Forces, nation states and international system. This study consists of five parts. In the first part the three concepts, competing for the position of leading theory of conflict in the twenty first century are analyzed: realpolitik approach, Transformation theory, and Forth Generation Warfare theory. Main focus is on the later. Works of the leading proponents of 4GW theory are discussed in this part: M. Creveld's theoretical thoughts about decentralization of warfare and its 'decoupleation' from the state; W. S. Lind's Forth Generation model and main driving factors simulating generational shift; and T. X. Hammes's ideas about political, social and economic factors as a true drivers of generational change. The aim of this analysis was to derive characteristics of the New Warfare. This enabled to identify the most dominant, specific features of this type of war fighting: new actors, new space and asymmetry. The second part of the paper is devoted for substance of the identified features elaboration. Today new participants of the new warfare could be divided at least into two groups: state and non-state actors, while within each of the aforementioned groups possible all other divisions according certain criteria. This paper focuses on civilian and military sectors including private dimension in both. Space where new warfare is taking place could be viewed through two different levels: micro and macro. While talking about the third feature - asymmetry, here this issue is discussed in terms of ways and means. In each of the other three parts of the paper the implications of new warfare for Armed Forces, States an International System are discussed. Results of the research show the need for adaptation for armed forces in terms of cooperation with private sector and more military focused civilian institutions. Concerning the states, results of the analysis show the necessity of deeper cooperation and integration with "friendly" international actors and possibility of "isolation" concerning non friendly ones. In general research shows the need for international cooperation in order to find new tools required in new war fighting; and the effect of it – the loss of states monopoly over warfare, by transferring part of their sovereignty to private sector and international institutions. New non-state actors appear in international system willing and able to shape international security issues. This affects international system, which needs to adapt to new changes in this sphere. Not only international legal base concerning war and military conflicts has to be reconsidered, but also international tools of power projection should be re-examined in terms of their relevance and effectiveness.
War has been an integral part of human history. The economical, political, social and technological advancement of society, has transformed primitive, tribal type wars into state waged wars that are highly organized and deadly. At the same time war appears to be taking new face. Today both states and non states wage war. Still ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, remind us that not all wars are fought among nation-states. Majority of wars in past three decades were not interstate, when at least in one fighting side it was something other than a military force, organized and operating under the control of national government. Almost all of these conflicts had the external intervention by other states. War against terrorism has showed that state owned armed forces meet new type of enemy in battle field. Not only armies and navies, but also local warlords, nets of terrorist groups and criminal gangs are the force that state militaries have to deal with. So the aim of this paper is to find out, how new warfare affects the international system and answer the questions what are the implications of the new warfare for the Armed Forces, nation states and international system. This study consists of five parts. In the first part the three concepts, competing for the position of leading theory of conflict in the twenty first century are analyzed: realpolitik approach, Transformation theory, and Forth Generation Warfare theory. Main focus is on the later. Works of the leading proponents of 4GW theory are discussed in this part: M. Creveld's theoretical thoughts about decentralization of warfare and its 'decoupleation' from the state; W. S. Lind's Forth Generation model and main driving factors simulating generational shift; and T. X. Hammes's ideas about political, social and economic factors as a true drivers of generational change. The aim of this analysis was to derive characteristics of the New Warfare. This enabled to identify the most dominant, specific features of this type of war fighting: new actors, new space and asymmetry. The second part of the paper is devoted for substance of the identified features elaboration. Today new participants of the new warfare could be divided at least into two groups: state and non-state actors, while within each of the aforementioned groups possible all other divisions according certain criteria. This paper focuses on civilian and military sectors including private dimension in both. Space where new warfare is taking place could be viewed through two different levels: micro and macro. While talking about the third feature - asymmetry, here this issue is discussed in terms of ways and means. In each of the other three parts of the paper the implications of new warfare for Armed Forces, States an International System are discussed. Results of the research show the need for adaptation for armed forces in terms of cooperation with private sector and more military focused civilian institutions. Concerning the states, results of the analysis show the necessity of deeper cooperation and integration with "friendly" international actors and possibility of "isolation" concerning non friendly ones. In general research shows the need for international cooperation in order to find new tools required in new war fighting; and the effect of it – the loss of states monopoly over warfare, by transferring part of their sovereignty to private sector and international institutions. New non-state actors appear in international system willing and able to shape international security issues. This affects international system, which needs to adapt to new changes in this sphere. Not only international legal base concerning war and military conflicts has to be reconsidered, but also international tools of power projection should be re-examined in terms of their relevance and effectiveness.
A state of stalemate settled in on the frontlines of World War I, particularly on the Western Front, which was a result of defensive systems that had greatly improved at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was a trigger to develop new offensive techniques that would stir up the entrenched fronts of World War I. Mechanised corps, including tank units, was one of such newly introduced techniques. With the advent of a new type of weapon, the need had arisen to improve defence by reinforcing it with anti-tank systems. In the wake of the 1914–1918 war and with the mechanised forces rapidly developing in the interwar years, it became necessary to create motorised infantry mobility of which, in combination with mechanised units, had increased exponentially leading to an enhanced importance of anti-tank weapons in combat. The issue of anti-tank defence was also of major concern in the armed forces of interwar Lithuania. In view of the then geopolitical situation of Lithuania and taking into account the national defence plans, it was Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union that were deemed the key aggressors constituting a threat to Lithuania's sovereignty. An analysis of sources shows that the two latter states had highly developed concepts of mechanised armies, thereby making the issue of anti-tank defence even more important for the Lithuanian army. Hence, the aim of this research is to examine and estimate capabilities of the Lithuanian armed forces to maintain defence against the enemy's heavy (mechanised) forces by making an analysis of the provisions enshrined in the statutes of Lithuania's army, the reflections on the experiences of military conflicts between 1935 and 1940 in the ranks of the leadership of the Lithuanian army, and actual capabilities to conduct defence against mechanised forces of the hostile armies.
A state of stalemate settled in on the frontlines of World War I, particularly on the Western Front, which was a result of defensive systems that had greatly improved at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was a trigger to develop new offensive techniques that would stir up the entrenched fronts of World War I. Mechanised corps, including tank units, was one of such newly introduced techniques. With the advent of a new type of weapon, the need had arisen to improve defence by reinforcing it with anti-tank systems. In the wake of the 1914–1918 war and with the mechanised forces rapidly developing in the interwar years, it became necessary to create motorised infantry mobility of which, in combination with mechanised units, had increased exponentially leading to an enhanced importance of anti-tank weapons in combat. The issue of anti-tank defence was also of major concern in the armed forces of interwar Lithuania. In view of the then geopolitical situation of Lithuania and taking into account the national defence plans, it was Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union that were deemed the key aggressors constituting a threat to Lithuania's sovereignty. An analysis of sources shows that the two latter states had highly developed concepts of mechanised armies, thereby making the issue of anti-tank defence even more important for the Lithuanian army. Hence, the aim of this research is to examine and estimate capabilities of the Lithuanian armed forces to maintain defence against the enemy's heavy (mechanised) forces by making an analysis of the provisions enshrined in the statutes of Lithuania's army, the reflections on the experiences of military conflicts between 1935 and 1940 in the ranks of the leadership of the Lithuanian army, and actual capabilities to conduct defence against mechanised forces of the hostile armies.
A state of stalemate settled in on the frontlines of World War I, particularly on the Western Front, which was a result of defensive systems that had greatly improved at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was a trigger to develop new offensive techniques that would stir up the entrenched fronts of World War I. Mechanised corps, including tank units, was one of such newly introduced techniques. With the advent of a new type of weapon, the need had arisen to improve defence by reinforcing it with anti-tank systems. In the wake of the 1914–1918 war and with the mechanised forces rapidly developing in the interwar years, it became necessary to create motorised infantry mobility of which, in combination with mechanised units, had increased exponentially leading to an enhanced importance of anti-tank weapons in combat. The issue of anti-tank defence was also of major concern in the armed forces of interwar Lithuania. In view of the then geopolitical situation of Lithuania and taking into account the national defence plans, it was Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union that were deemed the key aggressors constituting a threat to Lithuania's sovereignty. An analysis of sources shows that the two latter states had highly developed concepts of mechanised armies, thereby making the issue of anti-tank defence even more important for the Lithuanian army. Hence, the aim of this research is to examine and estimate capabilities of the Lithuanian armed forces to maintain defence against the enemy's heavy (mechanised) forces by making an analysis of the provisions enshrined in the statutes of Lithuania's army, the reflections on the experiences of military conflicts between 1935 and 1940 in the ranks of the leadership of the Lithuanian army, and actual capabilities to conduct defence against mechanised forces of the hostile armies.
A state of stalemate settled in on the frontlines of World War I, particularly on the Western Front, which was a result of defensive systems that had greatly improved at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was a trigger to develop new offensive techniques that would stir up the entrenched fronts of World War I. Mechanised corps, including tank units, was one of such newly introduced techniques. With the advent of a new type of weapon, the need had arisen to improve defence by reinforcing it with anti-tank systems. In the wake of the 1914–1918 war and with the mechanised forces rapidly developing in the interwar years, it became necessary to create motorised infantry mobility of which, in combination with mechanised units, had increased exponentially leading to an enhanced importance of anti-tank weapons in combat. The issue of anti-tank defence was also of major concern in the armed forces of interwar Lithuania. In view of the then geopolitical situation of Lithuania and taking into account the national defence plans, it was Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union that were deemed the key aggressors constituting a threat to Lithuania's sovereignty. An analysis of sources shows that the two latter states had highly developed concepts of mechanised armies, thereby making the issue of anti-tank defence even more important for the Lithuanian army. Hence, the aim of this research is to examine and estimate capabilities of the Lithuanian armed forces to maintain defence against the enemy's heavy (mechanised) forces by making an analysis of the provisions enshrined in the statutes of Lithuania's army, the reflections on the experiences of military conflicts between 1935 and 1940 in the ranks of the leadership of the Lithuanian army, and actual capabilities to conduct defence against mechanised forces of the hostile armies.
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.
