Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction: Government: Crises of Confidence -- 1: Our National Defense System -- 2: The Army -- 3: The Navy -- 4: The Air Force -- 5: The Marines -- 6: The Coast Guard and the Reserve Forces -- Glossary -- Further Reading -- Index -- About the Author -- Picture Credits.

U.S. experience in raising the armed forces has resulted in persistent political and social tensions. Individual freedom has seldom been held subordinate to national security interests. Executive control and legislative oversight have frequently been in conflict, but with little judicial challenge to either branch. Finally, national controls have assured a continuing influence upon state manning and operation of the militia. Despite inherently conflicting objectives, the resulting balance has provided armed forces sufficient to preserve the nation while largely guaranteeing individual freedoms.

Since World War II we have felt compelled for the first time in our history to maintain large standing forces. It is technology though, not numbers, that provides our edge in the continuing military competition with the Soviet Union. Acquiring advanced weapons is a complex process greatly complicated by our governmental system, which intentionally fragments political power. Mechanisms for improving the efficiency of the weapons acquisition process, however, threaten the very values that we seek to protect with our military power.

How does the U.S. constitutional system affect this country's ability to organize its armed forces? The primary impact of the system on the issues associated with organizing the armed services seems to be the inability of the United States to create a security apparatus with a truly national perspective. The result of this fragmented national security system has been an organizational and decision-making process that reflects the incomplete centralization of authority over the military. Incomplete centralization, in turn, allows the perspectives of the individual services to dominate the institutional environment and control-to a considerable degree-the functions and structure of the armed forces. More important, incomplete centralization and service dominance detract from the nation's ability to carry out the critical functions of strategic planning and advice, resource allocation, force structuring, and joint operations.

Since its introduction in 1977, the institutional/occupational (I/O) thesis has generated a growing body of international research. The basic proposition is that the military is moving from an institutional to an occupational format. The thesis is brought up to date by greater specification of I/O variables in military organization. Variables include legitimacy, role commitments, compensation systems, spouse, reference groups, legal system, and postservice status. The current formulation favors an approach that examines shifting constellations of I/O features within armed forces.