Suchergebnisse

Stöckmann, D.: Armed forces in a changing security and technological environment. - S. 1-5. Colson, B.: Le rôle de l'état dans les relations internationales. - S. 7-18. Chaliand, G.: Les nouvelles formes de conflits. - S. 19-22. Metz, S.: Changes in technology and warfare. - S. 23-27. Wijk, R. de: Welke veiligheids - en defensiepolitiek in deze veranderende context? - S. 29-36. Dannatt, F. R.: The consequences of this changing environment on security and defence policy. - S. 37-43. Lacoste, P.: L'évolution de l'environnement sécuritaire et technologique. - S. 45-51

On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender that also brought an end to the Second World War in Asia, Indonesia declared its independence. The declaration was not recognized by the Netherlands, which resorted to force in its attempt to take control of the inevitable process of decolonization. This led to four years of difficult negotiations and bitter warfare. In 2005, the Dutch government declared that the Netherlands should never have waged the war. The government's 1969 position on the violence used by the Dutch armed forces during the war remained unchanged, however: although there had been 'excesses', on the whole the armed forces had behaved 'correctly'. As the indications of Dutch extreme violence mounted, this official position proved increasingly difficult to maintain. In 2016, the Dutch government therefore decided to fund a broad study on the dynamics of the violence. The most important conclusions of that research programme are summarized in this book. The authors show that the Dutch armed forces used extreme violence on a structural basis, and that this was concealed both at the time and for many years after the war by the Dutch government and by society more broadly. All of this – like the entire colonial history – is at odds with the rose-tinted self-image of the Netherlands.

For a long time, the war in Indonesia and the extreme violence used by the Dutch troops were not a subject that was much discussed or written about in the Netherlands. After the end of the war, the government made great efforts to avoid discussions about it or even to nip them in the bud. The revelations by East Indies veteran Joop Hueting in 1969 initially led to great commotion, resulting in the 'Excessennota' and the government position that the armed forces had behaved correctly, apart from a number of 'excesses'. That was it, until in recent decades more and more indications emerged that the armed forces had used extreme violence on a larger scale. Not only politicians but also journalists, historians and history teachers struggled with the violent decolonisation of Indonesia. The groups most affected, such as veterans, Moluccans and Indo-Europeans, were also reluctant for a long time to talk about their often bitter experiences in public. Finally, Indonesia also did not seem very interested in reviving this history of mutual violence. As a result, it was only very late, very cautiously and jerkily, that the war gained a place in the Dutch culture of remembrance.

What shaped the defense transformation policies of NATO member-states? And what does this mean for the future of the alliance? In "The superpower, the bridge-builder and the hesitant ally", Rem Korteweg explores the impact of the strategic cultures of the United States, the Netherlands and Germany on their efforts to adapt their defense policies and armed forces in light of changes in the security environment. Transformation touched upon fundamental questions regarding the use of the military and the future of warfare in the late 20th and early 21st century. Rather than lead to cohesion within the alliance, defense transformation unearthed strong differences in the way in which the use of the military is understood in Europe and the United States

Lecturing the Dutch in public probably makes them more stubborn rather than less stubborn. And they are already stubborn enough,' wrote a British diplomat in July 1947. How did the United States, the United Kingdom and France view the Indonesian War of Independence in the period of 1945-1949? Did they show understanding for the Dutch political and military policies or rather for the Indonesian position, and in what ways did they try to influence the parties? Where did the Dutch get their military equipment to wage war in Indonesia? In 'Diplomatie en geweld', the authors show how other countries and the recently founded United Nations were involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and how they helped determine its course and outcome. In doing so they focus not only on the political and diplomatic aspects of the struggle, but also on foreign views on the use of violence by the Dutch armed forces