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Since an att-object must always be encountered within some situation, about which we also have an att, soc behavior must be a function of at least 2 att's: att-toward-object (Ao) & att-towardsituation (As). Opinion expression & changes in opinion expression are both forms of verbal behavior &, thus, also functions of Ao & As. When a change of opinion is empirically found it may arise from a change in Ao, or As, or both, or neither. The classical paradigm of attitude change studies-pre-test, treatment, posttest-cannot ascertain which of these 4 possibilities produced the opinion change & must therefore be discarded. 3 new methods are then proposed for determining whether opinion change does or does not represent an attitude change: test for opinion change in at least 2 diff post-test situations; test for diff'ial change in several opinions in one post-test situation; test for behavioral changes accompanying opinion change. Illustrative res findings are cited. AA.

In recent yrs a number of theoretical formulations have been made to account for attitude change (AC). Some of these have been applications of more general theory while others were devised esp to deal with AC; all are concerned with AC as effects of communications. The more general applicable theories include Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance & Heider's Balance Theory & learning theory. Some of the esp devised approaches are McGuire's Rational-Syllogistic formulation, Rosenberg's Affective -Cognitive Consistency approach, Osgood's Congruity theory, & Newcomb's Strain toward Symmetry. Brehm, Cohen, J. S. Adams, Romney, & the Maccobys have recently applied Dissonance theory to AC problems. Cartwright & Harary have developed theoretical applications to AC from Heider's Balance theory. Most of these theoretical approaches have at least one major characteristic in common. All involve a balance of forces approach in which the overloading of one type of factor gives rise to changes designed to restore balance; all employ homeostasis in some form. A large body of work in AC stems from traditional learning theory, notably the work of Hovland & his colleagues. It is felt that while one can make derivations from learning theory to dissonance or balance theory, the 2 points of view have produced considerably diff emphases & diff choice of res problems. According to learning theorists, one cannot comfortably hold inconsistent att's or beliefs because they produce conflicting action tendencies; & in the presence of such tendencies, the state of conflict itself becomes a drive which spurs the individual into some activity designed to resolve conflict. Conflict produced by holding incompatible att's would be theoretically no diff than a conflict of incompatible motor habits. Learning theorists have tended to range further afield in their choice of motive systems to manipulate in order to produce AC. AC is a process that presumably does not occur in a single instant of time, even though the over manifestation may occur as a single event when sufficient covert `bits' have been learned to result in a kind of `flopover' in response to a question. The underlying process may still be thought of as a cumulative one, to which the concept of the learning curve applies. Learning theorists have pointed to the importance of covert practice or rehearsal of a message during the post-communication period & have been concerned with the conditions which facilitate or interfere with such practice. A central issue is how the aroused motivation gets channeled into AC. This is where homeostatic theorists have made some of their greatest contributions. Much res & theorizing has been centered around the identification of the conditions which determine whether dissonance, or imbalance, or inconsistency, will result in AC or in some alternative course of action. AA.

Pretesting by means of questionaires is often used to provide a baseline for estimating exp'al effects. While there is much evidence showing S's react to pretests, the findings are quite inconsistent. In this exp, responding to an attitude item was viewed as comcitment on the part of the S, exerting pressure toward attitude consistency. The following hyp's were examined: (1) Persons responding to attitude questionaires would show less attitude change than would persons exposed to the same information in paragraph form. (2) Among persons responding to questionaires, there would be less change on salient than on nonsalient issues. 63 Introductory Sociol students were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups. The exp'al group was given a set of 10 attitude questions on current issues. The 1st control group was given 10 paragraphs to read on the same topics, while the 2nd control group was given unrelated material to read. A semantic diff'ial was admin'ed immediately afterward & again 6 days later to measure attitude change. hypothesis (1) was supported with the exp'al group showing signif'ly less change than either of the controls, with no diff between the control groups. However, hypothesis (2) was strongly disconfirmed with the majority of the S's showing more change on the salient than on the nonsalient issues. AA.

Negating false ideas of anxiety-provoking events, by itself, may increase popular fears, but new correct or incorrect information reduces perceived threat & promotes `healthy' att's. 4 messages concerned with explanations of catatonic schizophrenia & 2 with other topics (for control purposes) were administered singly to 192 undergraduate students at the U of Illinois. 2 of the `catatonic' messages (one psychol'al & one physical) gave plausible explanations & treatments. 2 messages (one psychol'al & one physical) gave false information. All messages were equal in length & similar in format. Each S participating in the supposed study of `writing styles' was given 1 of the 6 messages at random to read & then asked to make attitude ratings & answer other questions. Att's concerning mental illness, patients, & clinicians were measured by a special form of the Osgood Semantic Differential Scale including scales of the activity, potency, evaluative, & understandability dimensions. Additionally, S's receiving one of the `catatonic' messages were asked whether or not they thought the suggested patient treatment would work. The findings were that: (1) the 4 explanations were all relatively convincing, (2) the 4 messages (2 plausible & 2 false) produced signif'ly diff att's by `t' test concerning catatonic schizophrenia than did the control messages. Regardless of the plausibility or falsity of the messages, 'S's receiving the `catatonic' messages rated the concept as more `valuable', `less potent,' `less active,' & more `understandable' than those receiving the control messages.' Test & control S's gave diff att's toward `mental illness' on the activity & potency dimensions, & toward the concept of 'psychiatrist' on the 'understandability' factor, & (4) 'analysis of variance showed no signif diff's between `physical' & 'psychol'al' or `plausible' & `false' messages.' These findings can not be explained on the basis that the S's had never before heard of catatonic schizophrenia, but on the basis that it being associated with pain, embarrassment, & danger, people tend to accept any authoritative-sounding information purporting to cure it. C. M. Coughenour.

It is indisputable that collaboration between PO res & soc psychol is desirable & will benefit both disciplines. A necessary condition for this collaboration to be fruitful is that the collaborators show scholarship & the ability to think clearly. Several prominent psychol'ts have recently summarized the thinking & res now going on under the names of `cognitive dissonance,I 'congruity,' `cognitive balance,' etc, for the field of PO res. It is argued that the treatment meted out to the concept of `cognitive balance' as formulated by F. Heider is neither scholarly nor clear-thinking, hence the real significance of the concept is lost. An attempt is made to conceptualize clearly the concept of `cognitive balance' & the errors of the reviewers are pointed out & corrected. AA.

Communicator-recipient similarity is conceptualized as having 3 dimensions: demographic similarity, att'al similarity, & situational similarity. The first 2 of these dimensions were tested in 2 factorial-design, cross-cultural persuasion exp's involving Amer & Filipino speakers & a total of 128 Filipino S's. The general hyp investigated was: The greater the communicator-recipient similarity, the greater the att change & the more favorably perceived/evaluated the communicator & the communication. Att'al similarity proved to be a more potent variable than demographic similarity. All cells showed signif before/after att change, but, contrary to what was hyp'ed, both exp's indicated that the least similar communicators were the most favorably perceived/evaluated by the recipients. These results are interpreted as instances of the disconfirmation of negative expectancies. AA.