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Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

O stanju privatnih šuma u RH u nekoliko smo navrata pisali u Uvodnicima Šumarskog lista, a 2017. godine "Stanje privatnih šuma u Republici Hrvatskoj" bila je stručna tema povodom obilježavanja Dana hrvatskoga šumarstva. Prema podacima Šumskogospodarske osnove područja Republike Hrvatske iz 2016. godine, površina šuma i šumskih zemljišta u RH iznosi 2 759 039,05 ha. Od ukupne površine u državnom je vlasništvu 2 097 318 ha (76 %), a 24 %, tj. 661 721 ha u vlasništvu je privatnih šumovlasnika. Članak 14. Zakona o šumama definira prema površini šuma i šumskog zemljišta privatne šumoposjednike na male s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta do 20 ha, srednje s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 20, a manjom od 300 ha i velike šumoposjednike s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 300 ha. Prema toj klasifikaciji preko 99 % površina šuma i šumskog zemljišta pripada malim šumoposjednicima, njih 418 654, što daje prosječnu veličinu posjeda od 0,5 ha. Kao što ste već u uvodnom dijelu mogli zamijetiti, miješaju se pojmovi šumovlasnik i šumoposjednik, što je rezultat dvojnog vođenja zemljišnih knjiga kroz gruntovnicu i katastar, a njihova nesređenost otežava definiranja stvarnih odnosa. Rješavanje problema uređenja imovinsko-pravnih odnosa uvijek naglašavamo kao prioritet i prvi preduvjet stvaranja organiziranog društva. Isto tako vrijeme je da jasno razlučimo namjenu i korištenje šumskog i poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Od vremena Austro-ugarske monarhije, kada je napravljena prva razdioba, usprkos brojnim zakonskim odredbama, to još nismo učinili. Tako je primjerice velik dio šuma u privatnom vlasništvu nastao obraštanjem poljoprivrednog zemljišta, koje se još uvijek u zemljišnim knjigama vodi kao livada, pašnjak ili oranica. Istovremeno na apsolutnom šumskom zemljištu u državnim šumama podižemo maslinike i vinograde ili izdajemo dozvole za pašarenje??? Povijesne okolnosti definirale su danas izuzetno male posjede šumskog zemljišta u privatnom vlasništvu koji ne omogućuju kontinuirani prihod vlasnicima, već se jednokratnim zahvatom pokušava izvući što veća financijska korist bez pridržavanja potrajnosti, osnovnog načela u šumarstvu. Svijest o potrebi funkcionalnog udruživanja i planiranja šumskouzgojnih zahvata na razini odjela i odsjeka kod naših šumovlasnika nažalost još nije zaživjela, pa se usprkos tomu što za većinu privatnih šuma imamo izrađene programe gospodarenja, ono se u praksi svodi na nepovezane zahvate na pojedinim česticama. U privatnim šumama malih posjednika sve se češće događaju kriminalne radnje vezane za sječu bez doznake, krađu, izvođenje radova pridobivanja drveta od neregistriranih ili nelicenciranih izvođača, nekontrolirano stavljanje drveta u promet, nelegalna trgovina drvetom itd. Nepostojeća jasna i transparentna (tržišna) politika formiranja cijena drveta u Hrvatskoj pogoduje raznim preprodavačima, a vrijedna sirovina bez ikakve kontrole obično završava na stranom tržištu. Sve to navodi nas na razmišljanje o odgovornosti, države kao zakonodavca i njenog odnosa prema toj kategoriji privatnog vlasništva, ali i općeg dobra zaštićenog Ustavom RH. Postavimo ovdje pitanje odgovornosti cijele šumarske struke i njenih institucija, kao i naših kolega ovlaštenih inženjera koji često na terenu provode doznaku, ili otpremu, po načelu "od nečega se mora živjeti". Ako svi, kao što to čini struka, zažmirimo pred ovim problemom, teško da ćemo se u budućnosti moći hvaliti tradicijom potrajnog i prirodnog gospodarenja našim šumama. Prvi preduvjet uvođenja reda u privatnim šumama malih posjednika je organiziranje čuvarske službe. Prema aktualnom ZOŠ-u čuvanje šuma prepušteno je vlasnicima, što je s obzirom na njihovo stanje i dobnu strukturu praktički neprovedivo, ili je dana mogućnost da to obavljaju Udruge šumoposjednika, što se opet u praksi rijetko događa. Kroz povijest uvijek su postojali čuvari šume, bili to općinski (sreski) lugari do sredine 20. stoljeća ili su to donedavno kod nas obavljali djelatnici Hrvatskih šuma. Kako bi riješili ovu situaciju postoji nekoliko opcija: Þ Vratiti nadležnost Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. preregistracijom ove tvrtke. Þ Osigurati provođenje čuvarske službe kroz lokalnu samoupravu, kao što je to bilo propisano prethodnim ZOŠ-om, no u praksi nije bilo sprovedeno. Þ Osnovati "Šumsku policiju" s jasnim ovlastima koja će osigurati red i spriječiti kriminalne radnje. Þ Osnovati Državnu instituciju (agenciju) za šume, koja bi provodila javne ovlasti i interese neovisno o vlasništvu nad šumama i omogućila bi smisleno i sveobuhvatno planiranje i gospodarenje šumama na svim razinama. Uredništvo ; The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia has been treated in the Editorial section of the Forestry Journal on several occasions, and in 2017 "The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia" was a topic discussed at the Day of Croatian Forestry. According to the Forest Management Plan of the Republic of Croatia from 2016, forests and forestland in Croatia cover 2,759,039.05 ha. Of the overall area, state owned forests account for 2,097,318 a (76 %), while privately owned forests account for 661,721 ha (24 %). Article 14 of the Law on Forests classifies private forest owners into three groups: small owners with forests and/or forestland of up to 20 ha, medium owners with forests and/or forestland of more than 20 ha but less than 300 ha, and large forest owners with forest area and/or forestland exceeding 300 ha. According to this classification, over 99 % of the area of forests and forestland are owned by small forest owners (418,654 owners), which means that the average size of the forest property is 0.5 ha. As you may have noticed in the introductory part, there is an ambiguity relating to the terms forest owner and forest holder, which is the result of the dual keeping of land books through the land register and cadastre. Their unsettled status makes it more difficult to define real relationships. We always stress that the regulation of property-legal relations is the priority and the first precondition for creating an organized society. We must also make a clear distinction between the purpose and the use of forest and agricultural land. The first division was made during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but despite numerous legal provisions we have not yet done so since. Thus, for example, a large part of privately owned forests came into being by agricultural land being overgrown, but in land registers they are still registered as meadows, pastures, or ploughland. At the same time, we raise olive groves and vineyards or issue permits for grazing over an absolute forest land in state forests??? Due to historical circumstances, there are exceptionally small areas of forestland in private ownership today, and as such they do not ensure continuous income to their owners. Instead, there is an attempt to derive as much financial profit as possible through one operation without adhering to the principle of sustainability, the fundamental principle in forestry. The awareness of the need to functionally merge and plan silvicultural treatments at the level of compartments and sub-compartments has regrettably not yet taken root among Croatian forest owners. Therefore, despite the fact that management plans have been drawn for most private forests, in practice management is reduced to disconnected operations in individual plots. Private forests of small forest holders are witnessing an increase in criminal actions such as felling without marking, theft, timber extraction by unregistered or unlicenced contractors, uncontrolled placing of timber on the market, illegal timber trade, etc. The absence of clear and transparent (market) price forming policy in Croatia favours various resellers, while valuable raw material, usually without any control, ends up on foreign markets. All this makes us think about the responsibility of the state as a legislator and its attitude towards this category of private property, but also towards the common good protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Let us also tackle the responsibility of the entire forestry profession and its institutions, as well as our colleagues, certified engineers, who mark trees or dispatch timber in the field guided by the principle "one must have something to live on". If we, as a profession, turn a blind eye to this problem, we will hardly be able to boast in the future of the tradition of sustainable and close-to-nature management of our forests. The first precondition for installing the order in private forests of small holders involves setting up a guard service. According to the valid Law on Forests, the guarding of forests is the responsibility of their owners, which is practically unfeasible given their condition and age structure, or this could be done by forest owners' associations, which again rarely happens in practice. Throughout history there have always been forest guards. Until the mid-20th century they were municipal (regional) forest rangers, and until very recently this job was performed by employees of the company Croatian Forests. There are several options which might solve this situation: Þ Restore the jurisdiction of Croatian Forests Ltd by re-registering the company. Þ Implement guard services through local self-government bodies, similar to the regulations set down in the previous Law on Forests; however, this was not applied in practice. Þ Establish a "Forest Police" service with clearly defined powers to ensure order and prevent criminal activities. Þ Establish a State Forest Institution (Agency), which will exercise public powers and promote interests independently of forest ownership, as well as enable meaningful and comprehensive planning and management at all levels. Editorial Boards

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAUZ 20-tu OBLJETNICU DANA HRVATSKOGA ŠUMARSTVANa 101. Godišnjoj skupštini Hrvatskoga šumarskoga društva, održanoj 9. svibnja 1997. god. (188 sudionika) u Zaključcima pod red. br. 15 Skupština "proglašava 20. lipnja za Dan hrvatskoga šumarstva, koji će se od 1998. godine u organizaciji HŠD-a obilježavati svake godine". Naime, toga je datuma na 96. Redovitoj skupštini 20. lipnja 1991.g. jednoglasnom odlukom promijenjen naziv udruge iz Saveza društava inženjera i tehničara šumarstva i drvne industrije Hrvatske u Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo. Tako je od 1998.g. Dan hrvatskoga šumarstva redovito obilježavan. Uz redovita izvješća o radu i financijskom poslovanju udruge, u nastavku je uvijek slijedila aktualna stručna tema. Stručna tema ove Skupštine bila je "Hrvatsko šumarstvo danas i sutra". Uvod u raspravu dali su tadašnji predsjednik HŠD-a prof. dr. sc. Slavko Matić i direktor "Hrvatskih šuma" p.o. Zagreb Anđelko Serdarušić, dipl. ing. šum. Kao temu za razmišljanje, navest ćemo samo dio iz tih uvoda i rasprave objedinjenih u 15 zaključaka.Prof. Matić ponajprije naglašava kako je HŠD najmjerodavnija stručna organizacija koja mora raspravljati o stanju u hrvatskome šumarstvu, posebno onda kada su svakim danom problemi sve brojniji i uočljiviji. No, nitko ne očekuje njihovo rješenje preko noći. Najvažniji problemi su: zapošljavanje diplomiranih inženjera i općenito smanjenje broja zaposlenih u šumarstvu; nepotrebno izdvajanje velikih površina šuma u nacionalne parkove i parkove prirode i davanje na upravljanje raznoraznim upravnim odborima gdje gotovo i nema šumara; podređeni odnos prema struci gdje Hrvatske ceste, vodoprivreda i elektroprivreda, protivno Zakonu o šumama, ulaze u šume bez naknade; drvni sortimenti se raspoređuju po komisijama, uz niske cijene a svi se zaklinjemo u slobodno tržište; u šumu nam ulaze needucirani i slabo opremljeni poduzetnici s nekvalificiranom radnom snagom; poseban trud treba ulagati u afirmaciju struke utemeljene ponajprije na profesionalnoj etici; trebamo se riješiti onih "zalutalih" u šumarsku struku, kojima je cilj samo laka zarada.Direktor Serdarušić nakon uvoda daje desetak prijedloga za zaključke; uputiti zahtjev Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji za termin redovitog priloga o hrvatskom šumarstvu; da predstavnici HŠD-a, Šumarskog fakulteta, Šumarskog instituta i Hrvatskih šuma p.o. izrade suvremeni Zakon o šumama i Dugoročni program šumarstva i upute ga Ministarstvu uz zahtjev za ukidanje tzv. "liste finalista", reprogramiranja dugova, dodjela dionica, odgoda plaćanja itd.; usklađivanje odnosa šumarstva i drugih djelatnosti; da se osigura više financijskih sredstava za gospodarenje privatnim šumama i sanaciju ratnih šteta, te da na prostornom uređenju i djelatnostima zaštite prirode, neizostavno sudjeluju i šumarski stručnjaci.Tomislav Starčević naglašava kako je vrijeme da se analizira da li smo i koliko, dosljedno provodili temeljne koncepcijske pretpostavke za razvoj hrvatskoga šumarstva, gdje u provedbi tih opredjeljenja još nema jasne šumarske politike; Šumariji kao temeljnoj organizacijskoj jedinici ne daje se dovoljno važnosti i ovlaštenja, iz čega proizlazi gubitak motiva; kod uzgojnih radova vidljivo opada kvaliteta; doradom planova gospodarenja povećava se sortimentna struktura planova sječa, pa nemamo definirane planske veličine; naposljetku ovu Skupštinu smatra poticajnom za temeljiti razvoj šumarstva.Prof. Joso Vukelić smatra da Vlada RH nema koncepciju razvoja šumarstva i javnog poduzeća, ne uvažava stručna mišljenja, postavlja nekompetentan Upravni odbor; resorno Ministarstvo je neadekvatno organizirano i šumarstvo i lovstvo bi trebalo izdvojiti u posebnu Državnu upravu, kao što su to vode. Posebno ističe nezadovoljstvo društveno-moralnim položajem šumarske struke.Prvi resorni ministar Ivan Tarnaj ističe kako nijedna organizacija nije konačna, pa tako ni šumarska; ova dosadašnja, obrazlažući je detaljno, smatra da je bila dobra, jer trebalo je u teškim uvjetima preživjeti, no nakon 7 godina možda je vrijeme za novu.Prof. Branimir Prpić iskazuje nezadovoljstvo podređenošću šumarstva u Strategiji prostornog uređenja RH i smanjenjem opsega šumarskih djelatnosti, posebice u prostornom planiranju i zaštiti prirode i okoliša, gdje šumarske poslove preuzimaju nestručni kadrovi.Prošlo je 20 godina pa imajući pred sobom ovaj skraćeni prikaz navedene stručne teme (detaljno u Šumarskom listu br. 5-6/1997., str. 323-332), pokušajmo odgovoriti barem na dva pitanja: što se to do danas promijenilo i da li je "svatko od nas korigiranjem svoga rada dao najbolji doprinos poboljšanju stanja u šumarstvu", što je tada sugerirao prof. Matić u uvodnom izlaganju? Uredništvo ; EDITORIALOn the 20th Anniversary of the Day of Croatian ForestryAt the 101st Annual Assembly of the Croatian Forestry Association held on 9th May 1997, (188 participants), June 20th was proclaimed the Day of Croatian Forestry, which will be celebrated annually by the Croatian Forestry Association starting from 1998 (Conclusions, item 15). At the 96th regular meeting held on 20th June 1991, the name of the association was unanimously changed from the Association of Engineers and Technicians of Forestry and Wood Industry of Croatia into the Croatian Forestry Association. The Day of Croatian Forestry has been marked interminably since 1998. Regular reports on the activities and financial affairs of the Association have always been accompanied by discussions on current specialist topics. The specialist topic of the said Assembly was "the Croatian forestry today and tomorrow". An introduction to the discussion was given by Professor Slavko Matić, PhD, the then president of the Croatian Forestry Association, and Anđelko Serdarušić, BSc in forestry, director of the company "Croatian Forests". To provide food for thought, we shall mention only some parts of these introductions and discussions summarized in 15 conclusions.First and foremost, Professor Matić stresses that the CFA is the most competent professional organisation to discuss the condition of Croatian forestry, particularly in view of a growing number of acute problems. However, nobody expects overnight solutions. The most important problems include the employment of graduate engineers and the declining number of those employed in forestry in general; unnecessary conversions of large forest areas into national parks and nature parks and their management by managing boards consisting of anybody but foresters; a subordinate attitude towards the profession, reflected in the fact that the Croatian Roads, Water Management and Electrical Utility Company, contrary to the Forest Law, enter forests without any monetary compensation; wood assortments are distributed per commissions at low prices despite the fact that we all staunchly support the free market economy; forests are treated by uneducated and poorly equipped entrepreneurs with unqualified labour force; particular effort should be invested in the promotion of the profession that is based primarily on professional ethics; those who have "wandered" into the forestry profession by accident with the only goal of making easy money should be removed from forestry.Director Serdarušić followed his introduction with some ten proposals for the conclusions. These include the following: a request should be submitted to the Croatian Radio Television to allocate a fixed term for programmes on Croatian forestry; representatives of the CFA, the Faculty of Forestry, the Forest Research Institute and Croatian Forests Ltd should draw up a modern Forest Law and a Long-Term Forestry Programme and submit it to the Ministry. The Programme should be accompanied by a demand to abolish so-called "finalist lists", re-programme debts, allocate shares, postpone payments, etc; the relationship between forestry and other fields should be coordinated; more financial means should be ensured for the management of private forests and the recovery of war damage; and forestry experts should invariably be included into spatial management and nature conservation activities.Tomislav Starčević stresses the need to analyse whether the basic conceptual prerequisites for the development of Croatian forestry have been implemented and to what extent, considering that the application of these prerequisites is not guided by a clear forestry policy; the forest office, as the basic organisational unit, is not given sufficient importance and competences, hence the loss of motives; the quality of silvicultural treatments is visibly declining; by adding to management plans the assortment structure of cutting plans is increased, resulting in changes in the planned amounts; and finally, he considers this Assembly an incentive for the overall development of forestry.Professor Joso Vukelić points out that the Croatian Government does not have a clear concept of the development of forestry and public enterprises, does not accept professional opinions, and appoints incompetent management boards; the Ministry is inadequately organized; while forestry and hunting management should be placed under a separate State administration, similar to water management. He particularly expresses dissatisfaction with the socio-moral position of the forestry profession.The first forestry minister Ivan Tarnaj states that no organisation is final, and consequently the forestry organisation is not final either; he maintains that the current organisation is good in view of the fact that it was difficult to survive in hard conditions, but after seven years it is perhaps time to launch a new organisation.Professor Branimir Prpić expressed dissatisfaction with the subordinate position of forestry in the Croatian Strategy of Spatial Planning and with a reduced volume of forest activities, particularly in spatial planning and nature conservation and environment protection, where forestry activities are performed by inexpert personnel.Twenty years have passed: looking at this brief review of the topic (find a more detailed analysis in Forestry Journal No. 5-6/1997, pp 323-332), let us try and answer at least two questions: what has changed since and have we all "by improving our work, given the best contribution to the condition in forestry", as Professor Matić suggested in his introductory discussion. Editorial Board

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVANaslov uvodnika potaknut je građanskom inicijativom koja se u posljednje vrijeme širi Hrvatskom. Iako na facebook grupi, koja poziva na "tri zajednička dana uživanja u sadnji diljem Države" pod motom "Zasadi drvo, ne budi panj", prevladava entuzijazam i želja za jačanjem svijesti hrvatskih građana o očuvanju i zaštiti prirode, postoje i radikalniji osvrti na šumarsku struku i na trgovačko društvo Hrvatske šume, poput pitanja zašto se ne organiziraju javni radovi pošumljavanja? Tvrdi se da je to zato jer im je sječa prioritetnija od sadnje. Podmeće se teza: "Ne smiju oni posjeći više nego što mi možemo zasaditi!" Uzori akciji su velike sadnje u nekim zemljama poput Indije i Etiopije. Također poticaj akciji su i katastrofalni požari u plućima svijeta, Amazonskoj prašumi. Pohvalna je dobra volja i želja za ozelenjivanjem, ali ne mogu se uspoređivati zemlje u kojima vladaju drukčiji klimatski i stanišni uvjeti pa nakon sječe ili uništavanja šume požarima dolazi do deforestacije, nestaje tlo i šuma se ne obnavlja. U Republici Hrvatskoj je upravo obrnuto, na djelu je reforestacija, tj. šuma se širi na napuštene poljoprivredne i druge površine, tako da je danas gotovo pola države pod šumom, ali u različitim starosnim kategorijama. Ova akcija je samo odraz zabrinutosti običnog čovjeka, ali i određene neargumentirane histerije koja je pokrenuta protiv šumara u Hrvatskoj.S obzirom na sve učestalije i nekorektne napade na šumarsku struku, što je prevršilo svaku mjeru, potiče nas da se mi kao struka oglasimo. Možemo smireno, stručno i argumentirano, a možemo i bezobrazno kao što se nas napada. Ponajprije, za laike koji to žele čuti, kažemo da je sječa uzgojni zahvat. Šuma ili stablo ima nazovimo ga početak, rast kroz razne uzgojne faze do optimuma, a potom slijedi faza "odumiranja". Zadaća šumarske struke je prebroditi tu zadnju fazu upravo sječom starih stabala, polučiti korist društvu njihovom preradom, ali osiguravši prethodno u jednodobnim sastojinama u godini dobrog uroda sjemena prirodno pomlađivanje. Svakako prije bilo kakvog negativnog stava glede sječe, treba prići vrlo blizu površini gdje je do "jučer" bila npr. stara hrastova šuma te provjeriti da li i što sada raste na toj površini. U prebornoj pak šumi, npr. bukve i jele, prebiru se sječom stara dozrela stabla i ona koja smetaju podmlatku koji treba svijetla da bi ih zamijenio. Samo tamo gdje u potpunosti nije uspjelo prirodno naplođivanje, pa tako i na opožarenim površinama, ide se na pošumljavanje sjemenom ili tzv. "školovanim" sadnicama. Održati šumu vječnom, načelo je potrajnog gospodarenja, čime se ponosi hrvatska znanost i praksa, a što joj i šumarski svijet priznaje. Što rade Hrvatske šume d.o.o. pitaju se pojedini prosvjednici? Zadaća Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. kao trgovačkog društva u državnom vlasništvu, kojima je Država povjerila gospodarenje, je obavljati poslove sukladno Osnovama gospodarenja, što znači ne stihijski nego po Zakonu o šumama, sukladno šumarskoj politici i strategiji. Osnove gospodarenja za svaku gospodarsku jedinicu propisuju desetgodišnje aktivnosti, provjerava ih stručno povjerenstvo, a Rješenjem ih odobrava resorni ministar. U njih je ugrađeno i niz propisa i popisa koje propisuje Ministarstvo zaštite okoliša. Znači ništa se ne radi amaterski – sve počiva na znanstvenim i stručnim saznanjima u šumarskoj praksi stečenoj kroz preko 250 godina organiziranog šumarstva. Klimatske promjene, ledolomi, vjetrolomi i štetnici, čemu su posebice u zadnje vrijeme izložene šume, samo još otežavaju rad u šumarstvu i zahtijevaju još veću stručnost i znanje, a nikako amaterizam. Nije bez razloga još u pretprošlom stoljeću zaključeno da za gospodarenje šumom nije dovoljna viša, nego je potrebna visoka stručna sprema, što je kod nas ostvareno 1898. godine početkom rada Šumarske akademije (današnjeg Šumarskog fakulteta), kao četvrte visokoškolske ustanove Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.No, s prekomjernom sječom treba se boriti na dijelu privatnih šumskih parcela, ali s tom stihijom se odnosne udruge ne hvataju u koštac. U istoj rečenici pitamo se bezobrazno: tko su to "oni" koji ne smiju posjeći? Da li su to možda oni koji su pet godina studirali šumarstvo, skupljajući znanja iz botanike, više matematike, kemije, meteorologije, anatomije i fiziologije bilja, pedologije, dendrologije, dendrometrije, uzgajanja šuma, ekologije, uređivanja šuma, zaštite šuma i dr., prisegavši na promociji dipl. ing. šumarstva da će raditi po stručnim šumarskim načelima. Lekcije im pak dijele oni koji su u slobodno vrijeme malo "proguglali" i na vikend izletima uz dobru zabavu, "učvrstili" svoje znanje o šumarstvu. Njihovi stručni sufleri, a kažu da ih imaju, mogli bi konačno javno polemizirati. Očekivali bi od odnosnih udruga da nas podupru u protivljenju smanjenja naknada za općekorisne funkcije šuma (OKFŠ), iz kojih se financiraju izgradnja protupožarnih prometnica, gašenja požara, pošumljavanje opožarenih površina i razminiranje površina, no one očito pristaju da se to "gura" u parafiskalne namete. Hrvatska Vlada od Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. očekuje uplatu u državni proračun, dok čitamo, Njemačka Vlada ulaže 500 mil. EURA za sanaciju šuma, jer ih se prošle godine osušilo preko 110.000 ha.Nemamo ništa protiv toga da se ozelenjuju neke gradske površine, ali i to mora biti planski, kako izborom površina, tako i vrstom drveća, poznavajući i poštujući njihove ekološke i biološke zahtjeve. Saditi bilo što i bilo gdje, što iščitavamo iz upućenog poziva, je neodgovorno i prema prostoru, ali i prema biljci.Uredništvo ; EDITORIALThe headline of the editorial was prompted by a civil initiative sweeping through Croatia in recent times. The Facebook group, which calls for "three enjoyable days of planting trees across the State" under the motto "Plant a tree, don't be a stump", is imbued with enthusiasm and a wish to raise the awareness of Croatian citizens of the need to preserve and protect the nature; however, there are also more radical views on the forestry profession and the company Croatian Forests Ltd. Among others, they ask why there are no public afforestation activities and conclude that the reason lies in the fact that cutting trees has priority over planting them. There is an undergoing statement: "They cannot fell more than we can plant!" The campaign was prompted by large-scale planting campaigns in some countries such as India and Ethiopia. Another incentive to the campaign was provided by the devastating fires taking place in the lungs of the world, the Amazonian rain forest. The will and wish to plant trees deserves full credit, but we cannot be compared with the countries with different climatic and habitat conditions, in which felling or forest fires result in deforestation, loss of forest soil and inability of forests to regenerate. The situation in the Republic of Croatia is diametrically opposite: reforestation is an ongoing process; in other words, the forest spreads into abandoned agricultural and other areas, so that currently almost half of the country is covered with forests of different age categories. This campaign reflects the concern of the ordinary person, but also contains certain ill founded hysterical reactions targeted at foresters in Croatia.In view of the ever more frequent and unfounded attacks on the forestry profession, which has gone out of hand, it is time for the profession to voice its opinion. We can do it in two ways: we can either put forward professional and well founded arguments, or retaliate in the same impertinent manner in which we are being attacked. To start with, for those who are ready to listen, let us stress that felling is a silvicultural operation. A forest or a tree has its beginning, followed by growth through different silvicultural stages until it reaches its optimum and finally the stage of "dying". The task of the forestry profession is to deal with this last stage by cutting down old trees, making profit for the society by processing these cut trees, and ensuring natural regeneration in even-aged stands in the years of good seed mast. Before any negative attitude on a felling operation is taken, it would be advisable to inspect closely the area which was until "yesterday" covered by an old oak forest and check what is being planted in this area, if anything. In a selection forest of, e.g. beech and fir, felling is applied to remove old mature trees and those trees which prevent young trees from reaching the necessary light for growth. Reforestation with seeds or with so-called "trained" seedlings is applied only in those areas in which natural seedling has not been completely successful or in areas badly affected by fires. Maintaining the forest in a perpetually stable condition is the principle of sustainable management. This principle is something that Croatian science and practice is rightly proud of and for which it receives acknowledgement from the global forestry world.What does the company Croatian Forests Ltd do, some protesters ask? The task of the company, as a state-owned company which has been entrusted by the State with caring for the forests, is to manage forests and carry out all the jobs set down in management plans, in line with the Forest Act, the forestry policy and strategy. There is no question here of chaotic and disorganized management. Management plans for every management unit prescribe the execution of ten-year activities. These plans are verified by expert committees and approved by the corresponding minister. They also contain regulations and rules set down by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. As seen from the above, nothing is done on an amateur basis - everything is firmly grounded on scientific and expert knowledge of the forestry practice, which has been acquired through 250 and more years of organized forestry. Climate change, damage caused by ice and wind, as well as pests, to which forests have been particularly exposed in recent times, make work in forestry even more difficult and require even more expertise and knowledge - certainly not amateurism. This is the reason that as far back as the 18th century it was realized that management of forests required not just a college degree but academic education. In Croatia, this was put to practice in1898, when the Forestry Academy (the present day Faculty of Forestry) was opened as the fourth institution of higher education within the University of Zagreb.A battle against excessive felling should be fought in parts of privately owned forest areas, yet the above groups fail to grapple with this problem. Allow us to be impertinent enough to ask: who are "they" who are not allowed to perform felling operations? Perhaps those who have studied forestry for five years, acquired knowledge of botany, higher mathematics, chemistry, meteorology, plant anatomy and physiology, pedology, dendrology, dendrometrics, silviculture, ecology, forest planning, forest protection and other fields, and who have, when receiving their degrees of graduate engineers of forestry, pledged to adhere to expert forestry principles in their work? Such professionals are then lectured by those who have "googled" something about forestry and who have gained their knowledge of forestry at weekend outings in forests. We would welcome with open arms their expert advisors, which they claim there are many, to finally come out and engage in public debates. We would expect from these groups to support us in opposing the move to cut down on non-market forest function fees, which are used to finance the construction of fire breaks, fire suppression, reforestation of burnt areas and demining areas. Obviously, they prefer these fees to be "pushed" into parafiscal levies. While the Croatian government expects from the company Croatian Forests Ltd to pay into the state budget, the German government invests 500 million euro into the recovery of forests, since over 110,000 ha of forests dried only last year.We have nothing against making city areas green, but this should be carried out in a planned manner, both as regards the choice of areas and the choice of tree species, taking into account their ecological and biological requirements. Planting anything and anywhere, as seen from the initiative, is irresponsible both for the area and for the plant.Editorial Board

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.