AbstractThe purpose of this research was to adapt Antonak and Harth's (1994) Mental Retardation Attitudes Inventory for the Kuwaiti culture and to investigate its four‐dimensional structure. The study also aimed at identifying a unidimensional subset of items besides examining the quality of the identified items and the overall inventory. The 34 ‐item adapted inventor y was administered to 56 4 college students. Item analysis indicated that 29 items have had good psychometric characteristics. However, the exploratory factor analysis, cross‐correlations of scale and item scores, and correlations among scales did not support the four‐dimensional structure of the adapted inventory. Further, the sample was split into two random halves. A uni‐dimensional subset of 20 items was identified in one sample by iterative factor analyzing the item data and discarding items with small loadings. The other sample was used to cross‐validate uni‐dimensionality of the identified items. Analysis indicated that scores of the 20‐item inventory have high Cronbach coefficient alpha, and high stability and generalizability coefficients. Partial support for the validity of the scores had been ascertained by comparing the scores of male and female students, and by regressing the inventor y scores on indicators of familiarity with individuals with mental retardation. Findings were discussed with reference to Kuwaiti culture.Over the last two decades, inclusion has internationally become a critical part of the reform efforts to improve the delivery of services to individuals with Mental Retardation (MR). This trend focuses on increasing the opportunities for the placement of these individuals in the same social and educational set tings as individuals without MR. The new arrangements for providing services have created challenges to people without disabilities concerning acceptance, integration, and inclusion of individuals with MR into the mainstream of society (Praisner, 2003). Many researchers (e.g. Priestly, 1998; Yazbeck McVilly & Parmenter, 2004) have convincingly argued that these challenges have their roots in the societal norms and values that concurrently developed throughout the unfolding history of the meaning of MR. As Priestly (1998) noted, although people with differences have existed in all societies, the degree to which they were integrated or excluded varied according to predominant cultural perceptions. Yazbeck, McVilly and Parmenter (2004) suggested that people's attitudes toward individuals with MR are socially constructed and are acquired through experience over time.Individuals with MR are often judged by people based on their disability instead of their whole lives and what they may accomplish and experience during their life (Blatt, 1987). Consequently, People may rely on false generalization and develop negative attitudes towards individuals with MR. Makas, Finnerty‐Fried, Sugafoos, and Reiss (1988) noted that for nondisabled persons, positive attitude toward people with disability is usually conceptualized as being 'nice' and 'helpful', whereas for a person with a disability, the attitude would be dispensing with the category of disability entirely. A study of community attitudes in one state of Australia found that up to 86% of respondents reported feeling 'uncomfortable' when interacting with individuals with disabilities (Enhance Management, 1999). Another study (European Commission, 2001) found that 40% of Europeans reported feeling 'uneasy' in the presence of people with disabilities.Attitudes manifest themselves as positive or negative reactions toward an object, driven by beliefs that impel individuals to behave in a particular way (Yuker, 1988). They comprise a complex of feelings, desires, fears, convictions, prejudices, or other tendencies learned through varied experiences that give rise to a set or readiness to act toward a person in a certain way (Chaiken & Stangor,1987). This means that attitude is not behavior, but the precondition of behavior. In addition, Myers, Ager, Kerr, and Myles (1998) identified three types of attitudes that influence how non‐disabled people interact with, and include or exclude people with disabilities: (1) A preparedness to engage with people as consumers, neighbors, or friends; (2) a lack of awareness about individuals with MR; and (3) a wariness or hostility regarding the idea of community integration.Research has shown that the third type of attitudes, which represents negative and non‐acceptance of individuals with MR is commonly observed (Gething, 1994; Schwartz & Armony‐Sivan, 2001). Such negative attitudes in a society may present people with MR as a burden on the welfare system. Moreover, people might not see individuals with disabilities as possessing a valuable social role or possessing the same abilities and characteristics that the majority of people possess. Tus, individuals with MR may not be accepted or included in society and may often be treated badly. In turn, Wolfensberger (1988) indicated that individuals with MR, being in a devalued position, would behave badly as they think that this is what is expected of them.As integration of persons with MR is increasingly becoming a global reality, Kuwait has designed social policy aimed at promoting acceptance and inclusion of people with disabilities into the mainstream of society. To implement the policy of integration, the Kuwaiti government is continually forming inclusive services for individuals with MR. The recent policy of inclusion (law 13/96), which has been adopted in 1996, asserts that people with disabilities have a fundamental right to live and grow within their local communities. This law has spawned an expanded system of services to encourage people with disabilities to live like people without disabilities. Inclusion policies give individuals with MR the right to be involved in the same situations as people without MR. For example, more individuals with MR, for example, are being employed. Moreover, most children with Downs syndrome now attend Kindergarten and are included in social programs for children in the general population. The general goal of all types of services provided for individuals with MR is to improve their participation in society.Although the Kuwaiti government has shown a growing interest in the integration of individuals with MR, the chances of these individuals being able to integrate into mainstream society would depend on the attitude of others, such as students, teachers, coworkers, social workers, professionals, towards them. These attitudes, as found in many Western studies (Antonak & Harth, 1994; Gordon, Tantillo, Feldman & Perrone, 2004) are, for the most part, negative, which may contribute to negative outcomes on the part of individuals with MR (Byon, 2000). According to Wright (1983), disability situations are vulnerable to fundamental negative attitudes, and this would seem to be even truer in the culture found in Kuwait.In Kuwaiti culture, disability has stigmatizing effect on members of the immediate and extended family; families tend to keep members with MR out of the sight of other people. This contributes to social exclusion of people with MR. There is also the traditional common belief that disability is related to (1) God's willing that the parent should have a child with a disability, (2) God is punishing the parent, (3) God is testing the parent, or (4) God is selecting the parent for an unknown reason. Commonly, persons with MR have been considered burdensome and shameful, because they are incapable of contributing to traditional social obligations and roles.While those traditional beliefs still exist, the law 13/96 was legislated to support the integration of persons with MR into various aspects of life. Consequently, we expect that people in the society would react to this trend with frustration, anger, or refusal. Usually, people in Kuwait have little or no information about individuals with MR; thereby uninformed determinations, such as stereotypes, reflect their attitudes toward these individuals. According to Blatt (1987), a stereotype will fill in the cracks and unanswered questions in a situation with which people are not familiar. Langer (1989) in her theory of 'mindfulness' also shows that stereotype is 'premature cognitive commitments' that leads people to make judgments without enough information and reflection.Moreover, the society labels given to individuals with MR are often accompanied with stigma and negative connotations. This situation makes it difficult for those individuals to be included into society and be accepted for what they actually are and not for what others assume them to be. According to Biklen and Bogdan (1977), this type of discrimination is called 'handicapism' and is defined as'…a set of assumptions and practices that promote differential and unequal treatment of people because of apparent or assumed physical, mental, or behavioral differences' (p.206). These perceptions may prevent individuals with MR from being accepted, and they might be viewed, based on Erikson's theory, as a pseudo species, or as less than human (Smith, 1981).Furthermore, professionals', leaders', and students' views and beliefs about the integration of individuals with MR into society may result in slowing the process of inclusion and discouraging people from accepting these individuals as what they are. For example, though senior staff in Kuwait's Ministry of Social Affairs succeeded in including children with Downs syndrome into public kindergarten, no other effort has been made since 1996 to integrate other children with disabilities into inclusive educational settings. More critical is that, while leaders make efforts toward inclusion, they continue to support the permanent residence of individuals with MR in social welfare institutions and urge the government to provide free health, social and educational services for the residents. Ahmad (2004) found that between 1992 and 2002, there was an increase in the number of children, and males and females adults with MR who live in the Social Welfare Institution for permanent care. The number of residents with MR has increased from 223 to 296.According to Philips (1992), leaders' and professionals' beliefs about individuals with MR could have commenced with the industrial revolution that brought with it the practice of classifying people who were different, and who were not able to pursue personal dreams or act as the industrial society required. Leaders and professionals may perceive individuals with MR, as Blatt (1987) stated, blessed innocents or surplus population that is unnecessary and expendable. These beliefs may never give the individuals with MR an adequate opportunity to present themselves and their abilities to others.Praisner (2003) suggested that leaders' attitudes are the key factor in successful inclusion. Due to leadership position, leaders' and professionals' attitudes about inclusion either could result in increased opportunities for individuals with MR to be served in different settings or increased efforts to support the segregated special education services. According to Goodlad and Lovitt (1993), leaders and professionals have the decision to develop an inclusive setting, if they (1) make and honor commitments, (2) do what they say in formal and informal settings, (3) express interest in inclusion, (4) act and make their actions known, and (5) organize their staff and their physical surroundings to implement inclusive programs. As Praisner (2003) stated, the success of inclusion depends on how leaders exhibit behaviors that advance the integration, acceptance, and success of individuals with disabilities in general settings.Researchers (e.g., Horne, 1985) have also shown that students' positive attitudes may increase their willingness to work with individuals with MR, and lead to removal of barriers to integrate them into society. The positive attitudes of students may help to encourage the establishment of policies and the allocation of resources to increase the integration of individuals with MR into different settings in the society (Yazbeck, et al., 2004).To enhance the policy of inclusion in Kuwait, society needs to evaluate some of its structures and change people's attitudes to fit the needs of individuals with MR instead of making these individuals fit society's structures. Helping individuals with MR to be included into society and establish socially valued roles would not be difficult if the attitudes of society are less restrictive and less resistant to change.As Kuwait continues to develop social and educational policy about inclusion, researchers must pay attention to the connection between integration and attitudes. The provision of educational and social opportunities for individuals with MR can be legislated by Kuwait's government, but acceptance from other people cannot be ensured without knowing people's beliefs and thoughts about persons with MR.Developing an understanding of the attitudes that is predominant in society, which in turn influences the actions of its members, is critical if we plan for social changes and for evaluating the effectiveness of public policy on promoting an inclusive society (Schwartz & Armony‐Sivan, 2001). Given that there are negative attitudes toward people with MR, particular care must be taken to monitor changing social attitudes toward these individuals to identify any serious impediment to the progress of their inclusion in different settings: schools, workplace, and the wider community.Research that is relevant to individuals with disabilities (e.g. Geskie & Salasek, 1988; Antonak & Harth, 1994) has revealed the need for researchers to investigate the attitudes of people toward MR. Wolfensberger (1983) suggested that the key to changing how people are valued socially is to change the perceptions people have about individuals who may differ from the norm. Research, however, has indicated that the investigation of attitudes toward individuals with MR requires a psychometrically sound instrument. It is crucial to conduct research to gather accurate information about these attitudes; it would clarify people's awareness of persons with MR, and assist in evaluating intervention programs and developing appropriate course work for special education fields. Further, it would inform public policy decisions, funding priorities, and service delivery, which in turn, enhance the likelihood of achieving successful integration and improving qua lit y of life for persons with MR (Antonak & Harth, 19 94; Schalock, 1990). Accurate measurement of attitudes could also lead to early detection of negative attitudes, such as personal prejudices, misconceptions, and irrational fears of professionals, social workers, and teachers when they first get involved in disability work settings. Furthermore, it would help in providing a baseline for monitoring changes in their attitudes over time (Byon, 2000).Changing attitudes would help in supporting efforts of individuals with MR to become autonomous (Philips, 1992), and help to decrease the resistance of others to allow people with MR to make decisions about their own lives and to be independent (Schalock, 1990). As the history of the deinstitutionalization movement has shown, becoming autonomous and independent are not as simple as releasing people from state facilities and hoping they survive on their own. Autonomy and independence are based upon choice‐making, and choice‐making must be taught to people with MR, as they have never been allowed to make their own choices and do not know how to rationally choose for themselves.However, as Crutcher (1990) noted, personal choice is based on opportunity, and opportunity is accessible only when society decides it should be. Therefore, in order for individuals with MR to have the opportunity to make their own decisions and be successfully included in society, special effort must be taken to change peoples' attitudes towards them.Moreover, a psychometrically sound instrument of attitudes helps researchers to assess with known precision respondents' feelings about individuals with MR (affective aspect of attitudes), and their conceptions about them (cognitive aspect of attitudes). On the affective side, there are feelings of approval or disapproval of individuals with MR in the society. On the cognitive side, there are beliefs, knowledge, and expectations that affect people's behavior towards individuals with MR. The affective and cognitive aspects affect the respondents' opinions of what services should be provided for individuals with MR and what policy should be adopted. These also assist in the design, implementation, and evaluation of social intervention program and strategies geared toward removing barriers to integration (Geskie & Salasek, 1988).The present study focused on adapting, for use in Kuwait, the Mental Retardation Attitude Inventory‐Revised (MR AI‐R) of Antonak and Harth (1994). The MRAI‐R was chosen because of the limitations of the MR attitudes' instruments in the Gulf States, and in particular the lack of such an instrument in Kuwait. After reviewing literature, it seemed that there was only one measure of attitudes; an inventory developed by Qaryauti (1988). Despite the claimed appropriateness of Qaryauti's scale, we decided to use the MRAI‐R of Antonak and Harth for several reasons. First, Qaryauti's scale was based on Western instruments that Antonak and Harth criticized and motivated them to construct the MRAI‐R. In contrast, Antonak and Harth constructed the MRAI‐R based on a review of more than 50 years of the attitude literature, and developed their inventory on the most available valid instrument.Second, by reviewing the items of the MRAI‐R and Qaryauti's scale, it was clear to us that the MRAI‐R is more consistent with the requirements of the law 13/96 that was mandated in Kuwait to assure the right of individuals with MR to be included into public schools, workplace, and the wider community (see Table 1). Third, the MRAI‐R, unlike Qaryauti's scale, incorporates several components of attitudes: (1) the integration‐segregation of individuals with MR in various school programs, workplace, and community; (2) the willingness of people to be associated with individuals with MR (Social Distance); (3) the rights of individuals with MR to be included in schools, communities, and the workplace (Private Rights); and (4) the derogatory beliefs of people about the moral character and social behavior of individuals with MR. Of the 22 items in Qaryauti's scale, 13 were related to derogatory beliefs, six to social distance, and only three to private rights and integration‐segregation.Fourth, many transcultural researchers have used the MRAI‐R in populations as diverse as the United States, Australia, and Korea. In the US, Ward (1998) used the MRAI‐R to explore relationships between empathy and attitudes among 200 parents and adult consumers with developmental disabilities. Also, Yozwiak (2002) utilized the MRAI‐R to examine the beliefs and attitudes of 210 community members toward a child with MR who was a witness to a sexual abuse case. In an Australian study, Yazbeck and others (2004) used MRAI‐R to examine differences in attitudes between students and professionals in disability services, and persons in the general community (N=492). In Korea, Byon's study (2000) used the MRAI‐R to investigate the effect of social desirability on attitudes toward MR, and to compare the relationships between attitude measures (both direct and indirect measures) and behavioral outcome indicators. Obviously, findings from a large number of studies using the MRAI‐R contribute to its validity. In contrast, we failed to find any study in which Qaryauti's scale was used.Based on the above arguments, it seems that the MRAI‐R would be useful in needs assessments, especially in schools and mental health clinics. For example, when the ministry of education decides to implement the inclusion policy in schools, there would be a need to assess attitudes of teachers and students towards students with MR. The results of such assessment would help in designing programs that improve attitudes as needed. The MRAI‐R can also be useful for social workers, professionals, and researchers who work in a variety of primary social welfare settings. It helps them to identify and target those people who are the most in need of training and preparation to change their attitudes toward MR. In a wider scale, non‐profit organizations can use results of assessing attitudes in advocating the rights of those individuals.In general, the primary usage of the MRAI‐R could be: (1) screening for early identification of negative attitudes; (2) assessing attitudes of specific groups toward persons with MR; (3) pre‐ or post‐ measurement in intervention studies; and (4) helping researchers who aim at studying the effects of attitudes on different variables in the life of people with MR (i.e. job satisfaction, life satisfaction, family relationship, social support), or the relationship between attitudes and demographic variables (i.e. gender, age, marital status, employment, educational status, familiarity with individuals with MR).Following the recommendation of Antonak and Livneh (1988) that researchers should use the existing instruments and stop creating new ones, the purpose of the present study is to develop an Arabic inventory of attitudes toward individuals with MR by adapting the MRAI‐R to be suitable for use in Kuwait. Specifically, the study aimed at: (1) revising the MRAI‐R items to make them suitable to Kuwait's culture; (2) investigating the suitability of the four‐factor‐structure of the MRAI‐R for measuring attitudes toward individuals with MR in Kuwait; (3) selecting a uni‐dimensional subset of items, if the four‐factor‐structure was not confirmed; and (4) examining the psychometric characteristics of the adapted inventory.We decided to carry out this study on college students for various reasons: (1) college students are prospective educators or professionals who will be either dealing with people with MR or making decisions that affect their lives; (2) college students in Kuwait play an active role in social change and in changing public opinions;(3) they are representative cross‐section of Kuwaiti society; (4) a sample of college students is more easily acquired than a sample from the general population.
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 158-162
ISSN: 1545-8504
Ali E. Abbas (" Decomposing the Cross Derivatives of a Multiattribute Utility Function into Risk Attitude and Value ") received the M.S. degree in electrical engineering, the M.S. degree in engineering economic systems and operations research, the Ph.D. degree in management science and engineering, and the Ph.D. (minor) degree in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University, Stanford, California. He was a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford. He previously worked for Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He was also involved with several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and was a co-teacher of several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group, Menlo Park, California. He is currently an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a member of INFORMS, a senior member of the IEEE, an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research, and an editor of the DA column in education for Decision Analysis Today. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") holds a joint appointment as professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the Department of Engineering Physics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she chairs the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering. She has directed the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis (formerly the Center for Human Performance in Complex Systems) since 1995. She has more than 20 years of experience in risk analysis for the nuclear power, chemical, petrochemical, and aerospace industries. Before returning to academia, she spent seven years as a consultant at Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. While there, her clients included the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and a number of nuclear utilities, and she prepared testimony for Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings on the safety of the Indian Point nuclear power plants. Dr. Bier's current research focuses on applications of risk analysis and related methods to problems of security and critical infrastructure protection, under support from the Department of Homeland Security. She is also currently serving as a special term appointee for the Infrastructure Assurance Center at Argonne National Laboratory. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 1513 University Avenue, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: bier@engr.wisc.edu . Robert F. Bordley (" Using Bayes' Rule to Update an Event's Probabilities Based on the Outcomes of Partially Similar Events ") is an INFORMS Fellow and a winner of the best publication award from the Decision Analysis Society as well as five major application awards from General Motors. He is a General Motors Technical Fellow with experience in research, planning, quality, marketing, corporate strategy, and procurement. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and was formerly program director of Decision, Risk and Management Sciences at the National Science Foundation. Dr. Bordley has published 75 papers in decision analysis, marketing, and operations management. He has also served as chair of the American Statistical Association's Risk Analysis Section (which now has 1000 members), vice president of the Production and Operations Management Society, and a member of the INFORMS Board and the Decision Analysis Society Council. He earned a Ph.D. and M.S. in operations research and an M.B.A. in finance from the University of California, Berkeley. His primary interests have been in theoretical developments enabling high-impact application of decision analysis in a wide variety of corporate contexts (e.g., engineering design, corporate strategy, procurement, program management, etc.). Address: General Motors, Pontiac Centerpoint Campus North, 585 South Boulevard, Pontiac, MI 48341; e-mail: robert.bordley@gm.com , rbordley@umich.edu . Heidi M. Crane (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is an assistant professor of medicine at the University of Washington (UW) School of Medicine and the associate director of Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research at the UW Center for AIDS Research (CFAR), which promotes research comparing the effectiveness of management strategies for HIV-infected patients in routine clinical practice. She is co–principal investigator (PI) of a PROMIS (Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information Systems) National Institutes of Health Roadmap initiative U01 on measuring patient reported outcomes in clinical care for HIV-infected patients and PI of a National Institute of Mental Health R01 project on measuring and improving adherence for HIV-infected patients in clinical care. She is also medical director of the Madison HIV Metabolic clinic, PI of an American Heart Association grant on myocardial infarction and metabolic complications among patients with HIV, and PI of an Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality grant on comparative effectiveness of antihypertensive and lipid-lowering medication among HIV-infected patients. She provides care and training in the clinical care of HIV-infected individuals, and she also mentors junior investigators in HIV research in the UW Division of Infectious Diseases. Dr. Crane is a member of the Data Management Centers for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases–funded CFAR Network of Integrated Clinical Systems (CNICS) research platform of real-time electronic health record data for 22,000 patients from eight CFARs across the United States, and the International Epidemiological Databases to Evaluate AIDS project's North American AIDS Cohort Collaboration on Research and Design (NA-ACCORD), which merges data on 110,000 HIV-infected individuals in care at 60 sites across the United States and Canada. Dr. Crane leads the CNICS Patient Reported Outcomes Committee and the CNICS and NA-ACCORD myocardial infarction event adjudication teams. Dr. Crane's research focuses on methods to improve clinical care for HIV-infected individuals as well as metabolic and other chronic comorbidities of HIV. She received her internal medicine residency training from Barnes and Jewish Hospitals, and her B.A., B.S., M.D., M.P.H. and Infectious Disease Fellowship training from the UW. Address: Harborview Medical Center, 325 9th Avenue, Box 359931, Seattle, WA 98104; e-mail: hcrane@u.washington.edu . Naraphorn Haphuriwat (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") is a researcher at the National Metal and Materials Technology Center in Thailand. She applies tools including optimization, decision analysis, and process simulation to improve production processes and operations for small and medium enterprises. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering in August 2010. During her doctoral study, she was supported by the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California, where she conducted game-theoretic studies in the applications of security. She also received an honorable mention in the 2004–2005 University Book Store Academic Excellence Award Competition for a project related to computer security. Address: 114 Thailand Science Park, Paholyothin Road, Klong 1, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand; e-mail: naraphoh@mtec.or.th . Joseph B. Kadane (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is Leonard J. Savage University Professor of Statistics and Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Carnegie Mellon University. His research focus is on both foundational issues of Bayesian analysis and applications in many settings. These currently include physics, phylogenetics, air pollution, Internet security, law, and medicine, as well as Internet auctions. He also serves as an expert witness in legal matters. Address: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail: kadane@andrew.cmu.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors: Deterrence, Multiattribute Utility, and Probability and Bayes' Updating ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple-attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Mari M. Kitahata (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") is professor of medicine at the University of Washington (UW) School of Medicine, director of Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research at the Center for AIDS Research (CFAR), and principal investigator of the UW HIV Cohort. She has provided care and training in the clinical management of HIV-infected individuals for two decades, and she mentors investigators in HIV research in the UW Division of Infectious Diseases. Dr. Kitahata studies the outcomes of care for persons with HIV infection, and her research has elucidated key determinants of increased survival, including care managed by physicians with HIV expertise and earlier initiation of antiretroviral treatment. The need for observational research to complement the invaluable information provided by randomized controlled trials has grown tremendously, which is why she established the CFAR Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research program at UW in 1995 and was among the first CFARs in the United States to do so. Dr. Kitahata developed the structure and methods to merge comprehensive HIV patient data and biological specimens from multiple settings into a powerful resource for researchers conducting basic, translational, clinical outcomes/comparative effectiveness, and behavioral/prevention research. She has led efforts to establish networks of national and international HIV research collaborations to address the most pressing questions regarding treatment and outcomes for HIV-infected individuals that cannot be answered through smaller cohort studies. Dr. Kitahata directs the Data Management Centers for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases–funded CFAR Network of Integrated Clinical Systems (CNICS) research platform of real-time electronic health record (EHR) data for 22,000 patients from eight CFARs across the United States, and the International Epidemiological Databases to Evaluate AIDS project's North American AIDS Cohort Collaboration on Research and Design (NA-ACCORD), which merges data on 110,000 HIV-infected individuals in care at 60 sites across the United States and Canada. Dr. Kitahata serves on the Board of Directors for the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) HIV Medicine Association, the U.S. Public Health Service/IDSA Guidelines Committee for Prevention of Opportunistic Infections, and the International Training and Education Center on HIV (I-TECH), where she developed a national EHR system for the Haitian Ministry of Health. Dr. Kitahata received her B.S. from Yale University, M.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, internal medicine residency training at the University of California, San Francisco, and M.P.H. and Fellowship training at the University of Washington, where she was a Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholar. Address: University of Washington Medical Center, 1959 NE Pacific Street, UW Box 356423, Seattle, WA 98195-6423; e-mail: kitahata@u.washington.edu . Sanjeev R. Kulkarni (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") is a professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University. He is also an affiliated faculty member in the Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering and the Department of Philosophy. Prior to joining Princeton, he was a member of the technical staff at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. During his time at Princeton, he has held visiting or consulting positions with Australian National University, Susquehanna International Group, and Flarion Technologies. Professor Kulkarni has served as an associate editor for the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, and he is a Fellow of the IEEE. His research interests include statistical pattern recognition, nonparametric statistics, learning and adaptive systems, information theory, wireless networks, and image/video processing. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: kulkarni@princeton.edu . Daniel N. Osherson (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") earned his Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1973. Since then he has taught at Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Università San Raffael, Rice University, and Princeton University. His work centers on probability judgment and learning. Address: Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: osherson@princeton.edu . H. Vincent Poor (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") is dean of the School of Engineering and Applied Science at Princeton University, where he is also the Michael Henry Strater University Professor of Electrical Engineering. He holds a Ph.D. from Princeton. His research interests are in the areas of statistical signal processing, stochastic analysis, and information theory, and their applications to wireless networks and related fields. Among his publications in these areas are the recent books Quickest Detection (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Information Theoretic Security (NOW Publishers, 2009). Dean Poor is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and he is a Fellow of the IEEE, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Royal Academy of Engineering of the United Kingdom. A former Guggenheim Fellow, recent recognition of his work included the Institution of Engineering and Technology Ambrose Fleming Medal, the IEEE Eric E. Sumner Award, and an honorary D.Sc. from the University of Edinburgh. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: poor@princeton.edu . Guanchun Wang (" Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment ") received an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He is currently a Ph.D. student in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University. His research interests include statistical learning, information retrieval, and judgment aggregation. He also worked as a summer associate for McKinsey's technology practice. Address: School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: guanchun@princeton.edu . Henry H. Willis (" Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation ") is a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and the associate director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center. His research has applied risk analysis tools to resource allocation and risk management decisions in the areas of public health and emergency preparedness, terrorism and national security policy, energy and environmental policy, and transportation planning. Dr. Willis serves on the editorial board of the journal Risk Analysis and served on the National Academies of Science Committee on Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals. He earned his Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University and holds degrees in chemistry and environmental studies from the University of Pennsylvania (B.A.) and in environmental science from the University of Cincinnati (M.A.). Address: RAND Corporation, 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail: hwillis@rand.org . Xiting (Cindy) Yang (" Whether to Retest the Lipids of HIV-Infected Patients: How Much Does Fasting Bias Matter? ") completed her Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University in the area of elicitation, specifically focusing on elicitation of expert knowledge on phylogenies in the format of rooted trees. She is currently a statistical reviewer at the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Her current research focuses on clinical trials and elicitation. Address: U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 10903 New Hampshire Avenue, Building 66, Room 2223, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; e-mail: xiting.yang@fda.hhs.gov .
This guide accompanies the following article: The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the Sociological Literature, Compass 6/2 (2012): pp. 166–181, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2011.00440.xAuthor's introductionThe animal rights movement has been described as one of the most neglected and misunderstood social movements of our era. However, social movement scholars are beginning to realise the political and moral significance of the world wide animal protection movement at a time when nature itself has been included in the specialist field of environmental sociology. Just as people are beginning to see that nature matters and is not separate from society, nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) too are increasingly perceived as worthy of our respect and consideration. The long‐running animal protection movement which began in England in the 18th century is today better known as the animal rights movement. It is the men and women of this movement who, atypically for a social movement, are campaigning for a species that is not their own. The movement's theories and practices are important for what they do for animals and also because of what the animal rights controversy reveals about human beings.Author recommendsGarner, Robert. 1998. Political Animals: Animal Protection Policies in Britain and the United States. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.The book describes the progress made by the animal protection movement in the two countries where animal rights protests have been most prominent. The author presents a comprehensive examination of animal welfare policies in Britain and the US thus providing an informative comparative study of the movement's relationship with the state in these two countries. Garner's focus on policy networks corresponds to the sociologist's concept of social movement organizations. More than fifty such organizations balanced evenly between animal protectionists and animal‐user industries are discussed in the book. Political Animals provides an excellent introduction to the politics of animal rights, although missing in the accounts are the voices of the animal activists and their opponents. In the final analysis, it is the meaning activists attribute to their cause that drives the movement, a fact which Garner tacitly acknowledges.Imhoff, Daniel (ed) 2010. The CAFO Reader: The Tragedy of Industrial Animal Factories. Published by the Foundation for Deep Ecology with Watershed Media, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press.The Reader's subject – concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) – covers most of the topics relevant to factory farmed animals and is divided into seven parts: (1) The pathological mindset of the CAFO; (2) Myths of the CAFO; (3) Inside the CAFO; (4) The loss of diversity; (5) Hidden costs of CAFO; (6) Technological takeover; (7) Putting the CAFO out to pasture. The acronym CAFO suggests a bland, mundane practice and is therefore a name which the editor believes should be replaced by the more accurate label "animal concentration camps". The chapter titles indicate what is in store for the reader but the content is perhaps less confronting than the book's companion photo‐format volume of the same name. The reader is a very comprehensive survey of how living creatures are subjected to inhumane practices for their body parts by "corporate food purveyors" and is essential reading for anyone who cares about the future survival of all of the earth's species.Kean, Hilda. 1998. Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800. London: Reaktion Books Ltd.In this attractive book, the historian Hilda Kean provides one of the most comprehensive and interesting surveys of the early animal protection movement in England, the birthplace of animal rights. Kean tells a compelling story of how and why people's attitudes and practices involving animals changed over the past two centuries. She attributes these changes largely to the seemingly simple idea of "sight", or how people were influenced by seeing for themselves how animals such as horses and dogs were ill treated in public spaces such as in streets and markets. Animals "out of sight" in vivisection laboratories and in abattoirs also came to the attention of the early animal protectionists, most of whom were women. The sight and spectacle of animal abuse turned hearts and stomachs once a light was shone on these everyday cruelties by the pioneers of animal rights in England. Kean's book is nicely illustrated in keeping with the theme of seeing animals in their various relationships with humans.Munro, Lyle. 2005. Confronting Cruelty: Moral Orthodoxy and the Challenge of the Animal Rights Movement. Leiden & Boston: Brill.For most people animal cruelty is understood as unspeakable acts perpetrated by warped individuals mostly against dogs, cats, birds and sometimes horses. The animal rights movement seeks to broaden the issue of animal cruelty to include the vast numbers of animals that suffer and die in "the animal industrial complex" of intensive farming, recreational hunting and animal research and experimentation. The book draws on social movement theory to explain how and why an increasing number of people in the UK, US and Australia have taken up the cause of animals in campaigning against the exploitative practices of the animal‐user industries. Essentially, the thesis is that animal abuse is constructed by the animal rights movement as a social problem (speciesism) on a par with sexism and racism. This is the first book in the Human and Animal Studies Series which currently lists about a dozen monographs published by Brill under the editorship of Kenneth Shapiro of the Society & Animals Institute in the US.Noske, Barbara. 1989. Humans and Other Animals: Beyond the Boundaries of Anthropology. London: Pluto Press.As an anthropologist, Noske brings a different perspective to our relationship with nature, especially in the long process of animal domestication. Her chapter on "the animal industrial complex" shows how both human and nonhuman animals suffer within this structure of domination; for example, slaughterhouse work takes a heavy toll on the meat workers while the animals experience atrocious pain and misery on the assembly line of mass execution. Noske's book is valuable for its broad treatment of animal‐human relations in which she describes cultural, historical, structural and sociological aspects of these relations particularly in America and Australia.Wilkie, Rhoda and Inglis David (eds.) 2007. The Social Scientific Study of Nonhuman Animals: A Five‐volume Collection–Animals and Society: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. (Vols 1–5), London: Routledge.This is a collection of 90 previously published articles and book chapters in approximately 2,000 pages on the social‐scientific study of animals. The papers range from the earliest in 1928 on "the culture of canines" to the latest in 2006 on "religion and animals." Three quarters of the papers were published in the last two decades and are derived from anthropology, sociology, psychology, geography, philosophy and feminist studies.Because Animals and Society is based mostly on work derived from more than 12 different specialist journals, it has a claim to comprehensiveness; however, the editors mention topics that are not covered in the collection: Ethical issues; Animal welfare; The characteristics of animal protectionists; "Wilderness"; The role of animals in the lives of children; and The animal rights movement. The main topics included in the collection provide a hint of its value to researchers:Vol I. Representing the animal (Introduction and critical concepts in the social sciences)Vol II. Social science perspectives on human‐animal interactions (I): Anthropology. Geography. Feminist studies. Vol III. Social science perspectives on human‐animal interactions (II): Sociology. Psychology. Vol IV. Forms of human‐animal relations and animal death – the dynamics of domestication: Human‐pet relationships. Human‐livestock relations. Animal abuse and animal death. Vol V. Boundaries and quandaries in human‐animal relations: Border troubles: are humans unique and what is an animal? The legal, ethical and moral status of animals. "The Frankenstein syndrome": animals, genetic engineering, and ethical dilemmas. NB. The above is a shorter version of my review in Society & Animals, 16. 91–93, 2008. I thank the journal for publishing the original review and for permission to include the above version in Sociology Compass.Online materialshttp://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s2159904.htmThis is the story of a protest against the live animal export trade from Australia to the Middle East. The 7.30 Report of 11 February 2008, was one of several media stories on the cruelty involved in the transport and slaughter of cattle, goats and sheep which outraged thousands of Australians when they witnessed footage shot by animal activists. The four minute video recording provides commentary and images that explain why the live animal export trade is a "hot cognition" issue in Australia and the UK. More recently, in June 2012, the callous treatment of cattle in a number of Indonesian abattoirs became a major media story that prompted public outrage and calls for an immediate and permanent ban on the trade.http://www.sharkwater.com/For many people, sharks are the most feared of all creatures and also the most misunderstood. They have been called "the mother of otherness" and as a result when they are hunted and killed there is very little concern for their welfare. This groundbreaking film explains the importance of sharks to the ocean and seeks to dispel the main stereotype of the shark as the creature from hell. The film is the work of Rob Stewart whose lifelong fascination with sharks was the catalyst for his mission to save the great predator from extinction.http://www.wspa‐international.org/Regular internet users will probably have come across the advertisements from the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA), particularly its campaign against the cruelty involved in bear dancing. The WSPA, as an international animal welfare organization, is one of a very select few animal and environmental organizations recognized by the United Nations. Another campaign which is featured on their website is "The Red Collar Campaign", the motto for which is "Collars not Cruelty". Viewers are warned that the two and a half minute video clip contains some confronting images of cruelty to dogs suspected of being infected by rabies. WSPA's objective is to end the brutality inflicted unnecessarily on thousands of dogs perceived as a human health and safety risk; its solution to the problem of rabies is simple, cheap and effective.http://www.awionline.orgThe Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) is one of the most effective animal protection societies in the US. Its founder, the late Christine Stevens, worked most of her life as an advocate and lobbyist for animals. The AWI's attractive website provides many useful features such as the AWI Quarterly and details of its seminal campaigns which include research animals, companion animals, farm animals, marine animals and wildlife. Since it was established in 1951, the AWI has had access to the US Congress and in gaining the attention of powerbrokers, the organization has succeeded in securing animal welfare improvements that are legislated in law, which owes much to the work of Christine Stevens.http://www.league.org.ukHunting is a controversial issue in England which has developed into what is actually a class war between the aristocratic class and the "great unwashed". Founded in 1924, the League is virtually a household name in England. Its website contains some revealing film clips about the cruelty involved in the hunting of foxes, deer, rabbits and other animals in the English countryside. There is a great deal of information contained in the blogs and its FAQs as well as elsewhere on its website. Mention is also made of one of the latest hunting fads, "trophy hunting" which is apparently gaining popularity in some parts of the USA.Topics for lectures & discussionPart I: introduction and overviewWhat is the animal rights movement? Why do people campaign on behalf of a species that is not their own? How do individuals and social movements make their claims on behalf of nonhuman animals? These are some of the questions that would traditionally be posed in introducing the animal rights movement.ReadingMunro, Lyle. 2012. 'The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the Sociological Literature'. Sociology Compass6(2): 166–81.Waldau's recent book is a good introduction to what the movement is all about:Waldau, Paul. 2011. Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press.There are three main discourses on animal rights which provide insights into our constructions of "the animal": (1) Animals in this discourse are constructed as social problems (see Irvine, 2003 below for an example); (2) in this second discourse, animal defenders are demonised with labels ranging from "sentimental animal lovers" to "extremists" and even "terrorists" (see Munro, 1999 below for an example); (3) finally, the animal rights movement constructs our cruel treatment of animals as morally wrong and therefore deserving of the strongest condemnation (see Shapiro, 1994 below for an example). How and why people campaign against the exploitation of animals are issues explored in the following papers:Irvine, Leslie. 2003. 'The Problem of Unwanted Pets; A Case Study in How Institutions 'Think' About Clients' Needs'. Social Problems50: 550–66.Munro, Lyle. 1999. 'Contesting Moral Capital in Campaigns Against Animal Liberation'. Society & Animals7: 35–53.Shapiro, Kenneth. 1994. 'The Caring Sleuth: Portrait of an Animal Rights Activist'. Society & Animals2: 145–65.Part II: animal crueltyThis section includes some important contributions to explaining cruelty to animals.Agnew, Robert. 1998. 'The Causes of Animal Abuse: A Social‐psychological Analysis'. Theoretical Criminology2: 177–209.Munro, Lyle. 1997. 'Framing Cruelty: The Construction of Duck‐Shooting as a Social Problem'. Society & Animals5: 137–54.D'Silva, Joyce and John Webster. 2010. The Meat Crisis: Developing More Sustainable Production and Consumption. London and Washington: Earthscan.Merz‐Perez, Linda and Kathleen Heide. 2004. Animal Cruelty: Pathway to Violence Against People. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Ltd.Ascione, Frank. 2008. 'Children Who Are Cruel to Animals: A Survey of Research and Implications for Developmental Psychology.' Pp. 171–89 in Social Creatures: A Human‐Animals Studies Reader, edited by Clifton, Flynn. New York: Lantern Books.Winders, Bill and David Nibert. 2009. 'Expanding "Meat" Consumption and Animal Oppression.' Pp. 183–9 in Between the Species: Readings in Human‐Animal Relations, edited by Arnold, Arluke and Clinton Sanders. Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc.Part III: social movement theory and animalsThere is a large literature on social movement theory with relatively little that refers to nonhuman animals. Some of those which do take up the issue are included below along with the following books that provide a general introduction to the study of social movements.Lowe, Brian and Caryn Ginsberg. 2002. 'Animal Rights as a Post‐Citizenship Movement'. Society & Animals10: 203–15.Jasper, James. 2007. 'The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements.' Volume 4 Pp. 585–612 in Social Movements: Critical Concepts in Sociology Volumes 1–4, edited by Jeff, Goodwin and James Jasper. London and New York: Routledge.Buechler, Steven. 2011. Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present. Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers.Cochrane, Alasdair. 2010. Chapter 6 'Marxism and Animals.' Pp. 93–114 in An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory, edited by Cochrane's. Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.Einwohner, Rachel. 2002. 'Bringing the Outsiders in: Opponents' Claims and the Construction of Animal Rights Activists' Identity'. Mobilization7: 253–68.Part IV: animal advocacy and activism: strategy and tacticsThe above readings reveal to some extent at least why people campaign against animal cruelty. In this section's readings, the focus is on how animal activists run their campaigns in the streets (grassroots activism) and in the suites (organizational advocacy).Carrie Freeman Packwood. 2010. 'Framing Animal Rights in the "Go Veg" Campaigns of US Animal Rights Organizations'. Society & Animals18: 163–82.Paul, Elizabeth. 1995. 'Scientists' and Animal Rights Campaigners' Views of the Animal Experimentation Debate'. Society & Animals3: 1–21.Upton, Andrew. 2010. 'Contingent Communication in a Hybrid Multi‐Media World: Analysing the Campaigning Strategies of SHAC'. New Media & Society13: 96–113.Munro, Lyle. 2001. Compassionate Beasts: The Quest for Animal Rights. Westport, CT: Praeger.Munro, Lyle. 2002. 'The Animal Activism of Henry Spira (1927–1998).'Society & Animals10: 173–91.Munro, Lyle. 2005. 'Strategies, Action Repertoires and DIY Activism in the Animal Rights Movement.'Social Movement Studies4: 75–94.Jasper, James. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Singer, Peter. 1998. Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement. Lanham MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers Inc.Part V: academic/activist collaborationShould academic teachers collaborate with activists in their campaigns? Like the church/state relations debate this is a controversial question since there are arguments both for and against academic involvement in political and social movements. Most of the readings in the original Compass article and below tend to see more benefits than costs to collaboration; however, higher education administrators don't like dissent and it is hard to imagine an academic holding down his or her job if they were seen to be working with animal activists on a particularly controversial campaign. It might be seen as acceptable if the collaboration was with the SPCA in the US or the RSPCA in Britain but not if the activists were affiliated with members of a radical animal liberation group. Furthermore, an academic‐animal activist who campaigned say against the practice of animal experimentation at his or her university would surely be dismissed or at least threatened with dismissal unless they cut their ties with outside activists.Burnett, Cathleen. 2003. 'Passion through the Profession: Being Both Activist and Academic.'Social Justice30: 135–50.Kleidman, Robert. 1994. 'Volunteer Activism and Professionalism in Social Movement Organizations.'Social Problems41: 257–76.Focus questions Is the animal rights movement a genuine social movement when nonhuman animals are widely understood not to belong to society as it is generally understood? How would you respond to the claim that cruelty to animals is our worst vice. From your experience of seeing animal rights protests either on television or as the real thing, what do you think are the dominant emotions exhibited by the campaigners and their opponents? From what you've read or heard or seen of social movement protests, do you believe the most effective strategy is non‐violence or violence; and which of these two strategies do you think is more acceptable for the animal protection movement to follow and why? Should academics who lecture on social movements practice what they preach? What are some of the main benefits and problems associated with academic analysts of social movements collaborating with grassroots activists? The animal rights movement has been described as one of the fastest‐growing social movements in the West – and one of the most controversial. What evidence is there for these claims? Seminar/project ideaPlease suggest an exercise to help bring the subject to life, appropriate either for undergraduate or graduate students, e.g. an assessment, a presentation, or other practical assignment.Project idea or presentation Compare and contrast the website of an animal welfare organization and an animal rights group in relation to (a) their objectives; (b) their most important campaign; and (c) their preferred overall strategies and tactics. Which of these organizations has the most potential in attracting new supporters and why? What advice would you give to these two organizations on how they might enhance their communicative effectiveness with the general public? (see Munro's Compass article for some clues). Do an oral presentation on a radical animal liberation group such as the Animal Liberation Front or SHAC in which you describe its stated objectives, its seminal campaigns, its preferred tactics and its communication strategy as indicated by the group's website. Explain how effective the group is in terms of improving the lives of animals and how the activists justify the use of violence in their campaigns.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
Ann Tickner on Feminist Philosophy of Science, Engaging the Mainstream, and (still) Remaining Critical in/of IR
Feminist IR is still often side-lined as a particularistic agenda or limited issue area, appearing as one of the last chapters of introductory volumes to the field, despite the limitless efforts of people such as Cynthia Enloe (Theory Talk #48) and J. Ann Tickner. She has laboured to point out and provincialize the parochialism that haunts mainstream IR, without, however, herself retreating and disengaging from some of its core concerns. In this Talk, Tickner elaborates—amongst others—on the specifics of a feminist approach to the philosophical underpinnings of IR; discusses how feminism relates to the distinction between mainstream and critical theory; and addresses the challenges of navigating such divides.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?
I think the biggest challenge for IR is that it is relevant and helps us understand important issues in our globalized world. I realize this is not a conventional answer, but too often we academics get caught up in substantive and methodological debates where we end up talking only to each other or to a very small audience. We tend to get too concerned with the issue of scientific respectability rather than thinking about how to try to understand and remedy the massive problems that exist in the world today. Steve Smith's presidential address to the ISA in 2002 (read it here), shortly after 9/11, reminded us of this. Smith chastised the profession for having nothing to say about such a catastrophic event.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I've gone through quite a few transformations in my academic career. My original identity was as an International Political Economy (IPE) scholar; my first academic position was at a small liberal arts college (College of the Holy Cross) where I taught a variety of IPE courses. In graduate school I was interested in what, in the 1970s, we called 'North-South' issues, specifically issues of global justice, which were not the most popular subjects in the field. So I always felt a little out of place in my choice of subject matter. In the 1980s when I started teaching, IR was mostly populated by men. As a woman, one felt somewhat uncomfortable at professional meetings; and there were very few texts by women that I could assign to my students. I also found that many of the female students in my introductory IR classes were somewhat uncomfortable and unmotivated by the emphasis placed on strategic issues and nuclear weapons.
It was at about the time when I first started thinking about these issues, I happened to read Evelyn Fox Keller's book Gender and Science, a book that offers a gendered critique of the natural sciences (read an 'update' of the argument by Keller here, pdf). It struck me that her feminist critique of science could equally be applied to IR theory. My first feminist publication, a feminist critique of Hans Morgenthau's principles of political realism, expanded on this theme (read full text here, pdf).
Teaching at a small liberal arts college where one was judged by the quality of one's work rather than the type of research one was doing was very helpful—because I could follow my own, rather non-conventional, inclinations. So I think my turn to feminism, after ten years in the field, was a combination of my own consciousness-raising and feeling that there was something about IR that didn't speak to me. Later, I was fortunate to be hired by the University of Southern California, a large research institution, with an interdisciplinary School of International Relations, separate from the political science department. When I arrived in 1995, the School had a reputation for teaching a broad array of IR theoretical approaches. The support of these institutional settings and of a network of feminist scholars and students, some of whom I discovered were thinking along similar lines in the late 1980s, were important for getting me to where I am today.
What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
It depends on the level of the student: at the undergraduate level, a broad array of courses in global politics including some economics and history. Language training is very important too, and ideally, an overseas experience. We need to encourage our students to be curious and have an open mind about our world.
At the graduate level, this is a more complicated question. The way you phrased the question 'to understand the world in a global way,' can be very different from training to become an IR scholar, especially in the United States. I would emphasize the importance of a broad theoretical and methodological training, including some exposure to the philosophy of science, and to non-Western IR if possible, or at least at a minimum, to try to get beyond the dominance of American IR, which still exists even in places outside the US.
Why should IR scholars incorporate gender in the study of world politics? What are the epistemological and ontological implications of adopting a feminist perspective in IR?
Feminists would argue that incorporating feminist perspectives into IR would fundamentally transform the discipline. Feminists claim that IR is already gendered, and gendered masculine, in the types of questions it asks and the ways it goes about answering them. The questions we ask in our research are never neutral - they are a choice, depending on the researcher's identity and location. Over history, the knowledge that we have accumulated has generally been knowledge about men's lives. It's usually been men who do the asking and consequently, it is often the case that women's lives and women's knowledge are absent from what is deemed 'reliable' knowledge. This historical legacy has had, and continues to have, an effect on the way we build knowledge. Sandra Harding, a feminist philosopher of science, has suggested that if were to build knowledge from women's lives as well, we would broaden the base from which we construct knowledge, and would therefore get a richer and more complex picture of reality.
One IR example of how we limit our research questions and concerns is how we calculate national income, or wealth—the kind of data states choose to collect and on which they base their public policy. We have no way of measuring the vast of amount of non-remunerated reproductive and caring labour, much of which is done by women. Without this labour we would not have a functioning global capitalist economy. To me this is one example as to why putting on our gender lenses helps us gain a more complete picture of global politics and the workings of the global economy.
Feminists have also argued that the epistemological foundations of Western knowledge are gendered. When we use terms such as rationality, objectivity and public, they are paired with terms such as emotional, subjective and private, terms that are seen as carrying less weight. By privileging the first of these terms when we construct knowledge we are valuing knowledge that we typically associate with masculinity and the public sphere, historically associated with men. Rationality and objectivity are not terms that are overtly gendered, but, when asked, women and men alike associate them with masculinity. They are terms we value when we do our research.
In one of the foundational texts of Feminist IR, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists' (1997, full text here, pdf), you highlighted three particular (gendered) misunderstandings that continue to divide Feminists and mainstream IR theorists. To what extent do these misunderstandings continue to inform mainstream perceptions of Feminist approaches to the study of international politics?
I think probably they still do, although it's always hard to tell, because the mainstream has not engaged much with feminist approaches. I've been one who's always calling for conversations with the mainstream but, apart from the forum responding to the article you mention, there have been very few. In a 2010 article, published in the Australian Feminist Law Journal, I looked back to see if I could find responses to my 1997 article to which you refer. I found that most of the responses had come from other feminists. The lack of engagement, which other feminists have experienced also, makes it hard to know about the misunderstandings that still exist but my guess would be that they remain. However I do think there has been progress in accepting feminism's legitimacy in the field. It is now included in many introductory texts.
The first misunderstanding that I identified is the meaning of gender. I would hope that the introduction of constructivist approaches would help with understanding that gender is social construction - a very important point for feminists. But I think that gender is still largely equated with women. Feminists have tried to stress that gender is also about men and about masculinity, something that seems to be rather hard to accept for those unfamiliar with feminist work. I think it's also hard for the discipline to accept that both international politics as practice and IR as a discipline are not gender neutral. Feminists claim that IR as a discipline is gendered in its concepts, its subject matter, the questions it asks and the way it goes about answering them. This is a radical assertion for those unfamiliar with feminist approaches and it is not very well understood.
Now to answer the second misunderstanding as to whether feminists are doing IR. I think there has been some progress here, because IR has broadened its subject matter. And there has been quite a bit of attention lately to gender issues in the 'real world' - issues such as sexual violence, trafficking, and human rights. Of course these issues relate not only to women but they are issues with which feminists have been concerned. Something I continue to find curious is that the policy and activist communities are generally ahead of the academy in taking up gender issues. Most international organizations, and some national governments are under mandates for gender mainstreaming. Yet, the academy has been slow to catch up and give students the necessary training and skills to go out in the world and deal with such issues.
The third misunderstanding to which I referred in the 1997 article is the question of epistemology. While, as I indicated, there has been some acceptance of the subject matter, with which feminists are concerned, it is a more fundamental and contentious question as to whether feminists are recognized as 'doing IR' in the methodological sense. As the field broadens its concerns, IR may see issues that feminists raise as legitimate, but how we study them still evokes the same responses that I brought up fifteen years ago. Many of the questions that feminists ask are not amenable to being answered using the social scientific methodologies popular in the field, particularly in the US. (I should add that there is a branch of IR feminism that does use quantitative methods and it has gained much wider acceptance by the mainstream.) The feminist assumption that Western knowledge is gendered and based on men's lives is a challenging claim. And feminists often prefer to start knowledge from the lives of people who are on the margins – those who are subordinated or oppressed, and of course, this is very different from IR which tends toward a top-down look at the international system. One of the big problems that have become more evident to me over time is that feminism is fundamentally sociological – it's about people and social relations, whereas much of IR is about structures and states operating in an anarchic, rather than a social, environment. I find that historians and sociologists are more comfortable with gender analysis, perhaps for this reason. I'm not sure that these misunderstanding are ever going to be solved or that they need to be solved.
Although Feminist methodology is often conflated with ethnographic approaches, in 'What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions' (2005, pdf here), you argued that there is no unique Feminist research methodology. Nonetheless, Feminist IR is well known for using an autoethnographic approach. What does this approach add to the study of gender in IR? What might account for the relative dearth of autoethnography in other IR paradigms?
I think it is important to remember that feminists use many different approaches coming out of very different theoretical traditions, such as Marxism, socialism, constructivism, postpositivism, postcolonialism and empiricism. So there are many different kinds of feminisms. If you look specifically at what has been called 'second-generation feminist IR,' the empirical work that followed the so-called 'first generation' that challenged and critiqued the concepts and theoretical foundations of the field, much of it, but not all, (discourse analysis is quite prevalent too), uses ethnographic methods which seem well suited to researching some of the issues I described earlier. Questions about violence against women, domestic servants, women in the military, violent women, women in peace movements– these are the sorts of research questions that demand fieldwork and an ethnographic approach. Because as I stated earlier, IR asks rather different kinds of questions, it does not generally adopt ethnographic methods. Feminists who do this type of ethnographic research tell me that their work is often more readily received and understood by those who do comparative politics, because they are more comfortable with field research. And since women are not usually found in the halls of power – as decision-makers. IR feminists are particularly concerned with issues having to do with marginalized and disempowered peoples' lives. Ethnography is useful for this type of research.
I see autoethnography as a different issue. While the reflexive tradition is not unique to feminists, feminism tends to be reflectivist. As I said earlier, feminists are sensitive to issues about who the creators of knowledge have been and whose knowledge is claimed to be universal. Most feminists believe that there is no such thing as universal knowledge. Consequently, feminists believe that being explicit about one's positionality as a researcher is very important because none of us can achieve objectivity, often called 'the view from nowhere'. So while striving to get as accurate and as useful knowledge as we can, we should be willing to state our own positionality. One's privilege as a researcher must be acknowledged too; one must always be sensitive to the unequal power relations between a researcher and their research subject – something that anthropology recognized some time ago. Feminists who do fieldwork often try to make their research useful to their subjects or do participatory research so that they can give something back to the community. All these concerns lead to autoethnographic disclosures. They demand a reflexive attitude and a willingness to describe and reassess your research journey as you go along. This autoethnographic style is hard for researchers in the positivist tradition to understand. While we all strive to produce accurate and useful knowledge, positivists' striving for objectivity requires keeping subjectivity out of their research.
Robert W. Cox (Theory Talk #37) famously distinguished two approaches to the study of international politics: problem-solving theory and critical theory. How does the emancipatory project of the latter inform your perspective of IR and its normative goals? And is this distinction as valid today as it was when Cox first formulated it, over 3 decades ago?
Yes I think it's still an important distinction. It's still cited very often which suggests it's still valid, although postmodern scholars (and certain feminists) have problems with Western liberal notions of emancipation. I see my own work as being largely compatible with Cox's definition of critical theory. Like many feminists, I view my work as explicitly normative; I say explicitly because I believe all knowledge is normative although not all scholars would admit it. What Cox calls problem-solving theory is also normative in the conservative sense of not aiming to changing the world. A normative goal to which feminists are generally committed is understanding the reasons for women's subordination and seeking ways to end it. It's also important to note that the IR discipline was borne with the intention of serving the interests of the state whereas academic feminism was borne out of social movements for women's emancipation. The normative goals of my work are to demonstrate how the theory and practice of IR is gendered and what might be the implications of this, both for how we construct knowledge and how we go about solving global problems.
Much of your work addresses the parochial scope and neopositivist inclination of International Relations (IR) scholarship, especially in the United States. What distinguishes other 'Western' institutional and political contexts (in the UK, Europe, Canada and Oceania) from the American study of IR? How and why is critical/reflectivist IR marginalized in the American context? What is the status of these 'debates' in non-Western institutional contexts?
With respect to the parochial scope of US IR, I refer you to a recent book, edited by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World. It contains chapters by authors from around the world, some of whom suggest IR in their country imitates the US and some who see very different IRs. The chapter by Thomas J. Biersteker, ('The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for 'American' International Relations', read it here in pdf) reports on his examination of the required reading lists for IR Ph.D. candidates in the top ten US academic institutions. His findings suggest that constructivism accounts for only about 10% of readings and anything more radical even less. Over 90% of assigned works are written by US scholars. The dominance of quantitative and rational choice approaches in the US may have something to do with IR generally being a subfield of political science. Critical approaches often have different epistemological roots. And I stress 'science' because while IR is also subsumed in certain politics departments in other countries, the commitment to science, in the neopositivist sense, is something that seems to be peculiarly American. Stanley Hoffman's famous observation, made over thirty years ago, that Americans see problems as solvable by the scientific method is still largely correct I believe (read article here, pdf). I find it striking that so many formerly US based and/or educated critical scholars have left the US and are now based elsewhere – in Canada, Australasia, or Europe.
Biersteker sees the hegemony of American IR extending well beyond the US. But there is generally less commitment to quantification elsewhere. This may be due to IR's historical legacy emerging out of different knowledge traditions or being housed in separate departments. In France, IR emerged from sociological and legal traditions and, in the UK, history and political theory, including the Marxist tradition, have been influential in IR. And European IR scholars do not move as freely between the academy and the policy world as in the US. All these factors might encourage more openness to critical approaches. I am afraid I don't know enough about non-Western traditions to make an informed comment. But we must recognize the enormous power differentials that exist with respect to engaging IR's debates. Language barriers are one problem; having access to research funds is an enormous privilege. Scholars in many parts of the world do not have the resources or the time to engage in esoteric academic debates, nor do they have the resources to attend professional meetings or access certain materials. The production of knowledge is a very unequal process, dominated by those with power and resources; hence the hegemonic position of the US that Biersteker and others still see.
As methodological pluralism now retains the status of a norm in the field, John M. Hobson (Theory Talk #71) recently argued that the question facing IR scholars no longer revolves around the debate between positivist and postpositivist approaches. Rather, the primary meta-theoretical question relates to Eurocentrism, that is, 'To be or not to be a Eurocentric, that is the question.' To what extent do you agree with this statement? Why or why not?
Given my answer to the last question, I am not sure that methodological pluralism has reached an accepted status in the US yet. However, John M. Hobson has produced a very thoughtful and engaging book that asks very provocative questions. Unfortunately, I doubt many IR scholars in the US have read it and would be rather puzzled by Hobson's claim. But certainly the Eurocentrism of the discipline is something to which we should be paying attention. I find it curious how little IR has recognized its imperial roots or engaged in any discussion of imperialism. As Brian Schmidt and other historical revisionists have told us, when IR was borne at the beginning of the twentieth century, imperialism was a central preoccupation in the discipline. Race also has been ignored almost entirely by IR scholars.
To Hobson's specific claim that the important question for IR now is about being or not being Eurocentric rather than about being positivist or postpositivist, I do have some problems with this. I am concerned with Hobson's painting positivism and postpostivism with the same Eurocentric brush. Yes, they are both Eurocentric; but postpositivists or critical theorists – to use Cox's term – are at least open to being reflective about how they produce knowledge and where it comes from. If one can be reflective about one's knowledge it does allow space to be aware of one's own biases. Those of us on the critical side of Cox's divide can at least be reflective about the problems of Eurocentrism, whereas positivists don't consider reflexivity to be part of producing good research. Nevertheless, Hobson has made an important statement. He has written a masterful and insightful book and I recommend it all IR scholars.
Last question. Your recent work is part of an emergent collective dialogue that aims to 'provincialize' the Western European heritage of IR. In a recent article entitled 'Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations' you highlight the need for non-Eurocentric approach to the study of IR. In IR, what are the prospects for genuine dialogue across methodological and geographical borders? Where do you see this dialogue taking place?
This is a very tough issue. There are scholars like Hobson who talk about a non-Eurocentric approach, but given what I said about resources, about language barriers, and about inequalities in the ability to produce knowledge, this is difficult. As I've said at many times and in many places, the power difference is an inhibitor to any genuine dialogue. So, where is dialogue taking place? Among those, such as Hobson, who advocate a hybrid approach that takes other knowledge traditions seriously and sees them as equally valid as one's own. And mostly on the margins of what we call 'IR', where some very exciting work is being produced. Feminism is one such site. Feminist approaches are dedicated to dialogic knowledge production, or what they call knowledge that emerges through conversation. Feminists believe that theory can emerge from practice, listening to ordinary people and how they make sense of their lives. I also think that projects like the one undertaken by Wæver and Tickner (which is still ongoing) that is publishing contributions from scholars from very different parts of the world is crucial.
J. Ann Tickner is Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the American University. She is also a Professor Emerita at the University of Southern California where she taught for fifteen years before coming to American University. Her principle areas of teaching and research include international theory, peace and security, and feminist approaches to international relations. She served as President of the International Studies Association from 2006-2007. Her books include Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era (Columbia University Press, 2001), Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security (Columbia University Press, 1992), and Self-Reliance Versus Power Politics: American and Indian Experiences in Building Nation-States (Columbia University Press, 1987).
Related links
Faculty Profile at American University Read Tickner's Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation (Millennium, 1988) here (pdf) Read Tickner's You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists (1997 International Studies Quarterly) here (pdf) Read Tickner's What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions (2005, International Studies Quarterly) here (pdf)
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Blogbetreiber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie einen Blog Beitrag zitieren möchten.
Alexander Dugin on Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of Multipolarity
IR has long been regarded as an Anglo-American social science. Recently, the discipline has started to look beyond America and England, to China (Theory Talk #51, Theory Talk #45), India (Theory Talk #63, Theory Talk #42), Africa (Theory Talk #57, Theory Talk #10) and elsewhere for non-Western perspectives on international affairs and IR theory. However, IR theorists have paid little attention to Russian perspectives on the discipline and practice of international relations. We offer an exciting peek into Russian geopolitical theory through an interview with the controversial Russian geopolitical thinker Alexander Dugin, founder of the International Eurasian Movement and allegedly an important influence on Putin's foreign policy. In this Talk, Dugin—among others—discusses his Theory of a Multipolar World, offers a staunch critique of western and liberal IR, and lays out Russia's unique contribution to the landscape of IR theory.
Print version of this Talk (pdf) Russian version
What, according to you, is the central challenge or principle debate within IR and what would be your position within this debate or towards that challenge?
The field of IR is extremely interesting and multidimensional. In general, the discipline is much more promising than many think. I think that there is a stereometry today in IR, in which we can distinguish a few axes right away.
The first, most traditional axis is realism – the English school – liberalism.
If the debates here are exhausted on an academic level, then on the level of politicians, the media, and journalists, all the arguments and methods appear new and unprecedented each time. Today, liberalism in IR dominates mass consciousness, and realist arguments, already partially forgotten on the level of mass discourse, could seem rather novel. On the other hand, the nuanced English school, researched thoroughly in academic circles, might look like a "revelation" to the general public. But for this to happen, a broad illumination of the symmetry between liberals and realists is needed for the English school to acquire significance and disclose its full potential. This is impossible under the radical domination of liberalism in IR. For that reason, I predict a new wave of realists and neorealists in this sphere, who, being pretty much forgotten and almost marginalized, can full well make themselves and their agenda known. This would, it seems to me, produce a vitalizing effect and diversify the palette of mass and social debates, which are today becoming monotone and auto-referential.
The second axis is bourgeois versions of IR (realism, the English school, and liberalism all together) vs. Marxism in IR. In popular and even academic discourse, this theme is entirely discarded, although the popularity of Wallerstein (Theory Talk #13) and other versions of world-systems theory shows a degree of interest in this critical version of classical, positivistic IR theories.
The third axis is post-positivism in all its varieties vs. positivism in all its varieties (including Marxism). IR scholars might have gotten the impression that postmodern attacks came to an end, having been successfully repelled by 'critical realism', but in my opinion it is not at all so. From moderate constructivism and normativism to extreme post-structuralism, post-positivistic theories carry a colossal deconstructive and correspondingly scientific potential, which has not yet even begun to be understood. It seemed to some that postmodernism is a cheerful game. It isn't. It is a new post-ontology, and it fundamentally affects the entire epistemological structure of IR. In my opinion, this axis remains very important and fundamental.
The fourth axis is the challenge of the sociology of international relations, which we can call 'Hobson's challenge'. In my opinion, in his critique of euro-centrism in IR, John M. Hobson laid the foundation for an entirely new approach to the whole problematic by proposing to consider the structural significance of the "euro-centric" factor as dominant and clarifying its racist element. Once we make euro-centrism a variable and move away from the universalistic racism of the West, on which all systems of IR are built, including the majority of post-positivistic systems (after all, postmodernity is an exclusively Western phenomenon!), we get, theoretically for now, an entirely different discipline—and not just one, it seems. If we take into account differences among cultures, there can be as many systems of IR as there are cultures. I consider this axis extremely important.
The fifth axis, outlined in less detail than the previous one, is the Theory of a Multipolar World vs. everything else. The Theory of a Multipolar World was developed in Russia, a country that no one ever took seriously during the entire establishment of IR as a discipline—hence the fully explainable skepticism toward the Theory of a Multipolar World.
The sixth axis is IR vs. geopolitics. Geopolitics is usually regarded as secondary in the context of IR. But gradually, the epistemological potential of geopolitics is becoming more and more obvious, despite or perhaps partially because of the criticism against it. We have only to ask ourselves about the structure of any geopolitical concept to discover the huge potential contained in its methodology, which takes us to the very complex and semantically saturated theme of the philosophy and ontology of space.
If we now superimpose these axes onto one another, we get an extremely complex and highly interesting theoretical field. At the same time, only one axis, the first one, is considered normative among the public, and that with the almost total and uni-dimensional dominance of IR liberalism. All the wealth, 'scientific democracy', and gnoseological pluralism of the other axes are inaccessible to the broad public, robbing and partly deceiving it. I call this domination of liberalism among the public the 'third totalitarianism', but that is a separate issue.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I began with Eurasianism, from which I came to geopolitics (the Eurasianist Petr Savitskii quoted the British geopolitician Halford Mackinder) and remained for a long time in that framework, developing the theme of the dualism of Land and Sea and applying it to the actual situation That is how the Eurasian school of geopolitics arose, which became not simply the dominant, but the only school in contemporary Russia. As a professor at Moscow State University, for six years I was head of the department of the Sociology of International Relations, which forced me to become professionally familiar with the classical theories of IR, the main authors, approaches, and schools. Because I have long been interested in postmodernism in philosophy (I wrote the book Post-philosophy on the subject), I paid special attention to post-positivism in IR. That is how I came to IR critical theory, neo-Gramscianism, and the sociology of IR (John Hobson, Steve Hobden, etc.). I came to the Theory of a Multipolar World, which I eventually developed myself, precisely through superimposing geopolitical dualism, Carl Schmitt's theory of the Grossraum, and John Hobson's critique of Western racism and the euro-centrism of IR.
In your opinion, what would a student need in order to become a specialist in IR?
In our interdisciplinary time, I think that what is most important is familiarity with philosophy and sociology, led by a paradigmatic method: the analysis of the types of societies, cultures, and structures of thought along the line Pre-Modernity – Modernity – Post-Modernity. If one learns to trace semantic shifts in these three epistemological and ontological domains, it will help one to become familiar with any popular theories of IR today. Barry Buzan's (Theory Talk #35) theory of international systems is an example of such a generalizing and very useful schematization. Today an IR specialist must certainly be familiar with deconstruction and use it at least in its elementary form. Otherwise, there is a great danger of overlooking what is most important.
Another very important competence is history and political science. Political science provides generalizing, simplifying material, and history puts schemas in their context. I would only put competence in the domain of economics and political economy in third place, although today no problem in IR can be considered without reference to the economic significance of processes and interactions. Finally, I would earnestly recommend to students of IR to become familiar, as a priority, with geopolitics and its methods. These methods are much simpler than theories of IR, but their significance is much deeper. At first, geopolitical simplifications produce an instantaneous effect: complex and entangled processes of world politics are rendered transparent and comprehensible in the blink of an eye. But to sort out how this effect is achieved, a long and serious study of geopolitics is required, exceeding by far the superficiality that limits critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail et. al.): they stand at the beginning of the decipherment of geopolitics and its full-fledged deconstruction, but they regard themselves as its champions. They do so prematurely.
What does it entail to think of global power relations through a spatial lens ('Myslit prostranstvom')?
This is the most important thing. The entire philosophical theme of Modernity is built on the dominance of time. Kant already puts time on the side of the subject (and space on the side of the body, continuing the ideas of Descartes and even Plato), while Husserl and Heidegger identify the subject with time altogether. Modernity thinks with time, with becoming. But since the past and future are rejected as ontological entities, thought of time is transformed into thought of the instant, of that which is here and now. This is the basis for the ephemeral understanding of being. To think spatially means to locate Being outside the present, to arrange it in space, to give space an ontological status. Whatever was impressed in space is preserved in it. Whatever will ripen in space is already contained in it. This is the basis for the political geography of Friedrich Ratzel and subsequent geopoliticians. Wagner's Parsifal ends with the words of Gurnemanz: 'now time has become space'. This is a proclamation of the triumph of geopolitics. To think spatially means to think in an entirely different way [topika]. I think that postmodernity has already partly arrived at this perspective, but has stopped at the threshold, whereas to cross the line it is necessary to break radically with the entire axiomatic of Modernity, to really step over Modernity, and not to imitate this passage while remaining in Modernity and its tempolatry. Russian people are spaces [Russkie lyudi prostranstva], which is why we have so much of it. The secret of Russian identity is concealed in space. To think spatially means to think 'Russian-ly', in Russian.
Geopolitics is argued to be very popular in Russia nowadays. Is geopolitics a new thing, from the post-Cold War period, or not? And if not, how does current geopolitical thinking differ from earlier Soviet (or even pre-soviet) geopolitics?
It is an entirely new form of political thought. I introduced geopolitics to Russia at the end of the 80s, and since then it has become extremely popular. I tried to find some traces of geopolitics in Russian history, but besides Vandam, Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, and a few short articles by Savitskii, there was nothing. In the USSR, any allusion to geopolitics was punished in the harshest way (see the 'affair of the geopoliticians' of the economic geographer Vladimir Eduardovich Den and his group). At the start of the 90s, my efforts and the efforts of my followers and associates in geopolitics (=Eurasianism) filled the worldview vacuum that formed after the end of Soviet ideology. At first, this was adopted without reserve by the military (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia), especially under Igor Rodionov. Then, geopolitics began to penetrate into all social strata. Today, this discipline is taught in the majority of Russian universities. So, there was no Soviet or pre-Soviet geopolitics. There is only the contemporary Eurasian school, which took shape at the end of the 80s. Foundations of Geopolitics was the first programmatic text of this school, although I had published most of texts in that book earlier, and some of them were circulated as texts in government circles. Recently, in 2012, I released two new textbooks: Geopolitics and The Geopolitics of Russia, which together with The War of Continents are the results of work in this field, along four axes.
In your book International Relations, not yet published in English, you set out your Theory of a Multipolar World as a distinct IR theory. What are the basic components of the Theory of a Multipolar World—and how is it different from classical realism?
In order to be understood and not get into the details, I can say that the Theory of a Multipolar World seriously and axiomatically adopts Samuel Huntington's thesis about the plurality of civilizations. Russia has its own author, who claimed the same thing more than a hundred years ago: Nikolay Danilevsky, and then the Eurasianists. However, everything starts from precisely this point: civilization is not one, but many. Western civilization's pretension to universalism is a form of the will to domination and an authoritarian discourse. It can be taken into account but not believed. It is nothing other than a strategy of suppression and hegemony. The following point follows: we must move from thinking in terms of one civilization (the racism of euro-centric versions of IR) to a pluralism of subjects. However, unlike realists, who take as the subject of their theory nation-states, which are themselves products of the European, bourgeois, modern understanding of the Political, the Theory of a Multipolar World proposes to take civilizations as subjects. Not states, but civilizations. I call them 'large politeiai', or civilizations, corresponding to Carl Schmitt's 'large spaces'. As soon as we take these civilizations—'large politeiai'—as subjects, we can then apply to them the full system of premises of realism: anarchy in the international system, sovereignty, the rationality of egoistic behavior, etc. But within these 'politeiai', by contrast, a principle more resembling liberalism, with its pacifism and integration, operates, only with the difference that here we are not talking about a 'planetary' or 'global' world, but about an intra-civilizational one; not about global integration, but about regional integration, strictly within the context of civilizational borders. Post-positivism, in turn, helps here for the deconstruction of the authoritarian discourse of the West, which masks its private interests by 'universal values', and also for the reconstruction of civilizational identity, including with the help of technological means: civilizational elites, civilizational media, civilizational economic algorithms and corporations, etc. That is the general picture.
Your theory of multipolarity is directed against the intellectual, political, and social hegemony of the West. At the same time, while drawing on the tools of neo-Marxist analysis and critical theory, it does not oppose Western hegemony 'from the left', as those approaches do, but on the basis of traditionalism (Rene Guenon, Julius Evola), cultural anthropology, and Heideggerian phenomenology, or 'from the right'. Do you think that such an approach can appeal to Anglo-American IR practitioners, or is it designed to appeal mainly to non-Western theorists and practitioners? In short, what can IR theorists in the West learn from the theory of multipolarity?
According to Hobson's entirely correct analysis, the West is based on a fundamental sort of racism. There is no difference between Lewis Morgan's evolutionistic racism (with his model of savagery, barbarism, civilization) and Hitler's biological racism. Today the same racism is asserted without a link to race, but on the basis of the technological modes and degrees of modernization and progress of societies (as always, the criterion "like in the West" is the general measure). Western man is a complete racist down to his bones, generalizing his ethnocentrism to megalomaniacal proportions. Something tells me that he is impossible to change. Even radical critiques of Western hegemony are themselves deeply infected by the racist virus of universalism, as Edward Said showed with the example of 'orientalism', proving that the anticolonial struggle is a form of that very colonialism and euro-centrism. So the Theory of a Multipolar World will hardly find adherents in the Western world, unless perhaps among those scholars who are seriously able to carry out a deconstruction of Western identity, and such deconstruction assumes the rejection of both Right (nationalistic) and Left (universalistic and progressivist) clichés. The racism of the West always acquires diverse forms. Today its main form is liberalism, and anti-liberal theories (most on the Left) are plagued by the same universalism, while Right anti-liberalisms have been discredited. That is why I appeal not to the first political theory (liberalism), nor the second (communism, socialism), nor to the third (fascism, Nazism), but to something I call the Fourth Political Theory (or 4PT), based on a radical deconstruction of the subject of Modernity and the application of Martin Heidegger's existential analytic method.
Traditionalists are brought in for the profound critique of Western Modernity, for establishing the plurality of civilizations, and for rehabilitating non-Western (pre-modern) cultures. In Russia and Asian countries, the Theory of a Multipolar World is grasped easily and naturally; in the West, it encounters a fully understandable and fully expected hostility, an unwillingness to study it carefully, and coarse slander. But there are always exceptions.
What is the Fourth Political Theory (4PT) and how is it related to the Theory of a Multipolar World and to your criticism of the prevailing theoretical approaches in the field of IR?
I spoke a little about this in the response to the previous question. The Fourth Political Theory is important for getting away from the strict dominance of modernity in the sphere of the Political, for the relativization of the West and its re-regionalization. The West measures the entire history of Modernity in terms of the struggle of three political ideologies for supremacy (liberalism, socialism, and nationalism). But since the West does not even for a moment call into question the fact that it thinks for all humanity, it evaluates other cultures and civilizations in the same way, without considering that in the best case the parallels to these three ideologies are pure simulacra, while most often there simply are no parallels. If liberalism won the competition of the three ideologies in the West at the end of the 20th century, that does not yet mean that this ideology is really universal on a world scale. It isn't at all. This episode of the Western political history of modernity may be the fate of the West, but not the fate of the world. So other principles of the political are needed, beyond liberalism, which claims global domination (=the third totalitarianism), and its failed alternatives (communism and fascism), which are historically just as Western and modern as liberalism. This explains the necessity of introducing a Fourth Political Theory as a political frame for the correct basis of a Theory of a Multipolar World. The Fourth Political Theory is the direct and necessary correlate of the Theory of a Multipolar World in the domain of political theory.
Is IR an American social science? Is Russian IR as an academic field a reproduction of IR as an American academic field? If not, how is IR in Russia specifically Russian?
IR is a Western scientific discipline, and as such it has a prescriptive, normative vector. It not only studies the West's dominance, it also produces, secures, defends, and propagandizes it. IR is undoubtedly an imperious authoritarian discourse of Western civilization, in relation to itself and all other areas of the planet. Today the US is the core of the West, so naturally in the 20th century IR became more and more American as the US moved toward that status (it began as an English science). It is the same with geopolitics, which migrated from London to Washington and New York together with the function of a global naval Empire. As with all other sciences, IR is a form of imperious violence, embodying the will to power in the will to knowledge (as Michel Foucault explained). IR in Russia remains purely Western, with one detail: in the USSR, IR as such was not studied. Marxism in IR did not correspond to Soviet reality, where after Stalin a practical form of realism (not grounded theoretically and never acknowledged) played a big role—only external observers, like the classical realist E.H. Carr, understood the realist essence of Stalinism in IR. So IR was altogether blocked. The first textbooks started to appear only in the 90s and in the fashion of the day they were all liberal. That is how it has remained until now. The peculiarity of IR in Russia today lies in the fact that there is no longer anything Russian there; liberalism dominates entirely, a correct account of realism is lacking, and post-positivism is almost entirely disregarded. The result is a truncated, aggressively liberal and extremely antiquated version of IR as a discipline. I try to fight that. I recently released an IR textbook with balanced (I hope) proportions, but it is too early to judge the result.
Stephen Walt argued in a September article in Foreign Policy that Russia 'is nowhere near as threatening as the old Soviet Union', in part because Russia 'no longer boasts an ideology that can rally supporters worldwide'. Do you agree with Walt's assessment?
There is something to that. Today, Russia thinks of itself as a nation-state. Putin is a realist; nothing more. Walt is right about that. But the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, as well as Eurasianism, are outlines of a much broader and large-scale ideology, directed against Western hegemony and challenging liberalism, globalization, and American strategic dominance. Of course, Russia as a nation-state is no competition for the West. But as the bridgehead of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, it changes its significance. Russian policies in the post-Soviet space and Russia's courage in forming non-Western alliances are indicators. For now, Putin is testing this conceptual potential very gingerly. But the toughening of relations with the West and most likely the internal crises of globalization will at some point force a more careful and serious turn toward the creation of global alternative alliances. Nevertheless, we already observe such unions: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the Eurasian Union—and they require a new ideology. Not one like Marxism, any universalism is excluded, but also not simple realist maneuvers of regional hegemons. Liberalism is a global challenge. The response to it should also be global. Does Putin understand this? Honestly, I don't know. Sometimes it seems he does, and sometimes it seems he doesn't.
Vladimir Putin recently characterized the contemporary world order as follows: 'We have entered a period of differing interpretations and deliberate silences in world politics. International law has been forced to retreat over and over by the onslaught of legal nihilism. Objectivity and justice have been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Arbitrary interpretations and biased assessments have replaced legal norms. At the same time, total control of the global mass media has made it possible when desired to portray white as black and black as white'. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what is required as a response to this international situation?
These are true, but rather naïve words. Putin is just indignant that the West establishes rules in its own interests, changes them when necessary, and interprets allegedly 'universal norms' in its own favor. But the issue is that this is the structure of the will to power and the very organization of logo-phallo-phono-centric discourse. Objectivity and justice are not possible so long as speech is a monologue. The West does not know and does not recognize the other. But this means that everything will continue until this other wins back the right to recognition. And that is a long road. The point of the Theory of a Multipolar World is that there are no rules established by some one player. Rules must be established by centers of real power. The state today is too small for that; hence the conclusion that civilizations should be these centers. Let there be an Atlantic objectivity and Western justice. A Eurasian objectivity and Russian justice will counter them. And the Chinese world or Pax Sinica [world/peace: same word in Russian] will look different than the Islamic one. Black and white are not objective evaluations. They depend on the structure of the world order: what is black and what is white is determined by one who has enough power to determine it.
How does your approach help us understand Russia's actions on the world stage better than other IR approaches do? What are IR analyses of Russia missing that do not operate with the conceptual apparatus of multipolarity?
Interesting question. Russia's behavior internationally is determined today by the following factors:
First, historical inertia, accumulating the power of precedents (the Theory of a Multipolar World thinks that the past exists as a structure; consequently, this factor is taken into account from many sides and in detail, while the 'tempocentrism' (Steve Hobden, John Hobson) of classical IR theories drops this from sight. We have to pay attention to this especially taking into consideration the fact that Russia is in many ways still a traditional society and belongs to the 'imperial system' of IR.) There are, besides, Soviet inertia and stable motives ('Stalinism in IR');
Second, the projective logic of opposition to the West, stemming from the most practical, pragmatic, and realist motivations (in the spirit of Caesarism, analyzed by neo-Gramscians) will necessarily lead Russia (even despite the will of its leaders) to a systemic confrontation with American hegemony and globalization, and then the Theory of a Multipolar World will really be needed (classical IR models, paying no attention to the Theory of a Multipolar World, drop from sight the possible future; i.e., they rob themselves of predictive potential because of purely ideological prejudices and self-imposed fears).
But if an opponent underestimates you, you have more chances to land an unexpected blow. So I am not too disturbed by the underestimation of the Theory of a Multipolar World among IR theorists.
In the western world, the divide between academia and policy is often either lamented ('ivory tower') or, in light of the ideal of academic independence, deemed absent. This concerns a broader debate regarding the relations between power, knowledge and geopolitics. How are academic-policy relations in Russia with regards to IR and is this the ideal picture according to you?
I think that in our case both positions have been taken to their extreme. On one hand, today's authorities in Russia do not pay the slightest attention to scholars, dispatching them to an airless and sterile space. On the other hand, Soviet habits became the basis for servility and conformism, preserved in a situation when the authorities for the first time demand nothing from intellectuals, except for one thing: that they not meddle in socio-political processes. So the situation with science is both comical and sorrowful. Conformist scholars follow the authorities, but the authorities don't need this, since they do not so much go anywhere in particular as react to facts that carry themselves out.
If your IR theory isn't based on politically and philosophically liberal principles, and if it criticizes those principles not from the left but from the right, using the language of large spaces or Grossraum, is it a fascist theory of international relations? Are scholars who characterize your thought as 'neo-fascism', like Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovstov, partially correct? If not, why is that characterization misleading?
Accusations of fascism are simply a figure of speech in the coarse political propaganda peculiar to contemporary liberalism as the third totalitarianism. Karl Popper laid the basis for this in his book The Open Society and its Enemies, where he reduced the critique of liberalism from the right to fascism, Hitler, and Auschwitz, and the criticism of liberalism from the left to Stalin and the GULAG. The reality is somewhat more complex, but George Soros, who finances Umland and Shekhovstov and is an ardent follower of Popper, is content with reduced versions of politics. If I were a fascist, I would say so. But I am a representative of Eurasianism and the author of the Fourth Political Theory. At the same time, I am a consistent and radical anti-racist and opponent of the nation-state project (i.e. an anti-nationalist). Eurasianism has no relation to fascism. And the Fourth Political Theory emphasizes that while it is anti-liberal, it is simultaneously anti-communist and anti-fascist. I think it isn't possible to be clearer, but the propaganda army of the 'third totalitarianism' disagrees and no arguments will convince it. 1984 should be sought today not where many think: not in the USSR, not in the Third Reich, but in the Soros Fund and the 'Brave New World'. Incidentally, Huxley proved to be more correct than Orwell. I cannot forbid others from calling me a fascist, although I am not one, though ultimately this reflects badly not so much on me as on the accusers themselves: fighting an imaginary threat, the accuser misses a real one. The more stupid, mendacious, and straightforward a liberal is, the simpler it is to fight with him.
Does technological change in warfare and in civil government challenge the geopolitical premises of classical divisions between spaces (Mackinder's view or Spykman's) heartland-rimland-offshore continents)? And, more broadly perhaps, does history have a linear or a cyclical pattern, according to you?
Technological development does not at all abolish the principles of classical geopolitics, simply because Land and Sea are not substances, but concepts. Land is a centripetal model of order, with a clearly expressed and constant axis. Sea is a field, without a hard center, of processuality, atomism, and the possibility of numerous bifurcations. In a certain sense, air (and hence also aviation) is aeronautics. And even the word astronaut contains in itself the root 'nautos', from the Greek word for ship. Water, air, outer space—these are all versions of increasingly diffused Sea. Land in this situation remains unchanged. Sea strategy is diversified; land strategy remains on the whole constant. It is possible that this is the reason for the victory of Land over Sea in the last decade; after all, capitalism and technical progress are typical attributes of Sea. But taking into consideration the fundamental character of the balance between Leviathan and Behemoth, the proportions can switch at any moment; the soaring Titan can be thrown down into the abyss, like Atlantis, while the reason for the victory of thalassocracy becomes the source of its downfall. Land remains unchanged as the geographic axis of history. There is Land and Sea even on the internet and in the virtual world: they are axes and algorithms of thematization, association and separation, groupings of resources and protocols. The Chinese internet is terrestrial; the Western one, nautical.
You have translated a great number of foreign philosophical and geopolitical works into Russian. How important is knowledge transaction for the formation of your ideas?
I recently completed the first release of my book Noomachy, which is entirely devoted precisely to the Logoi of various civilizations, and hence to the circulation of ideas. I am convinced that each civilization has its own particular Logos. To grasp it and to find parallels, analogies, and dissonances in one's own Logos is utterly fascinating and interesting. That is why I am sincerely interested in the most varied cultures, from North American to Australian, Arabic to Latin American, Polynesian to Scandinavian. All the Logoi are different and it is not possible to establish a hierarchy among them. So it remains for us only to become familiar with them. Henry Corbin, the French philosopher and Protestant who studied Iranian Shiism his entire life, said of himself 'We are Shiites'. He wasn't a Shiite in the religious sense, but without feeling himself a Shiite, he would not be able to penetrate into the depths of the Iranian Logos. That is how I felt, working on Noomachy or translating philosophical texts or poetry from other languages: in particular, while learning Pierce and James, Emerson and Thoreau, Poe and Pound I experienced myself as 'we are Americans'. And in the volume devoted to China and Japan, as 'we are Buddhists'. That is the greatest wealth of the Logos of various cultures: both those like ours and those entirely unlike ours. And these Logoi are at war; hence, Noomachy, the war of the intellect. It is not linear and not primitive. It is a great war. It creates that which we call the 'human', the entire depth and complexity of which we most often underestimate.
Final question. You call yourself the 'last philosopher of empire'. What is Eurasanism and how does it relate to the global pivot of power distributions?
Eurasianism is a developed worldview, to which I dedicated a few books and a countless number of articles and interviews. In principle, it lies at the basis of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, combined with geopolitics, and it resonates with Traditionalism. Eurasianism's main thought is plural anthropology, the rejection of universalism. The meaning of Empire for me is that there exists not one Empire, but at minimum two, and even more. In the same way, civilization is never singular; there is always some other civilization that determines its borders. Schmitt called this the Pluriverse and considered it the main characteristic of the Political. The Eurasian Empire is the political and strategic unification of Turan, a geographic axis of history in opposition to the civilization of the Sea or the Atlanticist Empire. Today, the USA is this Atlanticist Empire. Kenneth Waltz, in the context of neorealism in IR, conceptualized the balance of two poles. The analysis is very accurate, although he erred about the stability of a bipolar world and the duration of the USSR. But on the whole he is right: there is a global balance of Empires in the world, not nation-States, the majority of which cannot claim sovereignty, which remains nominal (Stephen Krasner's (Theory Talk #21) 'global hypocrisy'). For precisely that reason, I am a philosopher of Empire, as is almost every American intellectual, whether he knows it or not. The difference is only that he thinks of himself as a philosopher of the only Empire, while I think of myself as the philosopher of one of the Empires, the Eurasian one. I am more humble and more democratic. That is the whole difference.
Alexander Dugin is a Russian philosopher, the author of over thirty books on topics including the sociology of the imagination, structural sociology, ethnosociology, geopolitical theory, international relations theory, and political theory, including four books on the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. His most recent books, only available in Russian at the moment, are Ukraine: My War and the multi-volume Noomachia: Wars of the Intellect. Books translated into English include The Fourth Political Theory, Putin vs. Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed From the Right, and Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning.
Related links
Who is Alexander Dugin? Interview with Theory Talks editor Michael Millerman (YouTube) TheFourth Political Theory website (English): Evrazia.tv (Russian) Evrazia.tv (English) Geopolitics.ru (English version) InternationalEurasian Movement (English version) Centerfor Conservative Studies (Russian)
Oral history interview with William Warren Steele, conducted by Jennifer Payne at Norwich University in Northfield, Vermont, on 12 September 2013, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. William "Bill" Steele was a member of the Norwich University Class of 1959; his interview includes discussion of his classmates and his memories of Norwich University as well as his later career and his family history. ; 1 William Steele Oral History Interview Interview Date: Interview Location: Sullivan Museum & History Center, Norwich University Interviewed by Jennifer K. Payne Transcribed by Thomas H. King III JENNIFER PAYNE: This is Jennifer Payne with the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. Today's date is September 12, 2013 and we're at the Sullivan Museum and History Center and I'm with Bill Steele. Welcome. WILLIAM STEELE: Thank you. JENNIFER PAYNE: Can you give me your full name please. WILLIAM STEELE: William Warren Steele. JENNIFER PAYNE: And where were you born? WILLIAM STEELE: I was born in - we lived in Roxbury but I was born in Montpelier in 1937. JENNIFER PAYNE: Ah-ha, ok. Do you have a nickname? WILLIAM STEELE: Bill JENNIFER PAYNE: Ok. What made you decide to choose Norwich? WILLIAM STEELE: Mainly it was family history. We didn't have a lot of guidance in those days about possibilities of college and all that, and my grandfather, two uncles, my father, and my cousin had all gone to Norwich. So it was sort of expected that a male Steele would go to Norwich and so that's where I went and also Norwich had a great influence over Montpelier in those days. My junior varsity high school football coach was a Norwich man. My girl's father was a Norwich man. Norwich sort of permeated Montpelier. So it was sort of a no-brainer I would go to Norwich and I did. JENNIFER PAYNE: Oh. So you were class of 59? WILLIAM STEELE: Class of 59, yeah. JENNIFER PAYNE: And what was your major? WILLIAM STEELE: Electrical Engineering. JENNIFER PAYNE: Who was your roommate? WILLIAM STEELE: Well my freshmen year it was Dick Thayer and Tom Turner. We were in Alumni Hall and I wouldn't have missed that for the world. It was a fire trap, but it was a lot of fun and Tom and Dick were my roommates. We were all three engineering majors. Dick later on changed to business I think, but we were all in one room for that freshmen year and I wouldn't have missed the Alumni Hall experience for the world. 2 JENNIFER PAYNE: What was it about, what was it about it exactly? Were there, was there anything that you remember doing there that you liked? WILLIAM STEELE: It was an old, old building, and as I say a fire trap, and because it was a fire trap there was no sprinkler system or anything in those days. It was all very old wood, dried out, painted probably 30 times, and so if a fire had ever started it would have gone pretty fast. So in our rooms we had, in front of the window, we had a high stool and on that stool was a bucket and we had to keep that bucket full of water all the time, and that was inspected to make sure no algae was forming so we had to take the bucket down and clean it out and refill it with water every day to make sure that didn't happen. So it was pretty basic in those days. But I made a lot of friends there, ah, Dick and Tom, and Pier Mapes. I think Jack Joyce was with us in those days. Friends that have lasted up over the years. JENNIFER PAYNE: That's wonderful. Were you in a fraternity? WILLIAM STEELE: No, no. Fraternities then, oh I think about a third of the Corps, when I talk about the Corps I'm talking about total student body, because if you were in Norwich you were in the Corps. So about a third of the Corps belonged to the six fraternities. The other two thirds of us did not. It was, it cost 12 dollars a month which wasn't insignificant in those days, and I only had 20 to begin with. So that, and also when I got to Norwich I didn't know what fraternities were. I had no background in any of this and as a result when they started talking about pledging and rushing and that kind of thing, I didn't have the foggiest idea what they were talking about. So the fraternity experience sort of passed me by and when Ernie Harmon got rid of the fraternities a few years after I graduated I wasn't too sorry. There was a lot of, Ernie Harmon thought that fraternities did not belong in a military school, and I think in retrospect that I agreed with him. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. Did you play any sports? WILLIAM STEELE: I played intramural baseball and that, that was it. And that was my freshmen year. After that I was not sports inclined. JENNIFER PAYNE: What activities did you do? WILLIAM STEELE: My freshmen year, you know when you're a freshmen you do everything. After that you do nothing [laughing], particularly when you're an electrical engineer because your total focus was on getting through the engineering curriculum. But my freshmen year I belonged to the Glee Club, which was sort of fun. We did some traveling. And I belonged to the Drill team and that was a lot of fun and we did traveling with that also. JENNIFER PAYNE: Oh wow. What did you do to relax? WILLIAM STEELE: I think - our entertainment, most of it was pretty regulated. You know we started in the morning would be rousted out, we'd march down to breakfast, we'd come back and then it was time to get your room cleaned up and get ready to go to your first class. Then in the evening it was back to the barracks and then almost immediately go down for dinner, and then when you came back from dinner it was study. So most of that was pretty regulated. I can 3 remember the one really bright spot relaxing time during the week was when we went down to Harmon Hall in the basement where there was the only TV on campus and we would watch Air Power [on Sunday Nights] 1. That was the big thing, was watching Air Power and it was all air power from the Second World War of course. And that was the big bright spot. There were some other things, I mean we did do some things in Montpelier, some social things in Montpelier. But the, but Montpelier was a little difficult. Most of us did not have cars. So if you wanted to go into Montpelier for something normally you hitchhiked. And so I hitchhiked back and forth many a time. JENNIFER PAYNE: Right up Rt.12. WILLIAM STEELE: Yup JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. Do you remember any songs? If you were in the Glee Club did you, do you remember any songs from your year? WILLIAM STEELE: Oh there was one that the faculty really liked: "There is Nothing Like a Dame" from South Pacific. And that was great, a whole bunch of guys of a mens school isolated and everything. The faculty thought that, that was most appropriate. So we sang that. Of course everyone sang "On the Steps of Jackman." I'm not sure that anybody sings that anymore because it's sort of outdated. JENNIFER PAYNE: How does it go? Do you… WILLIAM STEELE: It was, oh I remember it well. JENNIFER PAYNE: Would you? WILLIAM STEELE: Of course, "On the steps of Jackman, crying like hell, lies a new born baby. Can't you hear that son of bitching bastard yell? Oh who could be the father? Maybe it's you. Just another bastard son of old NU." [Laughing] JENNIFER PAYNE: That was wonderful. WILLIAM STEELE: Well you know it's sort of out of date now, but because of the sexual revolution and everything else, but back in those days there was sort of an image of a Norwich guy getting lose, impregnating some local girl, and then bugging out and hiding back in the Corps. And the idea of, you know, we talked about it but I never saw it happen, but we talked about lining the Corps up and having the girl troop the line up and down with a baby in her arms, looking for the offending cadet. So that was the kind of image that went on in those days, and the idea of a girl bringing the baby and putting it on the steps of one of the barracks, which Jackman was then. It was Headquarters Company. That was sort of an image that everyone was in favor of. Interesting thing, during our 50th anniversary, which was just 4 years ago, we were all lined up on the steps of the new Jackman, and when we were lined up for the picture being taken somebody started singing "On the Steps of Jackman" and the whole class sang it. 1 Added at the request of William W. Steele '59. 4 JENNIFER PAYNE: Oh I wish I could have been there for that. WILLIAM STEELE: [Laughter] That's a, yeah too bad they didn't have a microphone. JENNIFER PAYNE: That would have been great. Oh boy. Who was your favorite instructor at Norwich? WILLIAM STEELE: Oh that's easy. His name was Martin Webb. And at the end of our sophomore year we were told that we were gonna really be brought into line because we had coming our junior and senior year a new professor and his name was Martin Webb. He was 42 years old, he was a full Colonel in the Army, had been selected for Brigadier General at the age of 42, which is pretty fast, and then had taken a physical, had a heart condition and so the Army tossed him out. And he decided to come to Norwich, which was a military school, to do his teaching. So we, the other professors had instilled fear in us to this guy was going to come and really crack the whip. Well he came and that was not the way he operated at all. He took us under his wing, and he was the greatest example of a man I think that I have ever met. He did everything right. I can remember we were very proud when we had winter carnival of most things because he was there, he was our professor, and he was real full of carnival. And he had the most expensive class A uniform dress blues that I have ever seen. In those days we thought it cost $300 which would probably be like $1500 or $2000 now. Very good material and of course tailored to fit him exactly. Martin Webb took care of us and he made sure, he tried to make sure that we were properly trained for what we were going to do and of course a lot of us went into the Army. And so what he would do, which was illegal because the drinking age then was 21, he would have Sunday afternoon receptions at his house, and he would be dressed in his dress blues, and his wife Silvia would be in a hostess gown, and they would have our class, which was only 8 people, our senior class, out to their house for h'ordeuvres and drinks. And I didn't really realize it at the time, but what he was doing was grooming us for the social life of the Army. It was just one of those things that he took on, and then I think within a year of the time I graduated and went out to New Mexico I got a letter from Colonel Webb, and he had found a job that he thought I might be interested in, in Vermont. And of course I already had a job at White Sands Missile range so I wasn't interested in that. It just shows that even after we graduated he was looking out after us. Yeah one of the finest men I ever met. I came back five years after I graduated, they had an engineering symposium, and we were, some of us graduates were going to talk to the undergraduates at Norwich. And I came back for that, and Martin Webb had died within a few months before that. That bad heart of his that got him thrown out of the Army finally caught up with him and he had collapsed and died and so that was sort of sad. But he was the best professor that I ever saw, and the finest man I ever met. JENNIFER PAYNE: That's wonderful. What was your least favorite class at Norwich? WILLIAM STEELE: [Laughing] Advanced mathematics. And it was, and the reason I tell myself now was probably because the professor, well he probably knew his subject better than any other professor knew his subject at Norwich. He was a mathematician. He knew, he had worked with Einstein during the Second World War on the Atomic Bomb as I understand it. Brilliant guy, but could not relate to students, and could not teach, and we all had a lot of 5 problem in his class. I won't mention his name, but we all had a lot of problem in his class and I did especially. So yeah that was my least favorite of all classes. JENNIFER PAYNE: What do you remember most about being a rook? WILLIAM STEELE: [Laughing] I guess, because I had not assumed great responsibility yet from my life there was a certain freedom that came from that. And there was a certain, ah, nice sense that came with the organization and the discipline and the regularity of Army life. It was very comforting. You knew where you were, you knew what your status was, you knew what to do, you know who to go at certain times, and that was pretty comforting most of the time. And then again because I hadn't grown up at the time, I didn't have the sense of responsibility that I probably should have had. So that was a pretty good year. I liked that. Also I made a lot of friends that year that have been friends ever since. JENNIFER PAYNE: But was there, was there, was the part that you didn't like, was it, was there anything you didn't like about being a rook or? WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah, you couldn't have a car. You were with, at that time our total enrollment was about 700. So you had 700 cadets isolated in a very small town with no car. So there wasn't, a social life was sort of possible if you had the money and could find the transportation. Other than that it was a little difficult. JENNIFER PAYNE: How were you disciplined, when you were, if you were ever disciplined? WILLIAM STEELE: [Laughing] Oh I certainly was. Can almost be an expert on that. I'm not sure about the way it's done now, but in those days 99% of the discipline was done by the Cadet Corps itself. It was done by Cadets. The faculty and the staff played almost no part in it whatsoever. The battalion and regimental disciplinary boards, which was the highest level of discipline, could exact any punishment up to and including suspension for three years. Now if your offence required expulsion, then the faculty came into it or the staff came into it and I think actually the president came into it for final approval. But other than that it was all students. But I have a story for an exception to that, which was made in my case [Laughing] when the faculty got involved in it. I don't know if you're familiar with the name of Maurice Smith? JENNIFER PAYNE: Yes WILLIAM STEELE: Maurice Smith, I think he died within the last couple of years. JENNIFER PAYNE: Maurice Smith? WILLIAM STEELE: Maurice Smith yeah. JENNIFER PAYNE: He's a 102. WILLIAM STEELE: He's a 100 and he's still alive then, ok. Let me tell you a story about Maurice Smith [laughter]. He was at that time a Lieutenant Colonel and an Assistant Commandant of Cadets. I had a cousin who was class of '33, valedictorian of '33, who was a very good close friend of Maurice Smith. And my cousin came to Norwich for a Middlebury game once. Well my cousin who was pretty wild, anyway, and he, when he came he stayed with 6 Maurice Smith. So before he left for the game, he and I were going to sit at the game together, before he left for the game he filled up his flask with Maurice Smith's scotch and brought it to the game and then insisted that we sit on the Middlebury side. Well I was in my Cadet uniform so that wasn't entirely proper but he was my much older cousin so I went with him and we sat on the Middlebury side. And of course all of the Norwich side was looking over across the field at us, and my cousin bought a blanket which he put in our laps presumably to keep warm. But about every 15 minutes would take the blanket and we'd throw it up over our heads and we'd pass that flask back and forth. And well of course Maurice Smith was looking across as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets, was looking across the field and he could see all of this and he knew that he had a Cadet illegally drinking his scotch. [Laughter] So now the next story I'm going to tell you, I have no proof that there is a connection, but I think that there was. A month or two later during winter carnival I was the Officer of the Day and I went ahead and did my duties and everything. About two days after that I received a letter from Maurice Smith with 7 first class charges on it, some of which had a grain of truth to them, some of which had no truth at all to them. But any one of which could have gotten me kicked out of Norwich or at least suspended. So I had to sit down as a 20 year old cadet and, and type out an official letter responding to all of these charges. Which I did, and several days went by, and finally -. In those days the mess hall was one big room with tables for 10 people and everyone was served the same food. And in the corner was what was called the crow's nest which was were the Cadet Commander and his Exec. Officer sat. And it was quite tall, there's stairs going up to it. So I was called up to the crow's nest and I was told by the Cadet Exec. Officer that Colonel Smith had referred the whole matter to them, for them to adjudicate. So the Exec. Officer said "we have decided that if you would agree, we will give you 12 demerits and the whole thing will go away." Well in those days you were allowed 12 demerits a month before you had to start walking tours, and seniors very rarely got demerits for anything. So I said "Ok I'll take the 12 demerits and we'll call it even." [Laughing] So that's the only time that I can really remember personally when anybody other than a member of the Cadet Corps got involved in disciplinary action and I think I know the reason why. [Laughter] JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow and that would be, the reason was because? WILLIAM STEELE: Because I was drinking his Scotch in front of him and he couldn't do anything about it [Laughing]. JENNIFER PAYNE: What was the hardest part of attending Norwich? WILLIAM STEELE: The hardest part? Well you know you're a kid when you're in college, and you don't have a great perspective about the outside world and what's going to happen. And I think one of the things I worried most about was how well I would be prepared to go out and do a job of electrical engineering. It turned out that was the least of my worries. Norwich prepared me very, very well. I've met people from lots bigger colleges and people with advanced degrees that I could compete with very easily. So Norwich did very well for me, but I did worry some about that when I was a cadet. And I think that and just passing all the courses was, and when I say passing all the courses, in engineering in those days, and it was changed thank god, in engineering in those days all you had to do was to pass every course. That's all. There was no 7 grade point average requirement. So if you got - you could conceivably graduate with a 1.0, having got a D in every course. Martin Webb, the aforementioned Colonel Webb, the year after I graduated he became the head of the department, and he changed that and he said he was going to change that. Because what was happening, it was very difficult to get a 1.0. I mean we flunked out. I think we had over 30 electrical engineers my freshmen year and we graduated 8 or 7 I think. So it was very difficult to get that 1.0 and, but when we got out nobody knew all about that. So our low grade point average was put up against people from other schools who had perhaps a 2.5 average, and it was very difficult when we got started. Well Colonel Webb changed that. He made a higher grade point average as being required and made it somewhat easier for it to get that higher grade point average. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. What would say is the most important thing that Norwich taught you? WILLIAM STEELE: Discipline, organization, I think without question. And, and it stays with me today. It's something that has helped me all my life and it's just part of me now, so. JENNIFER PAYNE: What did, what did "I Will Try" mean to you as a student? WILLIAM STEELE: Nothing. It meant, well I shouldn't say nothing. As, I meant it has obvious connotations that you will try, you will exert an effort and all that. But aside from that it didn't mean a whole lot. Later on it meant something far more than that. It meant, whether or not it was a good motto or not and I never thought it was particularly imaginative, but it was historical. I think it was Truman Ransom that said that and it was picked up. But later on it became just about good or bad. It became about Norwich tradition and to me that became very important, still is very important. JENNIFER PAYNE: So how do you think, let's see, I want to talk about your professional life so tell me what happened after you left Norwich and how you got to be an engineer. WILLIAM STEELE: What happened was I had no job when I graduated from Norwich. My mother was living in New York City at the time so I went down to spend a couple weeks down there tramping up and down the streets of New York City finding if, I remember Aramco, Arabian American Oil Company was one company that I interviewed with. Didn't really know how to do an interview and it was a little difficult for engineers to get jobs. It was just one of those low points. But my father who was in the Army and stationed at White Sands Missile Range gave me a two week vacation as a graduation present, a two week vacation in New Mexico, in the great southwest. So I flew down there and stayed two weeks and I arrived there with 40 dollars and 40 pounds of luggage, 'cause 40 pounds of luggage was what those old propeller driven airplanes would take. And I stayed two weeks and I loved it. I loved the weather. I'd wake up early in the morning, it was, it's high altitude down there, 3/4000 feet, and the weather is perfect day after day after day. And I decided I wanted to stay so I cashed in my return trip plane ticket and got another 40 dollars for that and that lasted me another couple weeks, and then I had to get a job. So I got a job there with civil service at White Sands Missile Range. That was pretty much what my career was from then on. 8 JENNIFER PAYNE: What did you do, what did you do for White Sands Missile Range? WILLIAM STEELE: Well I started out in the television division which was doing special television set ups, for instance - of course a missile range, like any test range, tests Army materials, Army systems. And some systems when you test them you have to surveill them with television, and so we designed that kind of system. For instance there was a hot/cold chamber that we would put the material into. We had to design a television system that would withstand the heat and the cold so we could put it in there and take a look at that material from the outside while it was being tested. There's another one, a centrifuge, which was a big spinning thing, and we mounted a camera on the very center of that pointing straight out the arm toward the material being tested. So you could view that as it went around. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: So then another job that I had was, we were doing a drone test out at Yuma Proving Ground, which was several hundred miles away over in Arizona. And I was sent over there in order to put in a television system that would provide surveillance of the drones when they were on the launch pad and as they launched. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow, very interesting. WILLIAM STEELE: It was that kind of thing. Then after that I went into meteorology. JENNIFER PAYNE: Really? WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah, we had a big meteorological group and engineering division that would build data collection systems for the meteorologists. So I did that for several years and after that I went to work for Astrodata Corporation, one private industry which built timing systems. And then they went bankrupt so I was out of work and after that I ended up, in 1972, I ended up in Yuma Proving Ground. And at Yuma Proving Ground I got some really, I got two wonderful opportunities there. And the first one was - laser technology had begun essentially in 1960, that's the first time they got laser action and some actual light out of a laser rod. So this was then 12 years later when I went to Yuma Proving Ground, and they were about to be sent a laser radar to be evaluated. And so I got there at the right time and I was assigned that job. And it was the first general purpose laser tracking system in the Department of Defense. So I got a chance to do the evaluation of that, to buy some more. It turned out to be terribly successful. Then in 1973 I think it was, I was sitting talking to my boss, and an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel appeared at the door. And he said "My name is Val Denninger and I'm looking for a place to test a new navigation system." Well we had never tested a navigation system before, but laser tracking systems were ideal for doing that because what would happen - you'd put the navigation system on board an aircraft to tell you where the navigation system said the aircraft was, and then you would track the aircraft with laser trackers which would tell you where it really was. So my boss was a smart guy and so he asked a couple of questions on how does it work and so on and so forth. And we didn't know whether that - this guy had a great line, and we didn't know how much of his line was a little hokey and how much was real. So my boss asked him, he said, "At what level are, is that project being funded every year?" And Val told us, 9 I've forgotten the number but it was huge. 100 million or something like that which in 1972 was a lot of money. And we said, my boss said "First of all come in and sit down and close the door." Because every test range is looking for a lot of test work to do, it's our living. And the next question he asked was "And what do you call this system?" And Val said, "We call it the global positioning system, the GPS." And at that point we really got interested and it turns out that the dollar value that Val had given us included putting up all those satellites. That's what made it so big. So at that point we decided we really wanted that system. And we were a little tiny range, Yuma Proving Ground is not a large range at all, and we were in competition with White Sands Missile Range, which was huge, and Edwards Air Force base. So we decided we were the only ones that had operating lasers at that point, or had one operating laser at that point. So we sat down, they had the money, we had the will, and they fed us a lot of money for software development to buy more laser trackers and everything else and we just turned our work force into preparing to test the GPS. And sometime along, I've forgotten when maybe 1974, we were officially selected as the primary test range for the GPS and I was assigned as the range product engineer for that. And my job was then to coordinate all of the facilities for Yuma Proving Ground for testing this new thing, and so that was a great challenge. I'm probably the only person you'll ever meet that can tell you exactly how the GPS works and how it determines your location. It's a mathematical process. So I got to do that for I think, we flew the first test flight of a C-130 aircraft in 1976, and after that we were still testing the global positioning system up until I left Yuma Proving Ground in 1985. So that was an absolutely wonderful opportunity to get involved in something that turned out to be very big. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow that's amazing. That's, you mentioned the 4 generals that were in your class. WILLIAM STEELE: Yes JENNIFER PAYNE: And it's just amazing how your class and your colleagues have just been involved in such incredible projects. GPS is so big. WILLIAM STEELE: Yes, yes. And the 4 generals, the 4 general officers and our class was I think 153, and the 4 general officers, first of all lightning. As far as I know we had only had one 4 star general before our class and that was I.D. White in the class of 1922, interestingly enough a classmate of my father's when he went to Norwich. And I think Sully Sullivan was the second 4 star we got, and lightning really struck because he was made Chief of Staff of the Army, I think 1990 to 1994. Then about the same time Bill Streeter became the Commander of the Military District of Washington, which included Arlington Cemetery and Fort Myer down there, some other things. We had Don Edwards who was, for about 16 years I think, the Adjutant General of the State of Vermont. And then we had Dick Durgens who was a Brigadier General. So we had 4 general officers out of the class and as well as Pier Mapes who was president of NBC television for affiliates. JENNIFER PAYNE: Amazing. Who were your family members? What are their names of your family members that were here? I would like to get them on the record. 10 WILLIAM STEELE: Oh ok. My grandfather was the first one that went here. He went here for only a year and he took pre-, he took law here. And he was then the class of 1882 I think. JENNIFER PAYNE: He's that Fredrick Steele? WILLIAM STEELE: Yes JENNIFER PAYNE: Ok WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah, he was class of 1882. He went here for one year and then came under the influence of Dr. Mayo downtown in Northfield. And Dr. Mayo was a homeopathic physician and my grandfather then decided he would be a homeopathic physician. So he went to Hahnemann Medical School in Chicago for two terms. Came back, studied under Dr. Mayo for a while, and then moved down to Gaysville which is in the township of Stockbridge Vermont and practiced there from 1883 to 1903. And then he moved to Montpelier and, to ease up his workload. But I don't think it eased up his workload a whole lot. When he was in Gaysville he was always looking at the south end of a horse going north you know, because he was going around to Bethel and to Springfield and all those towns around there in a buggy, and he wanted to ease that up a little bit. So he moved to Montpelier, moved to 152 Main Street. Now when he was in Stockbridge he was the State Representative from Stockbridge to the State House of Representatives. And then he was elected as the senator from Windsor County, and did most of his work in the Vermont state legislature on medical things. Then when he moved to Montpelier of course he was in Washington County. He was then elected to the Vermont senate from Washington County, senator from Washington County. And in those days they had three kinds of medicine and one was allopathic, which is what we would call today regular medicine. And then there was homeopathic medicine, which today has sort of degenerated into wheat germ and that kind of thing, but in those days they did everything. They delivered babies mostly, and they set limbs. It was before abdominal surgery so there wasn't any of that, but surgery on the limbs and everything they did, and everything else. And then there was eclectic medicine, and eclectic medicine was based on Native American medicine. And those three were the three that were recognized in the state of Vermont. Well at that time I think my grandfather had come to the conclusion that allopathic medicine was the way to go, and of course he was right in retrospect. And so he joined the Allopathic Medical Society and participated in that and when he was in the legislator he came to the conclusion that you ought not to have three kinds of medicine, you ought to have one kind of medicine. So he sponsored legislation that passed easily, probably based on some other states' legislation. I don't know that I'm guessing. But what it did was set up a board of two allopaths, two homeopaths, and one eclectic medicine practitioner to set up one set of standards for practicing medicine. And that passed easily in both houses, was signed into law by the government, by the governor, and became the basis for what is now state boards for medicine in Vermont. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: And that was my grandfather. Wonderful guy, my hero because in his will he left me enough money to go to college for four years [laughter] which solved that problem in those days. The second one to go here was my uncle, whose name also Fred Elton Steele, he was 11 Fred Elton Jr. And he went here I think for three years and then transferred down to a medical school in Baltimore and finished up his medicine there. I think he graduated sometime around 1903 or 1904. And both of those guys - of course medicine was a little bit simpler then - both of them were M.D.s, they were both surgeons, and they were both psychiatrists. In fact my grandfather was the first psychiatrist in Vermont and used to make trips down to Brattleboro to the retreat down there to treat the patients down there. And in those days they had no standards for psychiatry or anything else. He showed an interest, was willing to take the time, so he became a psychiatrist. My uncle had psychiatric training and he became a psychiatrist. Worked with the Veterans Administration for years, ending up down in Northampton, Mass. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: Then the third one that went here was my uncle Edwin Harrington Steele. And he got his education he started out as an electrical engineer I found out years later, and then got interrupted because we had the First World War and he was pulled out or joined and went over to France as a corporal and fought in the First World War. And then when he came back he entered Tufts and became a dentist. And when he became a dentist he married a fellow dentist and they moved to Waterbury, Vermont and practiced from probably 1924 or so until his death in 1977 I think. Had a practice in Waterbury, yeah. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow, that's a long career. WILLIAM STEELE: [My father, Warren Brooks Steele, was the fourth member of the family to go to Norwich entering in the Class of '22. The reason for his departure three years later is a little mysterious. He was not suited to the academic life and that probably had something to do with his departure. His claim was always that it had something to do with the Mount Home Cemetery next to Norwich. According to his story, he snuck out one night and rearranged the letters on the cemetery sign to read "Hope On Me" Cemetery and was expelled. No matter which story is true, he worked at several odd jobs but joined the National Guard where he received his commission when 21 through correspondence courses. He was called to active duty as a major in 1940 to be the Executive Officer of Selective Service in Vermont. In 1943 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and sent to the China/Burma/India theater and then at the end of the war he took command of the Tokyo Ordnance Depot in japan where his family joined him. In 1953 and now a Colonel he was riffed as part of a plan to reduce the number of reserve officers who had left their civilian jobs to be in the Army. He reverted to Master Sergeant until 1960 when he retired as Colonel.]2 WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah. And then the [fifth] one that went to Norwich was Fred Elton Steele III, and he was very active with Norwich until he died. He was in his 90s when he died. And he was valedictorian of the class of '33 and became, went into the Army around the Second World War. Then he went teaching, he went to teach at the Merchant Marine Academy at King's point on Long Island and got some sort of a Naval commission down there. Taught down there for a long time and eventually moved back up to Montpelier at 40 Liberty Street and taught up at Vermont College until his retirement. And then there was me. And that was, that was, there was 2 Added at the request of William W. Steele '59.12 one other thing that I found out - in my class of 1959 was an Ed Steele from Waterbury. And we knew each other of course, we knew each other's name was Steele, and that was about it. He was a business major and a good athlete, basketball player, and we graduated and run off. And I don't know, it's probably about 10 years ago I got a call and "Is this Bill Steele?" I said "Yeah." "This is Karen Steele." I said "Yeah." [laughter] And she said, "From Waterbury." I said, "You must be a relative of Ed's." And she said, "Yes I'm his wife." And I says "good" and she said, "I'm calling because I'm doing genealogical research." And I said "Are you going to tell me that Ed and I are related." And she said, "yeah you're third cousins." So whenever I'm in Vermont I usually stay with Ed and Karen for, for three days or so and we do genealogical research, so. JENNIFER PAYNE: That's wonderful. Um. What advice would you give a Rook today about how to survive and thrive? WILLIAM STEELE: How to survive? [Laughing] JENNIFER PAYNE: Yeah. WILLIAM STEELE: How to survive at Norwich? JENNIFER PAYNE: And survive, yeah, survive at Norwich. WILLIAM STEELE: At Norwich? JENNIFER PAYNE: Or in the world, either. WILLIAM STEELE: If I had it to do over again, I would be, I would take the military aspect of Norwich very seriously. I would do my very best at developing myself as a leader, because Norwich offers you a magnificent opportunity to do that. I would advise anyone to enjoy Norwich but don't forget why you're here, to study hard because your grade school and high school academic record tend to get lost, but your college record doesn't. it follows you all the rest of your life and I would advise people to study very hard and to take full advantage of the leadership opportunities that Norwich offers. I didn't do any of that, but that's what I would advise. [Laughing] JENNIFER PAYNE: So what does "I Will Try" mean to you now? WILLIAM STEELE: Mainly to me it means tradition. It means Norwich tradition and I think Norwich traditions are terribly important, ought to be paid attention to. A lot of them have gone by the wayside and I'm sorry to see that. After we left, I don't know I think it might have been sometime in the 1980s, "I Will Try" was changed I think to "Essayons" and then changed back to "I Will Try." I don't think that should have ever been changed. I never liked "I Will Try" as a particularly good motto but it's tradition, it's been around since a, for a long time. Also something that was changed was our sports teams were always known as the Horsemen. It was the Norwich Horsemen and we had banners with a Cadet on a jumping horse and that kind of thing. That was changed to the Cadets. Norwich is not West Point, it's not supposed to be West Point, it wasn't founded as a West Point. It was founded for citizen soldiery, not professional soldiery, and I think that that Horsemen should have been kept. And if anybody, if anybody questioned that in this day, when women have been admitted to Norwich - something I was fully 13 in favor of and so was everyone else, well I'll deal with that in just a second - but if anyone were to complain well the Horsemen is gender specific, I'd just say the term Horsemen, if you look in the dictionary it's not gender specific, it can apply to women just like chairmen can. And I think it should have been kept and I would very much like to see it changed back. Now a word on, on women being admitted to Norwich. From my perspective Norwich has always followed the Army, it prepares people for the Army. And when the Army changed from brown shoe to black shoe, Norwich changed from brown shoe to black shoe. When the uniform changed, Norwich in my day used the regular Army uniform just with Norwich insignia, which was a great advantage because when the seniors graduated they would take off their class strip and the Norwich brass and they would have their first uniform, which was a great advantage for a poor second lieutenant coming out of Norwich. And I was sorry to see them change that also. When the regular Army changed their phonetic alphabet. See I was in Easy Company, which the next year became Echo Company. From the old, it changed from the old Abel, Baker, to Alpha, Bravo phonetic alphabet. Norwich changed and when the Army changed and admitted women it was within the Norwich tradition and practice to follow what the Army did. If you're going into an Army with women and you're going to have to deal with whatever problems and opportunities come along with that, you'd better be trained for it and Norwich does that. And I have always been so proud of Norwich, and I brag about Norwich all the time, because places like West Point and VMI and the Citadel all have had big problems and resistance to admitting women. And at Norwich it just happened without any ripple, it was accepted, we went on from there. And I thought that that had to do a lot with the fact that the command structure at Norwich was seamless. It was seamless from the president of Norwich down to the Cadet Corporal. We were all part of the same disciplinary administrative function. There wasn't any big dividing line between the student body and the responsibilities of the faculties and staff. So when the president said we will have women at Norwich, everybody saluted the flagpole and said "yes sir" and we had women at Norwich. JENNIFER PAYNE: Is there anything else you would like to add? Anything else you'd like to say? WILLIAM STEELE: Just that, that when I graduated from high school I had very little experience or knowledge of the opportunities of various colleges and all that. And I ended up at Norwich as much from family tradition as anything else. If I had it to do all over again I would still go to Norwich, and I would go to Norwich for the discipline, and the order, and all that kind of thing that it taught. Because I have never seen any other school that taught it like Norwich did, and taught the assumption of responsibility at such an early age. Because, as I mentioned before, Cadets exercise all the discipline in the Corps of Cadets or virtually all of it and I haven't seen any other school that did that, and that taught you at a very early age. In fact I was talking with one of our ex Cadet Colonels and he said you know there are a lot of Cadet Colonels that never have had as much responsibility, real responsibility, again in their career as they did that senior year as the Commander of Cadets. JENNIFER PAYNE: Really? 14 WILLIAM STEELE: So, yeah that what I think was really great about Norwich and why I would go back. JENNIFER PAYNE: That's wonderful. Thank you so much. WILLIAM STEELE: Well thank you for having me. It's been fun. JENNIFER PAYNE: I really enjoyed this. I'm going to hit the stop button. [She turns the microphone back on] JENNIFER PAYNE: There we go, you're on, ok. So tell me about General Sully. WILLIAM STEELE: Sully? Sully at that age was a very interesting guy because he didn't seem to have a whole lot of direction. He was a member I think of Sig Ep fraternity and a lot of his social life and everything was based around Sig Ep. He was not particularly good academically as I remember it, and, surprisingly enough, he was a Rook for his first year as we all were and a buck private for the next three years. He never made corporal, never made sergeant, never made officer. And, again didn't seem to have a whole lot of direction. He, his plans were, as I remember it, and I think the year book says that his plans were to go into business when he got out of Norwich. And instead of course he went on to be Chief of Staff. So, but one thing I found that was very interesting, we would be sitting around deciding what to do at say on Saturday afternoon we'd decide what to do on a Saturday night. And we'd say, well should we go to a movie, should we go down to Burlington to UVM to the basketball game or something, and we'd discuss it and Sully wouldn't say anything. And we finally say ok let's go to the basketball game down in Burlington. And then everyone would turn around and say "What do you think Sully? is that ok?" [Laughing] So, although he never adopted leadership role in the Corps of Cadets he had an enormous amount of charisma and leadership just built into him which I always thought made him Chief of Staff of the Army. And then when he was Chief of Staff he came to El Paso, to Fort Bliss, and gave a speech there and I was in the audience and what he told, he was speaking to people that might be the parents of people entering the Army, and he said "Don't worry if your kid is not a born leader. Give him to us in the Army and we will teach him leadership." And I thought that I've never been able to relegate two things, that this guy who was probably the most natural born leader I ever met in my life, would say "It's not necessary to have any of that, we'll just teach it to you." JENNIFER PAYNE: Huh. WILLIAM STEELE: So, yeah, Sully worked in the mess hall and in those days we would march down to the mess hall in formation, go in, there were table for ten people a piece all through the mess hall and we would be assigned a table and we would sit there. Senior Cadet, Cadet with the most rank at the table would be the table Commandant. All of the, or the Cadet Commander and his Exec. sat in a very elevated platform with stairs going up to it called the crow's nest in one corner of the mess hall. And typically what would happen is that announcements would be made when everyone was there, corps would be called to attention, announcements would be made, and then grace would be said. And then as soon as grace was said the doors from the kitchen would open and the waiters would come out with these carts with terrines on them and you 15 might, you'd have a terrine of mashed potatoes for instance and a terrine of corn and maybe a platter of breaded veal or something. One for each table and they would be but on the table, and the table Commandant would take his share and pass it on down. And one of the great things about Norwich was it was the table Commandant's job to make sure that the rook at the end of the table got as much food as all of the people proceeding him. So it was very, very good training for officers that whose primary responsibilities was to take care of the men, and that meant the privates as well as the subordinate officers. And Sully was one of those waiters. And as I remember it he was a waiter for four years. He was well known as the waiter, and the waiters did not go to formation, they left their last class and went right to the mess hall to get ready. And then they left the mess hall and went to their next class in the afternoon. And I think as I remember it for that they got free meals, they didn't have to pay the board part. So that's what I remember about Sully mostly. He roomed in Goodyear Hall on the third floor I think his senior year. I was, about the only time I ran into him was then because I was on the first floor of Goodyear. I was in the MP's for three years at Norwich and that's where, that's why I would run into him most of the time. And the other guy that I remember of course was Pier Mapes and Pier became - NBC Television had I think 11 presidents. Tt was under GE and they would have a president, they had a president for programming and they had a president for finance and a president. Pier Mapes became the president for affiliates. And I know the last time I saw him he said "Bill you're from El Paso." I said "Yes." He says "KTSM right?" I said "Yeah that's the NBC affiliate." So he knew all of those, but in college Pier was a tall gangly guy. Not athletic, not coordinated enough to be athletic, but the friendliest and nicest and least affected person that I ever met. Really good guy. He was in our company which was Easy Company our freshmen year and that's where I got to know him best, and then we both belonged to the Episcopal Church and did a lot of that work together in school. But Pier was a cheerleader, and Pier came from a family of money I think, in fact I know he did. And when he was a cheerleader he showed up dressed as a cheerleader out of the 1920s. He had a real raccoon skin coat and a megaphone and he would lead cheers doing that and I can remember when we were freshmen, we're sitting down talking in the evening ya know and Pier said "You know to be successful in business you don't have to be smart, and you don't even have to work real hard." He says, "but you have to make sure that you don't make any enemies, that you get along with everyone." And that's sort of what Pier did and later on, I mean 45 years later on, not too long ago, I had an occasion to call Pier to ask him about something. I've forgotten what it was and I said, "Pier do you remember what you told me when we were freshmen, 18 years old in college?" He said "no" and I told him you don't have to be smart to get along in business, you don't have to work real hard but you have to get along with everybody. He says "No I don't remember that," he says, "but ya know he said I was pretty smart as a kid wasn't I?" I said "Yeah I found out later on you were." So yeah that was what I remember best about Pier. Pier, I googled Pier and I found out I think his father's name was Pier Mapes also and his father was also a big executive with NBC and I believe when NBC got the contract to broadcast the Miss America contest his father had something to do, was in charge of that. And he decided that the Miss America contest ought to have a theme song. And so he went out and he contracted out 16 to have someone write a theme song for Miss America and that's where the "There she goes Miss America" came from. I think that was Pier's father that did that. JENNIFER PAYNE: Oh my gosh. Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: Good guy. I saw him at the 50th reunion 4 years ago. Still the same guy, still totally unaffected, one of the nicest guys you'll ever meet. Smart guy too. JENNIFER PAYNE: I have to ask you 'cause you mentioned it a couple times, the food. How was the food, how was the chow when you were here? WILLIAM STEELE: Well [laughing] I thought it was good. Of course food when you are told what to eat, you're going to get lots of complaints, so of course there were lots of complaints. But by and large I thought it was very good. Standard meals, scrambled eggs and cream chip beef on toast and, and uh for breakfast. Yeah I thought it was very good and with the regulation that went on at the tables everybody got enough to eat. We didn't have it like it is now where you go in and select what you want and eat pizza three times a day if you want it. We were fed good balanced meals and so that along with. But one thing we did not have then that they have now, Norwich has improved greatly by the way since then. We did not have a whole lot of exercise. When you were a freshmen you were given calisthenics I think one day a week, something like that, not very much and that was about it. And there were no, there was no equipment. There was no weight room or any of that. No swimming pool. So when we had a chubby little fellow come in to the Corps of Cadets, four years later he would graduate as a chubby little fellow. We didn't have nearly the emphasis on health and fitness that they do now because the Army didn't. The Army did not have that. I was in Japan right after the Second World War - 1946, 1947 - and living on an Army post and a lot of those soldiers were grossly out of shape. Not in good shape at all and when the Korean war happened, 1950 I think it was, those were the troops they sent over to fight. And those troops were not in condition to fight and that's why they got slaughtered. And I think now the Army is emphasizing fitness a great deal more and so is Norwich and that's a great advantage. We had no fitness room, we had no swimming pool. You could go down and run around the track if you wanted to and that was about it. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah. Other advantages that they have now - we had no laundry then at Norwich. To get your laundry done you can have it done one of two ways: in the basement of Harmon Hall they had a laundry counter. You would take your laundry down give it to them, they would ship it downtown and your laundry would be done downtown and then shipped back and you would pick it up in Harmon Hall. The other way you could do it, they had a standard tin box with straps around it and you could put your dirty laundry in there and send it home and have mom do it and send it back. And a lot of people did that. JENNIFER PAYNE: Really? 17 WILLIAM STEELE: And when I got out of Norwich I sent a letter back and said you know you've really got to get laundry facilities there. And so I got sort of a letter that was designed to put me off and but I noticed a few years later they had installed laundry facilities here. The other thing we didn't have was multiple ROTC types. We had Army ROTC. JENNIFER PAYNE: That was it. WILLIAM STEELE: That was it. And our Cadets, we had one or two that took their commissions in another service, I'm not sure how that worked. But they didn't have Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, they didn't have any of that. It was just plan Army ROTC. We did have one thing that I think they've done away with. If you were a very good military person, got good marks, good recommendations and everything you would become a DMS which was a Distinguished Military Student. If you were a DMS in ROTC you could take a regular Army commission. You wouldn't be reserve it would be regular Army, and I think they've done away with that. I think the regular Army is strictly West Point graduates now, that's my understanding. JENNIFER PAYNE: You grew up a little while in Japan. Was your dad in the Military? WILLIAM STEELE: Yeah he was in the Military, shipped over to command Tokyo Ordinance Depot right after the war. We went over in November of 1946 which is about less than a year and a half after the war, everybody had 15 months after the war ended and we were some of the first dependents over there. JENNIFER PAYNE: Really? WILLIAM STEELE: Which meant well there was a school, so when I went to school I went to school with English kids and Australian kids and all that. I skipped school a lot and [laughing] because I found a way to get around it. But, that was it. I spent most of my time, my entertainment, I was 9 years old when I went over and 10 when I came back, but most of my time was spent in what was the Red Cross Club, became the Service Club, which was for enlisted. And they had pool tables and ping pong tables and things like that and free coffee all the time. So that's where I spent all my time. We would go to the post, my father would go to his office and I would go to the club, and maybe meet for lunch, and then I'd go back to the club and spend all my time there. Learned how to drink coffee there at nine years old [laughing]. And later on, things were pretty wild then and my parents, my father was a Lieutenant Colonel then and he and my mother went for a vacation to, with a stop at Hong Kong, and to the Philippines. But the three of us stayed there right outside of Tokyo, and a Captain and his wife came and lived in the house and sort of babysat for us. Which was pretty wild because they, let's see we drank beer, I was 9 years old, we drank beer. I learned how to drink beer, my sisters had mixed drinks, they were 11 and 13. They were older so they had mixed drinks. I had beer. We smoked, I learned how to play poker, and was not a bad poker player when I was 9/10 years old. So it was pretty wild bringing up and most of my friends were Japanese. I spoke no Japanese. They spoke no English. Didn't make any difference we still played together and all that. The house we lived in was beautiful. It was a college president's house. The living conditions were incredible because the occupational Army took over things like that. So we had a two story stone house, and this is for a Lieutenant Colonel, with manicured lawns and manicured everything outside. 18 JENNIFER PAYNE: Nice. WILLIAM STEELE: That's where we lived. We had, for a family of five we had 7 servants. We had Mama San who was the chief maid and then she had her 13 year old daughter who was my buddy then, and she lived there also. Then there were 3 maids. And I'm not sure there's an upstairs maid and a downstairs maid and maybe a kitchen maid or something. There were three maids, and then there was the boiler man who was sort of the handyman and he took care of the boiler that heated the house and took care of everything else around. And then the last one was the cook. Always had trouble with the cook because the cook, we had two or three cooks and they all had short tempers and threw pots and pans around and all that. But, so we had 7 servants for a family of 5 over there. JENNIFER PAYNE: Oh my gosh. WILLIAM STEELE: It was pretty, pretty interesting. The biggest event I can remember there was my father and the whole family being invited to the Chinese Embassy for a big party and [laughing] I think I was 10 by this time, by the time this happened. So I went and the Japanese serving girls didn't know any different, they were taught to do certain things and that's what they did. And I was on my third martini by the time my mother figured out what I was doing. So after a couple martinis I had to dress like an adult and I saw this beautiful Chinese girl in a red gown and I decided that I wanted to dance with her so I went over asked her to dance. And she indulged me, we danced as best as I could. It was fun. Yeah I remember that evening very well. But there were no rules, an occupational Army doesn't worry about too many rules and too many standards. It was a pretty wild year. Then I came back to the United States in the 5th grade and all of a sudden it was culture shock all over again [laughing] and I couldn't do all the stuff. I really had to study, make up for a misspent year in Japan having played hooky from school at least half the time. JENNIFER PAYNE: Did you play poker at Norwich? WILLIAM STEELE: No, No I never played poker after Japan to speak of. I played pretty good poke, but it was everybody played poker which meant that you didn't have to be that good at it. But when I came back then the poker games were sort of dominated by people who were really good at it and you didn't, either you should get really good at it or you should stay away from it. And I found that out I think one lesson and that was it for poker, so. JENNIFER PAYNE: Sounds like it was a very interesting year. WILLIAM STEELE: Yes it was a very interesting year. Yeah it taught me that if you're going to be in a war, you'd better win because you're a lot better off if you win then you are if you lose. And the Japanese, one of the reasons we had so many servants is because the Japanese economy was destroyed. A great deal of Tokyo was destroyed. You know we fire bombed them with the Doolittle Raid. [Coughs] Excuse me. And so one of the things the American occupation was doing was hiring as many Japanese as possible so they would not starve to death. I can remember, I'm one of the few people I know who actually saw Douglas McArthur. Because if you think of that you know a lot of people have seen Eisenhower and the other Generals from the 19 Second World War, but McArthur was sort of scarce. And the reason he was is because during a great deal of his career he was in the Philippines sort of remote, and then after the Second World War, and then of course Second World War he was in the South Pacific. After the Second World War he moved, his office was in the Dai-Ichi building in the middle of downtown Tokyo. So he was out of the country most of the time, that's why nobody had seen him. But I can remember seeing him once and all the stories about him were true. He was the most dramatic actor that you ever saw in your life. And we were traveling along, we'd gone to downtown Tokyo to do some shopping. And of course we were using an Army Jeep and I was the 9 year kid so my mother sat in the front seat beside the driver, my two sisters sat in the two rear seats, and then I sat on the ground or on the floor with my feet down by the gear shift and my back up against the back seat. And all of a sudden we got stopped, and the reason we got stopped is that when Douglas McArthur came to work in the morning everything stopped. The traffic was stopped. And so I sort of heisted myself up so I could see out the front window and here came a line of what must have been, oh probably six motorcycles with lights flashing, and then at least two cars, and then motorcycle escort in back. And this was McArthur arriving for work at the Dai-Ichi building. And his car stopped, they let him out, of course still with all the flashing lights around. They had a line of MPs on either side of the sidewalk going up to the Dai-Ichi building, and crowds of Japanese, I mean must have been 20 or 30 deep, just wanting to get a glimpse of McArthur. And so he got out and he had the, the crushed hat with the 50 mission crush on it that he always wore, all he did he took the grommet out of it so the sides sort of drooped down, and the corn cob pipe and he was a tall, tall guy anyway. And no mistaking who it was and he stood up in between that line of MP's into the Dai-Ichi building and of course the MP's dispersed and the escort dispersed and we were allowed on. But it was quite a dramatic scene and my understanding was that scene went on every single morning he went to work [laughing] and whereever he went. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow. WILLIAM STEELE: He was quite something. I don't think he did a, frankly a good job of commanding because he was in charge of all of those troops in Japan and let them get totally out of shape because nobody expected another war to come along. And I think now that we've learned our lesson and I think that the Army will not make that mistake again, but they certainly did then. There's no question who was in command of Japan. McArthur was in command. Everyone knew it, he made sure that everyone knew it [laughing]. JENNIFER PAYNE: Wow that a good story.Yeah. Wow, anything else? WILLIAM STEELE: No I think that's it this time. JENNIFER PAYNE: Ok, alright no that's good, that's really good.
Education has the power to provide opportunities for meaningful, personal growth. In this research I usc my own, personal narrative as a means to explore various feelings of accomplishment and disappointment throughout my educational experience. Written reflections from graduate-level courses and a self-written story of my educational experiences, including my role as a teacher, were used for data analysis. These artifacts were coded using NVivo software. Coding revealed four themes: Self-worth and Selfesteem; Freedom through Authenticity; Regret; and Change and Redemption. Discourse, which is a guiding, invisible force, shapes the narrative, or lived experiences, of individuals. Its influence on my narrative was examined. The discursive claim of education is that the main goal of education is about and in the best interests of students. As my experiences in education were not positive and I felt that I did not receive what I needed, I assumed that my narrative countered the discourse. The findings showed that it was not I who countered the discourse, but rather my mental illness. This finding revealed the oppressive force of discourse upon the teachers in that there was not room for mental illness in education. This brings into question the discourse about viewing teachers solely as professionals as opposed to teachers as people. ; SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 2 Acknowledgements I most appreciate Dr. Louise Moulding. Qualitative research is not her thing. I know she did this for me. Dr. DeeDee Mower was the framework and the scaffolding who kept this project steady throughout its construction; however, long before we were aware of DeeDee's expertise, Louise took on this project with me. She remained my chair though she felt, and verbalized, that she was not the best candidate for that role. I cannot think of a better person to have guided me through this project. I do believe that there is no one else with whom I would have rather gone on this journey. She made me feel safe and she made me feel loved. This was a very special project, so I needed a very special person to chair it. Thank you, Dr. Moulding. You helped me change my life. Love is not enough they say. That is why we needed Dr. Mower. She was the shepherd of us sheep lost in the pasture of qualitative research. We often strayed, but she kindly brought us back. She brought her expertise, but she also brought excitement. I was discouraged a few times-more than a few times. DeeDee was always so excited about this project. She saw something I could not see. She saw power in this research beyond what I had ever considered. Her wisdom was indispensable. I have never experienced as much altruism in life as I did in her office as she taught me the language of narrative research. It has always seemed that she was invested as much as I was to this project. I did not spend a lot of time in Dr. Stewaii's office, but it is in her class where my journey began. She allowed me to explore my story within the contexts of her course. My reflections were priceless to me. They were precious. I will continue to appreciate the respect and care Dr. Stewart showed toward my feelings. Her comments were insightful and helped me continue my growth. I felt validated as a person and encouraged to stay on SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION my journey of self-discover because of the comments she wrote in the margins of one of my assignments. She made me feel special. 3 In addition, I wi~h to thank Hayley Blevins and Erin Furlong for their support. We went through this program together. They became my very best friends: we had a lot of fun. They loved me, they laughed with me, and they even cried with me. This experience was overwhelming with the many emotions that came with the project. Our friendship became my strength many times. I am fortunate to have met them. I think they are great, and I love them. Thank you also to Weber State University and the M.Ed. program for providing the platform for this research. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 4 Table of Contents NATURE OF THE PROBLEM . 7 Literature Review . 8 Purpose of Education . 9 Personal Experiences in Education . 12 The Role of Expectations . 1 7 Self-efficacy for Educators . 21 Why Narratives Are Valid in Educational Research . 23 PURPOSE . 29 METHOD . 30 Instruments . 3 0 Procedures . 31 FINDINGS . 35 The Four Major Themes . 35 Self-worth and Self-esteem: Authenticity and Freedom . 36 Regret . 39 Change and Redemption . 40 Conclusions . 43 REFERENCES . 47 APPENDICES . 51 Appendix A: Institutional Review Board Approval Letter . 51 SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 5 List of Figures Figure 1. Coding data for final analysis. This figure shows the interactions of the three research questions in data analysis . 34 Figure 2. Four themes emerged from the overlapping area of the three research questions. The arrows show the interconnectedness of all four . 36 SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 6 Abstract Education has the power to provide opportunities for meaningful, personal growth. In this research I usc my own, personal narrative as a means to explore various feelings of accomplishment and disappointment throughout my educational experience. Written reflections from graduate-level courses and a self-written story of my educational experiences, including my role as a teacher, were used for data analysis. These artifacts were coded using NVivo software. Coding revealed four themes: Self-worth and Selfesteem; Freedom through Authenticity; Regret; and Change and Redemption. Discourse, which is a guiding, invisible force, shapes the narrative, or lived experiences, of individuals. Its influence on my narrative was examined. The discursive claim of education is that the main goal of education is about and in the best interests of students. As my experiences in education were not positive and I felt that I did not receive what I needed, I assumed that my narrative countered the discourse. The findings showed that it was not I who countered the discourse, but rather my mental illness. This finding revealed the oppressive force of discourse upon the teachers in that there was not room for mental illness in education. This brings into question the discourse about viewing teachers solely as professionals as opposed to teachers as people. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 7 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM The purpose of education today seems to be influenced by economy rather than by humanity. Its extrinsic rewards are favored over its intrinsic power for personal transformation and growth. The earliest colleges were institutions used to prepare its students to become clergy. In the 1700s universities began to offer a breadth of courses that enabled individuals to reflect and reason. Experiences during university studies crossed many subjects. Students were mentored so that they would be able to apply the knowledge from these subjects to their own growth and identity. The goal was to allow individuals a range of opportunities that would engage all parts of their lives, both present and future. The early 1800s marked an initial shift in the view of education that abandoned the emphasis on the learner, his experience, growth, and identity replacing them with what the learner should learn. College attendance became more common and those pressures led to a decrease in the quality of instruction. The educational philosophy concerning the purpose of education is again focused on practical measures and extrinsic gains. This comes at the cost and marginalization of the intrinsic benefits of education. Despite this current situation, education still has power to provide intrinsic benefits. These benefits are still of value independent of the extrinsic benefits and need to be acknowledged and encouraged. The expectation an individual holds as he experiences education enhances or diminishes the potential for education to aid in personal growth and transformation. Thus, students who enter their scholastic endeavors with hopes of becoming a better person or a belief that they will gain a new view of the world are likely to find such things, while SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 8 those who seek only a degree and better employment are likely to overlook and graduate never experiencing the available benefits. Society continually undervalues intrinsic aspects of education, which encourage students to do the same. Education is a lived experience that shapes identity and should be a foundation for a stable view of one's self. However, as students increasingly enter college without the realization of the role education can play in self-views and self-efficacy, they graduate with only a degree, mostly unchanged. Eliminating academic studies that may not be practical or directly applied to the workplace neither produces college graduates who have attributes employers state they look for in candidates nor does it project happiness or satisfaction in their future professional lives. The professional benefits may feel hollow or inadequate because individuals also need a sense of fulfillment. By sharing and discussing the intrinsic benefits of education, expectations of students may shift and graduates may feel a sense of fulfillment and self-pride. Literature Review The contemporary debate about the main role of education in society is not a new idea with such dialogue recorded as far back as the early eighteenth century, before American independence (Spring, 2014). Early colleges resisted focusing on specialized and practical curricula, opting instead to uphold the principle that the student graduate having developed "a balanced character that could fit into any intellectual conversation or gathering" (Spring, 2014, p. 70). However, over time higher education shifted toward specialized curricula that would land graduates in occupations, and ultimately came to care less about the intrinsic benefits of education, such as a sense of fulfillment or SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 9 identity, than the knowledge or skill sets they attain (Hanson, 2014). As this shift continues, the expectations for growth in universities decrease as knowledge and occupational tasks increasingly become, not means to an education, but the "benchmarks and we abandoned the big questions about who our students become" (Hanson, 2014, para. 3). Purpose of Education The marginalization of intrinsic benefits of education existed even in the eighteenth century (Hofstadter, 1955/1995). Higher education, and education in general, has historical foundations in religion. The instruction focused on doctrines and teachings from whatever religion managed the institution. Courses, such as Greek and Latin, were not offered as means for personal growth, but to enable the students who were expected to become clergy or civic leaders to fulfill their responsibilities. In the eighteenth century colleges began to depart from this practice (Spring, 2014). Despite this departure from narrow religious curricula, there were individuals who proposed universities what would exclude "all but the useful and vocational subjects" (McCaughey-Ross & McCaughey, 1980, p. 251) this meant the elimination of classical languages completely, and restricting instruction of science and mathematics to direct applications similar to today. However, these proposals were originally rejected in favor of a far greater breadth of instruction (Spring, 2014). Samuel Johnson was instrumental in these changes when he became the first president of what is now Columbia University in 1754 (Mccaughey-Ross & McCaughey, 1980). In the announcement of the university's opening, Johnson explains the proposed instruction to be: SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 10 . In the learned languages, and in the arts ofreasoning exactly, of writing correctly, and speaking eloquently; and in the arts of numbering and measuring, of surveying and navigation, of geography and history, of husbandry, commerce, and government, and in the knowledge of all nature in the heavens above us, and in the air, water, and earth around us, and the various kinds of meteors, stones, mines, and minerals, plants and animals, and everything useful for the comfort, the convenience and elegance of life, in the chief manufactures relating to any of these things; and finally to from the study of nature to the study of themselves . and everything that contributes to their true happiness, both here and hereafter. (as quoted in Mccaughey-Ross & Mccaughey, 1980, pp. 251-252, emphasis added) Changes at other universities followed: arithmetic became a requirement for college admission; mathematics became required in three of the four years of college instead of one; science equipment such as barometers and microscopes was imported; and readings by Locke, Newton, Copernicus and others were assigned readings (Spring, 2014). A graduate of baccalaureate programs in the 1 gth century was expected and assumed to be one who was balanced and engaged in all the facets of his intellect (Spring, 2014). However, this changed decades later as the demand for education rapidly increased (Spring, 2014). In the haste to respond to the demand for more and more universities, the quality of instruction was ignored (Spring, 2014 ). The proposals to exclude the classics, depth in mathematics and science, and reasoning, which had been rejected in the past, gained favor. The majority of causes were economic since limited content would result in the hiring of fewer faculty, who could then be assigned a maximum amount of courses. But appearances also played a role, as the time-to- SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 11 graduation rate could be more efficient. Not only were instructional concerns ignored, the construction of universities was also poorly planned and poorly organized. The goal of education became simply to provide "every locality with a cheap . institution that would make it possible for the local boys who desired degrees to get them easily" (Hofstadter, 1955/1995, p. 214). In fact one historical researcher pointed out that Often when a college had a building, it had no students. If it had students, frequently it had no building. If it had either, then perhaps it had no money, perhaps no professors; if professors, then no president, if a president, then no professors. (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 4 7) Philosophies of education today are similar and with a similar cause. The narrowing of curricula in the early nineteenth century resulted from an increased demand of college attendance. Today there is again an expectation that all children should have the opportunity to attend institutions of higher education. There is also an idea of the "cheap institutions" quoted by Hofstadter (1955/1995) earlier; demands for grants, debt forgiveness (whether federal or through future employer), or other financial aid such as scholarships has been increasing rapidly (Cronin, 1986). Educational achievement is now narrowed to data that can be published and explicitly verbalized. There is little acceptance of alternative forms to demonstrate educational success (Burwood, 2006). It is ironic to learn that the very employers students hope to impress by their resumes, grades, and efficiency of scholastic achievement tend to say they value qualities of diverse and intellectually curious people (Hanson, 2014). The emphasis on test scores, economics, and career and technical readiness is at odds with the attributes employers seek when interviewing candidates for positions. Recognition of the intrinsic benefits of SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 12 education seems to be superficial when accrediting agencies are not known to hold educational institutions accountable for the personal growth of their graduates even when it is explicitly written in the institution's mission statement or objectives (Hanson, 2014). When individuals and universities do cite these benefits they are mentioned only as support to the extrinsic benefits to society such as communicating in occupations, saving the government welfare money, and so forth (Times Education Supplement (TES), 2005). It is now the credential that matters most, not the education or the process (TES, 2005). In both secondary schools and within higher education, grades are inflated and content has been diluted to increase graduation rates with an inattention to student achievement or competence (Carter, 2007; Goos, Gannaway, & Hughes, 2011; Hanson, 2014). Promoting programs that provide only the content of subjects without the reasoning, application, and history of the material has caused some to ask, "What kind of 'graduate' [are] these courses producing?" (Smith, 2003, para. 11). The associated expectations and assumptions surrounding diplomas, certificates, and degrees is that they are symbols of sacrifice, dedication, enlightemnent, and application of traits such as perseverance, but "all too often the piece of paper is confused with the territory that it purports to describe" (Starr-Glass, 2002, p. 224). Therefore, such expectations and assumptions that have accompanied academic progress for hundreds of years are no longer a guaranteed result of educational achievement such as graduation. Personal Experiences in Education The statement, "Education holds a miraculous and transformative power," is an example of intrinsic benefits. It is also the title of a recent report on education (Adkins, 2012). What is interesting about this title is that the great majority of the report is spent SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 13 overviewing the state of American education and its impact on economy, such as salaries and costs per pupil, and touting the monetary advantages of graduating from both college . and high school; the monetary disadvantages of not completing school, and other economic boons from education. Yet, the author, the executive director for the Council of State Governments, titles his work Education Holds a Miraculous and Transformative Power and concludes the piece with an unexpected redirection of thought: While the statistics are telling, for me, education has always been a very personal pursuit. I can still name each of my elementary school teachers . These educators . had a profound impact on my aspirations, my career and my enjoyment of life . I was blessed with dedicated teachers whose passion for learning helped kindle my own pursuit of knowledge . What a miraculous and trans.formative power education holds! (Adkins, 2012, p. 3, emphasis added) There is a natural question as to why an author would spend so much time discussing the extrinsic aspects of education and its role to produce economically viable citizens only to conclude with emotional recollections. It is because education can, and does for many people, provide means for personal growth to transform them into the very best versions of themselves independent of societal and personal affluence (Smith, 2003; TES, 2005). However, it is important to note that in spite of the heartfelt description of his own childhood experience in education, he states that he knows that his daughter is successful because of her test scores with no mention of any personal transformation (Adkins, 2012). Possibly nowhere else in education has this point of personal fulfillment and intrinsic benefits of education been advocated more than in the arts. It is well known that SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 14 funding for such programs in public education has faced cutbacks providing another example of favoring extrinsic aspects of education. Of course, there have been many who fight for the arts to stay, but often these arguments approach the battle from the wrong angle (Koopman, 2005). The justification for the persistence of art curricula has been housed within the tenets that they enhance the traditionally respected subjects such as reading, math, and science, because that is the currency used for influencing law and policymakers. Even when these claims can be supported with research, they tend to be correlational; however, Koopman (2005) contends that justification in relation to math and sciences should not be required. When individuals are self-aware and have created stable identities, they are more likely to stay in college, improve weaknesses (Carter, 2007), and find satisfaction and happiness in the workplace over their lifetimes (Hanson, 2014). When education is free from the oppressive pressure of efficiency and task achievement, it can shape the understanding students have of themselves when they ask "Who am I?" (TES, 2005). Koopman (2005) asserts that the benefit of forming self-identity ought to be adequate to argue the benefits of arts in education and ought to be valued independently of practical and extrinsic educational goals. In a hierarchy of learning, changing as a person is placed at the top (Wood, 2015), yet this type oflearning remains undervalued. This has diminished opportunities for personal growth, which have become a secondary goal of education, if a goal at all. Sandra Smith's (2003) personal story may be helpful to explain the dual and contradictory claims that education is providing both practical and personal gains. Sandra was well aware that college education would prepare her for and provide better SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 15 employment and economic stability. Sandra explained that though she did go to college (being a single-parent and working as a low-wage input clerk) with the hopes of improving her social and economic status, she also wanted to study something she loved, being English literature, "and maybe even to achieve personal transformation along the way" (Smith, para. 5). These expectations shaped her experience. Her university requirements included a breadth of courses before any specialized courses could be taken. Because of these courses, Sandra "discovered a new way for seeing [her]self' and has "never seen [the] world in quite the same way again" (Smith, para. 6). In her writing, Sandra reminisced about courses in sociology, geography, and cultural history. She shared specific content and its transfer to her life, thoughts, feelings, and philosophies. She learned how to develop and communicate ideas, to question the status quo, to gain an active frame of mind in addition to practical skills such as pdoritizing work and developing strategies for success in new situations. At her "traditional university a degree meant much more than the subject in which you majored" (Smith, para. 6). Of course she also learned linguistics, grammar, the history of the English language, and "how to write a whole lot better" (Smith, para. 7). In fact, she got everything she had sought. She did graduate in English, and loved her major, but of the internal changes mentioned in her writing, none of them were in direct relation to that major. Those changes resulted in experiences and learning that were outside of her initial focus; they came because the university requirements held to the historical roots that education has outcomes of educated, well-versed beings not simply graduates with degrees. Upon graduation, however, Sandra concluded that her degree in English would likely not lead to a position that would yield economic independence (Smith, 2003). With SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 16 this concession, she returned to school with the aim of getting vocational training. She quickly found that the attributes which are claimed to be encouraged in schoolingdiscussion, questions, and creative thought-were not so welcome, instead favoring preconstructed work skills. In spite of this she found the experience to be positive due to its learning opportunity. Her goal was different from the first; she was not in school to study something she loved or maybe to experience personal transformation. However, her perspective favoring learning as the goal increased her satisfaction and still allowed for personal growth. She did learn skills for the work place, except they were not fully adequate. In a sad irony, Sandra took her up-to-date skill set directly into the workplace only to find that they were not up to date (Smith, 2003). Instead she found that in today's workplaces "there is no time to find your feet or acquire specialist knowledge. You have to hit the ground running" (Smith, para. 10). Design of courses was formed wholly for the needs of business and industry. This relationship between higher education and industry no longer supports educated beings. Rather, it supports the production of what Hanson (2014) terms human capital, viewing students as the currency of American economics. Sandra's story, though, actually provides an example that even this goal of skills-based education is not being met. Sadly, this extrinsic model of education caused Sandra to doubt the value of personal growth and transformation in education. She wondered for a time if her first four years of college had been a waste, eventually concluding: . That it cannot be just about training for the workplace. There's probably something very wrong with a society that is driven by market forces to turn its back on millennia of knowledge and learning in favor of narrow vocational skills. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION . I think that a workplace that has little room for arts/humanities graduates is missing something vital. (Smith, 2003, para. 12) 17 She was correct. Education does not need to be justified in terms of objective and practical measures. Even though not all parts of education are "necessary for subsistence, [they can] crucially . contribute to the fulfillment of one's life" (Koopman, 2005, p. 93). "The question, 'What is [education] good for?' should be answered by the response: '[It is] good for life.' Or, better still, '[It is] good for nothing. [It is] good life itself'" (Koopman, 2005, p. 96). The Role of Expectations The effects of expectations and perspectives on the perceived benefits of obtaining an education were briefly noted in Sandra's story, yet it is an important supporting idea when considering intrinsic benefits. Bruner (1966) has stated that people. are naturally curious with a desire to learn. This desire seems to be innate beginning with infants (Martinez, 2010). As individuals grow, this curiosity becomes more complex as various factors shape the motivations behind the will to learn. Bruner (1966) divides individuals' motivations as either competence-based or achievement-based. Tippen, Lafreniere, and Page (2012) divided motivation into similar divisions of grade-oriented and learning-oriented. Competence-based motivation serves to fulfill the basic need that humans have to use learning to exert control over a situation. This could be analogous to grade-oriented motivation, which leads to efficiency, and, in a way, control of one's educational experience. In contrast, achievement-based motivation does not allow satisfaction to occur due solely to evidence of skill or ability, which evidence could be analogous to a grade, but rather the actual application of that skill or ability. For example, SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION it would not be enough to get a grade; one must show how his or her ability to get the grade affected his growth. 18 Achievement-based motivation requires greater self-awareness or metacognition (Tippen et al., 2012) Learning-oriented students were more likely to have a high level of conscientiousness in addition to the characteristics discussed as desirable by employers: self-discipline, independence, intellectual curiosity, creativity, and an openness to experience new opportunities (Tippen et al., 2012). Students who were motivated by learning were also seen to self-impose high academic expectations. The opposite was found for grade-oriented students who displayed conforming and uncreative approaches to learning. Interestingly, neuroticism was highly correlated with grade-oriented students. This may relate to the controlling component of Bruner's competence-based motivation since pressure to control the outcome of grades creates stress when the success, in this case the grade, will be determined by the teacher or professor. Even though this knowledge about motivation has been communicated, a focus on objective and businessready education persists. As such, there is pressure upon educators to decrease the standard required in order appease those students who refuse to use learning as motivation. Otherwise, such students would perceive their professors as unfair, provide them with poor evaluations, which may directly affect their positions (Goos et al., 2011). As the environment where "students are consumers and grades the currency exchanged for measures of success" (Goos et al, 2011, p. 95) continues to grow, competency-based motivation is encouraged over achievement-based motivation and grade-oriented motivation is encouraged over learning-oriented motivation. For example, in assessing a skill, a teacher may simply accept an explanation or description of what SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 19 must be done, grade-oriented and competency-based, rather than requiring the student to show understanding through action or the creation of a product, learning-oriented or achievement-based. There may be some who contend that the students may already have a grade-orientation when they enroll in college. However, it has been shown that as students spent more time on campus and in classroom settings during their first year of college, they became more work-avoidant (low effort) and grade-oriented (Kowalski, 2007). This can cause educators and students to lose faith in the caliber of the education provided (Carter, 2007; Hanson, 2014; Smith, 2003). Bandura proposed a different idea termed self-efficacy. This is a person's belief that he or she is capable of doing something regardless of his or her actual ability. Bandura (1977) describes four different ways that an individual's self-efficacy can be positively affected: mastery, through repeated success in an experience that required effort or perseverance; vicarious experience, observing others' success and believing "I can do the same"; social persuasion, when others praise and encourage actions voicing their belief of the individual's ability to succeed; and lastly, emotional and physiological states, the effects of a person's physical and mental health, may also alter ones perceptions of ability. I will use Krista's story to illustrate some of these ideas. Krista did not complete high school in spite of loving school and her teachers (Lebrun, 2013). However, for reasons unstated she did not complete high school; she did not finish ninth grade. She did her best to find work in the mall or at restaurants. At one point she shook blueberry bushes as a harvester, which apparently paid a decent wage. Despite the bush-shaking income, life was hard and she was tired. She was tired physically and she was tired of looks and judgments. "Determined to prove to people that SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 20 [she] was more than a blueberry-shaker or a hamburger flipper" (Lebrun, 2013, para. 4) she decided to get her GED. Krista had an expectation that school could change her and improve her life. Just as self-efficacy can be positively influenced, it can also be negatively influenced. Being viewed "with pity or disgust, as if you are worse than the gum stuck to the bottom of [a] shoe" (Lebrun, para. 4) is an example of how self-efficacy can be diminished. This being her experience, Krista began her journey with feelings of uncertainty. This changed through a mentor at the community college she attended. Through her encouragement, Krista earned her GED. In contrast to the negative influences of society, this mentor had "looked at [her] as though [she were] somebody . [and] made her feel like [she] could do anything" (Lebrun, para. 5). This is an example of how social persuasion can increase self-efficacy. Upon completion of her GED, Krista displayed the influence of Bandura' s mastery experience describing her sense of identity and rise in society. Upon reception of her GED, "just like that, [she] was somebody . [she] could do anything" (Lebrun, para. 6-7). Education has that power. It has the power to shape a person's identity and a person's self-image. Krista's example does not end with a GED, however. With new confidence in academic success, stemming from mastery of previous educational success, she returned to community college. Her expectations were unclear, but not undefined: "I had no clue what I wanted to be or what I wanted to do, but I knew I wanted a college diploma to hang next to my GED" (Lebrun, 2013, para. 7). Krista was not operating under an expectation that college would provide her a skill set and a myriad of knowledge to recall. She was not returning to school with the needs of industry in mind. She returned to get what a college diploma is purported to represent-a changed person. Similar to SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 21 Sandra's experience, Krista took courses in multiple areas leading to an associate's degree. Upon graduation she realized that she loved learning. It could be said that Krista was a learning-oriented student. She graduated with a bachelor degree in education, then a master's. With a little social persuasion from the dean of her university she finally earned a Ph.D. She started at a community college in Florida; now she teaches at a community college in Florida, yes, the same one. "I not only got my start at a community college. I got my future" (Lebrun, para. 13). Self-efficacy for Educators Krista's story is insightful and exemplary of the way education can shape a person's personal growth and sense of fulfillment. The GED to PhD experience is not common, but the impact of education is. Self-efficacy for teachers has traditionally been related to teachers' belief that they will be able to elicit desired outcomes from their students (Williams, 2009). That is the traditional meaning of education-the classroom, the students. Interviews with practicing teachers revealed a common theme. Teachers' self-efficacy is most positively affected not through student achievement from their instruction, but rather through personal interactions with their students and the faculty (Hargreaves & Preece, 2014). The literature rarely represents teachers as individuals separate from their professional roles. In review of the research regarding teachers' emotions, Gargante, Monereo, & Meneses (2013) found that " . Teachers' emotions are generated and applied only to specific objectives, such as in their preparation and professional development, in process of educational changes, in teaching situations, or in teachers' professional lives . Although teachers' emotions are clearly identified and labelled . there are few SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 22 classifications to sort [them] into relevant and useful categories in education . Emotions are [mostly in] only two categories, positive and negative emotions. (p. 3) As established earlier in this paper, attending school is a personal and can also be an emotional experience. For teachers in New Zealand who returned to school to update their credentials both were true (Williams, 2009). Over two hundred teachers entering a university program to upgrade teaching credentials participated in a survey examining both personal and professional self-efficacy. Over half of the participants had more than twenty years of teaching experience. Unlike the United States and most of Europe, New Zealand has traditionally only required a certificate program for education, not a baccalaureate degree. Only recently, at the very end of the twentieth century was a degree required. Though it was not a requirement for practicing teachers, many went back to college to attain the degree, which explains the large sample size. Partial credit toward the upgrade, which amounted to approximately two thirds, was awarded to those teachers for the education attained in their initial certification along with work experience. Most of the teachers stated they experienced doubts of success, discomfort or intimidation at the beginning of the program, not only because of the program but also because of the newly-graduated teachers who already had a degree (Williams, 2009). As the program progressed the experienced teachers realized they could be successful. These mastery-experiences positively influenced their self-efficacy. At the end of the program self-efficacy had improved dramatically in both confidence personally and confidence professionally. Closing interviews did not reveal many comments about confidence in their ability to teach. However, "several interviewees spoke of becoming 'a different SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION person', having 'an extra spring in my step' . or 'walking through the world with a head held high'" (Williams, 2009, p. 607). One specific teacher was quoted as saying: 23 I always thought I was . quite good in the classroom but academically average . . . I was stunned every time I opened a paper and there was an A . Coming here and doing those papers made me realize . I actually can. I actually have a good academic brain and what a shame it's taken me until my 40s to find out. (p. 607) Through the process of upgrading their credentials, the teachers in New Zealand showed that it is not just the teacher who gained greater self-efficacy, but also the person. Far too often the personal is taken out of educational research forgetting that these experiences have power. Education is not an isolated, sterile environment in which humans exist for the first twenty-five or so years of life. That is why education has such broad implications for personal growth. Education is a process of becoming a new person. Starr-Glass (2002) explained that the woman in his research "is a real person, not just a straw-woman set up for the sake of argument or rhetoric" (p. 221 ). We are all real people. We are not numbers or imaginary visages. We are real and have real emotions. Education has the potential to provide a place to experience them as a means for the growth of self and identity. "A good degree opens the world" (Elmes, 2015, para. 11). Why Narratives Are Valid in Educational Research Education is a part of life. In the United States, this statement more than likely elicits a visualization of a schoolhouse with classrooms filled with desks and tables. This common view of education is provided, shaped, and determined by discourse (Foucault, 1972). Discourse, in qualitative terms, is overarching ideas and frameworks within which SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 24 individual experiences occur. Narratives are the experiences themselves. It is within this relationship that narratives are subjected to the power of the discourse to frame and shape realized experiences. Whether speaking of formal or informal education, learning is a natural part of one's life experience. Learning is believed to occur through a sequence and collection of experiences. "To live is to live in time, from moment to moment, from episode to episode" (Koopman, 2005, p. 93). Learning is a process over time, which varies among individuals. Because education and learning are of an experiential nature, it makes sense to study education in terms of discourse and narratives (Clandinin & Co1melly, 2000). There is no way for an individual to share a story without using narrative. Focuses in U.S. education have shifted more and more toward measuring academic achievement based on statistics and what students know rather than what they become (Hanson, 2014). Narratives have been useful in analyzing language and linguistics (Althusser, 1970/1971; Sartre, 1988) and ethical, moral decisions (McCarthy, 2003). These historical and traditional uses of narrative research will not be examined here. Instead, the more recent application of narrative research in regards to identity and self-fulfillment will be examined. A study of nurses specializing in the emergency department (ED) of hospitals examined certain personality characteristics in relationship to the nurses' practices when treating geriatric patients presenting with cognitive impairment and pain; this sample population is notable as it presents complex needs (Fry, MacGregor, Hyland, Payne, & Chenoweth, 2015). The results support the claim that learning and self-analysis are positively assessed and improved through use of narratives. In the case of these nurses, SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION who are in a non-traditional, but still educational environment, it was concluded "confidence and self-efficacy was [sic] developed through the experience of nursing praxis . communication, and interrelationship with patients and caregivers and the wider social and physical environment within the ED" (p. 1627). The results also included nurses' comments during focus groups, which provided insight to the changes that occur over time, context, and experience. It is possible that a person's narrative, or story, can be shared and interpreted differently at one time or in one context in one narrative, but then change in another narrative (Georgakopoulou, 2013). 25 The discourse of nursing praxis did not change resulting in new nursing practices, but rather time and context changed nurses' narratives of self and of nursing praxis, which may no longer fit within discursive nursing practices. It is through the sharing of narratives that the power to employ a dynamic relationship between a person's past self and a person's current self through reflexivity is allowed. Narratives can continue to be defined and interpreted in different ways through time and context. It is because of this that students use narratives to create, develop, and alter their identities as they "think, talk, and tell stories about who [they] are, where [they] have been, and what [they] have done" (Hanson, 2014, para. 7). Engaging in meta-narrative may reveal conflicts between accepted discursive understandings and an individual's narrative. This can be specifically useful to resolve ideas about the ability to be different from and yet the same as others; to maintain a self-view of constancy over time (even a lifetime); and one's place in the world-"Am I acting on the world, or is the world acting on me?" (Bamberg, 2010). In the context of this paper, "Am I constructing my experience(s) in education and therefore SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION myself, or is my place in education determined outside of myself?" Bamberg terms this as the "two directions of fit." 26 Because narratives shape a person's identity and discourse shapes narratives, it makes sense that a study and analysis of an individual's narratives ought to be used to understand what education is actually accomplishing in regards to both narratives and educational discourse. This is to say that narratives have inherent power to provide meaningful information about identity and personal growth, particularly meta-narratives. However, this power is constantly ignored in favor of the informative powers of discourse. Koopman (2005) states that "the concept of fulfillment indicates that our experience . need not be that of an external power [such as discourse] to which we are exposed. It suggests how we might optimally realize our temporal existence" (p. 93) through sharing and experiencing narratives to inform discursive traditions and see beyond them. A student's self-view is not objective and is not stagnant. It is inextricably coru1ected to all things he experiences, thinks, and feels. Thus, it follows that education and learning become part of a student's identity, who he is, while also becoming part of his past (Hanson, 2014). It follows, then, that there is information regarding education and learning that can only be recovered and presented through narratives. This information can only be useful when gleaned from authentic, personal narratives. This research, for instance, is based on my personal narrative. As such, I have chosen to write using first-person voice. The discourse of academic writing is well illustrated by Nash (2004) as he explains his cause to liberate academic writing: The denial of the value of the selfs stories in an academic setting is born in the command all of us have heard in school at some time: never use the 'I' in formal SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION writing. The 'I', we have been told, is incapable of discovering and dispensing wisdom without the support of the 'them', the certified experts. (p. 54) 27 Using made-up, rhetorical examples does not allow for a discursive analysis, as those will naturally conform to the discourse (Georakopoulou, 2013). However, Bamberg (2010) has indicated that an individual considering hypothetical situations for himself, such as "what ifl had made [this choice]?", may be a safer and more reliable way to explore one's self-identity with greater clarity. This is true because meta-narratives have the ability to consider deviations from or discrepancies in the discourse. There are really two parts to this idea: the ability to view one's possible selves based on hypothetical decisions in the past; and the ability to view one's possible selves in the future based on decisions currently being made. This latter part is quite relevant to this paper as a student's perception of academic achievement is shaped by discourse. Relating back to Bamberg's "two directions of fit" would raise the question as to how a student views himself in regards to education. Is it education to student or student to education? It is known that narratives are not fixed (Bamberg, 2010). One reason is that they are shared for a variety of reasons, which alters what is determined as relevant to be shared. Some examples include trying to get out of an undesirable consequence, consoling another, and teaching or sharing one's understanding with others. Again the dynamic nature of narratives is seen as a person interprets and re-interprets his life at different times. Comparing such narratives can show themes (sameness over time) in a person's life, while also showing changes. Narrative research is of particular importance when viewed in light of the latter as changes in self-identity or life-interpretation can often be unexpected and may not otherwise be noticed as discourse limits what can be SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 28 shared and what will be seen (Dyson & Genishi, 1994). Narrowing the experience of education to charts and graphs of some such variable like graduation rates or time spent in a library does not represent what is actually occurring in a student's life. "Students use narratives to build and maintain a sense of who they are" (Hanson, 2014, para. 23). Considering the narrative nature of a student's education, it only makes sense to incorporate narratives and discourse into the field of educational research. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 29 PURPOSE The historical timeline of American education has seen changes from narrow religious curriculum, to broad learner-focused curriculum, to today's narrow business-driven curriculum. The current curriculum marginalizes intrinsic benefits of education limiting opportunities for personal development, the formation of self-identity, and new perspectives on life and the world. To promote the self-fulfillment and satisfaction individuals will have in both their personal and professional lives, intrinsic benefits of education must again be valued in their own right not secondarily to extrinsic benefits. The current practice, which devalues the personal components of education, limits and ignores the potential power that individual narratives have to inform discursive practices and beliefs. When the sharing of narratives is consistently censored, prevented, or otherwise limited, unknown and unexpected truths will remain undiscovered. The purpose of this project was to offer a place for me to examine my life: beliefs, philosophies, feelings, self-esteem/self-efficacy, and identity. I am the purpose of this project. I can truly say, "It is all about me." My journey through life is not only different, as all journeys are, but very unique and not very happy. I entered the M.Ed. program at Weber State University with a desire to change. I wanted to find love and meaning in my personal life; I wanted to be happy. The purpose of this project was to reach a place where I could overcome feelings of shame, guilt, and regret as I looked back on the choices I had made, specifically in regards to my education. It is about me, and in a way it is me. I do hope that it will resonate with and aid others. I hope it will build camaraderie and unity among other teachers, but ultimately, the purpose of this project was just as the title says: self-fulfillment through education. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 30 METHOD Educational discourse stresses the quantifiable and utilitarian aspects of education. This has led to an ignorance regarding the potential for education to provide a platform for individual growth and the lived experience of students. This driving force of education has had direct, negative effects on my life leading to confusion, unhappiness, and eventually resentment toward educational praxis. Because the motive of this project was to sort through my own personal concerns, narrative research was utilized. There have been some persisting concerns about the use of narratives as a methodology in educational research. These are addressed in the previous section titled "Why narratives are valid in educational research" and partly in the literature review. Unaddressed in those sections are concerns regarding personal narrative. Since it has already been established that each individual is shaped by discourse, the validity of findings can be questioned. Operating under the basis that subjectivity has power and provides benefits to educational research, this method is appropriate for use. Instruments Narrative research, by its definition, is based in storytelling. The story then becomes the primary artifact for analysis. It was imperative, therefore, that my story was told. This was accomplished through a written reflection of my educational experiences using a technique known as stream of consciousness (James, 1890). The idea is that thoughts cannot be viewed as isolated or chopped apart; they are always flowing-like a stream. The use of stream of consciousness shows this interior monologue through writing. Structure and grammar are abandoned to allow for an exploration of associated thoughts. In a colloquial sense, it allows, and possibly encourages, the storyteller to go SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 31 off on tangents. Once finished this narrative was not reviewed by me until months later when I coded the data, which allowed for greater objectivity on my analysis. My written narrative provided the bulk of data. In addition, ten other reflective artifacts were used for analysis. These were written as requirements for courses taken in the M.Ed. program. It is important to note that they were not written with the intent to be used or analyzed in any project, which provides greater objectivity of the data. Of the ten, eight artifacts came from an educational psychology course. The professor required her students to design and propose assignments that would be used to assess his or her competence of the material presented in each chapter of the text. In a research methods course in the prior semester, I was first exposed to narrative research during a routine search of literature for an assignment. I initially questioned the validity of the article for publication, but after reading it felt a powerful connection and considered employing it in my own project. Entering the educational psychology course with that consideration, I felt it may be useful to practice writing narrative pieces. For each chapter in our textbook I wrote a reflection of when I felt or identified with the psychological theories presented whether professionally as a teacher, personally as a student, or as an individual. The other two artifacts came from an independent studies course in which I read literary classics, and the other from a curriculum and assessment course. Procedures· NVivo software was used to code the data. This software allows for electronic coding and sorting of written data into categories, including cross-referencing. The narrative and reflective pieces used were uploaded into the software. As I read over the SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 32 sources I created categories and assigned sections of texts to a category. All categories were developed after the coding process began; there were no pre-defined categories. Any length of text could be selected and assigned to one or more categories. Through the use ofNVivo, all original sources remained intact while new pages were created-one for each category-which contained the references from all sources for that category in one place. It was also possible to delete references from within a category, move a reference into a different category, or to keep a reference in that category and add it to a different one at the same time. In other words, coding could be done from within the original source itself or from within a category page. Narrative research allows themes to appear without predefined categories. This avoids the forcing of references into specific categories, which provides greater validity to and confidence in the conclusions. Although the initial coding did not have predefined categories, research questions had been generated months prior. These questions were not used to create categories or guide the coding process. I developed three research questions regarding how the timing of my master's degree, my mental illness, and motivation affected my educational narrative respectively. These questions in themselves would threaten the claim of objectivity of the coding; however, I actually misplaced and forgot these research questions. I was troubled about losing my research questions; but it turned out to be an unintended positive means to improve the strength of my claims. It was under this condition that I coded the original sources without influence from the three research questions: Why were my goals for my education different during my master's degree than those in my public school and undergraduate degree? What SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 33 influence has my mental illness had on my educational experience? How does motivation affect educational experience? When I was writing the narrative piece, which provided the core of data for this project, I felt anxious and an unwillingness to explicitly state anything about mental illness. In fact, at times, I would reword, rephrase, or entirely remove sections of the narrative as I wrote it. I knew it was an integral part of my experience, but also felt as though it should not be present in the writing. As a result, very few references to my illness survived the written telling of my story. Once I began developing research questions, I felt guilty that I was not as forthcoming about that part of the story. Dr. Mower told me that it would be fine and still useful because it might be able to strengthen my case that the discourse prevents the honest expression of my narrative. I felt that I, again, had prevented my project from showing what I believed to be a very impactful part of my narrative. First, I diminished and limited the inclusion of mental illness in my written narrative, and then I forgot to include it in my coding. It was discouraging. Dr. Mower again thought it was just fine and said the bit about the discourse battle. The pep talk was not effective and I remained saddened. This experience will be of importance in the findings section. I was disappointed and honestly felt that my project had been compromised in some way; yet, I continued. As aforementioned, normally in narrative research one would decide which categories to use for continued analysis and allow overarching themes to appear. However, since I had specific research questions, this traditional methodology was adjusted. After identifying which of the many categories ought to be used for further analysis, I created three new categories, one for each of my research questions: Master's, SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 34 Motivation, and Mental Illness (see Figure 1). I reviewed the coded data within each of the original categories and then performed a secondary coding of the data into one (or more) of the three research questions. Any references that did not fit within those three categories were abandoned. I printed the coded data within the three research questions and then performed a tertiary coding. Just as the first coding process, I allowed categories to appear without predetermined ending points. This coding was done by hand. Figure 1. Coding data for final analysis. This figure shows the interactions of the three research questions in data analysis. Only categories that fell within the overlapping area of the three research questions were considered for final analysis. Four categories remained for final analysis: Self-worth and Self-Esteem; Authenticity and Freedom; Regret; and Change and Redemption. It is worth noting that the references within these four categories remained in the data pool after three separate coding procedures. Unlike during the original and secondary coding, the emotional influence and the overall feeling of the references were added to the criteria. Therefore, themes rather than categories will be used to refer to these four groupings. References that were accepted for final analysis were also reviewed as to whether they showed examples of the discourse or a counter-narrative, meaning that my experience opposed the discursive claim. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 35 FINDINGS Discourse is an idea that has developed an identity. It has power and influence over an individual, a group, or even an entire society or culture. Discourse shapes the experiences of individuals. It is an invisible hand that directs actions, thoughts, words, and beliefs. The personal stories and lived experiences are narratives. The discursive view is that narratives are fiction in themselves, that there is no individuality. Discourse makes the rules and people unknowingly obey. It is this reason that my final analysis includes this section in addition to the research questions. This research brings into the light the reality that what the discourse claims to be may not be at all. In fact the actual realities which are lived and felt every day might be completely the opposite. Though I set out to reveal the discourse and its oppression on narratives, I found that narratives may also perpetuate the discourse not only through conformity but also by agreement. My story illustrates all three of these situations: countering against, conforming to, and agreeing with the discourse. The Four Major Themes Four major themes emerged while looking within the overlapping area of the three research questions. These were: Self-worth and Self-Esteem; Authenticity and Freedom; Regret; and Change and Redemption (see Figure 2). SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 36 Figure 2. Four themes emerged from the overlapping area of the three research questions. The arrows show the interconnectedness of all four. One theme included references about self-worth and self-esteem. Positive references such as "I feel more empowered," were coded together alongside any negative references such as "I did not deserve to have fun." The second theme presented many different feelings that have in common living with authenticity. Although the term authenticity was never mentioned in the data, I often refer to the "real-me." Other references in this theme share my desire "to be free from it all," and resolving feelings of instability. The third of the four themes was regret. Regret was also one of the original categories during the first-order coding of the data. The final theme focused on change and redemption. References included thoughts about change when I wrote," . education has the power to change people . it could change me," as well as references to applicable changes as in my world views or my motivation behind my actions. All four themes were closely intertwined. This finding was not surprising considering this was a single, personal narrative. More than being intertwined the first SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 37 two themes were more akin to a pair. The best term for the relationship is mutually inclusive. The categories are distinctly different but necessarily interactive. I explain this term as analogous to the relationship between twins. Each has his own name, personality, habits, friends, and so on, yet always the relationship with his twin is apparent and powerful. Certainly what one twin does affects and causes changes to the other, but often both operate separately while never operating independently. In the good, in the bad, in the confusing, in the times which would otherwise fracture a relationship forever, twins are together. So also were my feelings of self-worth and my feelings about emotional stability, authenticity, and self-entrapment. The remaining two themes were also closely related and in a similar way. Contrastingly, the relationship between change and redemption and regret was more similar to cause-effect and correlation. More often than with the other pairs, references from these two themes were often found without the other nearby. However, this quote may illustrate how regret can act as an impetus for change: "I want to show the world that I can take all of those regrets and the guilt and the shame and remedy them by living by a different pattern," whereas these quotes show how change can expunge regret: "My master's degree is all about redemption." "It will give me my life and my joy back." Self-worth and Self-esteem: Authenticity and Freedom Living with authenticity, I found, brought relief. My writings mention more than once that I believe that education had the power to change individuals, and I knew that I would need to put myself in a position to take advantage of that. The data showed that I lived with a lot of shame because I was not willing to take that risk. "I could not force myself to be the best version of myself. I held myself back . and I was unhappy and SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 38 unfulfilled." Of the many, many other entries that portray this, the feeling is most appropriately captured in a quote from Great Expectations (Dickens, 1860/1979): "In a word, I was too cowardly to do what I knew to be right, as I had been too cowardly to avoid doing what I knew to be wrong." This trend began in my k-12 experiences. As it continued, "I became more aware of the conflict between my values of growing and . [my] actions." In fact, I received "my bachelor's degree with a lot of regret and disappointment." My master's experience was different because I was willing to be authentic. I decided that I could not sacrifice.myself any longer. This relief is shown as "I am so very proud of myself. I am proud that I am doing it [meaning making education about my personal needs for once,] and I am proud that I am doing it now-earlier than later." As part of my master's program I enrolled in an individual study course. I elected to read classic literature. In part, the motivation of this was to overcome the fear that someone would one day discover, that as smart and educated as I was, I was not well read. I had not had the opportunity in school to read these books, and I had not yet taken it upon myself to procure them from the library or bookstore. These readings yielded far more than overcoming the embarrassment from the deception about not reading a few famous books. In these books I found myself and my identity. "I understand myself more because of this course," I wrote in my final reflection. One book was particularly affecting. A young, innocent man posing for his portrait was introduced in the opening chapter of The Picture of Dorian Gray (Wilde, 2011 ). As Mr. Gray experienced the world, he behaved in dishonest, lustful, and other undesirable manners. Through some magic, never fully explained in the book, the manifestations of these choices never SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 39 showed on his face but rather on his portrait. Likewise he did not age rather his agedness appeared on his portrait. Thus he was able to maintain the appearances of a good, scrupulous man while living quite oppositely. I considered the similarities to my own life: "I feel that I misrepresented myself;"" . No one knew me. Not even my family. I could not share myself with them (referring to anyone, not just my family.)" Reading the book felt like a confession-as ifthe author of the book knew my story. It brought relief, though nothing had changed. I viewed Dorian Gray as myself in fictional form and the portrait as a representation of my soul. Others saw my accomplishments. I saw "a fraud and a man who cut the corners of his education." This book strengthened my resolve for authenticity in my education. "I do not want to look at my portrait and find it ugly and dirty and unbearable to look upon, while I appear so youthful and enviable." Instead of hiding my portrait away in the attic and behind locked doors, as Mr.· Gray did, I found that I was "as open as possible" which led to "a greater connection to humanity." Regret Many references of regret were accompanied by guilt. This was not surprising and those references, though applicable here, were better placed in the first theme of selfworth and self-esteem. What was surprising were the feelings of loss which also accompanied regret. Loss of enjoyment was one common regret, which appeared in the very opening line of my written story: "My biggest regret of my college career was that I never enjoyed it." In another reminiscing thought: "I wish I would have done more in my college career that involved . enjoyment." Yet another: "I wish I would have slowed down and enjoyed youth . "In addition to loss of enjoyment was the loss of self-improvement. This regret often came because "I held myself back." Others were formed SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 40 while "I was frozen in fear," or because "I could do only those things in which success seemed inevitable . " I missed an opportunity to study red pandas in China. "I really wanted to go and it felt right. I had the money," but I did not go. Many of these regrets were due to social pressures. The judgement and approval of others was a deciding factor as to what I would do. "One reason . I never felt fulfilled is because I was accomplishing things to impress and fill up others buckets, not to fill up my own." One of the most interesting issues of my regrets was that I felt I had no power to change them. The feelings of loss expressed with regret came with a sense of permanence. There was a forever loss. In many ways and in various amounts of words, I expressed there are things "I will never get back." I also found that regrets were persistent. With each new regret, the "burden of [my] mistakes" would grow larger. In fact, "mistakes and regrets pile[ed] on [my] body simultaneously." Regrets, it seemed, could be created, but never destroyed. Change and Redemption I was constantly "wait[ing] in fear and hope both to be found out as a fraud . "I convinced myself that if someone were to call me out I would be forced to change. My high school counselor did just that. "I realized that she knew how I was not living up to my greatness and . gave partial effort for appearance only. It was a powerful moment in my life, but one that still did not allow me to change." I think the most interesting finding about change was that there was so little of it for so long. The second theme about authenticity and freedom presented many desires for change. Thus, motivation for change was always present, yet change did not occur. I later wrote about a requested substitution of course requirements in my bachelor's program. Again, the data showed that I was not SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 41 completely open to embracing change. "Part of me hoped that [my advisor] would deny the request, but part of me was ready to fight her if she did." One of the premises within the literature review focused on the shift education has taken in focusing on data and grades, not the student. In my mind, this was the new discourse on education. I would call this the discourse of educational prestige. It was my belief that the discourse of educational prestige is what prevented change and growth. I believed this was the oppressive force, which had prevented my self-fulfillment. There was a great power and a sense of defiance when I wrote that I applied to the master's program "to find myself personally, not professionally." I felt I was proving something to the world when I wrote in bitterness, "This time it is about me." I found out that the discourse of education still maintained a focus on the students' best interests. Through analysis of the data, I learned that the discourse of educational prestige was not a discourse, and it already had a name. Its name was mental illness. For me it came in the fonn of bi-polar and social anxiety disorders. One common finding about change was that I refused "to deviate from the path that I had planned earlier." Once I made a plan, I felt obliged to see that plan true to the end, even after it was clear that it was a bad plan. Mental illness was the invisible force, which silently shaped my narrative to oppose and resist change. Thus, when opportunities came to improve or change, I would not take them. "I felt that I did not deserve [to change] because I had made a mistake in not planning for those opportunities." This was a dominating thought. This was what held me back. It was this logic which made regret permanent. My narrative became a collection of unhappy experiences though the influence of mental illness, not the discourse. Despite that reality, I did change. I did make "it about me." I did "make a difference. A difference SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 42 for me." All of those changes happened, but they did not happen because I overcame the discourse. The reason that my master's experience yielded more rewarding outcomes is not because I was more aware and more empowered to fight the discourse, but rather that I was more aware and more empowered to fight my mental illness. Before my master's degree I viewed education as a means to gain social approval and self-worth, which caused me to take classes and participate in extra-curricular activities "that would be impressive and [make] people love me." This is apparent in the two examples with the high school counselor and college advisor. Contrastingly, I entered the master's program believing that it "could help me deal with my emotional insecurities and other personal chaos." Directly stating my need for emotional support is what made this time around different. "I am here to be healed," I wrote. This does agree with the discourse. Education is power. This theme is also about redemption. I found in the end that redemption is not what was there. Even though, "My master's degree is all about redemption." When I imagined this moment in my story, I wrote, "I will see my own portrait of a man redeemed of errors and a man regained of his confidence and self-worth." I do not think that redemption has taken place. The words speak of redemption, but instead I found healing and forgiveness. "I just want to be at peace," I said. "I want to feel stable." The data showed those wishes were granted. The discourse would claim that these changes in my self-worth, self-esteem, and self-acceptance were socially constructed, that there was no individual force from my narrative, but I know it is different. I felt the battle against the discourse as I pushed SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 43 myself to find a place in the world and in the teaching profession with mental illness. I felt the pressure of the discourse every time I added a bit more of myself to the project. The discourse does influence my life, but it is not the only power that exists in my life. I have my own power to fight the discourse in the times when my experiences no longer agree with the discourse. Conformity is not guaranteed. I do have a voice, and that's what this is. This is my narrative. It is I. Conclusions I found that discourse is not inherently evil. In fact, narratives may very well agree with discourse more often than they do not. Contradicting my expectations, the data did not support that discourse was the oppressive enemy I had villainized it to be at the commencement of this project, or at least not to the severity I assumed. I found, rather, that it was the mental illness that shaped and oppressed my narrative. However, though the discourse did not oppress my narrative directly, it hid from view my mental illness, which prevented me from growth. I was unable to face my mental illness because I was not fully aware of where or what it was. It is in this way that, for me, the discourse was oppressive and was an enemy. One clear example of the role mental illness played in my narrative comes from the paired themes of self-worth and authenticity. In that section I quoted the disappointment and shame that came with the reception of my bachelor's degree. The discursive practices regarding graduation are celebrating, rejoicing, and congratulating. Clearly my experience countered that discourse. I assumed that my nanative was countering that discourse. Reviewing the data I found a quote about how I would feel upon reception of my master's degree: "The acceptance of my degree will in a way be an acceptance of myself." Here, my narrative agreed with the discourse. In light SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 44 of these contradictory experiences, I conclude that it was my mental illness that countered the discourse. Another example was shared under regret. It was the missed opportunity to study abroad in China. I regret not going because it would have been an awesome and rewarding experience, "but in my mind I did not have the time." "I tried to convince myself that I should go and get the experience but every time I thought about taking the trip I felt overwhelmed with all the pressure to get my degree as soon as possible." The discourse on education supports unique, personal, and expansive experiences. In other words, the discourse supported the trip. It was my mental illness that pressured me into living a narrative without a trip to China. Mental illness expects conformity. It shapes narratives and counters discourse. The reason I did not see mental illness in each of these examples is because mental illness has no place within the discourse. In some professions, mental illness is acceptable and even expected. These are often the arts. This is not the case in teaching; even art teachers are held to a different standard when it comes to mental illness than their non-teaching counterparts. I have written that it is the mental illness which counters the discourse. That mental illness is part of me. Mental illness and my narrative are linked. In that way, my narrative does counter the discourse. Because the discourse said mental illness in educators cannot exist, it was difficult to distinguish between the influences of the discourse and the influences of my mental illness. It was difficult for me to find my place in this profession. I knew that I had a mental illness and I knew that I wanted to be the stable, helpful, competent teacher that the discourse advertised teachers to be. I wanted the discourse. I agreed with the discourse. However, I also had a mental SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 45 illness, which meant I could not fully embrace the discourse. This conflict was confusing for me as a student and later as a teacher. It caused me to feel "uneasy and [lack] confidence in myself . for being unable to decide within which arena I belonged." The discourse celebrates differences and individuality. I felt that mental illness was too diverse for celebration: " . Being different and unique is not easy," I explained, "This is especially true when it comes to intellect. It is extremely isolating." There was no room for mental illness, so there was no room for me-or for teachers like me, I suppose. With all of the findings about the oppression of mental illness, I return to the final theme of redemption. Redemption is about being saved. I found there was nothing from which I needed to be saved. The discourse informs us that mental illness is to be hidden and controlled. I believe this discursive influence caused me to feel that I needed redemption from my mental illness. The discourse was wrong. I still feel that there is a necessary battle with my mental illness, yet I also found that the acceptance of my mental illness opened the doors that led to self-fulfillment. Mental illness is not a sin, which requires redemption. Had I continued to hide my mental illness, I would not have gained access to the good in education-the good of the discourse. I now have far fewer regrets, and none that haunt me, because I ensured that I received both satisfaction and growth in my master's program. I found that enjoying life is not regrettable. I found that selfimprovement is not regrettable. In the final analysis, as I looked upon my po1irait, I did not find a man redeemed of his errors, but I did find a man regained of his confidence and self-worth. Whether fighting or embracing my mental illness, the data showed that it is only when I accept its existence that I feel at peace. Itis an authentic way to live. I found that being the best is not as good as being the best me. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 46 Finding that mental illness is what caused much of my frustration and dissatisfaction in education advocates for more narrative research on mental illness in teachers including the narratives of teachers without mental illness. This recommendation echoes the observation in my literature review that there is little research in education from the perspective of the teacher, particularly in separation from instructional strategies and professional duties. Teachers are a major part of the educational system both in effort and in number. Considering this large role, it makes sense to include their real, lived, and personal thoughts based on their real and lived experiences even when they may include such things as mental illness. The discourse of educational professionalism portrays teachers in objective ways such as measurable credentials and role-model-worthy characteristics. However, it was found that teachers' emotions heavily influence teachers' motivations and thought processes. Thus, "knowledge of teachers' emotions is essential to understand teachers and teaching" (Gargante et al., 2013, p. 2). My research showed that teachers, as people, ought not to be forgotten. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION REFERENCES Adkins, D. (2012). Education holds a miraculous and transformative power. Capitol Ideas, 55(5), 3. Retrieved from 47 http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/sept_ oct_ 2012/sept_ oct_ 2012 images/CI_S ept0ctl2.pdf Althusser, L. (1971). Lenin and philosophies and other essays. (B. Brewster, Trans.). New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. (Original work published 1970) Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 82(2), 191-215. Bamberg, M. (2010). Who am I? Narration and its contribution to self and identity. Theory and Psychology, 21(1), 1-22. Bruner, J.S. (1966). Toward a theory of instruction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Burwood, S. (2006). Imitation, indwelling and the embodied self. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 39(2), 118-134. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2006.00232.x Carter, C. (2007). Top 10 reasons students struggle and drop out freshman year-and what you can do about it. Recruitment and Retention in Higher Education, 21(7), 3-5. Clandinin, D. J. & Com1elly, F. M. (2000). Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative research. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc. Cronin, J.M. (1986). Student financial aid: An international perspective. Phi Delta Kappan, 67(9), 657-661. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 48 Dickens, C. (1979). Great Expectations. Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press. (Original work published 1861) Dyson, A.H. & Genishi, C. (1994). The need for story: Cultural diversity on classroom and community. Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English. Elmes, J. (2015). Q&A with Glyn Davis. Times Higher Education. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.co. uk/ question-and-answer-glyn-davisuni versity-of-melbourne Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. Fry, M., MacGreagor, C., Hyland, S., Payne, B., & Chenoweth, L. (2015). Emergency nurses' perceptions of the role of confidence, self-efficacy, and reflexivity in managing the cognitively impaired older person in pain. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 24, 1622-1629. Gargante, A. B., Monereo, C., & Meneses, J. (2013). Affecting dimension of university professors about their teaching: An exploration through the semantic differential technique. Universitas Pyschologica, 13(1 ), 1-22. doi: 10. l l 144/Javeriana.UPSY13-1.adup Georgakopoulou, A. (2013). Building iterativity into positioning analysis: A practicebased approach to small stories and self. Narrative Inquiry, 23(1), 89-110. Goos, M., Gannaway, D., & Hughes, C. (2011). Assessment as an equity issue in higher education: Comparing the perceptions of first year students, course coordinators, and academic leaders. The Australian Educational Researcher, 38, 95-117. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION 49 Hargreaves, E. & Preece, S. (2014). The value of the personal in teachers' professional learning: A case study. Professional Development in Education, 40(1), 130-146. Ilanson, C. (2014). In search of self: Exploring student identity development. New Directions for Higher Education, 2014(166), 7-13. Hofstadter, R. (1995). Academic fi'eedom in the age of the college. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. (Original work published 1955) James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company. Koopman, C. (2005). Art as fulfillment: On the justification of education in the arts. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 39(1), 85-97. Kowalski, P. (2007). Changes in students' motivation to learn during the first year of college. Psychological Reports, 101(1), 79-89. Lebrun, K. M. (2013). A community college journey: From GED to Ph.D., Community College Week. Retrieved from http://ccweek.com/article-3428-pov-a-communitycollege- j ourney-from-ged-to-phd.html Leondari, A. (2007). Future time perspective, possible selves, and academic achievement. New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 114, 17-26. Martinez, M. E. (2010). Learning and Cognition: The design of the mind. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc. McCaughey-Ross, B. & Mccaughey, E. P. (1980). From loyalist tofoundingfather: The political odyssey o.f William Samuel Johnson. New York City, NY: Columbia University Press. McCarthy, J. (2003). Principlism or narrative ethics: Must we choose between them? Medical Humanities, 29(2), 65-71. SELF-FULFILLMENT THROUGH EDUCATION Nash, R. (2004). Liberating scholarly writing: The power of personal narrative. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Rudolph, F. (1990). The American college and university: A history. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. (Original work published 1962) 50 Sartre, J.P. (1989). The idiot in thefamily. (Vols. 1-3). (C. Cosman, Trans.). New York, NY: Random House (Original work published 1981) Smith, S. (2003). What an education did for Rita. Times Higher Education. Retrieved from https ://www.timeshighereducation.co. uk/features/what-an-education-didfor- rita/ 185364 .article Spring, J. (2014). The American school: A global context (9th ed.). New York City, NY: McGraw-Hill Education. Starr-Glass, D. (2002). Metaphor and totem: Exploring and evaluating prior experiential learning. Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 27(3), 221-231. Tippen, G.K., Lafreniere, K.D., & Page, S. (2012). Student perception of academic grading: Personality, academic orientation, and effort. Active Learning in Higher Education, 13, 51-61. Wilde, 0. (2011). The picture of Dorian Gray (2011 ed.). New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Original work published 1890) Williams, R. (2009). Gaining a degree: The effect on teacher self-efficacy and emotions. Professional Development in Education, 35(4), 601-612. Wood, K. (2015). Changing as a person:· The experience oflearning to research in the social sciences. Higher Education Research & Development, 25(1), 53-66.
Transcript of an oral history interview with W. Russell Todd conducted by Joseph Cates at the Sullivan Museum and History Center on May 16 and May 19, 2016, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project. W. Russell Todd graduated from Norwich University in 1950 and was president of the university from 1982 to 1992. In his interview, he discusses his thirty-two years of active duty in the U.S. Army as well as his experiences at Norwich University. ; 1 W. Russell Todd, NU '50, Oral History Interview Interviewed on May 16, 2016 and May 19, 2016 At Sullivan Museum and History Center Interviewed by Joseph Cates JOSEPH CATES: This is Joseph Cates. Today is May 16th, 2016. I'm interviewing General Russell Todd. This interview is taking place at the Sullivan Museum and History Center. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. OK, first tell me your full name. RUSSELL TODD: William Russell Todd. JC: When were you born? RT: I was born on the first day of May, 1928, in Seattle, Washington. JC: What Norwich class are you? RT: Class of 1950. My father was 26. My son was -- I'll think about that. JC: Well, we'll get back to that. Tell me about where you grew up and your childhood. RT: For the first year of my life we lived in Seattle, Washington. Dad had a job with a lumber company out there, getting experience to come back to work for his father, who ran a lumber company just outside Milton, Massachusetts. So I grew up for the first nine or ten years in Milton, Massachusetts, a very nice place, right on the edge of where Mattapan and Milton come together. There was a lot of traffic. Well, just for an example, during that period of time I came up with my dad to his fifteenth reunion, and the difference in traffic between where we lived and what we found up here was considerable. When I got back to school on Monday the teacher said, "Russell had a day off. He's now going to tell us what he saw." Well, nothing came to mind, and I stood and told them that I had seen something they had never seen, miles and miles and miles of dirt roads. Now I live on one. (laughs) JC: Was that the first time you were ever at Norwich? RT: Yeah. JC: What was your impression of it when you first saw it? RT: It was a very interesting period of time. It was just before World War II affected the United States, and many, many people were sending their sons to Norwich -- rather than perhaps better prepared schools -- because they could get a commission. They assumed that everyone was going to go to war, and the opportunity of getting an education and a commission together at the same time really appealed to a lot of people. Our football team got everybody we wanted of great quality. We won all the games in that time 2 frame. And we had some very, very fine people who came back in 1946, the year I entered the university, and they made a big impression on my life. JC: I'm sure. I assume the buildings were the same. There weren't any new buildings between the time that you went and -- RT: As a matter of fact it was 1941 I believe, and two buildings on the main parade ground were being dedicated. One wasn't quite finished, and the other was, and two new dormitories shows you an example of what I was saying, how it was a golden period in Norwich's history. But saying that, the opposite is true when the war ends. You remember that we had, what, 15 cadets come up here after the Civil War. They all got off the train, (laughs) yeah, we don't think much about that. It's happened each time there's been a war. The incentive, or the idea, or the concept of perhaps having to serve didn't appeal to a lot of people at the end of wars. JC: Right. You kind of have a boom before the war and a bust after the war. RT: Yeah. JC: What made you decide to come to Norwich? RT: I think probably that trip did, that and the fact my dad was always talking about it. He would make us on Saturday nights -- eating beans and franks -- to sing Norwich songs around the table. (laughs) JC: Do you remember any of those Norwich songs? RT: There's a good one. What is it? "Oh, My First Sergeant" "Oh, my first sergeant, he is the worst of them all. He gets us up in the morning before first call. It's fours right, fours left, and left foot into line. And then the dirty son of a buck, he gives us double time. Oh, it's home, boys, home. It's home we ought to be. Home, boys, home, in the land of liberty. And we'll all be back to Norwich when the sergeant calls the roll." JC: That's wonderful. (laughter) I've heard in some of the oral histories "On the Steps of Old Jackman," but I haven't heard that one before. (Todd laughs) So when you came here with your father, was that during homecoming? RT: Well, homecoming and graduation were the same period of time. It was fascinating to me. It was a cavalry school. They had all kinds of drills that we went to and watched, and prizes were awarded. People loading up the water-cooled submachine guns on horseback and racing around, then taking them down, and putting in ammunition blanks, and firing -- you know, first, second, and third prizes kind of thing. Oh, yeah, that impressed me. Then, of course, the parades were fun to see. But it took about three days to get through graduation and homecoming as a single entity. JC: When you came to Norwich what did you major in? 3 RT: That's an interesting story. As I said, Norwich was having trouble at that time recruiting people, and I got recruited by the president of the university. We met in Boston, and he asked me all the things I was interested in, and to him it looked like I should be an engineer, and he wanted me to take an exam that would carry that forward. Well, I took the exam, and I became an engineer, and about the first part of the second semester I discovered you really had to do the homework. I really didn't like that much, and I wasn't doing very well, so I changed my major to history and economics. I really found that fascinating. JC: Well, tell me about what it was like being a rook here. RT: Yeah, another interesting thing. I was sold on the rook system, and my dad had always talked about it. When he brought me up here, people would drop off their suitcases, and go right out onto the parade ground, and start being ordered around by the corporal. I thought that was great. I never seemed super. But I didn't have many followers on that. I was very anxious that my father leave, and get out of there, and go home, and I convinced him to do that. But after, oh, maybe a month the class, who had elected class officers by that time, called a class meeting, and we all got together -- I've forgotten where now. "We got to stop this. We got to tell these guys we're not going to put up with this nonsense. We've got to show our power." I stood up and said, "Gentlemen, this isn't what we want to do. We want to put up. We want to show him we can do it," and I got booed right off the stage. However, they eventually made me class secretary, so I didn't lose all my friends that day. (laughs) JC: Now let's talk about post-war Norwich, because you did say there's kind of a bust. There isn't as many people. RT: Yeah, I think we had 200 in our class, and there was no really classes of Bubbas. Norwich toward the end of the war, when they were really desperate to get money to pay salaries to the faculty, had a high-school level. I think it was two years, the high-school level, and many people went into that and came up here, and that toward the end made some income for the university. But what it did for us, as an incoming class of freshmen, we had our officers, lieutenants, who were younger than we were, but they'd been here two years. You know, that didn't sit over very well either. That was difficult. JC: And the cavalry was still here at that time. RT: It was, yeah, for the first two years of my term and tenure at Norwich, at that point. JC: What do you remember about the horse cavalry? RT: Oh, my God. Oh, my God. Well, let's just put it this way. The first person I visited in Northfield when I came back as president was my old sergeant [Kenoyer?], who we hated. He was tough. But on the other hand, we really liked him, and I felt very, very sorry for him, and I really wanted to see him. His son had won entry into West Point, and 4 about two nights before he was to report in he and a bunch of his buddies were in an automobile accident. I think they were hit by a train and killed. Sergeant [Kenoyer?] was never the same after that. He continued to ride horses in the parades in Northfield and that kind of thing. But he was a character. His education was perhaps at the level he was working, taking care of the horses, and taking care of the riding. He was a good man, but, for example, I had a roommate named George Pappas who was scared to death of the horses, and some of the horses knew it. They knew when you were afraid. And old George would step into the stable area, ready to put on the harness, and that old horse would just back him into the wall and lean on him -- oh, you win. Then, of course, [Kenoyer?] would come by and say, "Kick him in the neb with your knee!" Well, no one was going to do that, trapped in there. So George, he decided that he would skip equitation classes, and instead he took 10 demerits for every single class that he was supposed to be at, and he spent his first semester walking around the parade ground on Saturdays carrying a rifle, doing tours. Many things can be said about George. That's a whole other story of absolute wonder. But it was difficult. We only went down once a week actually to use them, but there really wasn't a hell of lot you can learn in one-hour time once a week. But toward the end of the freshman year we were out trotting around in the neighborhoods, etc. I remember one time one of the captains in the Army ROTC program there, officers, Army officers, lead us on a parade, and we went out across the railroad tracks and up into the hills. And on the way back the horses got the idea they themselves would like to jog back to the stables, and we came charging down that hill totally out of control. Some of the horses and men went all the way to downtown before they came under it. I went through the football practice. (laughs) It wasn't everything it was cracked up to be. Now there were some people here, including a classmate by the name of Bob [Bacharat?] [00:13:18] who really was a polo player. He came from Switzerland. I think that's the reason he came to Norwich was to be able to play polo, and we played polo in that time frame with people like Miami who flew their horses up here. Now, I never saw the plane, but we were told all this and a few years earlier, before the war, that Norwich was playing the big colleges and winning. Toward the end of the first year we played something called broom polo, which they'd throw out a basketball on the floor, and then you'd have to hit it with a broom to get it to go to the goal. Those kinds of things were fun to watch. I remember one time George, my roommate, in skipping class went up into the stands, which are on the south end of the hall, but up above in a balcony, and he opened the window and got a snowball, several of them, and put them up there. When somebody would go by, the stove down on the floor -- there were four stoves in that place -- they'd get red hot, but they really didn't make a hell of a lot of difference when the temperature was 30 below or whatever it might have been outside. And the horses, when you'd take them from the stable to the riding hall, would fight you all the way; they didn't want to go out in that cold. But George, on one occasion, dropped snowballs on those red-hot stoves, and you can imagine, they hissed. As the horse went by, this great hiss came out, and the horse would throw the guy, or run for the far -- I went hell bent for election to the far wall. And when he stopped, I went right up onto his neck and was hanging on. Sergeant [Kenoyer?] came over and gave me hell, you know, "You didn't take control of that horse." (inaudible) [00:15:36] There are people lying down all 5 around, and the horses are running around. Well, there's a certain romance in having the horses, so long as you're sitting in the stands watching a polo game. (laughs) JC: Had you ever ridden a horse before? RT: No, never. JC: So you didn't have any experience with horses. RT: Neither did anybody else. Yeah, yeah. They were wonderful animals though, for the most part. JC: Now you said a lot of the people that were there before the war came back after the war to finish up. RT: Mm-hmm. A lot may be too much of an adjective to use, but Alumni Hall was essentially filled with non-married veterans, or veterans who hadn't brought their wives back. Civilian clothes and having nothing to do with the military. The rest of the dormitories were filled with 200 and whatever it was cadets, and the very few upperclassmen like the one I mentioned who came up through the high school route. We didn't have a lot to do with them, and they were very serious about their studies in the classrooms, very serious about their studies. The fraternization took place after the first of the year when we could go into a fraternity house, and I remember the older veterans -- older, 22 maybe -- who were in Theta Chi, where I was, were a remarkable bunch of people and very, very much appreciated. They didn't always come to dinner with us, but they were in the house and participated with it. They ranged all the way from a parachutist in Europe to a lieutenant colonel in the air force. So that's a big gap. But they were great guys who made fraternity life reasonable. JC: Well, tell me about Theta Chi. Why did you choose that one? RT: Oh, yeah, the same old story, the same reason I came here. My dad was a Theta Chi. Why, of course that's what I'd do. This is my father's fraternity, you know. JC: So what were the fraternities like? RT: They weren't too bad. When General Harmon eliminated them, I thought it was the right thing to do, because there weren't fraternities at other military colleges. And when they were started I really believe they were very useful. They were much more an eating club, and since there wasn't a mess in the university in the 1850s. If you look into some of the old records you'll see at graduation time they invited the alumni back to have dinner, and they had dances. They had inter-fraternity baseball and football, etc. We were trying at my time, in my fraternity, to replicate that. It wasn't perhaps as successful as it might have been. It was great fun to beat SigEp in baseball or something. But it was a different part of the university. I remember one time when I was a corporal, and one of the men in the rank under me, in the barracks, was in the fraternity. We get down to the fraternity, 6 and he would give me a hard time for giving him a hard time. It wasn't what I thought it should be, but it was a good time. I mean, don't misunderstand me. Well, it was a fraternity. (laughs) The girls came in by train, if they were away. Carol came up several times on a train to spring break, or a winter carnival, and that kind of thing. That was good sport to have a place where we could party. There was no drinking - baloney, there wasn't. (Coates laughs) I remember one time we were having lunch, and one of the seniors, one of the veterans that had come back, was the president of the house, and he said, "Our Theta Chi member on the faculty, old Professor Woodbury, is going to be our chaperone for the party. Does anybody know Professor Woodbury?" "I know Professor Woodbury. My father told me about him. I've met him once." He said, "Good. You and your date will sit in the living room with the Woodburys while we're down in the basement drinking." (laughter) It wasn't much fun that night. We had the bars hidden behind sliding doors, or doors that pulled down, and all this kind of stuff, so if we got word that there was someone from the faculty coming we could close it up and all sit down, smile, and look like there was no alcohol in the place. JC: Can you tell me a little bit about winter carnival and some of the dances that you all had? RT: They were good sport. Much of the fun though centered around the fraternity at that time. Yes, of course we went to the dance, etc., but before going to the dance we probably went to the fraternity, and certainly after the dance we went to the fraternity, and that was really good sport. In my senior year my roommate, Rollin S. Reiter, from Ohio decided that in his fraternity they were going to have a special Christmas party. Now, it didn't make an awful lot of sense, because it was right at exam time. We took exams right in that time frame, so he really had to work to get these guys. They were going to do it in tuxedoes, not in our uniforms, so that slowed it down a little, too. But one of the guys, Chubby Jordan, who has since passed away, he was a brigadier general in the Massachusetts National Guard later on, an ex-marine. He didn't want to go do it, so they convinced him that he had to do it, and they would get him a date. When he went to the fraternity house, he was introduced to the worst looking girl in the place, and he immediately started drinking beer and avoiding her and all this. It wasn't even the girl they were going to match him up with, and they just were teasing him something awful. When he got very sleepy they put him on the pool table, laid out flat like in a mortuary and put two lit candles, one at either end of him on the pool table. It was a sight for sore eyes. (laughs) JC: I bet it was. Now you were on the rook committee while you were there? RT: Yeah. In my sophomore year I was the head of the rook committee, elected by the class. During the summer period of time I had to get together with the printers and the university and go through this business. There were big posters that said "Beware, Rook, Beware," and then they listed all the things down. We'd get them printed up here by John Mazuzan down in the Northfield Press, and then we'd sell them to the rooks at $1 apiece. I don't know what we did with the money, in the class coffers I guess. Yeah. I remember that President Dodge, who had no military experience previous, but was a very, very well known scientist and had been the dean of one of the big Midwestern schools in that area, 7 he was brought in by some hefty people on the board of trustees. He didn't fit. He didn't understand us. He was a great academic and did some very fine things for the university. But he called me in one day, as head of the rook committee, and said, "When will this period end?" This was right after supper. I said to him, "Sir, it's very clear. It's right on the chart." He said, "I want it to end at Thanksgiving." I said, "Sir, I don't think you're talking to the right guy. You should really be talking to the commandant of cadets, your left-hand man." He said, "Well, I don't know if I can convince him," and I thought, oh, my God, what have we got here, you know. (laughter) He was a fine gentleman, but the minute it was possible for the alumni to discover that General Harmon might be available, in May of my senior year, Dodge was gone. The alumni just -- it wasn't working the way they wanted to see it work. JC: So Harmon was not president any of the time that you were here? RT: His inauguration was held at the same time as my graduation. It was one thing. He had been here for maybe a month, and I remember that we had a football banquet, and they invited General Harmon to come. And he stood up and told us all that he had been here as a cadet, and he had come back in 1935 as the commandant of cadets, and he loved and understood this university, and he was going to make it famous, you know, kind of, "Yeah!" Just the kind of story we needed. Then he told us a story that just curdled me. It was a dirty story. I'd never heard some guy stand up in a dinner and tell a dirty story. It sort of surprised me. He had that reputation. As a matter of fact, one time later in my career, when I was in the army, I was asked by my boss if I would go back to Hamilton, Massachusetts, where I had lived at one time and see Mrs. George Patton, and tell her that her son-in-law -- as a brigadier general -- was about to be sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky. He was married to one of Patton's daughters, and he is now a bachelor. I was to go with three sets of quarters' plans and say, "Which of these, General, would you choose, because we at Fort Knox can now get the house painted up and ready for you, and all this kind of stuff ahead of time?" Well, Mrs. Patton agreed. When the time actually came general orders was late in his itinerary and couldn't be there, so she said, "Why don't you and Carol just come to dinner, and we'll talk about this? I will pass your message to Johnny when he comes through next week, and your leave is over." So that was just fine. But we had a quiet period in that Mrs. Patton was at one end of a long table, and I was at the other end, and Carol was in the middle, and there was a little old maid with a bonnet on her head, and an apron moving around quietly around the room. Everything went silent, and I said, "I can handle this." I said to Mrs. Patton, "Mrs. Patton, do you happen to know General Harmon?" And she said, "Indeed, I do, Russell, and he's a very disgusting man." (laughter) Now as it turns out, she gave an award right after that, she gave an award at Norwich of a similar pistol of General Patton's famous (inaudible) [00:29:38] to the leading cadet. But she was clear. (laughter) JC: Yeah, I've heard stories about General Harmon. RT: He did a great job. He stayed too long, but he did a great job. 8 JC: Well, what clubs were you in when you were here at Norwich? RT: Yeah, I went out for football. I'd come from a little school in Wenham, Massachusetts, where we played six-man football, and if one guy was sick, it didn't look like we were going to play, you know, kind of thing. I went out for football in Beverly High School, and that was danger. I mean, I wasn't up to that. When we got to Norwich I said, "I'm going back out for football. This looks like --" They were mostly freshmen. There were some veterans that came back, and there were some very good veteran players who came back but weren't interested in playing football. They wanted to study and have a family life. So Norwich had a terrible football team during that period of time. About the second day of practice Joe Garrity, who'd been a friend of my dad's who I had known, put his arm on my shoulder as we walked back to the locker room and said, "I've got a job for you." And I thought to myself, I'm going to be quarterback for the freshman team. And he said, "You're my manager, how about that?" and I said, "Oh, OK." Later in life, when I became president, the alumni director here, Dave Whaley, took me out to visit various alumni clubs. In Chicago a fellow named Hale Lait, who played football and was co-captain in his senior year, started to walk up to us, and Dave says, "Mr. Lait, do you know General Todd?" Hale Lait says, "Shit, he used to wash my jock." (laughter) And it was true! We had a big laundry over there. JC: Were you in any other clubs while you were here? RT: Yeah, I'd have to think upon it. We had an international relations club that I became president of at some point of time under -- oh, come on, his name is skipping me. I'll come back to it. But we brought I people to speak on the issues, and then Norwich formed an alliance with the other colleges where we were all working together, and that was sort of fun working that out. Oh, incidentally, when I was manager for the freshman team I had to write all the letters to the other schools and make all the arrangements, all that kind of thing. It sort of surprised me that the university wasn't doing that; the athletic department wasn't doing that. JC: Did you have a favorite professor when you were here? RT: Yeah, and I just told you I couldn't remember his name. (laughter) Sidney Morse. JC: Oh, OK. RT: Old Sidney Morse was a terrible lecturer, but he was a genius, you know. He understood American history, and that was his forte, and he also was a wonderful human being and understood us. He really got me to dig in and start getting decent grades. He would lecture, but he would have side comments on this thing, and there we are taking notes left and right. I never wanted to miss a class under any circumstances. He invited some of us -- one of them being me -- over to dinner, and he was just a great sport. He was not a big man in stature, but a big man in intellect. JC: Was there a professor you particularly didn't like? 9 RT: Oh, there were some who I'd rather not name who I didn't appreciate or think that they were at the level they should be. JC: What was the favorite class you ever took here? RT: I guess it was history. That's what I worked at. Let me go back to what I didn't like. We lost -- somehow, I don't know how -- one of the economics professors, and President Dodge brought in somebody in mid-semester, and this guy had written many books and was well appreciated around the world, but he was terrible. He couldn't remember any names, he refused to take any attendance, so people didn't come. You could answer him back and forth. I was told, I can't vouch for this, I was told by the people that say they did it. They invited him out the night before his final exam to join them for dinner in Montpelier, and when the time came, they picked up the tip, and went down to the railroad station, and put him on a train going to Montreal. (laughter) I believe it was true. But he just wasn't accustomed to teaching at our level in that circumstance. He was someone that should have continued writing his books. He was essentially a sociologist, but that was a while. I got called in by the dean for skipping class, and the dean was a great guy at that time. I was a little embarrassed by it, but the class was mostly veterans in this particular -- in economics. You know, they had their way. They weren't required to come to class. If they didn't come to class it chalked up one of a series you could have freer, but cadets didn't have that, so I just played like I was a veteran to old Mumbles [McLeod?]. That's what they called him, Mumbles. When the dean called me in, I got right back on it. JC: Decided you'd rather go back to class. RT: Yeah. JC: Did you ever get in much trouble when you were here? RT: Not really. I came close a number of times. Well, let me go back and talk about Carol. Carol and I met one time when we were in about the ninth grade. She was in Beverly, Massachusetts, and we were living in Hamilton, Massachusetts, at the time, and the Congregation youth groups met at a third place, Essex, Massachusetts. There were lots of people of our ages. You know, these groups didn't know each other. And I spotted her. She was -- wow! Wow, yeah. But I never got to speak to her before we broke up and went back. A couple of years later in Beverly High School -- we'd moved to Wenham, and Wenham didn't have a high school, so I went to Beverly High School. Todd with a T and Wyeth with W happened to have lockers opposite each other on the wall, and I said, "My God, there's that girl." I went over and spoke to her, and she invited me to her birthday party, and that'll show it all started with us. But it came to a point in our sophomore year when I had changed from engineering into history and economics. I had to make up some subject material that I didn't get in the first part, and I went to the University of New Hampshire trying to make it up. I went down on the weekend to her house in Beverly, and I stayed with her aunt 10 who lived next door. She was on my team. But Carol when we were -- she said, "Let's stop this tennis game for a minute. I want to talk to you." We walked up to the net, and she said, "You know, I'm through with this relationship. You're never going to be serious about anything you do in your life; you're going to be a perennial sophomore. I want to do more with my life than you are going to do, and this isn't going to work out." OK, I'll show you. I came back and studied like hell for the last two years I was here and sort of caught up. But it was interesting, when I was invited back at graduation time to be the officer who commissions everybody, and at that time the university ordered a master's or a PhD, you know, honorary to the speaker. Loring Hart didn't tell me whether I was supposed to say anything or not, so I had in my pocket a little thing I would say. It went something like this. It is indeed an honor to be here. I represent my classmates in this ceremony, and I'm very proud of the way Norwich is moving. But I would like you to know that 25 years ago, this very day, I received a letter from the committee on academic degrees and standings that read to this effect: "Dear Cadet Todd, The committee has met and has agreed to allow you to graduate (laughs) based on the circumstances that were not your fault." (laughter) So, you know, that's the way life went for me. I dug in and did relatively well. But another interesting thing about that. I don't know about anybody else, but I had a picture in my mind of VMI, and the Citadel, and all these places as being superior to Norwich in their military training, etc. But when I got in the army I discovered that 50% of them were duds, and it just changed my life around and my feelings about my institution. Yeah, it was strange. JC: When you graduated from Norwich what was the first -- you went into the army. RT: Yeah. JC: Did you go straightaway into the army, or was there a period? RT: Well, some of us -- I think it was 12, maybe as many as 15 -- received an opportunity to go into the regular army, not into the reserve army. I was one of those. About half of my classmates who were given that ability to do that chose not to do it, so there were a number of us that went. Upon graduation we received our commission in the United States Army Reserve, and then two weeks later I was brought into the regular army with another commissioning thing, which happened to be by my father's Norwich roommate, Colonel [Rice?] in Boston. He was running something in Boston for the army at the time. That was sort of fun. Then I went immediately off. We graduated about 15 or 17 May or something, June rather. On the second day of July, I reported in to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment Light at Fort Meade, Maryland, as one of these people you had a regular army commission. So there wasn't any time -- there was time enough in between that the family all went down to Cape Cod for a two-week vacation, but I graduated and went into the army. JC: Now did you get married before you were in the army? 11 RT: No, no. No, no. I was still trying to get back in Carol's good graces. Before I left -- well, I went, as I said, to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Now the army was doing something really stupid at that time. They had been told to reduce the army's personnel requirements, and rather than reducing in any reasonable way, they chose to take one-third of every squad, one-third of every company, one-third of every battalion, one-third of every regiment. It was a paper army. It couldn't really operate well at all. But when the war broke out in Korea they took from those drawn-down forces and sent them over as individual replacements, supposedly to go into units that also had the same kind of vacancy that was created now. So we had almost no reasonable training while I was in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment before going to Korea, and these people went into units for which they were not trained. The army was really messed up, really messed up. General Abrams one time in discussing this with a group of officers, after he'd become chief of staff of the army, had tears running down his face. "No army should ever do that to its people. There is no excuse for it, and as long as I'm chief of staff I guarantee you that our units will be ready to fight, if we have to fight." You know, oh. It was a terrible mess over there. So before leaving that unit in which I had a miserable career for that short period of time. For example, it wasn't two weeks later that the post's military police battalion left Fort Meade and went to Korea. Company A of my organization, of which I was a lieutenant, became the post's military policemen. Now, we know nothing about being the post's military policemen, not a thing. There wasn't anything in ROTC, there wasn't anything that lead us to believe. What I knew about policing was I'd seen in movies, and I hid behind the "Welcome to Fort Meade" sign in my sedan, and chased down someone that was speeding, and discovered it was the chief of staff of the post. At midnight I went over and had a bed check in the post's prison, to see that there weren't any knives in there. But I got called in and said, "Hey, come on, get off it. You can go to jail for what you're doing," you know. (laughs) It was crazy. I was trying to do my job as I knew it, but no one was there to supervise me in any way. JC: And how long were you doing that? RT: I left there in September. I went in in July, left in September, and got to Korea in late November, first having leave and then going to the West Coast, going through the checks and balances of travel over there. Just about that time MacArthur announced that the war would be over by Christmas, and as a result the army slowed down the number of replacements they were sending over. This was just about the time that the marines invaded Inchon, and it was followed up with the 7th Division behind them, and trapped the North Vietnamese soldiers below us. It was really a magnificent maneuver. So we were just sitting around in California waiting to get orders. Every weekend we'd go into town, and we'd go into some bar and then talk out loud about how we've got to go, and waiting to go to war, this kind of thing. Somebody would pick up the bar tab. (laughs) Then we crossed the Pacific during a hurricane, and that was something most unusual, as you might imagine. The piano broke loose in the lounge. It had been a troop transport in World War II, and they converted it to be a troop ship but for families to go to Japan or other places. At that time these ships were the property of the army, it wasn't the navy. 12 I remember distinctly there was a captain on board, mostly lieutenants, but this captain on board was a ranger, and he'd a big, puffed-up chest, and walked among us, and told us to stand up straight, and "Take your hands out of your pockets." When he'd get tired of doing that he decided we should have bayonet drill, and issued the bayonets, put them on our rifles, and went up on the deck. Oh, God. I said, "I'm not playing this game." There was a ladder still going up the funnel, in wartime where they had a station to look for submarines, OK. I went up there while everybody else was screaming and hollering down below and got away with it. It's a wonder I ever went anywhere in the army. (laughs) JC: So what was Korea like? RT: Well, let me describe it. We arrived the day before Thanksgiving in Inchon, got off the boat. There was a long, long tidal process; the ship couldn't get close to the docks or anything else. So they threw the nets over the side, and we were to go over the side of the ship and climb down into a small boat to go in. But we had all our personal gear with us. We were carrying great bags of stuff. I had two bottles of whiskey in my bag, and some damn fool says, "Drop your bag into the boat." I did. (laughs) But as a matter of fact, they took our uniforms away from us at that time and said, "We will hold them here, because if everybody goes home at Christmas it won't affect you for a while, and you'll be in a regular army uniform." But we got on the boats and went on the shore. They fed us what was left over from the Thanksgiving dinner, and a lot of canned fruits, put us on a train, and sent us up to North Korea. Each of us, each lieutenant, was on an open freight car, you know, enclosed but with doors on both sides, and each one of them had a little stove in it. It was cold, and we headed north, and every time the hospital train came south on that one track we would pull over maybe an hour before it came by, and then stick around and get back onto the thing. In my one car I had 27 people. Those cars were small. They were Japanese-style freight cars, and they were small. We had nothing but straw on the floor and a sleeping bag, but it was a summer sleeping bag, not a winter sleeping bag, and the stove didn't really heat the thing at all. There were slots in the side of the thing. Anyway. We didn't have any ammunition, and we would get shot at on the train. Now, nobody I know of got hit, but it made quite an impression. But still they didn't issue us any ammunition. There was a major in charge, and he was in the last car, which was a caboose kind of car, tight, a good stove, etc., etc. So whenever the train stopped we as lieutenants would run back and sit in his car with him and then take off again. Many of the soldiers would get off and run in to find somebody in the little town we stopped in and buy rot-gut whiskey. Boy, they were in trouble. One of the people in the car behind me, I was told, went blind on the spot. Maybe he was cured later, but it made an impression. We finally got to the capital of Pyongyang, and they put us on trucks and took us to what used to be a hospital. We went on about the fourth floor and were on cots, or on the floor, kind of thing, and at midnight that night some captain in the army came in and said, "OK, everybody out. Get down on the truck below. Let's go. Get your gear together." Well, we all didn't get there first, and the last of us were turned around and sent back. That batch was never heard from again. The next morning we were loaded on trucks and sent up. But before going they fed us a good breakfast. We went down into 13 the basement of this place -- it was steaming and dark down there -- and we had breakfast on some slate or granite tables. Steam is pouring out of the coffee pots, etc., and I filled my cup with coffee and took a big drink to discover that it was maple syrup. I went forward that day sick as a dog, sitting at the end, at the tail of that truck yurking all the way. I'm sure all those men I was traveling with, "Look hey there, look at that lieutenant. He's so scared he's puking," you know. We went on and eventually we came to a stop, and the captain who was leading this convoy came back and told us to get off the trucks and go into these schoolhouses that were available, right immediately, I mean, just saw them and said, "Take them." We went into the schoolhouse, and he turned around and went back to get "another load," quote, unquote. We never saw him again; he never came back. Here we are with no ammunition, carrying guns, living in a schoolhouse, and the Chinese are moving in on us. They were moving down the mountains on both sides of this thing, and then there was a tremendous, tremendous loss of life up the mountain further, coming toward us. The 38th Regiment that I joined after we got out -- I get the men out, and then I jumped on a mess truck headed south, all trying to find where the headquarters for the 38th Regiment was. The 38th Regiment was part of the 2nd Division, and it lost in about two days, coming through a real tight trap -- there was a river, there was a road that wasn't wide enough for two tanks to pass, and then there was a mountain again on the other side, and the Chinese are up on both sides just raking the convoy. One truck stops, you know, they've got to push it off the edge to get the convoy going again. Now I wasn't a part of that, but I joined the company that did, and when I finally caught up with my unit, it was because I had stopped in from the schoolhouse when I saw the 1st Cavalry Division people pull on in close to us, so I went over and inquired. I walked into the TOC, the tactical operation center, and there was a major sitting in front of a map, on a stool, making little marks on it. I waited a while, and he didn't notice me, and finally I said, "Sir, could you tell me where the 38th Regiment is?" and he turned around and said, "No, but where's the division? Where is the 2nd Division?" I said, "Sir, I have no idea. We're trying to find it. We were left off down here." He said, "I don't know where they are. If you --" It was that confusing. They lost something like 4,000 men coming out of that gap. Now, I wasn't affected, not at all, in any way. I was scared to death at times, but then after that I joined the 38th Regiment. When I went in to meet Colonel Pappal -- yeah, something like that -- he shook hands with one, and passed me a bottle of whiskey with the other one, and said, "Son, you're going to need this." I reported in to the battalion commander, and he at the time was meeting with his staff in a little hutch where the Vietnamese -- the Vietnamese -- the Koreans built their houses of mud and mud brick, and they would cook in an open room attached to the house, and the smoke would go under the floors and heat the house. We were sitting on one of those floors, warm and toasty, and they were passing the bottle of whiskey around this circle as we talked about (inaudible) [00:59:47]. By that time the bottle of whiskey got pretty hot. (laughs) It was a very strange circumstance. When he finally got to it, the battalion commander said to me, he said, "Todd, you're going down to A Company." I said, "Sir, and who commands A Company?" He said, "You do." I had about as much opportunity to learn infantry tactics and lead a rifle 14 company as nobody at all. My buddy who I was traveling with who had some experience in World War II in combat in Europe, came back and went to the University of Illinois, and then came into the army the same as I did, through the (inaudible) [01:00:34], he was sent down to a company that already had an experienced commander. You know. Nobody was thinking. I sent the first sergeant back to division headquarters, he got commissioned, and he came back, and essentially he told me what we ought to be doing. Then we did it. Until MacArthur issued an order, that probably came to him to do it, that said all armored officers that had been assigned to infantry units are to be returned to armored units. So I went down to the regimental tank company of the regiment where my company commander, before coming over there, was an infantry officer who was aide to camp to the commanding general who gave him the tank company in the 38th regiment who didn't know a damn thing about tanks. It was really screwed up everywhere. At a point when I was running the rifle company, I was told that a replacement was on the way, flying in, and he would replace me as company commander. Oh, great, that's good news. The guy showed up, and during World War II he had been in the air force as a bombardier. He had absolutely no infantry experience. He had joined the nearest reserve unit to his home when he was discharged. It really wasn't working out. Where we got replacements, the adjutant would go down and say, "Has anybody been through armored training?" Nobody. Nobody. So there wasn't anybody to send to the armored company except the people that came in (inaudible) [01:02:41]. So we were training these guys, but we weren't -- there were some old sergeants that really knew what they were doing, and that's we made. We eventually had a pretty good tank company. I remember my sergeant was a gruff, old son of a bitch. I walked up to a formation he was holding one day, and his back was to me, and I was walking toward the platoon. And I heard him say "The kid says we got to --" I said uh-oh. "Sergeant [Beach?], come with me," and we went in to see the company commander. I told the company commander that I couldn't resolve this one. He said, oh, very well, I'll assign someone else." Sergeant [Beach?] remained behind. Wow, I've done it. Sergeant Beach comes out. I said, "What happening Sergeant?" and he said, "I'm going to be the lieutenant in charge of the other platoon." Ahhh, God, you know. (laughs) It just wasn't the army I knew later on. Yeah. It was a very sad arrangement. It really wasn't until General Walker was killed in a jeep accident, and he was the 8th Army commander, and they sent General Van Fleet over to run it, and we by that time had moved 125 miles to the rear. We were running as an army. Word got out very quickly that General Van Fleet's orders were "I don't want to see your plans of defense, I want to see your plans of attack." And everyone says, "Sure, sure, General. You look at them, and you'll be all alone up there." Well, by God, he took that army and straightened it out and moved it forward and stopped the Chinese, without much additional support. It was amazing to see that happen. I'll never forget that, that one man deciding that he's going to turn the army around and you'd better fall in line. I did have one experience before that happened when I was with the tank company, and I was in a jeep riding down a road, and the division commander had decided that since we had all these losses, and we're all screwed up, that he had a way to make us all feel proud of ourselves and identify. The methodology he used was that one regiment would have a mustache, another regiment would have sideburns, and another 15 would have goatees. Crazy, just crazy. But I'm driving down the road, and an assistant division commander, a one star, is coming this way, and he went right by, and I saluted, and then he stopped and hollered back at me. I jumped out and ran down to his jeep. He said, "You're not obeying the division commander's orders." I said, "Sir, what do you mean?" He said, "You shaved." I said, "No, sir, I've never shaved." (laughter) God. Yeah. But General Van Fleet really pulled that into order, and he relieved a lot of people. He relieved my brigade commander, gave us a lieutenant to be the colonel's slot in the brigade, who turned out to wind up with four stars in the end. They made the mechanism work. JC: Amazing. Now, you were awarded the Medal for Valor in Korea, weren't you? RT: Yeah. I got a Bronze Star for Valor and a Silver Star for Valor, neither of which I really want to talk about much. I think somebody else would have done better to have them than me. I mean, I was pleased, happy to receive it, proud to wear it on my uniform kind of thing, but there was a lot of that going on to bolster up morale of everybody. JC: Is there anything else you want to say about Korea? RT: I don't know. At the end it was a pretty good experience. When we had gone into a stalemate, we started a rotation system back to the United States, and it was a point system. If you came within a certain period of time, then you could go back at a date specific, so we all knew when we'd be going back. There were points for the kind of job you had and all this kind of thing. It was interesting, I went back to Japan, spent a few days in Japan. When we got on the boat I was assigned -- as I had on the way over -- to a large stateroom, and I think there were 12 of us in it, and up and down cots. It was the same gang I went over with. You know, the timeline of where you engaged in combat were the same for all of us, in different units, and that was really pretty special. Two of them, only two of them, didn't come back, and they were both infantry officers. To the best of my knowledge, from the 38th Regiment that I was familiar with, the lieutenants didn't go back whole. The majority of them were killed. Those that were wounded were wounded seriously enough that they didn't come back to the unit. So it was us armored guys that, essentially, came back together, went over together and came back together. Stopped in Hawaii on the way back, pulled into the port, and there's all these hula girls down on the thing, people with big signs, "Welcome Home, Veteran." I said, "Hell, I'm not a veteran. That's a guy that sits outside the post office trying to sell pencils." (laughs) That came as a bit of a shock to us. But, yeah. JC: Well, once you got back to the United States where were you stationed? RT: Before I got back to the United States, on R&R in Japan, I knew of my rotation date. I called Carol, who by that time had finished her year after Smith at Radcliffe, taking the first year of the Harvard Business School program at Radcliffe -- business school faculty, business school-devised location, Radcliffe. I called her and said, "How about meeting me in New York City on such and such a date at the Biltmore Hotel? We'll meet under the clock." Now, meeting under the clock, there'd been a movie about that whole 16 business. So she did, and we went to my family's house. They'd moved to Scarsdale, New York, at that point. I asked her to marry me. She said, "Give me a couple of weeks." So I went back to visit my family. They're not my immediate family, my grandparents in Quincy, Massachusetts, and my other grandparents in Dorchester, Massachusetts. I went to -- my uncle, my mother's brother, ran a hardware store that had originally been his father's, and he said, "What are you going to do about a car?" I said, "I got to get one." I sold my car before I went over. He said, "Well, I've got a good friend who's honest, and I think we can get a good car." So I went over that afternoon and bought a car and called Carol, and I said, "I bought a car today." She said, "A convertible?" and I said, "Yes," and turned it in the next day and got a convertible. (laughter) I'd do anything to make sure she's sweet. She said yes, we were married on the nineteenth of June of that year, and she obviously had to quit her job to become an army wife. JC: So where did you all go after that? RT: The first station when we returned, and I'm talking now about the same group of army officers that went over and came back together, also went to Fort Knox, and we lived in newly-built quarters that were built by a civilian contractor on the edge of there, which were great for a newly-married couple, but they certainly weren't anything special. George and Joanne Patton lived next door to us, a small world, yeah. I've lost my train of thought here now. (break in audio) JC: And we'll get back started. All right, so we were talking about Fort Knox. RT: Fort Knox being a first assignment together in the army was really great. So different. I mean, Fort Knox was organized. Everything was working well. People were happy. Not that we weren't working hard, because we really were. My first assignment was to a training division. It took the number of the division, the third, and replicated it and then trained, basic training. I was in the 2nd Brigade headquarters working on the planning and that kind of thing. I really was disappointed that I wasn't one of the company commanders, but it turns out that that was a tough job. In the tank company, the guy that headed the tank company had more tanks than a tank division, and it was a mess to keep them all straightened out and going around. So one day I went back home for lunch, and Mrs. George Patton, Sr., was sitting in the living room of our house talking to Carol. She had come down to Fort Knox because George and Joanne had just been married, and Joanne got some kind of disease when they were on the honeymoon in the Caribbean. And I reintroduced myself to Mrs. Patton, and we sat down and talked. She asked me what my job was, and I told her. I said, "But I've got to go. I've got an appointment this afternoon to see the commanding general. They're looking for an aide to camp to the commanding general, and I really don't want that job. I really would prefer to get an opportunity to command a company in the division here." She said, "Russell, General Collier is a very, very fine man. He has a 17 fine family life. He is a very, very successful soldier who commanded the 2nd Armored Division at the end of the war in Berlin. You could learn an awful lot working for him." So I went over, and I got the job, and for the next two years I was the junior aide to the commanding general. I did such things as travel with him when he went to different places for different purposes. My buddies all got a hold of me when they found out I was going to do this job, and all had things they wanted changed at Fort Knox, and I was to be their agent in telling the commanding general how he could change the place. Very early on we went out of the headquarters, down the steps, into the car, went past the post theater. I thought, well, here goes. I said, "Sir, do you realize that on this post now an officer must be in his full dress uniform in order to go to the movies?" He said, "Yes, I know that, and it will remain that way." I didn't have many new ideas for him after that. (laughs) He'd go over to the armor school, and the people that are teaching in the combat kinds of business would say, "This is what we're doing now, General, and what do you think? We'd like your approval of it," and I'd sit in the back of the room and listen to what was going on, and understand it. I would hear the people that had served in combat talk about what you ought to do, and I got a great education. Also, every year there was something called the Armor Warfighting Conference. Twice I was there for that. They bring in all the people that belong to the Armor Association, or were serving in an armored position, all the senior people, and they'd talk about what the army ought to be doing in armor. One of my jobs was to go into the airport in the general's big sedan and his chauffer and pick these guys up and drive them back to the post, and I'd chat with these guys, and it was really fun. I got to know an awful lot of people, army commanders, army staff members, and all this. I really felt pretty special that I'd had this kind of an opportunity. Then we also had at Fort Knox in that time frame an armor board. This armor board, when General I. D. White was the commander at Fort Knox -- before General Collier -- that the chief of staff of the army was not pleased with the way the chief of ordnance was managing the tank program and gave the responsibility to the commanding general at Fort Knox. All the bigwigs gathered at Fort Knox to make decisions about what the next tank would look like, what the next armored personnel carrier would look like, etc., etc. Again, I sat in the back of the room, and young captains and majors, most of them West Point graduates who'd gone off to graduate school and were coming back and using their talents. It was a great, great opportunity for me. We were always invited to the house when the Colliers were having a party, and people would say, "Oh, you're going over there and pass the cigarette butts around with them, aren't you?" "No, we don't do that. We're part of that group." Mike Popowski here in town, his dad was one of those colonels on the post at that time. I really got to know all those people. Not that it was doing me any good, but I learned from them, you know. I learned how to act, I learned when to shut up. It was very useful, and it was a great time. The Colliers were magnificent to us. We had a child while we were living there -- it was Tom, and Tom got burnt badly in an accident at our house. He was crawling across the floor, and there was a coffee pot that started percolating, and he looked up and pulled on the cord, and it came over and broke open on his back. The Colliers came over and relieved us of our 24-hour duty, and they took it over; they sat with that baby. We were their family. It was amazing; it was wonderful. 18 Yeah. I began to really understand what the army was about, that it could be a good army. JC: Well, after Fort Knox where did you go? RT: Let's see. Oh, yeah. When General Collier left, he was to be promoted and going to go to Korea, and he offered me the opportunity to go with him, and I told him that I would much prefer to have a tank company in Europe. While I loved the guy and his family, I wanted a tank company in Europe. He said, "We'll take care of that," and he called up the commanding general of the 2nd Armored Division in Europe, the one that they call Chubby Doan, and told him the situation and that I would be on orders to go over to the 2nd Armored Division and a tank company. He said, "I'll give him a tank company." So, wow! You know, we made it, and off we go to Europe. We pull into Bremerhaven, which is the northern port in Germany, and they send forth a little craft to meet the boat. A sergeant first class climbs up the rope ladder and comes over and starts telling people what their orders are going to be, and I was ordered to something called the 13th Military Intelligence Group. I thought, oh, my God, something's wrong here. The colonel who was in charge of us all on the boat, for the boat trip, he got his orders, and he opened it up, and it's the 13th MIG. He said, "What's an MIG?" I said, "The best I know it's a Russian airplane." (laughs) It turned out that he thought he was going to the 1st Infantry Division for a regiment. Well, we got off the boat, and both of us went down to this intelligence group, went through two different fences, guards posted in towers and all the rest of it, and slept in an open bay area over the officers' club. There were a number of other offices there, and they said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "I don't know. I'm here by mistake. I'm headed to the 2nd Armored Division." They said, "No, no, you aren't. We're all in the same business, fellow. Tell us where you're going." And I said, "No, no. I'm an officer, and I'm going to --" They said, "We understood an armored officer was coming, and he was going to go underground and behind the Iron Curtain, and report on the Russian movements." Holy Crow! That's not for me. So the next morning I went down and asked authority to see the commanding officer of the 513th [sic] MIG. He spoke with me, and he said, "No, you're going down. You're not going to do that; that's rumor. You're going down to the headquarters in Heidelberg, and you're going to be an intelligence officer in that headquarters." I said, "I'm not an intelligence officer." He said, "That's your orders." OK. So I went down to Heidelberg. General Jim Phillips was the G2 at the time, and I asked to see him, and I went right up to his office and told him my sad story, that I was going to go to the 2nd Armored Division -- and he was an armored officer -- "Now here I am an untrained specialist in your department." He said, "What were you going to do?" I said, "Well, General Doan in the 2nd Armored Division had accepted me to come and be in tank company." He says, "I'll talk to him about that," and he reached over -- they had a red phone system that red phones went to the different generals in different locations -- he picked it up and dialed 27 or whatever it was, and General Doan answers the phone, and I'm sitting there. He said, "I got a young captain sitting here that tells me he's supposed to be in the division. Tell me about him, what are you going to do with him?" Well, poor old General Doan hadn't remembered much about the phone conversation a couple of 19 months before or something, and said, "Well, I'm going to make him my aide." And he said, "Like hell you are. I'm keeping him here for that." (laughs) I did it all over again for another two years in the headquarters at [Usera?]. [01:26:32] It was a great experience. General and Mrs. Phillips were a mother and dad to us; they'd invite us to Sunday dinner, and little Tom would crawl around the floor or under the table, and General Collier would feed him peanuts or something. It was a wonderful time, and when the Colliers would take a trip and borrow the commander in chief's train, we went with them. It was marvelous. I saw all of Europe. I knew most everything that was going on in the intelligence field, and it was a great experience with wonderful people. But when he got assigned to go back to the United States, I took the Colliers up to the port to put them on. When I came back, this again on the commander in chief's train, I had the train stop in Mannheim, and I got off in Mannheim. I wasn't going to be stopped again and reported in to the 57th Tank Battalion and for the last year there had a tank company. That was probably the greatest experience of my life. It really was a good experience. We were hard training, we were well trained, good people. In the beginning we had a wonderful commander who was a major, and the division commander, General Doan, didn't want to put a lieutenant colonel in that slot. He wanted this man to get that experience, but eventually they had to pull him and let -- the lieutenant colonels were backing up. So we were out maneuvering and we came to the last day of the maneuvers, and the new battalion commander arrives, and we have this party in a beer hall. The new commander arrives, and one of the company commanders in Charlie Company walked up to the head table with two boots of beer. You know what that is? Glass things that replicate a boot. Big. He puts one in front of each of the two commanders and says, "Let's see who's the better man." This poor guy that has just got off the train coming down from Bremerhaven and crossed the ocean picks up his boot and starts to drink. The battalion commander we love drinks it down and wins the contest, and the new battalion commander was so tight from drinking that beer too fast his feet slipped out from under him as he sat at that table and went right down under the table. (laughter) That was his first day of duty, and he didn't improve much after that. We were all pretty cocky, the company commanders; we were doing a lot of good things. But he knew nothing about it. We told him -- we were told that he had served in a tank battalion in World War II, and that's all we knew about him. It sounded great to us, a guy with some real experience. Well, it turns out that he reported in to a replacement company, and they said, "Take this truckload of men and go forward to point A. There will be a sign on the road at so many miles or kilometers. Turn left in there, and that's where your unit will be." Well, he got down there and made the turn, then went up, and three Germans come out and say, "Achtung! Put him in the compound!" and he went directly to the prisoner-of-war camp. He never had any experience. He'd been a public information officer before, and he was terrible. He was so bad that in a morning meeting every time, when he would suggest something the other three company commanders, we'd sort of nod or shake no. And "Well, what's the matter?" You know why? We didn't get any leadership out of him at all. When it came time to leave there, I had probably the most frightening experience in my life. He stood up in front of the entire battalion officer group and said, "Well, now that Captain Todd is leaving maybe I can take command of this battalion." Oh, my God. 20 Oh, my God. He gave me an efficiency report that would sink anybody, but it just turned out that in that moment of time the army changed the efficiency report system whereby your commander rates you, and his boss rates you, and then a third person rates what they did. Well, the third person turns out to have been the fellow that had been recently the brigade commander, and he knew me, he knew my performance, etc., and he sent back the efficiency report to be redone. Ho. (laughs) Yeah. Those were good times though, good times. Scary times, but testing, really testing you. JC: Because you were right there in Germany during really the height of the Cold War. RT: Yeah. As a matter of fact, one time we were out on maneuvers, 200 miles from our base, when the French and British moved into Suez, because the Egyptians said they were taking over the canal. There we are sitting out in the woods saying, "Oh, my God," because the president had said, "Oh, no, you don't." Eisenhower said, "No, you don't. You can't do that. We give you a lot of money to bring your economies back from the war, and we'll stop it tomorrow unless you withdraw." But we didn't know all that, and my guys are saying "We're going to gyro to Cairo," you know, that (laughter) kind of stuff. We finally came back. But if we'd had to go, I haven't seen a unit that would be any more ready than we were. Yeah. It was really a great exper-- In a company command, everybody doesn't have to bypass the battalion commander who's a dud. But when you do have to do that, then you're really thinking on your feet. It was great. JC: What was your next assignment after that? RT: Would you believe back to Fort Knox? JC: Oh, really? RT: Yeah. I went back there to go to the Armor Officer Advanced Course, which was a nine-month course in there, in which they were teaching you at the next level. Now the course we took before at Fort Knox was a course we should have had before we went to Korea. I came away with a great impression of how good that was. It was excellence. When I saw General Collier working with the instructors and telling them how to handle this kind of thing. When I came back three years later, it was a well-organized organization. In fact, General Abrams had been there as the head of the command department. It was a first class education. I really and truly look back upon my Norwich experience as not up to that standard that the army was producing there. At the end of that course I had talked my way into becoming one of the instructors in the command department, and I was thrilled to death about that. On graduation day I'm sitting in my chair on the aisle, and as the assistant commandant went by my seat he stopped and said, "You're going to be working in my office." (laughs) So I then worked for Colonel Chandler, who was a first-rate soldier. He had been horse cavalry, in the Philippines, and was on the Bataan death march. He was really very much a gentleman, very much strong willed, and very much of a tutor, and I worked out of his office. My job was to arrange the schedules of the classes, and we had all kinds of classes -- enlisted classes, officer classes -- so that they would mesh how 21 many people, how many classrooms do we need, how many instructors do we need, on what day are we going to do it? I was bringing home page after page of long paper, and on the kitchen floor working out the details of making this thing work. It was great, but, again, there was an intermediary. There was a lieutenant colonel who was my immediate supervisor who, again, I thought to be a dud. On my first day of working there he said, "That's your desk right over there." And I'm, "Yes, sir." I went over to my desk. Now what do I do? Here I am, I found my desk. There was a major sitting at a desk facing me who never looked up. He was just scribbling away, scared to death of this guy evidently. A few minutes later he came over and said, "Well, here's the first project I want you to do. This is it. I want you to study this, and then rewrite it, and we'll discuss it." Fine. It wasn't five minutes later, he came over and said, "No, I want you to do this one instead." I went through about six of those before I understood what I was doing. I was hopeless that anything was really going to happen. That same day he came over and looked over my shoulder, and I looked up, and he said, "What are you writing there?" I said, "Well, sir, I'm writing myself a note so that I will be able to put these things in the appropriate order." He said, "Well, you're not saying it very well." (laughter) It was awful. My out was Colonel Chandler, and a major got assigned to the office, and he very quickly understood what was going on here and went in and talked to Colonel Chandler, and Colonel Chandler moved him out. Again, we got a very, very fine operating organization going. It was good; it was very successful. But, you know, every time there's some kind of a roadblock in your career, you've got to stop and figure out how the hell you're going to get around it. JC: What was after Fort Knox? RT: Twenty more years of -- let's see. I graduated from Fort Knox. I was selected below the zone for a promotion. Do you know what that means? JC: Uh-uh. RT: When you're considered for promotion a board meets in Washington, and everybody whose career appears between this date and this date is considered. Isn't that right? Well, what they started, and I don't know if they're still doing it or not -- I think they are -- they would go below this zone and choose certain people to be examined with this group, and I was lucky enough to do that and really jumped ahead. In the headquarters there was Major Howard from Norwich University. Major Howard didn't graduate from here, but he was an instructor when I was a student here. He was in another department, or I didn't see much of him. But when I came out on the below-the-zone list, there were two of us at Fort Knox that came out on it, and he called me on the phone, and he said, "Well, I thought Frank would make it, but I never thought you would." (laughter) So things are weird, but Leavenworth was an exciting time. I was a captain. The majority of people were majors and lieutenant colonels. A real shock of my life in the first day was seated at tables, and there's a blank card in front of you, and the instructor said, "Now write your name on it, not your rank. Write your name on that card." Well, the guy sitting opposite me was a lieutenant colonel, and I was a captain, and I don't know his rank. What do I call him? We were all calling each other by their first names 22 rather than you find in a unit. That (inaudible) [01:41:04] like that, I'm up against it here. So I worked hard, harder than I've ever worked, and at the end of the halfway mark in the course they gave us standings of where you stand in the course, and I was number five or something. I said, "I'm working too hard." Yeah, that was good, a good period in our life. We had Saturdays and Sundays off. I had a little golf group I played with on Saturdays, and Michelob beer was local out there. We'd buy a pitcher -- the loser would buy a pitcher of beer, and that was a big deal. That was a big deal. JC: So when did you go to graduate school at the University of Alabama? RT: Strange you should ask that. When I came to the end of the course at Leavenworth a general officer, a brigadier general, came out to the course to announce to the armor officers, to the infantry officers, etc., what your next assignment would be. About the third name he read was a good friend of mine, and when he read off where he was to go this guy went "Ooohhh." The general looked down at him and said, "What's the problem?" He said, "Sir, I don't think anybody in your office ever read my request." "Oh." He said, "Major so-and-so, come out here." The guy comes out from behind the curtain with a big notebook, and the guy flaps through it, and he looks down, and he says, "I don't know what you're complaining about. It says right here, 'Anywhere in the world but Fort Knox.' And you're going to Fort Knox, your second choice." (laughter) Then he got to my name, and he said, "I want to see you right after this." I thought, oh, God, what now? So I went in, and he was in his office. There was a temporary office. And he said, "We've got a problem here," and I said, "Sir, what is it?" He said, "Well, they've got you going to graduate school, and as the chief armor officer I want you to go to an armored unit." I said, "I have a choice?" He said yes. I said, "Where will I go if I go to an armored unit?" He thought for a minute, and he said, "You'll go to the tank battalion in Hawaii." I said, "Can I discuss this with my wife at lunch?" and he said, "Sure," and I came back and said, "We have decided that we're going to go to graduate school," and that's how that worked out. JC: So you went to Tuscaloosa instead of Hawaii. RT: Yeah. (laughs) JC: Now, what degree did you get at Alabama? RT: MBA. It was a good tough course, but it was in the process of changing the curriculum of business schools, and some of it was very tough. Part of it was very simple, but some of it was very tough. I established a schedule where I went in very early in the morning, got in there before 7:00 every morning, went down to the basement of the library where I had an assigned carrel and started working until it was time for a class to begin. I'd go up to the class and go back to the basement, eat my lunch in the basement, go home at 5:00, and hardly ever did any midnight work at home. We lived a good, wonderful family life in Tuscaloosa. Now, it wasn't all easy. There had been the problems of the colleges not admitting blacks, and the president of the United States pushing hard to make them do it. 23 Then there were the riots at Ole Miss, right at that time. The army sent down its chief person who determines whether the applicants will go to college -- army applicants -- and to which college they will go to. So we all gathered, and there were people taking nuclear physics, and [we have to?] discuss with him, and he talked it back and forth, etc. Finally one young captain in the back said, "Sir, this is all very interesting, but the army's practically at war with our citizens. What the hell happen-- What do we do? What are our orders, and what are our instructions here at the University of Alabama, if the same kind of thing breaks out on this campus?" This poor old duffer who'd been the president of some college someplace sort of shook his head and said, "Well, I hope you'd be on the side of the government." (laughter) That hit right in the heart of soldiers. But it was a good program. When I left I was going to be assigned to the headquarters in US Army Europe in the comptroller's office, and you're required to stay in that position for three years to make up for your being chosen for that job. They want to use your knowledge and experience. Just before I left they changed it, and I went to the US Army Support Command in France, which had 57 separate organizations that it commanded, to include a pipeline that came in at St. Nazaire and went out to all of the air bases and army refueling, etc., and repair of tanks, repair of everything. We took German factories over, used Germans. It was a very, very exciting assignment in terms of technology, but I got assigned to the comptroller's office in that damn headquarters, and I was one of three soldiers. The rest were all civilian employees, or French. One of the people that worked for me was from Yugoslavia; he'd escaped Yugoslavia. So it was a mixed up kind of place. We lived at a French house down by the railroad station. We didn't want to live in the government quarters, we'd done enough of that. We wanted to have an experience in France. From that point of view, it was wonderful. The job was terrible, just terrible. They expected me to know everything that they did in their routine because I'd been to this business program. Well, I had to really move fast to catch up with them. My boss was a man by the name of [Birossi?]. He'd been an Italian-American soldier in World War II who married an Italian and never went home, and when they created the support command then he stayed on in Europe and became a very important man in the headquarters as the budget manager of this very vast organization. I worked like hell to try and get it straightened out. They first gave me the responsibility of working the budget of a couple of the major organizations, one the tank rebuild plant, which was -- God, it looked like General Motors out there. I finally got frustrated with it all. We'd all sit in a room, roll out our papers, and bring in the guy, the comptroller, from that organization, and you'd sit facing each other with Mr. [Birossi?] looking over your shoulder, and you'd work out a budget for them. How the hell did I know? I didn't have any basis for doing it, but we'd discuss it to get it. When this was all over and calmed down I said, "This is stupid as hell," to [Birossi?]. He said, "What are you talking about?" And I said, "We've got the world's best information technology program right in this headquarters, those guys that are working the plants do it all by technical means, punch cards, and here we are sitting around trying to argue about a number on a sheet of paper that doesn't mean a damn thing." He said, "What do you suggest?" I said, "I suggest we go to talk to them, get onto their system somehow, and work this thing out that we can make a reasonable stab at it." He said, "OK, wise guy, do it." 24 Now, there was a lieutenant colonel in this overall office who was Birossi's boss, and I went to see him and told him, I said, "Now, I'm not competent to do this. There's no question about it. However, if you give me two of those young captains of finance that work down the hall from me, I can get this thing started and going." So he assigned these two guys to me, and we changed the whole system of how we did the budgeting of US Army Europe. I got some kind of an award for that. Then they put me in another job where I had all kinds of stupid responsibilities. I had a responsibility for efficiency of each of these many, many organizations, and I got permission to send people -- Frenchmen -- back to the United States to be trained in each of those depots to do it. Then we pulled all of this together right as the secretary of defense had initiated a program to improve work force relationships, his program, and they sent it out and said, "Everybody in the army, navy, and the air force will use these procedures." And my two-star boss said, "No, we won't. We're not doing that. We got a god system, we just got it started, and, well, that's the way it will be." OK, you're the boss. So six weeks later, maybe two months later, there's a message sent to the commanding general that said "We're sending over someone from the Department of Defense to look at your program." I got called in to the CG's office, and he said, "You got two weeks to put this program in place." Well, you know, I was put into a position where I got attention, and I could do what I wanted to do, and I could get help to do it, and everything just sort of worked together. It was a great experience. But, again, it's a case of speaking up and saying what you think is wrong and finding a way to do it. I went in on the train from Orleans into Paris to the IBM plant with boxes of punch cards in my (inaudible) [01:53:43] and brought them into IBM, and we worked it out with them to do it at first before we turned it over to our own organization. That's because if we screwed it up, we'd screw them up badly. But those two finance captains did all the work. I just plowed ahead. Another time, in that same job -- I really thought -- when I got there I said, "My career is ruined. My career is ruined. Who's going to believe that I was in a damn headquarters for a support group? No, uh. I'm an armored guy. No." But anyway, they came up with another program, again, out of the Department of Defense. This time it was to work specifically with -- I can't remember the name of it, but, again, it came out of the secretary of defense's office, and again I got the job to do it. But this time I had an opportunity to start from the beginning with it. It was a matter of saving money, and we were supposed to put out programs, out to our subordinate units, and help them find money and other ways of doing business (inaudible) [01:55:09]. We started with the laundries, a simple thing, and went into the laundries with the people we trained, and they would say to the laundress, "How can you do your job better?" They'd say, "Well, I've been working at this for six years. If we did this, and that, and the other thing," and all of a sudden we weren't doing anything but saying "How do you do it?" and then helping them do it, and getting their boss to agree to it. Well, then you had to take all this information and turn it over to another agency who would check your figures, and numbers, and back and forth, and everything. That all seemed to work out, and things were going along rather well when they put me in for an award as the civilian of the year for product improvement. I was called (laughs) into Heidelberg, and they put on a parade, and the commanding general and I are -- there were other people, for other reasons, being recognized that day. I'm standing 25 beside the commanding general when the troops are passing in review, and he said, "What the hell are you doing here? This is a civilian award." I said, "Sir, you signed it." (laughter) And off we went. I just kept working. Living there was great sport, except the French are crazy. We lived in a neighborhood, as I said, on Rue de la Gale, and the house was an old one. It was rent controlled, and we had to slip the landlord money on certain days, and you'd walk up to his house with a paper bag full of money. A door would open, a hand would come out and grab the paper bag out of your thing, the extra money for the -- crazy. In the neighborhood we never made close friends except in one instance. Our youngest daughter, Ellen, went to French school. The other two kids refused; they were smart enough not to do it. Ellen and her friend [Pascale?] (inaudible) [01:57:36] walked to school with her mother and Carol, over to school. The ladies walked back from school. After lunch, walked over, back to get, march them over, again, at the end of the school day. And they talked, and they talked, and they talked. Not a single word of English was ever spoken for three years between these two women. We get back to the United States and got a very nice letter from her, in English, and she said, "You never would have improved your French the way you did if you knew I had been a nanny in Great Britain and speak English." (Cates laughs) Now, that's the dirtiest, rottenest trick I can ever imagine happening. (laughter) When we had a problem with the house, you'd try and go out and find someone that would fix the faucet. Now, there are four sizes of pipe, and there are 12 sizes of faucets, and there are 14 sizes -- and they ask you which one do you want? You don't know. So somebody has to come and measure it and go back, and two days later you've got water running again. When it came time to buy coal, we went down to the place you buy coal, and it was a storefront on the main road, right in the main store, and he's got little glass canisters with different kinds of coal in the window. You don't buy coal that way anywhere else in the world. We went in, and he wanted to know how many radiators we had in the house, and how many veins each radiator had, and how many sections were in the stove, and then he could figure out how many tons it would take to heat the house. He didn't ask if there was any broken windows, or open doors, or boards off on the roof. They did it totally unscientific. Then when you come to that decision, then they say, "Now do you want it from Belgium? Do you want it from --" you know, down the list. We want anthracite from Belgium, OK. Then they come and dump it in the house with buckets in the window of the cellar, and the whole house is covered with coal dust everywhere. And it was expensive. Living there was not easy, but we made a pact that we were going to go once a month with the kids to Paris, every time, every month, and we did, and we traveled a lot. Not any great distances, but we loved parts of France. But the French were very difficult to live with. JC: Oh, I'm sure. I've been there once. (laughs) RT: The worst one was my father had a cousin who was, in relationship to Dad, it was about six up from him in the corporation, and he was the chairman of the board. We got a call that he was coming to visit the French company that was owned by the American company, and they were going to come down and see us in this hovel (laughs). And just about the time we knew that they were coming but not exactly when they were coming, 26 the French left us with a bit of a problem. When they put in the sewer system, they left the septic tank in the house, in the basement, made of clay, and it began to leak. Do you have any idea what living in that house was like? You couldn't flush a toilet. When I'd go off to work and leave Carol, they had a deal with these crazy guys coming in, and eventually they came in. One guy came in, and he took off the top of this thing, and then he went away. She chased him down, and he said, "Oh, you've got to hire somebody else. The union won't allow me to put the hose down in here and suck out what's left. You've got to find that guy." And it went on, and on, and on, and trying to live in that house. Fortunately we got it cleaned up before Uncle George showed up for lunch. (laughter) JC: Sounds like it was quite difficult living in that house. RT: It was very difficult. Every single day one of us crossed the street to the bakery that was directly across the street from us, and we'd order a demi pan, and bring it back for breakfast, or something else. And every single day that one of us went, my own experience was I'd walk in the door -- "Bonjour, Madame." (laughter) The only guy that spoke to us lived next door, and the reason he spoke to us was that nobody else in the neighborhood, or the town, or the city would speak to him, because he had been a butcher during the Nazi occupation and gave the Nazis all the best cuts of meat. We had no phones. It took three years to get a phone, and it was a three-year tour. If you got a phone, you had nobody to call; they'd all gone home. They're crazy, just crazy. (laughs) JC: So what was the next assignment after France? RT: Well, while in France the Vietnam War broke out, and people lieutenant colonel level in Europe were being pulled back to the United States and given a command in Vietnam. So I applied to get a command in Vietnam, and they said, "Oh, no, no, no, no, you haven't finished your tour for having gone to graduate school. You can't possibly go." This is talking to somebody back in Washington. Then another job opened up, and they needed a lieutenant colonel in an armored battalion, and I called them back again. I said, "I'll come back to this job after that. How about that?" "Nope, we can't do that. We can't do that." Eventually they said, "OK, when you come home from --" I put enough pressure on them. "When you come home from France, we'll send you to Vietnam." And when we came home from France, they said, "No, you're going to go to the Armed Forces Staff College. You've been selected among the army, navy, and air force to go to the Armed Forces Staff College, for six months. After that, we'll get you a job that will get you to Vietnam." Well, you know, it's frustrating, just terribly frustrating. After the Armed Forces Staff College they told me I would go to Vietnam, but first I would go to pick up 57 tanks that had just been manufactured of a new design, and I was to form the tank battalion in the United States, train it in the United States, and take it to Vietnam. When that day came, ready to go, we had three rounds blow up in the chamber back at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and they said, "Hold it. You're no longer on the list to go. But you are going to go to the Naval War College." I couldn't get to Vietnam! It was very difficult. 27 JC: What was the Naval War College like? RT: Terrible. The Naval War College, well, we called it the sleeping room. They had two major speakers every day, one in the morning, and one in the afternoon. That was fine. I mean, I loved to hear them, and they did have a message, but it wasn't work. It was sitting there like you're turning on the television. There was no challenge to this thing at all. Now you could go and get a master's degree along with it from George Washington, but I couldn't, because I had a master's degree, so they weren't going to let me take that program. So they hired somebody the University of Massachusetts had fired from their Economics Department, an old man, to be my mentor and take me through a separate program -- nothing comes out of it other than a dissertation at the end. OK, I'll put up with it, but he was awful, and it was a waste of my time. You never had time between these people to really go to the library and do something. It was 20 minutes. What can you do in the library in 20 minutes? No, you don't. Everyone went and get good coffee, sat around and talked, etc. Oop, time to go back into the bedroom. There was nothing going on in terms of substance in the place. When I had my first time as directing my little group, I worked long and hard on the assignments, and came in the next morning and said, "OK, let's see. Now we had readings in this one, and then we had a differing opinion from this requirement, and then this one, and another one. Commander Jones, what do you think about this?" "Oh, shit," he said, "You don't think I pay any attention to that, do you? I'm in the George Washington program. I'm not going to do any of this." That was a general attitude. There wasn't any depth to what we were doing. One day the admiral in charge, who'd married a British lady and had just come back from another tour in London, said, "How would you like to have lunch at my house with a guest speaker, Todd?" I said, "Gee, that would be very nice, sir." I got up there to discover there were 12 or 13 of us at separate tables and he and the speaker was at another table. What did we do? We sat around and chatted, and ate his food, and left. He said, "How'd you like that?" I said, "What are you referring to, sir?" He said, "Well, the opportunity to be with the speaker." I said, "We weren't with the speaker. You were with the speaker." "Well, how would you handle that?" "I'd put in a round table, and we'd all sit around and talk." "What a great idea." Really, really bad stuff. So he did, and then he invited me to come, and I went, and he said, "How did that go?" I said, "Sir, that was wonderful. But if you did that in the classrooms it might help, too." "We don't have round tables in the classrooms?" He'd never been in a classroom. We didn't have one single naval officer who was nuclear qualified come to the course. They sent them to the National War College. We didn't have one single graduate of a senior college who was on the faculty. I could go on, and on, and on about how bad it was. But one day, in Vietnam, I was sitting at my desk outside General Abrams's office, and I got a call from the naval head in Vietnam. I'm trying to think of his name. I know it as well as I know my own. But anyway, he called me and said, "Russ, I got to see General Abrams." I said, "Well, he's tied up at the moment. Come on up and sit down, and I'll get you in just the minute I can break into it." He said, "Good," and he came up. We sat there, and he said, "I got to talk to General Abrams. They're going to announce this afternoon that I'm the new chief of naval operations, and I don't want him to hear it from anybody else but me." I said, "Oh, have I been waiting for this." He said, 28 "What are you talking about?" I said, "You can do something about the Naval War College that I couldn't," and I laid it out for him, and he fired the guy when he got back there. This is Zumwalt, Admiral Zumwalt. He fired the guy and changed all the programs. I mean, they were tough on him, and they've got a good school there now, or at least the last I knew of it, a very good school that has been accredited. But it was awful. JC: Did you finally get to Vietnam after the Naval War College? RT: Yeah, that's why I was sitting in General Abrams's office. I was to be sent over to be on the command list, which meant this list of people the army feels are capable of doing a job as colonel in a combat unit. They sent my name over, and then they called me back and said, "We've withdrawn your name." (sighs deeply) I said, "Come on, guys. This isn't fair." He's "Hold it, hold it, hold it. They're looking for an assistant to General Abrams, and we've sent your name in." I said, "Look, I've met General Abrams a few times. I don't think he was very impressed with me. I don't think he'll select me off of any list of yours." He said, "There is no list. We only sent your name." (laughter) So I went over there, and I sat for, oh, eight months I guess in General Cao Van Vien's office, who was the head of the Vietnamese armed forces, and I acted as a liaison between General Abrams and General Cao Van Vien, of which there was no requirement. Those guys talked to each other whenever they wanted to. But I represented General Abrams when General Cao Van Vien called the other -- the Koreans, the Australians, the New Zealanders, etc., etc. -- together on a Monday morning to have a meeting, and that was interesting, and I learned a lot, and I met a lot of people. Eventually the secretary of the staff rotated home, and I took his slot. You actually work for the chief of staff, but I read and decided which messages that came in that night would go into General Abrams the next morning, so I got to work very, very early and stayed very, very late, day after day after day, seven days a week. But I really loved working for the guy. Every Saturday morning we would meet with the commanders of the army, navy, air force, etc., the CIA, in the basement of our building, and it was general so-and-so, admiral so-and-so, etc., and Colonel Todd. And Colonel Todd sat in the back of the room and checked -- again, a great learning experience. Watching the interrelationship between these very, very senior commanders was a great experience. Then I went with General Abrams every Monday morning down to brief the ambassador. We'd drive down in his sedan. On Sunday I'd prepare a book for him that he'd go over, and then he'd have that in front of him. He never read it. He never sat in front of the ambassador and read it. I'd be on pins and needles all the time that he'd turn to me and say, "What the hell's this?" (laughs) But he was great. Then I got a command. I left the headquarters and went out and joined the 24th Division as a brigade commander, and I'd been there about eight days when it was announced that the brigade was to go home. (laughs) The next day I got a call on the radio, out flying around in my helicopter -- I had seven battalions in the brigade at the time -- from the corps commander, General Davidson, and General Davidson said, "Meet me at coordinates so-and-so," and we both flew into a point. He said, "I'm pulling you out of this. I've got a problem with the Royal Thai Army. The officer we have working 29 with them is not acceptable any longer to the Royal Thai Army. I need somebody tomorrow, and you're it." That was the craziest thing I've ever been involved in. Wonderful, wonderful Thai commander, who began his military experience at age five in a military academy run by the government. He finished his education in France. The French owned Indonesia. Thailand (inaudible) [02:16:30]. So there we were. Day in and day out, he and I would receive the same briefing. He'd get it in Thai, and his aide-de-camp would give it to me in English. We never ever, ever came to the same solution. We were generations in thought apart. For example, in World War II Thailand never declared war on anybody, but went to war against the Allied forces when they thought Japan was winning. This fellow was a captain in the Thai Army, and he did something very spectacular -- whatever it was, I don't know, very heroic. He was called back to the capital, and he was given the Royal Order of the White Elephant or something. They'd give out five for every war. This was something very, very special, parades, the whole business. He went back to his unit, and then the Thais decided that the Japanese weren't winning the war, and they changed and became our allies. Now you're not going to believe this. They called him back and took the medal because he was fighting on the wrong side. (laughs) I could go on forever on this. My brain couldn't absorb it. When I'd left that and gone back to the United States, I guess when this happened -- I don't remember where I was, but anyway, I wrote him a letter, and I said, "What in the world is going on in Bangkok? You were the commander of the 1st Division, responsible for the security of Bangkok. Your father-in-law is the dictator. They're rioting in the streets, and, to the best I know, nothing's happening." He wrote back to me, after some (inaudible) [02:19:06] time, and said, "Well, you just don't understand our way of thinking. The soldiers had killed some civilians who were rioting, so I went back to my BOQ and stayed there two weeks, and when I came back my father-in-law had been deposed, and the fighting was over." Huh? (laughs) And it wasn't that he wasn't a good soldier, and it wasn't that he was afraid of anything. No, we'd fly around in his damn helicopter and take it places I never would have gone. On the other hand, he had some VIPs coming over, and he said, "We can't take the helicopter today. I'm going to use it tomorrow for some Thai VIPs, and I don't want any fingerprints on it, I don't want to make sure there's no bullet holes in the thing. We'll just take this other thing." What? We couldn't come together. At one point, the real one that almost got me in trouble -- I think it was on Thanksgiving -- our base camp also had three units in it from the 1st Cavalry Division, and the Thais, and the Thais who were responsible for the security, and I was responsible to the US headquarters. Well, on the big army base, maybe 15 miles away, on Thanksgiving night everything went up in the air, flares, and shooting, and machine guns, and all the Thais thought this was great, and they all did it. He called me in the next morning, and he laid me out. He said, "No Thai would ever do that. Your Americans did this." Well, OK, I'll suck it up. "I assure you it won't happen again, sir." So come New Year's time, I put out to my staff with each of his units, where they normally served, to stay with them all night and record everything that happened in that TOC. Next morning he got me again when I went in there. I said, "Sir, before we say anything else, I suggest you talk to your TOC officer." He went down there, and those 30 guys, we made them record everything, and he discovered that it was his units that were doing it. What do you suppose his answer to that one was? JC: I don't know. RT: He called in his senior officers and said, "I'm resigning from the army. You've let me down." And he went back into his hooch and stayed there for about three days. I woke up at the end of three days early in the morning, and the whole goddamn Thai Army that was posted in Vietnam was out there in a formation. I walked out to see what was going on and stood behind him -- he was up on a platform -- and they all apologized, etc., and he forgave them, and they went back into the woods to their positions. They'd left their fighting positions to come back and apologize to the commanding general. JC: Oh, wow. RT: (laughs) You can find one worse than that, I'll bet. My goodness. JC: Want to stop again? (break in audio) JC: Let's stop here, because we've done about another hour and 10 minutes. (break in audio) RT: Let's -- (break in audio) [02:23:15] JC: All right, this is Joseph Cates. Today is May 19, 2016. This is my second interview with Major General Russell Todd. This interview is taking place at the Sullivan Museum and History Center. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. So when we left off last time we had gone through Vietnam, and you're ready for your next assignment. What was that? RT: OK. When the Royal Thai Army left Vietnam I moved out to a brigade, as I said earlier. But the time with the brigade was very unsatisfactory to me as a professional. It was a little more than a month, and that's not what I considered to be a command. So thinking about what would happen when I got home, I called to the Pentagon, talked to the people in armor branch. A lieutenant colonel sits on a desk and shuffles the papers for colonels and helps make the decisions. I told him I wanted to have a particular command at Fort Lewis, Washington, that I knew the command was about to change. And they said, "Oh, we've already appointed somebody to that port. But you are coming back to go to the Pentagon." 31 I had fought off the Pentagon earlier in my tour. When I was working for General Abrams I got a call from the Pentagon that said "We're bringing you back to the United States because a new position has opened up, and it calls for a brigadier general, and although you're only a colonel, we want you to fill that position." And I said, "Tell me about it." They said, "Well, you're going to be the army's first drug-and-alcohol-abuse officer." I said, "You've been watching what I'm drinking." He said, "No, this is what we've got in mind for you." And I said, "That isn't going to work. It just isn't going to work. I'm over here on a two-year tour, and if you want me to leave here, I'll give you General Abrams's telephone number, and you can call him and ask him to release me." Well, no, they didn't think they would do that. (laughs) So when I went back I went to the Pentagon, and there I went to work for a four-star general who I had met several times, because he traveled to Vietnam back and forth, General Kerwin, a wonderful, wonderful soldier. And when I reported in he told me that I was going to be the head of the department that he supervised for the Modern Volunteer Army. My job would be to coordinate all of the programs that were going on both at posts, camps, and stations around the country and around the world, and also within the Pentagon, to evaluate where we ought to be going. Well, OK. It wasn't my first choice. I had about, oh, 10 lieutenant colonels working for me in a very small office that didn't have any windows, and there was a lieutenant general working in the chief of staff's office whose title was the chief of modern volunteer army. So I was torn between two very senior officers who didn't agree with each other very often, and the job went on, and back and forth, and up and down, but a lot of answering letters from the Congress and this kind of thing, and then evaluating things that came from the field. Well, one day I was up in the next level in the Pentagon, because I'd been called by that lieutenant general, and he started chewing me out just something awful for reasons I couldn't explain. Finally he said, "I'm going down and see General Kerwin." My boss. What the hell's this about? So I was standing alone in his office. He went out a side door, and I said, "I've got to get to General Kerwin quick." So I picked up -- they have red phones that go between the very senior officers. I picked it up and dialed General Kerwin's office, and he has to answer that, no matter what's going on. And I said, "Sir, we got trouble," and told him what was going on. I saw him later in the day. He said, "Thanks. That really made a difference." From that moment on, he treated me like I was one of his best friends and had faith in what I was doing. Now, they did bring back in a major general who had just stopped commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, and he came in, and he was my immediate supervisor. But General Kerwin made a proposal -- not a proposal -- instructions to everybody about that time that said "Everybody that works for me in the deputy chief of staff personnel office is going to spend four years in this job." I could see my chances of getting a second shot at a brigade just going out the window. Carol and I had bought a house in Washington, the first home we ever owned. In France it was a rental, and everything else was army quarters. So this was special. She loved that house. She took a job in Washington, DC, in the personnel department, and then she had done a lot of that before, and that was sort of a big part of what she had done at Radcliffe after Smith, and she loved that job. In fact, everywhere we went she tried to find a job that would keep her busy and active. 32 So there we were, balancing back and forth. Now what do I do? Well, I'll go back to my old trick and call the people in my branch on the phone, and I called this young man early one morning before anybody else was in the office, and he happened to be there. I told him my plight, that I'd been really cheated in that one month I'd had in the thing, and General Davidson had said I was coming to Europe with him to command a brigade, and that didn't work out once he found out I'd never been in the Pentagon. "So I want a command, and I want to lay it out right now. I want you to start working on it." He said, "Sir, I'm not sure I can do that." I said, "Well, what time do you come to work?" He said, "Well, I'm in here by 8:00 every morning." I said, "Get in at 7:30 on Monday, because I'm going to call you every goddamn Monday I'm sitting at this desk," and I did. Eventually he said, "I've made an appointment with you with my boss, Colonel [Touche?], who oversees all the branches for colonels." I walked over, and it was my old friend from Fort Knox who had been the senior aide when I was the junior aide to General Collier. He had talked it over with the committee that makes these kinds of decisions, and they were going to put my name in nomination to go back onto the brigade commanders list. Great. A few weeks later I get a phone call that says "We put your name before the committee, and you are on the list, and you're number two." Uh-oh. I'm supposed to spend four years working for General Kerwin? (laughs) So a little later they call back and said, "Whoa. Wait. In the 2nd Armored Division the brigade commander has moved up to be chief of staff, and that brigade is open." I said, "OK. Now you guys call General Kerwin and tell him that you're pulling me out." They said, "Like hell we will." (laughter) So I went to see General Kerwin, and he sort of grimaced and (inaudible) [02:32:24]. He said, "You know my policy." I said, "Yes, I do, sir, but this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for me." And he said, "I'll tell you tomorrow." So the next day he called me, and he said, "Against my better judgment I'm going to let you go to that command. But let me tell you this. The day that's over you're coming back to work for me." I said, "Yes, sir. Thank you." I ran home. (laughs) A little later, in time, the moving truck was in front of the house. I'd gone home, checked out of the office, done everything appropriately, and gone back, and there was a phone call waiting for me at home. General Kerwin. He went on to say what he really wanted me to do, wouldn't I know, is that -- "Sir, we've made our deal," and he says, "OK, but remember, I'm going to get you when you get (inaudible) [02:33:21]." And that was very pleasing to me. I loved the idea of working for him. But, again, it was a matter of just working your way through the system. It was terribly important to my career and to me. People were telling me that "You don't have to do this" kind of thing. You know, "You've done all those kinds of things." But no, that wasn't the career I wanted. So I went to the 2nd Armored Division and took over the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, and that was a real fun thing. I really enjoyed it. I had a lot of good people working for me. Some of them went on to become general officers later on. The first thing that happened was they told me that the brigade in one month is going to move to Germany on Operation [Forger?]. Does that mean anything to you? Well, in the Cold War we had built all kinds of home hutches and places to store tanks and materials that take a lot of time to get into the theater. If they said, "OK, the balloon went up. Come over here," you wouldn't have had any -- you'd have to wait for your 33 tanks for a month. So they had all those vehicles and stuff over there, and every year we went over and exercised the idea of flying over -- not me, the army did. It was my brigade's turn, and it was just great. I had planned that thing for every possible contingency, in my mind, and we laid it out with the staff. I said, "Now if this happens, or that happens, or this happens, this is what we'll do. Plan A, B, C, and D." And damn, I figured everything except it was going to snow at Fort Hood, and the air force wouldn't show up. (laughter) So we were about two days late getting there, and it slowed things up. But we went out on maneuvers for about a month and a half, and that was a great experience. I'd done it as a company commander when I was stationed in Europe, but as a brigade -- when I went over I've been detached from the 2nd Armored Division of the United States and attached to the 1st Infantry Division, when I got over to Europe. There for the first time I met a fellow named (laughs) -- I met someone, a senior officer, a brigadier general who, because my brigade wasn't part of his division, I had to go through the ropes of him looking over my shoulder for the first three weeks of what we were doing. It wasn't easy. Eventually he and I had a good reputation among each other, and then we're good. It worked out pretty well. Well, his name is Fuller, Fred Fuller. Just to move that part of the story a little further forward, when I went to Forces Command he was the DESOPS, and I was the assistant -- correction, he was the DESPER, personnel, and I was the assistant DESOPS. And again, good friends, you know. No, sir. I had to prove myself all over again to him. That was tough. That was tough. Then when I became division commander at Fort Hood, would you believe they made him the corps commander, and my boss again? And again, I went through the process. I called it rook training, he wanted to test me on everything that was going on, and then eventually he agreed, and we got along. That was a very difficult relationship I had with that individual. So we came back from Germany after the Reforger, and it was time to change division commanders. A general officer that I had met once or twice but didn't know came in as the two-star commanding the (inaudible) [02:38:26]. This was a fight for my life. He, in my opinion, didn't represent a good soldier. He would drive in his jeep with the two stars on the front, down the street, and the men in the division would say, "Hi, General," and he'd wave back, "Hi." No saluting, none of this. He would come around in my battalion and ask the company commander and the battalion commander to see their operational reports, and particularly the readiness reports, whether or not this tank would go or that one. He required them, not required them, but pushed hard for them to like take something off this tank and put it on that tank, and now we've created another tank that this one isn't working, this one if you take the parts and put it on this one, that's one less tank, but will look that much better. It was everything how you looked. Eventually he was promoted to lieutenant general and shipped to Europe, and his chief of staff caught on to his way of life, reported it. He got thrown out of the army, reduced to major general, and was retired. But that was a tough fight, that was a tough fight. In town now there's a major general, retired, John Greenway. Maybe you've met Phyllis. JC: I have. RT: Well, John Greenway was my chief of staff in the brigade, and I don't know how many times he saved my life. He'd say, "No, no, no, don't go up there and tell that general off. 34 Don't do it. Stop here." One time I actually said, "The hell with you, John, I'm going up there." I was really mad. Again, he had ordered my people to do something that was not proper. So John called up the division chief of staff, who was a good friend, and said, "Russ is on the way. Stop him." (laughs) So I never got in to see him, and I calmed down, and the chief of staff discussed it with me in a way. But it was a difficult, difficult system to live with, but I had wonderful people working for me. JC: Well, that's good. RT: Yeah. JC: What year is this? RT: Oh, my God. (inaudible) [02:41:04] I can't remember my birthday. (laughter) It was about '60 something, yeah. I came back to the United States, and I was assigned to forces command, where General Kerwin was, the man that said, "You're going to go work for me," and I went to work for General Kerwin just as I'd been promoted by the system to be brigadier general. I worked for him for two years and then another year with General Rogers, who went on to be the chief of staff of the army, and it was great. Real professionals who understood various ways of handling people beautifully. I must admit, he had a chief of staff who wasn't quite up to speed in my opinion, and as a result I found myself bypassing the chief of staff, which really isn't a very good idea. But both General Kerwin and General Rogers, when I was there, would call me on the phone directly and ask me to do something. As the junior brigadier general at Fort McPherson, Georgia, they immediately appointed me to be club officer, and to be the president of the Association of the United States Army chapter at Fort McPherson. I was really the junior guy in that headquarters as far as a general officer is concerned. The biggest thing that happened to me really there was that that's when we had the baby lift out of Vietnam, and then we had the evacuation of Vietnam. In the operations business at forces command, we had the responsibility of preparing those units in the United States, wherever they might be involved, to prepare them for the influx of people. I was up a lot of nights and really mad at the air force sometimes. They would bring in planes early, before we could finish taking people off the previous planes and get them, kind of thing. They finally came around. But it was a real wonderful experience as far as I'm concerned. I had the thrill of getting a thank you letter from the president and being called in by the State Department, who had the responsibility of taking these people once they arrived in the United States -- when they arrived in the United States the army was responsible for them. We took old barracks and tried to fix them up to be for families and all the rest of it. And the next step was to put them out into the population in America, and that was done by the State Department. At the end of this, the State Department gave me an award and invited me over to Foggy Bottom, and it was carried out in the formal part of that. It's a very ordinary-looking building, but inside, on the top floor, they have collected and put in there all the furnishing and antiques of America. They would go to somebody that had something that the State Department wanted, and they would say "We would like to have it, and we will replicate it exactly, and give you back the replication." They built -- it's a museum, it's a wonderful, wonderful museum of 35 American furniture through time. I was really impressed with it being there. I wasn't that impressed with the State Dept- people in Vietnam. (laughs) It was very interesting. JC: Yes, sir. So this was around 1975, that would be (crosstalk; inaudible) [02:45:47]. RT: Yeah, that's right. Yeah. I did one or two year. JC: Where were you from Fort McPherson? RT: From Fort McPherson, when my immediate boss left General Rogers called me in and said, "I want you to be my full-time top guy and deputy chief of staff operations." I said, "No, General, that isn't right." "What are you talking about, it isn't right?" I said, "You want someone that's been a division commander to be in that job. I mean, you're dealing with all those division commanders, and if the guy that's passing the instructions hasn't had the experience of being a division commander, it doesn't come through right." And he said, "All right. All right." About a year later I was on a board in Washington. You're sent in to do a lot of those things. Interestingly enough, on this particular one I was the head of the board for captains being promoted to major, and I got in trouble with General Rogers. The instructions we had were "These are the formulas, etc., that you follow when you're looking at the history of their being in the service. You can add to this other things, if you, as a board, want to do it." The first thing we added to it was that any captain who had served a normal period of time as a captain in the combat arms branches and had not had a company wasn't to be promoted on this occasion to major. Passing up a captain, you pass up the real army and the real understanding of the army, and, oh, boy. It turns out that we eliminated from being promoted five captains at West Point, instructors, and that reverberated around the world. (laughs) General Rogers finally calmed down. Then on another occasion when I was away in Washington he called me on the phone and said, "The major generals promotion list has just come out." I said, "Oh, good. Who's on it?" and they said, "You are." Oh, wow. After I went back he called me in his office and said, "Now, I'm going to send you to Fort Hood to command a division." Previous discussion, you got to have a command. I said, "Oh, my. Where's George going?" And he looked at me with this great strain on his face and said, "George who?" I said, "George Patton, 2nd Armored Division." I had been in the 2nd Armored Division twice. Four men have commanded the 2nd Armored Division, three of them during World War II. I knew that was my place in life. Well, he said, "You're going to the 1st Cav." Of course, when I'd been there as a brigade commander the 1st Cav was the enemy. (laughter) It was a little difficult to change my mindset that I was now the head of the 1st Cavalry Division, but it turned out to be a good assignment, too. We were immediately assigned a mission of working on something that was called Division '86, and this was the '76-'77 time frame. What we would do is to experiment with different organizational concepts, try them out, and another R&D organization would evaluate whether this was a good idea, or whether it wasn't a good idea. But, man, was that a lot of work. We had soldiers picking up their mattresses and marching over two streets, and then joining another company, because now we were trying -- we were going to have tank platoons with only four tanks rather than five tanks, 36 and these guys had to fill in for the -- you know, back and forth, and up and down. It was a crazy time, but it was very, very rewarding. We lived next door to George Patton and Joanne Patton, and as a matter of fact we had become very close friends over the time we were in the army. We went home on vacations sometimes by accident at the same time, back in New England, and other times purposefully. But we celebrated our twenty-fifth wedding anniversary together, both divisions, at the club, and it was officers. It was really good sport. JC: Was that your last command? RT: No. They sent me to -- at one Fort Hood, after two years of commanding the division, I went down and commanded something called [Tecada?] [02:51:38], which was a research and development experimental station kind of thing. I was doing to the rest of the world what they'd been doing to me, for two years I guess, at which point I was shipped over to Europe to be the deputy chief of staff for operations under General Kroesen. He was one of the most magnificent soldiers I'd ever met. I worked for him once before for a short time, but he was first class. Then I got a call from Loring Hart, president of Norwich University, who I'd gotten to know -- over his 10-year span as president -- pretty well. In my traveling around at various times, I was the head of the Norwich Club of Georgia, the Norwich Club of Fort Hood, the Norwich Club in Europe. They'd come over to visit, and we became close. I had come home on leave to see my dad, who was in bad trouble health wise, and I got a call from Loring Hart to my dad's home down in New Hampshire. He said, "I need you to come up here. I need to talk to you; it's important." And I said, "Gee, I don't know. Dad is not well, I don't know how long he's going to live, and I can't be here very long, so I really and truly want to see as much of him as I can." He said, "Well, afterward, after this weekend" -- it was a big alumni weekend -- "I'll stop in to see you." I said OK. Well, Mother got a hold of me, and Dad got a hold of me and said, "Go on up there." Dad said, "Get a hold of my classmates and tell them I'll be there next year." Well, I knew most of his classmates. When I arrived I found them at lunch in the Armory, and I walked down to the table, the half where they were, and started saying this lie about my father, he's going to be getting well, and he'll see you next year when he comes. All of a sudden the most unusual thing happened. There was this great noise in the Armory, and it kept getting louder and louder and louder. As this individual coming into the room got closer to our table, I discovered that it was General Harmon coming back, and all of these people were saying, "Ernie, Ernie, Ernie, Ernie." I couldn't believe it, you know, really and truly. It showed me just exactly how much he was loved by this institution. That doesn't mean he didn't make a lot of mistakes at times, but he really pulled us out of the woods. So Loring Hart stops in at the house and says, "The board at Norwich University has told me that 10 years is enough, and I'm going to retire. I want you to put your name on the list to be considered." I said, "You're a PhD, you taught English, you became the dean of the university. I don't have any of that." He said, "And you don't need it either, because I'm absolutely certain they're going to choose a soldier." I said, "What do you know, I'm qualified." I went back to Europe, told my boss, and then came back. I made a couple of trips back and forth. I told my boss, which was General Kroesen, what was 37 going on, and then went to see the chief of staff of the army to tell him that I was putting in my papers. You know, after you've been division commander you owe the army something, because of the experience they've given you. So I went to see General "Shy" Meyer, who I'd known in Vietnam, and I was a little dubious here. What will he say? So I told him, and he jumped up from behind his chair, rushed around to my side of his desk, shook my hand, and said, "Boy, that's just exactly what I want to do when I get out." (laughter) Then, unfortunately, and this doesn't have to be spread around, he told me that my name had been submitted to be promoted to Lieutenant General, and it is now before the Congress. Had I not put this in and had I been selected, I was going to go to one of two different jobs, and neither one of them sounded as much fun to me as coming home. Not that I could change my mind. Once you've told the army you're retiring, you're retiring. You don't change your mind. So that's how I got here. JC: What were the other two choices? RT: To be the chief of staff of USEUCOM, which was for the European theater of all of the activities there, and the other one was on the joint staff, doing the DES-OPS kind of work, which is called the J5. JC: So you come to Norwich. Talk a little bit about the application process, because I know Phil Marsilius says in his oral history that they gave you an eight-point plan that they wanted implemented. RT: Yeah. Very unusual I thought, and very useful. Before I get to that (laughs), Carol and I came. We went to New York City and joined a committee of the board who were involved in the selection process. The plane was late, the taxis weren't running, and we were late getting to this thing. Carol was a little nervous that that showed that maybe we weren't working hard enough to get there. They said to me, "We've just finished lunch. Do you want something to eat?" and I said, "Oh, yeah. How about a bowl of onion soup?" Carol said to me afterward, "You could have chosen anything but that cheese dangling out of your mouth." (laughter) But, to me, we had a wonderful conversation, and quite frankly I left in the cab going back to the airport with a member of the board who sat there and congratulated us, because they were certain that the board was now going to select us. Yeah, interesting. Where were we in our discussion? JC: The eight-point plan. RT: Yeah. I can't tell you what the eight-points are right now, but they were all reasonable, one of which was to make Vermont College work, the system of the two institutions together, and that's interesting, too. On that point I tried very hard -- they put a lot of pressure on Loring to go up to Vermont College at least twice a week. He'd go home, changed out of his uniform into civilian clothes, go up to Vermont College, and I don't know what he did, presumably he did good things, and came back again. I got into that routine with him, and I found that Vermont College was in deep trouble, I mean, in my opinion. Over time Vermont College had reduced the quality of their education in order 38 to sustain the number of students they needed, and they had all kinds of programs going that didn't make a lot of sense. They had a nursing program that was excellent. Excellent. They had just bought some programs from -- oh, what's the name of it? JC: Goddard? RT: Goddard College, and they were difficult to mesh into the family. For example, I hadn't been here very long, and I got a call from Mrs. Lippincott, who was the chief officer of Vermont College and had previously been Loring's assistant. I got a call that said, "There's going to be a graduation on Friday" -- this was about Wednesday -- "and it's going to be outside at Vermont College. It's going to be one of the Goddard programs that's graduating at this time. They would like to invite you to be part of their graduation." So I said, "Fine, I'll be there." But before I went I hadn't heard anything more, so I called up to find out, and I said, "Now, what's my role in this? Do I hand out the diplomas? Do I make a speech, do I congratulate them from the platform? What do I do?" They said, "Oh, no, they just want you to sit there and be present. They do all this themselves." OK. I can live with that, and we'll see what happens. The first student to graduate came up, gave a little speech, each one of them, and then took their diploma and put it from their left hand to their right hand, and went back to their chair. The institution wasn't involved. This happened seven or eight times before I really said this is something we've got to look at. Then they decided, or they didn't then decide, the next thing was to have a musical rendition. They had a fellow with a fife and a piano player, and they pushed the piano out toward the group, and the front leg broke off pushing it through the grass. They somehow got it jacked up and started, and the flute player -- well, it was awful, just awful. The next day I said to my vice president, Jim Galloway, major general, retired, I told Jim what had happened, and he said, "You know, you weren't the first. I was the first. The same sort of thing went on, but it was crazier when I was up there." I said, "Tell me." He said, "The flute player was in a tree." (laughter) So we spent some time trying to bring it into the focus. Quite frankly they had some fine professors. They just didn't have a system involved. JC: I've always heard Goddard is a little strange. RT: Well, put it this way. One time Carol and I invited the president of -- oh, in Burlington. JC: UVM? RT: N
The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. Beloff, Max. "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. Brauer, Kinley J. "British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration." The Journal of Southern History 38, no. 1 (1972): 49-64. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. Carman, Ezra Ayres. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. Chance, Joseph E. The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. Cozzens, Peter. No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 59 Daniel, Larry J. Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln. New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. Grimsley, Mark. The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Halleck, Henry Wagner. Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. Hennessy, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Hess, Earl J. Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. Hess, Earl J. Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man of the Confederacy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. Hoslett, Schuyler Dean. "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. Jacobson Eric A. and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War: A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971. Jordan, Brian Matthew. Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. Longacre, Edward G. To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 60 McClellan, H. B. The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry. Edison, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1993. McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Miller, Donald L. Vicksburg: Grants Campaign That Broke the Confederacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020. Muehlbauer, Matthew S. and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. Murfin, James V., and James I. Robertson. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and Robert E. Lees Maryland Campaign, September 1862. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004. Noe, Kenneth W. Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. Pohanka, Brian C. Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. Pooley, Andrew. "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australasian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. Rhea, Gordon C. The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. Royster, Charles. The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1991. Sanders, Stuart W. Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. Volpe, Vernon L. "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 61 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. Weigley, Russell Frank. A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. Woodworth, Steven E. Nothing but Victory the Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. Primary Sources: Allan, William. The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. Alexander, Edward Porter. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Volumes 1-4, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson, and Clarence Clough Buel. New York: The Century Company, 1885. Donaldson, Francis Adams. Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. Fleming, Francis P. A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. Marshall, Charles. Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. Newman, Simon P. "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. Rhodes, Elisha Hunt. All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. Small, Abner Ralph. The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 62 United States War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. Tourgée Albion W. The Story of a Thousand: Being a History of the Service of the 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War for the Union, from August 21, 1862, to June 6, 1865. Edited by Peter C. Luebke. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011.Watkins, Samuel R.Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011