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Engl. Zsfassungen

In this article, the processes of re-stratification in Serbia during the period from the end of the 1980s until recent times are analyzed on the basis of findings of several empirical investigations. In the first part of the text, the author points out that a systemic change implies not only quantitative changes in the control and distribution of social resources, but also changes in the way of constituting the basic social groups, and the forms of their relations, which means that the groups themselves (ruling elites, middle classes, and even manual workers) in socialism and in capitalism must be defined differently. In the second part of the text, attention is drawn to the changes in three areas of the stratificational system in Serbia: mobility, economic differentiation and value orientations. In the field of social mobility, an increase of self-recruitment of all basic classes is established, but also, in particular, a strengthening of barriers between manual workers and higher social strata. Furthermore, the author points out an increase in economic differentiation, and a growing importance of private property to this differentiation (the singling out of major private entrepreneurs on the top of the material status hierarchy). It is shown that, on the level of values, all classes (including the ruling class and the middle class) are characterized by inconsistency, in terms of a pronounced presence of statist-distributive values, which hampers the process of consolidation of a new institutional and normative (market and pluralistic) order in Serbia. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with problems of poverty in Croatian society. The introductory part points out the economic and political circumstances in which the poverty of a considerable number of citizens becomes an important social problem. In the next part, concepts of absolute, relative and subjective poverty are defined. This is followed by an overview of the results of research into the extent of absolute and relative poverty in Croatian society conducted from 1998 to 2009. The results show that the rate of relative poverty basically remained the same throughout the above-mentioned period. Furthermore, it is shown that the risk factors causing citizens' poverty are the following: low level of education, unemployment, low retirement pensions, old age, and large number of children in the family. The author concludes that the Croatian government neither developed nor carried out any systematic and efficient plan of fighting poverty in Croatian society. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with problems of poverty in Croatian society. The introductory part points out the economic and political circumstances in which the poverty of a considerable number of citizens becomes an important social problem. In the next part, concepts of absolute, relative and subjective poverty are defined. This is followed by an overview of the results of research into the extent of absolute and relative poverty in Croatian society conducted from 1998 to 2009. The results show that the rate of relative poverty basically remained the same throughout the above-mentioned period. Furthermore, it is shown that the risk factors causing citizens' poverty are the following: low level of education, unemployment, low retirement pensions, old age, and large number of children in the family. The author concludes that the Croatian government neither developed nor carried out any systematic and efficient plan of fighting poverty in Croatian society. Adapted from the source document.

In his first interview to Croatian media after a long period of silence, in October 1989 the leader of the newly formed Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Franjo Tudjman, described himself as 'a Croat man, Marxist, Revolutionary and Historian'. Why did he use concepts such as 'Marxist' and 'Revolutionary' at the time when elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe these concepts became politically incorrect and unpopular? In this article we argue that Tudjman's views on self-determination and secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia were driven by life-long commitment to Leninism and (especially when it comes to the 'national question') Stalinism. When he reappeared in Croatian politics in 1989, Tudjman used the Leninist - not Wilsonian - concept of 'self-determination', which in Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation includes the 'right to secession'. This position enabled him to form an unusual - but logical - coalition with former Communists who were at the same time also nationalists, as well as with anti-Communist separatists. The author analyses the link between Tudjman's politics in the 1990s and Leninist-Stalinist principles of the 'right to self-determination' and 'right to secession'. Adapted from the source document.

This article firstly focuses on the initial recognition, in the final period of the second Yugoslavia, of the existence of social inequalities, as the first serious symptoms of abandoning the ideology of social equality and socialism as a whole. Moreover, the nationalist mobilization was used as a lever for restoration of capitalism as a typical class society. After that it briefly outlines two post-war periods of structuring social opportunities in societies in the West, and partly also in the East. The first period is designated primarily by egalitarian tendencies, which is manifest in increased popularity of critical and radical trends in social sciences. The second period, which still lasts, is quite opposite in orientation, and this is, in turn, manifest in ever greater relevance of social Darwinism as a discursive foundation of a series of sciences. The next, and largest, part of the article is dedicated to an attempt at explaining the permanence of social inequalities, and the author stresses the inexhaustible character of Rousseau's question regarding the origin of social inequalities. In the present-day quest for an answer to that question, certain similarities are noticeable between (neo) evolutionism and (neo) Marxism. Although Marx himself stressed the correspondence of his conception of class struggles in history with Darwin's conception of struggles for survival in nature, but also took into account the differences (between natural evolution and human history), the conclusion on the identity of their conceptions imposes itself through observations about the constant defeat of the proletariat in age-long struggles against the oppressors, which continue to this very day in the epoch of neo-liberal global capitalism. Reflecting on possibilities of a generally different outcome in the struggles for a more just society, the author finds that there are two interrelated prerequisites to their existence. The first has to do with connecting the theory and practice of liberalism and socialism with the aim of establishing a balance between the mechanisms of individual freedom and competition on the one hand, and social sensitivity or solidarity on the other. The second prerequisite is the construction of a world democratic state. Its political interest and scope of governing would neutralize the key concept (and self-reproduction mechanism) of social Darwinism -- inclusive fitness. Quite simply, the latter means to favour "one's own" group while humiliating or excluding the other. In a society with a globally ruling government, the division between "one's own" and "somebody else's" parts of the world -- the boundaries of which are nowadays all too often shifted to and fro as a consequence of the erratic character of expansion and contraction of the market and the breaking out of conflagrations of war, producing a permanent Hobbesian "state of nature" -- would make way for wisdom of governing and for work of all for the benefit of all. Adapted from the source document.

The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.