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AbstractThis paper explores the basic responsibilities of those who "govern" any kind of organization, whether these be non‐profits, widely held or closely held firms, cooperatives, or voluntary agencies. It adopts a perspective that is largely philosophical and sociological rather than legal or economic, and explores the basic functions of governors in relation to their organizations. It begins its inquiry by contrasting managing and governing. It argues that the practice of governing consists fundamentally in the exercise of reflective and authoritative judgment. The paper then reflects on the basic character of organizations, using what the author refers to as a revised stakeholder model. It argues that organizations are constituted and reconstituted by their ongoing, negotiated, asset‐creating interactions with diverse constituencies. With this enlarged view of organizations as a frame of reference, the paper then spells out in order of importance the fundamental responsibilities of governors. These consist of overviewing their organizations to promote the good of their organizations as a whole, reviewing and authorizing organizational strategies, monitoring organizational performances, supervising chief administrators, as well as other tasks. In order to assume these responsibilities effectively, governing boards need to be constituted so that they can deliberate well. While recognizing merit in the view that regards governors primarily as agents of stakeholders with proprietary claims, the paper argues instead that boards should be constituted to represent the interests of their organizations as whole.RésuméCet article examine les responsabilités fondamentales de ceux qui "gouvernent" les différent types d'organisa‐tions, qu'elles soient organisations sans but lucratif, à capital privé ou cotées en bourse, coopératives, ou organisations volontaires. Il adopte une perspective essentiellement philosophique et sociologique plutôt que légate ou économique, et explore les fonctions fondamentales des gouverneurs par rapport à leurs organisations. II commence par une discussion sur la différence entre gestion et gouvernance. Nous proposons que la gouver‐nance est avant tout un exercice de réflexion et implique un jugement d'autorité. Ensuite, nous réfléchissons sur le caractère fondamental des organisations en utilisant ce que nous appelons un modèle réSvisé des parties prenantes ("stakeholders"). Notre argument est que les organisations sont constituées et reconstituées par les interactions permanentes et négociées entre différent groupes, et que ce sont ces interactions qui créent les ac‐tifs de l'organisation. Avec comme cadre de référence cette vue élargie de l'organisation, cet article énonce par ordre d'importance les responsabilités fondamentales des gouverneurs. Celles‐ci consistent à exercer une vue générate sur Vorganisation pour le bien de leur organisation dans son ensemble, de revoir et d'autoriser les stratégies organisationnelles, de suivre les performances organisationnelles, de superviser les responsables, ainsi que d'autres tâches. Les comités de gouvernance doivent être constitués de telle sorte qu 'ils assument leurs responsabilités et puissent bien délibérer. Tout en reconnaissant le mérite du modèle des gouverneurs comme agents des parties prenantes, cet article met en avant que les comités de gouvemance devraient représenter les intérêts des organisations dans leur ensemble.

Humans are dependent on others for their livelihood for many years before they become economically productive and self‐supporting. In modern industrial societies productivity and the capacity to be self‐supporting also require costly investments in human capital. What is the proper division of responsibilities between parents and other members of society for rearing children and thus, collectively, reproducing the population? And how equitable is the sharing between husband and wife of the burdens that fall on the immediate family? To what extent should social responsibilities for childrearing be formalized in explicit institutional arrangements? While certainly long‐standing, these questions acquired a special urgency in industrial countries beginning with the second decade of the twentieth century as a result of the convulsive experience of the world war. (In subsequent decades, below‐replacement‐level fertility amplified such concerns.) Total mobilization for war resulted in the massive influx of female workers into industry, thus undercutting prevailing assumptions about the logic and equity of an industrial system characterized by sharp divisions of labor by sex, discrimination in hiring and remuneration in the job market, and routine reliance on unpaid female labor in childrearing.In the March 1917 issue of The Economic Journal, Eleanor F. Rathbone addressed these issues in an article titled "The remuneration of women's services." This article is reproduced below in full. "Perhaps the most important function which any State has to perform—more important even than guarding against its enemies—is to secure its own periodic renewal by providing for the rearing of fresh generations," asserted Rathbone. How is this burden paid for? She saw the existing system as iniquitous and haphazard—requiring a disproportionate and unremunerated contribution from the adult female population, a contribution supplemented only in a "hesitating and half‐hearted way" by the state. The modern state gradually accepted responsibilities to cover some of the costs of formal education and started to make minor provisions for child nurture and medical expenses. Still, she noted, "the great bulk of the main cost of [population] renewal [the state] still pays for… by the indirect and extraordinarily clumsy method of financing the male parent"—thus accomplishing the task "in a very defective and blundering way." Rathbone argued for a radical rethinking and revision of the existing system. She further elaborated her proposals in a book, The Disinherited Family, published in 1924. This book was republished posthumously in 1949 under the title Family Allowances. Lord Beveridge, father of the post–World War II British welfare state, in an Epilogue written for that book, attributes the intellectual preparation of the 1945 Family Allowances Act "first and foremost" to the author of The Disinherited Family.Eleanor Rathbone was born in 1872 to a prominent Liverpool family. Educated at Oxford in classics and philosophy, she played an active public role as a suffragist, feminist, and advocate of social reforms. She was a member of the British Parliament, as an Independent, from 1929 to her death in 1946.

Teatro Abierto ('Open Theatre') was launched in Argentina in 1981. It was the idea of a number of playwrights, directors and actors, many of whom had spent all or many of the years following the 1976 coup in exile abroad. They were determined to demonstrate that theatre was still a living art in Argentina in spite of repeated government censorship and outright repression by means of bannings, threats and blacklists. 'We reckoned that if we all appeared together, they couldn't possibly silence the whole thing,' one of the founding group commented. Their idea was to put on 21 short plays at the rate of three a day over a week, with repetitions of the plays over a month. However, halfway through the first week, just after the performance of a play which contained references to the thousands of 'disappeared' in Argentina (see Box), the theatre staging the plays was burnt out. Several people, never subsequently identified, broke into it and spread phosphorus bombs throughout the auditorium. The theatre was gutted, and since it was not insured, has remained empty ever since. The outcry against such a blatant attack on freedom of expression was so great that the season of plays was quickly offered a home in a larger theatre, where the remaining works were performed, arousing enormous public interest. Teatro Abierto 1981 was an important psychological turning point for cultural life in Argentina under the military. The fact that a group of artists had stood together and refused to allow any interference with their work greatly encouraged others. Their initiative was soon followed by similar events in dance, cinema and photography, all of them demonstrating the vitality of Argentine cultural expression despite six years of official censorship and neglect. The play which follows, Odd Man In, was one of the works presented in the 1981 series of Teatro Abierto. Its author, Eduardo Pavlovsky, returned recently to Argentina after spending several years in exile in Spain. He has described his escape from Argentina in the following fashion: 'In my play Telarañas ('Cobwebs') there is a scene in which two gas board officials force their way into a home. In fact, they are not from the gas board at all, but are torturers. Cobwebs was written in 1976 and put on at the Teatro Payró in 1977. It lasted two days. I received a letter from the Secretary of Culture of the City of Buenos Aires asking me to withdraw it. Possibly because I wasn't fully aware of the kind of situation we were really in, I took no notice, and forced them to issue a formal banning decree. Three months later, two 'gas board officials' came to my place asking for me. Luckily my secretary realised what was going on, and phoned to me upstairs. By this time, another eight 'gasmen' had appeared. If I'm here to tell the story, it's because by then I had climbed out of my window and escaped across the roofs.'

The present article is a summary of a quantitative Social History in three volumes (can be obtained directly from the author) treating of the 24 cathedral chapters of the Old German Empire in the 17th and 18th Century. The research on the cathedral chapters which were as well spiritual as secular corporations, until now is rather traditional in its methods, i.e. focusing on the constitutions and the biographies of the canons. Actually there are only a few monographies. Our study which comprehends all chapters examines 5 725 cases. The case-unit is not the person, but the prebend. The following variables are taken up: name (locality) of the chapter, dignitaries, degrees (for commoners), the ways of applying to and retiring from the chapters, social status (seven categories for the nobility, two for the commoners), advancements in rank, origin, cumulations. The completeness of the data is generally more than 90%, often towards 100%. All data is published in form of chronological lists of the canons in every chapter, besides an index of names is given. Therefore our work serves as a reference-book too. The data were processed with SPSS, crosstabulations and other statistics are published also. For regional inquiries the chapters were classified into three groups: Northern Germany, the chapters of the Knights of the Empire (i. e. Rhineland and Franconia), Southern Germany and Austria. To show the chronological development we divided the entire period (1601-1803) into four periods of about fifty years. The article presents some important results for every variable. Some general Statements are possible. From the viewpoint of social history the hypothesis of three regional types has been verified. Chapters at the border of the Empire form a particular group which shows more and more deviations to the Standard. On the other hand the chapters in the center assimilate. Spatial mobility decreases, local recruitment increases. There are tendencies to closeness and occasional provincialism. Cumulations increase in the second half of 18th Century. Canons from the middle and lower classes were almost completely eliminated during the two centuries. Thus the European feudal reaction can clearly be demonstrated using the example of the German cathedral chapters. Our research shows that the chapters get into a crisis in the late 18th Century. They could no more accomplish their functions as providing institutions for the German nobility. For many reasons the run to the prebends grew as well as the commoners' criticism influenced by the Enlightenment. They disapproved the loss of the chapters' spiritual functions, the prevalence of the nobility, the grewing exclusion of the commoners and the enormous cumulations. Proposals to a reform failed. The difficult Situation in the Empire during the Napoleonic Wars forced the secularization (1803) which brought the end to the old German cathedral chapters.

SUMMARYPeasants have frequently been observed to exhibit two patterns of political behavior which tend to inhibit the formation and consolidation of peasant economic and political organizations, namely political passivity and violence. Theories so far have usually concentrated on explaining either only one of these behavior patterns, or only one class context (either inter‐or intra‐class relations). Noting that Chinese peasants during land reform frequently adopted these behavior patterns both towards landlords and towards peasant leaders of their organizations, the author develops her own explanation based on the analysis of several case studies, one of which is presented here in detail as illustration. Her main hypothesis is that Chinese peasants make rational behavior‐choices based not only on the calculation of expected material benefits, but also on that of political risks. This latter calculation appears to rest on certain assumptions which are shared by the majority of Chinese peasants and which do not differ in content when considering the future political behavior of peasant rather than landlord power‐wielders.RÉSUMÉIl a souvent été considere que les paysans manifestent deux types de comportemcnt politique ‐ passivité d'une part et violence d'autre part ‐ ce qui tendrait à empêcher la formation et la consolidation d'organisations paysannes, tant politiques qu'économiques. Et jusqu'ici les théories se sont habituellement centrées sur l'explication soit d'un de ces types de comportement, soit sur un unique contexte de classe (relations entre classe ou internes à la classe).Observant que les paysans chinois ont, durant la réforme agraire, fréquemment adopté ces types de comportement tant à l'égard des propriétaires terriens que des leaders de leurs organisations, l'auteur développe son propre modèle explicatif à partir de plusieurs études de cas dont une sert ici d'illustration. Sa principale hypothèse est que les paysans ont en fait un comportement rationnel dans la mesure où celui‐ci n'est pas seulement basé sur un calcul économique mais aussi sur un calcul des risques politiques. Ce calcul politique sc révèle alors reposer sur certaines dispositions qui sont communes à la majorité des paysans chinois et qui ne changent pas de sens si on examine le comportement politique futur par rapport à l'exercice du pouvoir des propriétaires terriens.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEs ist häufig beobachtet worden, daß Bauern zwei politische Verhal‐tensmuster aufweisen, welche die Bildung und Konsolidicrung von ökonomischen und politischen Bauernorganisationen tendenziell verhindern, nämlich politische Passivität und Gewalltätigkeit. Theorien haben sich bisher meist darauf konzentriert, entweder nur eins dieser Verhaltensmuster oder diese nur in einem Zusammenhang (entweder Inter‐ oder Intraklassenbeziehungen) zu erklären. Ausgehend von der Beobachtung, daß chinesische Bauern während der Bodenreformzeit häufig diese Verhaltensweisen sowohl gegenüber Großgrundbesitzern als auch gegenüber den Bauernführern ihrer eigenen Organisationen ergriffen, entwickelt die Autorin aufgrund einer Analyse mehrerer Fallstudien ‐ von dencn cine hier zu Illustration ausführlicher darge‐stellt wird ‐ ihre eigene Erklärung. Ihre Hauptthese ist, daß chinesische Bauern rationale Verhaltensentscheidungen treffen, die nicht nur auf der Berechnung von erwarteten materiellen Vorteilen, sondern auch von politischen Risiken beruhen. Dieser letzten Kalkulation scheinen einige Annahmen zugrundezuliegen, die von der Mehrheit der chinesischen Bauern geteilt werden, und die sich inhaltlich nicht un‐terscheiden, gleichviel ob es sich um das politische Verhalten von Bauern oder das von Großgrundbesitzern handelt.

SUMMARY This article criticizes the argument of Radorniro Tomić, (see 'Reflections on the Coup d'Etat in Chile', IDS Bulletin vol.7 no. 3, October 1975) according to which there was a possibility of an agreement between the Chilean Christian Democrats and the parties of Unidad Popular which would have saved Chile from the events of September 1973. The counter‐argument rests on the evidence that the Christian Democrats did all they could to prevent the UP government from fulfilling its programme, and even when partial agreements were in the air, ended up by defeating such efforts. Tomić represents a minority view in his party which is dominated by Frei, the President of Chile from 1964 to 1970, who has always rejected any deal with the Left. However, the author agrees with Tomić that an agreement would have saved the country from its present fate, even if it would have involved some sacrifice of ultimate goals.RESUME La Démocratie Chrétienne et la Gauche au Chile: Le Bilan Selon TomićL'article qui suit remet en question la thèse de Radomiro Tomić, (voir 'Réflexions au sujet du Coup d'Etat du Chile', Bulletin de 1'IDS, Vol. 7, No. 3, Octobre 1975) selon laquelle il est question de la possibilité d'un accord entre Démocrates Chrétiens Chiliens et partis de L'Union Populaire qui aurait pu éviter au Chile les evenements de September 1973. Le contre‐argument repose sur le fait que les Démocrates Chrétiens ont fait tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour empêcher le Gouvernement d'UP de remplir son programme, et même lorsque des accords partiaux étaient dans l'air, ont fini par mettre de tels efforts en échec. Tomić représente les vues d'une minorité au sein de son parti, dominé par Frei, Président du Chile de 1964 à 1970. qui a toujours refusé de traiter avec un parti de gauche. Cependant l'auteur pense comme Tomić qu'un accord aurait sauvé le pays de son destin actuel, même si cela avait impliqué le sacrifice d'objectifs ultérieurs.RESUMEN Tomić y la Relación entre la Democracia Cristiana y la Izquierda en Chile: Un ComentarioEste articulo critica la tesis de Radomiro Tomić (ver, 'Reflexiones sobre el Golpe de Estado en Chile', Boletín IDS Vol. 7, No. 3, octubre 1975) según la cual los partidos de la Unidad Popular hubieran podido llegar a un acuerdo sin transacciones ideológicas con la Democracia Cristiana y evitar asi la tragedia de septiembre de 1973. Tomić representa una tendencia minoritaria dentro su partido, el que está dominado por el ‐ex‐Presidente de Chile Eduardo Frei, quien nunca quiso llegar a un acuerdo. El autor concuerda con Tomić que un entendimiento con la izquierda hubiera salvado al país de su destino actual, pero cree que su ausencia se debió a que nadie apreció con claridad los riesgos que se corrían al no buscar seriamente un acuerdo.

Those phenomena that are called revolutions, in the conventional sense of the word, are essentially moments of turbulent acceleration following periods of retardation; and such are the phenomena of the révolution tranquille in Québec, which are confused by some with the inclusive events of long duration. In this perspective, and as a prelude to the analysis of current conceptions of the so-called quiet revolution in Québec, the author offers a study of the economic and social history of the United States from 1920 to 1940. He sees no sharp break between the fabulous twenties and the depression decade; nor does he see a gap between the interwar period and the preceding so-called progressive period. This can be seen through the unfolding of social, political, and economic events, provided that care is taken to adopt the mental set of transcending the conflictual in order to assent to the cumulative aspects of the historical process. Seen from this angle, the issues appear more complex, and contemporaries may easily be pardoned for failing to grasp the fundamental questions or for seeing revolutions where there are none. In the freedom of dancing, smoking, and drinking with women or, again, in the freedom of teaching the theory of evolution in schools (freedoms conquered in the twenties and the early thirties), some have seen a revolution. In a like manner, the New Deal has been described as revolutionary, as has the economic theory of J.M. Keynes. But if capitalism really has undergone such trials, how then can it still carry on so vigorously? In fact, it has learned to adapt itself to the changing conditions of its survival without altering its basic character. New regimes arise and the system carries on. The New Deal created a new regime to which capitalism acclimatized itself; and in the new regime capitalism managed so well that it could take advantage of the change in mentality in order to save the system. Under the New Deal, however, capitalism reached an important stage of its politicization, as it did somewhat later, under the new fiscal policies derived from Keynes' general theory. Yet, despite all revolutionary appearances, it continued to operate on the basis of usury, and while taking hold of the new media of information it mobilized resources with a view to profit and in so doing it organized things and men with equal indifference and efficiency. The system has continued to operate on the same basis of usury and, in order to sidetrack violent protest, it has adopted the issue of social justice; it has been willing to substitute assistance for employment, destructive idleness for creative leisure. Those benefits that are labeled social security and are now distributed without much regard for human creativity have the properties of a tranquillizing pill. And so we are reminded of the panem and circenses politics of a declining Empire. Are we really prepared to swallow the tranquillizing pill?

For an introduction to this article see SA 0206/E9423. The article is a reprint from Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 1944, 25, 2, 100-117. Res is presented which inquired into the readjustments that have taken place in Negro fam life as 'a result of war emergency (WWII), & to what entent these readjustments may have been conditioned by the factor of minority group status. 1, 000 Tex Negro fam's were selected from various towns & cities in East Tex according to the proportional representation of the Negro pop in these areas. 50 Negro fam heads were asked to write letters giving an account of how the present war has affected their fam's. The following aspects are dealt with: (1) changes in fam formation; (2) changes in place of residence; (3) changes in econ functions of fam members; (4) relation of fam readjustment & minority group status. Data show that under the influence of WWII Amer fam's come into existence more rapidly & become dissolved more rapidly than in peace time. Negro fam's are no exception. Fam's had an abnormally high rate of mobility during the 3-yr period immediately following 1941, & their reasons for moving were based upon attempted adjustment to the labor demands of the US war economy. Responding to the expanded labor demand in specific industries, members of these fam's shifted from a group of agri'al & domestic service workers to a mass of factory labor. Although this shift intensified racial friction, it resulted in a change of the position of these fam's & the establishment of a new pattern of life which they defined as better than the old. The att's of white & Negro Coll students revealed a willingness of whites to tolerate this change in ES as long as the traditional SR of the races are maintained. 4 Tables, 5 Charts. Henry A. Bullock, SOME READJUSTMENTS OF THE NEGRO FAMILY IN 1944 AND 1970-offers an explanation of how the author viewed Negro fam readjustment in the first instance & how he views it now. In 1944 the concern was with the degree & manner in which an instit accommodates to new circumstances imposed upon it by the external environment in which it is enmeshed. Then the quality of black fam's was judged in terms of how they deviated from WASP norms. Now the Amer assimilation ideal is being abandoned. Blacks want to be black. Negro fam's could now be observed in terms of the efficiency with which they are org'ed to meet needs generated by conditions under which black people have to live. In a ghetto, a WASP style of fam org would be a poor tool for fam survival. Today's res'er should probe beyond the structural horizon & into the dynamics of fam org itself. This will lead to a further & beneficial fading of the demarcation line between pure & applied res. M. Maxfield.

Le désir de convertir en une autre monnaie les données soviétiques en roubles a fait l'objet de nombreuses controverses et a toujours forcé l'attention des économistes soviétiques et occidentaux. L'intérêt académique accordé à la formule de conversion a été renforcé par des préoccupations pratiques : comparer le budget soviétique de défense nationale, les efforts d'investissements dans la recherche et le développement. L'intérêt récent des Soviétiques pour la technologie occidentale et la coopération économique avec les pays hautement développés, donne une nouvelle dimension au problème de la convertibilité, à savoir la conversion des données soviétiques concernant les coûts et les profits, la fixation du prix des innovations technologiques et des produits nouveaux.
Cette étude entend résumer et passer en revue la situation actuelle de l'art de calculer des taux de conversion rouble/dollar, résultant de comparaisons binaires effectuées en termes de quantité et de prix entre l'Union Soviétique et les Etats- Unis. L'auteur a plus précisément voulu réaliser une analyse comparative des 22 taux rouble/dollar dont il examine le caractère rationnel, la méthode de calcul et la crédibilité. Il présente à la fin de l'article neuf observations générales concernant les taux examinés. Etant donné que les taux d'origine occidentale, analysés ici, ne tiennent pas compte des modifications de prix effectués en U.R.S.S. en 1967 et des changements institutionnels récents, issus des réformes économiques, deux problèmes sont posés : (1) les modifications qui se sont produites après 1955 dans les systèmes américain et soviétique supposent-elles un ajustement en hausse ou en baisse des taux fondés sur les prix de 1955 ? (2) l'applicabilité des déflateurs de prix soviétiques officiels à l'ajustement des taux fondés sur les rapports de prix soviéto-américains de 1955.
En tant que cas particulier des indices de prix, un taux rouble/dollar est sujet à toutes les mises en garde usuelles en ce qui concerne ce type d'instrument de l'analyse économique. Malheureusement, les conclusions afférant aux capacités de production, qui peuvent être tirées des indices quantitatifs résultant de comparaisons binaires entre deux pays, sont limitées par la situation de l'équilibre concurrentiel. L'article débute par un examen des aspects méthodologiques essentiels des comparaisons binaires entre pays et par l'énumération des caractéristiques et des limites des taux de prix. Ensuite, l'auteur procède à l'analyse comparée d'une sélection de taux de conversion rouble/dollar qui se présente en deux parties. Premièrement, il prend en considération et examine vingt taux de conversion (15 d'origine occidentale et 5 d'origine soviétique), estimés de manière explicite. Ces vingt taux sont comparés dans le Tableau I et s'accompagnent de commentaires critiques. En outre, il propose deux taux de conversion implicites, concernant les biens de production durables et estimés sur la base de données soviétiques. Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur évalue ces vingt taux (voir Tableau II) en fonction de six critères : connaissance de la manière dont on les a calculés, objectifs, type et caractère adéquat de la méthode utilisée, détermination des prix, déterminations des pondérations, pondérations utilisées.
L'étude se termine par les principales conclusions suivantes : 1) Sauf rares exceptions, les méthodes employées par les divers auteurs n'étaient pas suffisamment connues pour permettre d'adopter la série requise de taux de conversion rouble/dollar pour la comparaison des économies soviétique et américaine en général ou en termes d'un effort spécifique (budget de la défense, investissements dans la recherche...) ; 2) Pratiquement tous les taux de conversion occidentaux, présentés dans le Tableau I, sont fondés ou utilisent les résultats d'une étude de Becker, effectuée sur un échantillon de prix soviétiques de 1955 pour les biens de production durables. Cependant, les rapports de prix de 1955 n'ont plus qu'un intérêt historique depuis les révisions de 1967 et les transformations institutionnelles, accompagnant en U.R.S.S. les réformes économiques. De toute évidence, les temps sont mûrs pour une étude détaillée, fondée sur les prix soviétiques actuels et les données concernant la production afin de calculer une nouvelle série de rapports de prix pour les biens de production durables, qui servira à étayer des taux de conversion rouble/dollar acceptables ; 3) Pour huit raisons au moins, y compris des données fragmentaires découvertes dans la littérature soviétique, on peut supposer que les taux réels ont pu être supérieurs à ceux de 1955 ; 4) Dans les sources occidentales aussi bien que soviétiques, on s'est sérieusement interrogé sur la validité de l'utilisation des indices de prix soviétiques officiels, notamment ceux qui concernent les industries de construction de machines et de travail des métaux, pour ajuster à d'autres années les taux rouble/dollar de 1955. Les principales réserves à l'égard des indices de prix soviétiques se rapportent aux méthodes utilisées pour leur calcul et au caractère limité de l'échantillonnage.

O artigo faz uma revisão crítica do pragmatismo americano que situa no sujeito, primordialmente, a forma social de ser e de agir, colocando em segundo plano as condições sociais de vida. O puritanismo calvinista, o moralismo e a ideologia do Ocidente são analisados, situando a realidade brasileira e o convívio com a violência crescente, focando a questão da construção social do medo e da juventude, sobretudo a dos bairros periféricos, e marcada pela condição de ser afro-descendente, o que implica no racismo estrutural da sociedade brasileira. Retomando Weber, e fazendo um contraponto – e não uma contraposição – com Freud, o autor chega à inevitável conclusão da violência como uma resposta ao "mal-estar da civilização", mas, sobretudo da civilização brasileira, onde, verdadeiramente, Cristo não morreu por todos, nem tampouco o capitalismo é para todos. Palavras-chave: violência, criminalidade, polícia, juventude, exclusão. ViolENCE AND POVERTY: broken windows and civilization uneasiness Gey Espinheira The paper makes a critical revision of the American pragmatism that places the social form of being and acting on first place on the subject and secondly on social life conditions. The Calvinist Puritanism, moralism and the ideology of the West are analyzed, contextualizing the Brazilian reality and the familiarity with the growing violence, focusing on the issue of social construction of fear and on youths, especially the ones from the peripheral districts, who are marked by the condition of being Afrodescents, thus resulting in structural racism of the Brazilian society. Resuming to Weber and making a counterpoint and not a contraposition, the author resorts to Freud to come to the inevitable conclusion of violence as an answer to "civilization uneasiness", above all of the Brazilian civilization, where Christ definitely did not die for all and neither is capitalism for all. Key words: violence, criminality, police, youths, exclusion.VIOLENCE ET PAUVRETE: fenêtres brisées et le mal-être de la civilisation Gey Espinheira Cet article présente une révision critique du pragmatisme américain qui place, avant tout, dans le sujet la forme sociale d'être et d'agir, en reléguant au second plan les conditions sociales de vie. Le puritanisme calviniste, le moralisme et l'idéologie de l'Occident y sont analysés, situant la réalité brésilienne et son rapport avec une violence croissante, en mettant l'accent sur le problème de la construction sociale de la peur et de la jeunesse, surtout dans la périphérie, et marquée par le fait d'être afro descendante, ce qui implique un racisme structurel de la société brésilienne. En reprenant Weber, et en faisant un contrepoint - et non pas une contre position – avec Freud, l'auteur en arrive à l'inévitable conclusion de la violence comme réponse au "mal-être de la civilisation", mais surtout de la civilisation brésilienne où véritablement le Christ n'est pas mort pour tout le monde et bien moins encore en est-il du capitalisme qui n'est pas fait pour tous. Mots Clés: violence, criminalité, police, jeunesse, exclusion. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

O artigo faz uma revisão crítica do pragmatismo americano que situa no sujeito, primordialmente, a forma social de ser e de agir, colocando em segundo plano as condições sociais de vida. O puritanismo calvinista, o moralismo e a ideologia do Ocidente são analisados, situando a realidade brasileira e o convívio com a violência crescente, focando a questão da construção social do medo e da juventude, sobretudo a dos bairros periféricos, e marcada pela condição de ser afro-descendente, o que implica no racismo estrutural da sociedade brasileira. Retomando Weber, e fazendo um contraponto – e não uma contraposição – com Freud, o autor chega à inevitável conclusão da violência como uma resposta ao "mal-estar da civilização", mas, sobretudo da civilização brasileira, onde, verdadeiramente, Cristo não morreu por todos, nem tampouco o capitalismo é para todos. Palavras-chave: violência, criminalidade, polícia, juventude, exclusão. ViolENCE AND POVERTY: broken windows and civilization uneasiness Gey Espinheira The paper makes a critical revision of the American pragmatism that places the social form of being and acting on first place on the subject and secondly on social life conditions. The Calvinist Puritanism, moralism and the ideology of the West are analyzed, contextualizing the Brazilian reality and the familiarity with the growing violence, focusing on the issue of social construction of fear and on youths, especially the ones from the peripheral districts, who are marked by the condition of being Afrodescents, thus resulting in structural racism of the Brazilian society. Resuming to Weber and making a counterpoint and not a contraposition, the author resorts to Freud to come to the inevitable conclusion of violence as an answer to "civilization uneasiness", above all of the Brazilian civilization, where Christ definitely did not die for all and neither is capitalism for all. Key words: violence, criminality, police, youths, exclusion.VIOLENCE ET PAUVRETE: fenêtres brisées et le mal-être de la civilisation Gey Espinheira Cet article présente une révision critique du pragmatisme américain qui place, avant tout, dans le sujet la forme sociale d'être et d'agir, en reléguant au second plan les conditions sociales de vie. Le puritanisme calviniste, le moralisme et l'idéologie de l'Occident y sont analysés, situant la réalité brésilienne et son rapport avec une violence croissante, en mettant l'accent sur le problème de la construction sociale de la peur et de la jeunesse, surtout dans la périphérie, et marquée par le fait d'être afro descendante, ce qui implique un racisme structurel de la société brésilienne. En reprenant Weber, et en faisant un contrepoint - et non pas une contre position – avec Freud, l'auteur en arrive à l'inévitable conclusion de la violence comme réponse au "mal-être de la civilisation", mais surtout de la civilisation brésilienne où véritablement le Christ n'est pas mort pour tout le monde et bien moins encore en est-il du capitalisme qui n'est pas fait pour tous. Mots Clés: violence, criminalité, police, jeunesse, exclusion. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

This article examines U.S.-Cuban academic and educational exchanges from 1959 to 2005. The term International Educational Flows (IEFs) is introduced, defined as movements of individuals and/or organized groups across national boundaries for the primary purpose of studying, researching, expanding and/or sharing academic knowledge via any combination of institutional, organizational, and/or experiential delivery. The author argues that IEFs have not been given due attention as a ''signifying actor'' in the international arena to date. The case of the United States and Cuba is used to illustrate how IEFs can impact, and be impacted by, the broader contexts of bi-national relations as well as the actions of interested individuals and groups. U.S.-Cuban academic and educational IEFs during five chronological periods are examined: 1959–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1996, 1997–2002, and 2003–present. For each period, U.S. and Cuban governmental approaches toward bilateral IEFs are discussed as well as the development of IEFs themselves. Information obtained via interviews with many of the key individuals involved in U.S.-Cuban IEFs provides interesting commentary and illustrates the significant role that dedicated individuals and groups have played over time. Mention is made of the current (2005) sui generis situation, attributable primarily to U.S. governmental policies. Resumen Este artículo examina los intercambios académicos y educacionales entre Estados Unidos y Cuba desde 1959 a 2005. Se introduce aquí la expresión International Educational Flows (IEFs), que se define como los movimientos de individuos y/o grupos organizados a través de fronteras nacionales con el propósito primordial de estudiar, investigar, expandir y/o compartir conocimiento académico por vías de cualquier combinación de intercambios institucionales, organizativos y/o como resultado de la experiencia. La autora sostiene que hasta la fecha los IEFs no han recibido la debida atención en tanto que un ''significativo actor'' en la arena internacional. El caso de las relaciones entre EE.UU. y Cuba se utiliza aquí para ilustrar cómo los IEFs pueden impactar, y a la vez ser impactados, por contextos más amplios de las relaciones binacionales, así como por las acciones de individuos y grupos interesados en ellos. Se examinan también aquí los IEFs académicos e institucionales de las relaciones EE.UU.-Cuba durante cinco períodos cronológicos: 1959–1976, 1977–1981, 1982– 1996, 1997–2002 y 2003 al presente. Para cada período, se discuten las actitudes de los Estados Unidos y de Cuba hacia los IEFs bilaterales, así como el desarrollo de los IEFs como tales. La información obtenida por vía de entrevistas con muchos de los individuos claves que han estado involucrados en los IEFs entre Estados Unidos y Cuba proporciona un interesante comentario e ilustra el significativo rol que dedicados individuos y grupos han jugado a lo largo del tiempo. Se menciona también la actual (2005) situación sui generis, atribuible primordialmente a las políticas gubernamentales de los Estados Unidos.