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Criterio Libre magazine has played an important role in promoting scientific dissemination as a fundamental mechanism in the transformation processes of our Latin American nations towards better formed societies, with a healthy balance between the necessary growth of the production of tangible and intangible goods and a more fair distribution of wealth, for the benefit of all its populations, which seek to eradicate poverty, which is the greatest scourge that humanity has not yet been able to overcome. Therefore, we rely on criteria of the development of science that contribute to these ideals, choosing then the best articles, subjected to rigorous evaluation processes by recognized national and international researchers, who have also contributed to raise the scientific quality of them through his thoughtful observations and also to develop scientific thinking and the use of the best style for their communication, enriching the social scientific thought in our nations. We can summarize these principles as follows: the development of science and technology as an expression of given sociocultural and valorative systems, the development of science at the service of productive transformation for the benefit of society, the awareness of the role of science and technology in the definition of power relations at the national and international levels and its insertion in development policies, the use of science and technological innovation as instruments of autonomy, openness to novel approaches in the consolidation of social science, the freedom of critical thinking at all levels of scientific knowledge management, among others. In this sense, we have tried to strengthen the analysis and critical development of economic, administrative, financial and accounting sciences, opening a space for the discussion and development of the epistemology of these social sciences, which increasingly becomes the central axis of our magazine. The present edition of Criterio Libre includes two articles that enrich this epistemological discussion: in the first one the researcher José J. Ortiz B. poses a dilemma that accompanies the development of accounting science, "The crisis of accounting representation: problems of science social or power politics?", which seeks to clarify the factors that originate the problem of accounting representation from a reflection on the theoretical foundations that support this important topic and the empirical references that show this problem, factors that have been seen as an epistemic obstacle in the consolidation of this young science and to which the author intends to contribute in his epistemological clarification and in the proposal of alternative solutions, which he proposes for discussion to the scientific community with an interdisciplinary approach and from the paradigm of complexity. In the second article, Professor Jean Paul Sarrazin poses an interesting dissertation on "Religion: do we know what we are talking about? Examination on the feasibility of an analytical category for the social sciences". The objective of this review was to find an analytical category that is precise, clear and sufficiently broad to study empirically the vast range of sociocultural phenomena that can be or have been considered as "religious". It concludes that in spite of the absence of a unified analytical category, some of the most prominent elements in the different definitions can constitute, by themselves, useful analytical categories for empirical research. It can be deduced that this section has been faithful to the principles that we exposed at the beginning of this editorial and that we hope will continue to become an open forum for the scientific development of our disciplines. A second section, devoted to accounting and finance, defines topics that have become of substantial interest due to the strong theoretical development that these disciplines have reached, arriving to a phase in which the disputes of the paradigms that support different approaches have been decanted, and it is in this field where contributions arise that consolidate important theoretical schemes or that, on the other hand, discard hypotheses that allow debugging systems that, in the manner of the layers of an onion, are grouped by levels, which contributes to the consolidation of the social sciences. In this section we find two important articles oriented under this philosophy: the first one analyzes the effects on the accounting information of public companies in the Colombian electricity sector of the implementation of Resolution 743 of 2013 regarding the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for some public companies. This topic is one of the applications of the important advances in the development of accounting theory for the financial economy, which in spite of this does not manage to establish solid roots for the conditions of the developing countries, as this article proves that the transformations assumed are the result of a change in the organizational economic model, where, rather than attending to the international regulation model, it responds to a process of concentration of strategic assets by actors that have the ability to capture regulation, demonstrating that the interdisciplinary approach is a fertile ground to explain in a better way the reality of these countries in the globalizing environment that characterizes the current economy of these countries. The second article, about the "Impact of self-financing on the innovation of micro, small and medium-sized Colombian companies," allows us to delve into an aspect that has not been explicitly studied and that is located at the frontiers of knowledge between economics, finance and the administration, especially directed at an important sector of the economy of the developing countries, that of the MSME companies, which despite their great contributions to the economic well-being of the population, occupying 80% of it in these countries, no intellectual effort has been devoted by our researchers, wasting a space of potential development of autonomy that will clear the way for the true socioeconomic development of our region. The descriptive results show that Colombian MSMEs use their own resources as a priority for their investments, and inferential results obtained through linear regressions indicate that internal financing has a positive and significant influence on their overall innovation, as well as on their products/services, productive processes and management. This is a variable of fundamental importance to be involved in the development policies for the Latin American industry and that very little is taken into consideration until now, in what has been called the Orange economy, which countries like Colombia want to promote. The reality is that internal or own resources are still the main source of funding for the investment projects of these companies, and while this is consistent with the postulates of the theory of financial hierarchy, everything seems to indicate that the reasons for this are mainly the barriers they encounter to access the external financial market. The next section, dedicated to economic discipline, shows us an important article focused on the analysis of the relationship between "Good governance and effectiveness of development aid", a topic of high relevance for our economies. The article aims to deepen the origin and changes experienced by the notion of good governance; analyzes the constituents and determinants of it, as well as its relationship with close concepts such as institutional quality, and above all, the ideas and evidence created on the relationship between good governance and the effectiveness of development aid. Finally, it concludes that there is no general consensus that aid has been effective in promoting economic growth, and there are both supporters and opponents of this idea. Reflectively, it paves the way for empirically verifying the true effects of economic aid and the conditions under which better results would be possible for the benefit of large masses of the population. This edition closes with two sections: the first one, traditional on topics of administration as a discipline that is structurally integrated with the economic, accounting and financial, and where two articles are developed: the first of these is entitled "Co-creation and new challenges of generating value that organizations face". This matter is very topical and marks a trend in modern administrative theory, which is revolving around the new approaches to the generation of value. It is concluded that, in order to generate a sustained value in organizations, the focus of the managers' actions must be the creation of joint value with their clients and not the exclusive goal of increasing the sales of their products or services usually designed internally and closed. The second article, under the title "Model to analyze the incidence of social capital in human development in Bogotá, DC", focuses on identifying whether there is a type of relationship between social capital and human development in the endogenous context of the city of Bogota. For this purpose, it is proposed to conduct a descriptive investigation, based on multiple regression analysis, which facilitates the proposal of a model that determines the level of incidence of social capital in human development, based on the calculation of the Human Development Index and the Index Decomposed social capital in cognitive capital index, ICSC, structural social capital index, ICSE, social representation index of social capital, IRSCS, components of the integral calculation of the social capital index. Based on these calculations, it is verified that the scope and use of social capital are unknown in the city, which generates a society with a high level of atomization and disinterest about the problems of citizenship. Being able to verify these assertions has the utmost importance to adopt policies of social and human development in the D.C., taking into account the different analytical components that were used in the study. In the last section, dedicated to knowledge management, the issue of bullying is analyzed pedagogically by sexual orientation among male students in the environment of secondary education, which seeks to contribute to the prevention of bullying behaviors, due to the effects that this has in the welfare of a population that tends to segregate in an undemocratic manner and that is already part of the educational models that should be oriented towards the formation of values. As pedagogues, we believe that education can and should create environments of respect and appreciation of difference, where everyone can access it, regardless of sexual orientation, gender or other social or cultural constructions. The set of the eight articles that we put at the disposal of the academic community, organized in the sections oriented according to the principles that support the scientific philosophy and the editorial policy of the magazine, is configured in a new effort that we are sure will contribute to the strengthening of the scientific and technological development of our disciplines in an environment that is ours, but that dialogues with the universality of knowledge at a global level, and that progressively will become the great pillars of our human and social development ; La revista Criterio Libre ha venido desempeñando un rol importante en la promoción de la divulgación científica como mecanismo fundamental en los procesos de transformación de nuestras naciones hispanoamericanas hacia sociedades mejor conformadas, con un sano equilibrio entre el necesario crecimiento de la producción de bienes tangibles e intangibles y una más justa distribución de la riqueza, en beneficio de todas sus poblaciones que buscan la erradicación de la pobreza, el mayor flagelo que la humanidad aún no ha podido superar. En ese orden de ideas, nos hemos fundamentado en criterios del desarrollo de la ciencia que contribuyan a esos ideales, seleccionando los mejores artículos, sometidos a procesos rigurosos de evaluación por reconocidos investigadores nacionales e internacionales, quienes también han contribuido a elevar la calidad científica de los mismos con sus atinadas observaciones y también a desarrollar el pensamiento científico y la utilización del mejor estilo para su comunicación, enriqueciendo el pensamiento científico social en nuestras naciones. Dichos principios los podemos sintetizar de la siguiente manera: El desarrollo de la ciencia y la tecnología como expresión de sistemas valorativos y socioculturales dados, el desarrollo de la ciencia al servicio de la transformación productiva en beneficio de la sociedad, la concientización del papel que tienen la ciencia y la tecnología en la definición de las relaciones de poder en los niveles nacional e internacional y su inserción en las políticas de desarrollo, la utilización de la ciencia y de la innovación tecnológica como instrumentos de autonomía, la apertura a enfoques novedosos en la consolidación de la ciencia social, la libertad del pensamiento crítico en todos los niveles de la gestión del conocimiento científico, entre otros. En tal sentido hemos querido fortalecer el análisis y desarrollo crítico de las ciencias económicas, administrativas, financieras y contables, abriendo un espacio para la discusión y desarrollo de la epistemología de estas ciencias sociales, que cada vez más se convierte en columna vertebral de nuestra revista. En el presente número se incluyen dos artículos que enriquecen dicha discusión epistemológica: en el primero de ellos el investigador José J. Ortiz B. nos plantea un dilema que acompaña el desarrollo de la ciencia contable, "La crisis de la representación contable: ¿problemas de la ciencia social o de la política del poder?", en donde busca dar claridad a los factores que originan la problemática de la representación contable a partir de una reflexión sobre los fundamentos teóricos que sustentan este importante tópico y los referentes empíricos que muestran dicha problemática, factores que necesariamente se han expresado como un obstáculo epistémico en la consolidación de esta joven ciencia y al que el autor pretende aportar tanto en su esclarecimiento epistemológico, como en la propuesta de alternativas de solución, que pone para discusión a la comunidad científica con un enfoque interdisciplinario y desde el paradigma de la complejidad. En el segundo artículo el profesor Jean Paul Sarrazin nos plantea una interesante 18 Universidad Libre disertación alrededor del concepto "Religión: ¿sabemos de lo que estamos hablando? Examen sobre la viabilidad de una categoría analítica para las ciencias sociales". El objetivo de esta revisión fue encontrar una categoría analítica precisa, clara y suficientemente amplia para estudiar empíricamente la vasta gama de fenómenos socioculturales que pueden ser o han sido considerados como "religiosos". Se concluye que a pesar de la ausencia de una categoría analítica unificada algunos de los elementos más destacados en las diferentes definiciones pueden constituir, en sí mismos, categorías analíticas útiles para la investigación empírica. Se puede deducir que esta sección ha sido fiel a los principios que expusimos al comienzo de este editorial y que esperamos se siga convirtiendo en tribuna abierta para el desarrollo científico de nuestras disciplinas. Una segunda sección, dedicada a la contabilidad y las finanzas, define temáticas que se han tornado de interés sustancial dado el fuerte desarrollo teórico que han venido alcanzado esas disciplinas, llegando a una fase en que las disputas de los paradigmas que sustentan diversos enfoques se han venido decantando y es en ese terreno donde florecen aportes que consolidan esquemas teóricos importantes o que, por otro lado, descartan hipótesis que permiten depurar sistemas que, a la manera de las capas de la cebolla, se van agrupando por niveles, lo cual contribuye a la consolidación de las ciencias sociales. En esta sección encontramos dos importantes artículos orientados bajo esa filosofía: el primero de ellos analiza los efectos que sobre la información contable de las empresas públicas del sector eléctrico colombiano tuvo la implementación de la Resolución 743 de 2013, la cual se refiere a la adopción de Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF) para algunas empresas públicas, siendo este tópico uno de los aplicativos de los avances importantes del desarrollo de la teoría contable para la economía financierista, que a pesar de ello no logra asentar sólidas raíces para las condiciones de los países en desarrollo, como lo comprueba este artículo que encuentra que las transformaciones asumidas son el resultado de un cambio de modelo económico organizacional, en donde más que atender el modelo de regulación internacional, responde a un proceso de concentración de activos estratégicos por parte de actores que tienen la capacidad de capturar la regulación, demostrando que es el enfoque interdisciplinario un campo fértil para explicar de una mejor manera la realidad de estos países en el entorno globalizador que caracteriza la economía actual de dichos países. El segundo artículo acerca del "Impacto del autofinanciamiento sobre la innovación de las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas colombianas", permite profundizar en un aspecto que no ha sido explícitamente estudiado y que se ubica en las fronteras del conocimiento entre la economía, las finanzas y la administración, dirigido especialmente a un sector importante de la economía de los países en desarrollo, el de las empresas Mipymes, que a pesar de sus grandes aportes al bienestar económico de la población al ocupar 80% de la misma en estos países, no se le ha dedicado un esfuerzo intelectual por parte de nuestros investigadores, desaprovechando un espacio de potencial desarrollo de la autonomía que permitirá desbrozar el camino del verdadero desarrollo socioeconómico de nuestra región. Los resultados descriptivos muestran que las Mipymes colombianas utilizan prioritariamente recursos propios para sus inversiones, y los resultados inferenciales obtenidos mediante regresiones lineales señalan que el financiamiento interno influye positiva y significativamente en su innovación global, así como en la de sus productos/servicios, procesos productivos y gestión. Esto es una variable de importancia fundamental para ser involucrada en las políticas de desarrollo para la industria latinoamericana y que muy poco se toma en consideración hasta ahora, en lo que se ha venido denominando la economía naranja, que países como Colombia quieren fomentar. La realidad es que los recursos internos o propios siguen siendo la principal fuente de financiación para los proyectos de inversión de estas empresas y si bien ello es coherente con los postulados de la teoría de la jerarquía financiera, todo parece indicar que las razones de esto son principalmente las barreras que encuentran para acceder al mercado financiero externo. Nuestra siguiente sección, dedicada a la disciplina económica, nos muestra un importante artículo enfocado al análisis de la relación entre "Buen gobierno y eficacia de la ayuda al desarrollo", tema de altísima pertinencia para nuestras economías. El artículo se propone profundizar en el origen y los cambios experimentados por la noción de buen gobierno; analiza los constituyentes y determinantes del mismo, así como su relación con conceptos cercanos como el de calidad institucional, y sobre todo, las ideas y la evidencia creada sobre las relaciones entre el buen gobierno y la efectividad de la ayuda al desarrollo. Finalmente llega a la conclusión de que no existe un consenso general en cuanto a que la ayuda haya sido eficaz para promover el crecimiento económico, y existen tanto defensores como detractores de esta idea. De manera reflexiva deja abierto el camino para verificar empíricamente los verdaderos efectos de la ayuda económica y las condiciones bajo las cuales se harían posibles unos mejores resultados en beneficio de grandes masas de la población. Cerramos este número con dos secciones: la primera, tradicional sobre temas de administración como disciplina que se integra estructuralmente con la económica, la contable y financiera, y donde se desarrollan dos artículos: el primero de estos se titula "La co-creación y los nuevos retos de generación de valor que enfrentan las organizaciones", siendo esta temática de gran actualidad y que marca una tendencia en la moderna teoría administrativa, que está girando sobre los nuevos enfoques de la generación de valor. Se concluye que, para generar un valor sostenido en las organizaciones, el foco de las acciones de los gestores debe ser la creación de valor conjunta con sus clientes y no la exclusiva meta de aumentar las ventas de sus productos o servicios habitualmente diseñados de manera interna y cerrada. El segundo artículo bajo el título "Modelo para analizar la incidencia del capital social en el desarrollo humano en Bogotá, D.C.", se centra en identificar si existe un tipo de relación entre el capital social y el desarrollo humano en el contexto endógeno de la ciudad de Bogotá. Para tal fin, se propone hacer una investigación descriptiva basada en análisis de regresión múltiple que facilita la proposición de un modelo que determina el nivel de incidencia del capital social en el desarrollo humano, partiendo del cálculo del Índice de desarrollo humano y del Índice de capital social descompuesto en índice 20 Universidad Libre de capital cognitivo, ICSC, índice de capital social estructural, ICSE, Índice de representación social del capital social, IRSCS, componentes del cálculo integral del índice de capital social. Con base en esos cálculos se llega a comprobar que en la ciudad se desconocen el alcance y uso del capital social, lo que genera construir una sociedad con alto nivel de atomización y desinterés por los problemas de la ciudadanía. Poder comprobar estos asertos es de suma importancia para adoptar políticas de desarrollo social y humano en el D.C., atendiendo los diferentes componentes analíticos que se utilizaron en el estudio. En la última sección, dedicada a la gestión del conocimiento, se analiza pedagógicamente el tema del bullying por orientación sexual entre estudiantes masculinos en el ambiente de la educación media, que busca contribuir a la prevención de comportamientos de bullying, por los efectos que ello tiene en el bienestar de una población que tiende a segregarse de manera antidemocrática y que ya hace parte de los modelos educativos que deben orientarse a la formación de valores. Como pedagogos, creemos que la educación puede y debe crear ambientes de respeto y valoración de la diferencia, en donde todos puedan acceder a ella, sin importar la orientación sexual, el género u otras construcciones sociales o culturales. El conjunto de los ocho artículos que ponemos a disposición de la comunidad académica, organizados en las secciones orientadas según los principios que fundamentan la filosofía científica y la política editorial de la revista, se configura en un nuevo esfuerzo que estamos seguros contribuirá al fortalecimiento del desarrollo científico y tecnológico de nuestras disciplinas en un entorno que nos es propio, pero que dialoga con la universalidad del conocimiento a nivel global, y que progresivamente se constituirán en los grandes pilares de nuestro desarrollo humano y social. ; La revue Criterio Libre a occupé un important rôle en promouvoir la divulgation scientifique comme mécanisme fondamental dans les procès de transformation de nos nations latino-americaines vers sociétés meilleure conformées, avec un sain équilibre entre la nécessaire croissance de la production de biens tangibles et intangibles et une plus juste distribution de la richesse, au profit de toutes ses populations, que cherchent éradiquer la pauvreté, qu'il est le majeur fléau que l'humanité encore n'a pas pu surpasser. Par l'antérieur, nous basons sur des critères du développement de la science qu'ils contribuent à ces idéals, en choisissant alors les meilleurs articles, soumis à des rigoureux procès d'évaluation par des reconnus chercheurs nationaux et internationaux, qui ont aussi contribué à élever la qualité scientifique des mêmes par leur sages observations et aussi à développer la pensée scientifique et l'utilisation du meilleur style pour sa communication, en enrichissant la pensé scientifique sociale dans nos nations. Nous pouvons résumer dits principes: le développement de la science et la technologie comme expression de systèmes d'évaluation et socio-culturelles donnés, le développement de la science au service de la transformation productive au profit de la société, la prise de conscience du rôle de la science et la technologie dans la définition des relations de pouvoir en les niveaux nationaux et internationaux et son insertion dans les politiques de développement, l›utilisation de la science et de l›innovation technologique comme des instruments d›autonomie, l›ouverture à nouvelles approches dans la consolidation de la science sociale, la liberté de la pensée critique en tous les niveaux de la gestion de la connaissance scientifique, entre autrui. Dans ce sens, nous avons essayé fortifier l'analyse et développement critique des sciences économiques, administratives, financiers et comptables, en ouvrant un espace pour la discussion et développement de l'epistemologie de ces sciences sociales, que de plus en plus se convertit dans l'axe central de notre revue. La présente édition comprend deux articles qu'ils enrichissent dite discussion epistémológique: en le premier d'ils le chercheur José J. Ortiz B. pose un dilemme qu'accompagne le développement de la science comptable, "La crise de la représentation comptable: ¿problèmes de la science sociale ou de la politique du pouvoir?", dans lequel cherche éclaircir les facteurs qu'ils causent la problématique de la représentation comptable à partir d'une réflexion sur les fondements théoriques qu'ils soutiennent cet important question et les référents empiriques qui montrent cette problématique, facteurs qui ont été considérés comme un obstacle épistémique à la consolidation de cette jeune science et aux quels l›auteur entend contribuir dans sa clarification épistémologique et dans la proposition de solutions alternatives qu›il donne à lacommunauté scientifique avec une approche interdisciplinaire et du paradigme de la complexité. Dans le deuxième article, le professeur Jean Paul Sarrazin fait une thèse intéressante sur "Religion: savons-nous de quoi nous parlons? Examen de la faisabilité d›une catégorie analytique pour les sciences sociales". L'objectif de cette revue était de trouver une catégorie analytique précise, claire et suffisamment large pour étudier empiriquement la vaste gamme de phénomènes socio-culturelles qui peuvent être ou ont été considérés comme "religieux". Il conclut qu'en dépit de l›absence d›unecatégorie analytique unifiée, certains éléments les plus saillants des différentes définitions peuvent euxmêmes constituer des catégories analytiques utiles à la recherche empirique. On peut déduire que cette section a été fidèle aux principes que nous avons énoncé au début de cet éditorial et que nous espérons qu'ils continuera à devenir une plateforme ouverte pour le développement scientifique de nos disciplines. Une deuxième section, consacrée à la comptabilité et à la finance, définit les sujets qui sont devenus d›un intérêt substantiel en raison du fort développement théorique que ces disciplines ont atteint, atteignant une phase dans la quelle les différends des paradigmes qui soutiennent diverses approches ont été réglés et c'est dans ce domaine que les contributions surgissent qui consolident des schémas théoriques importants ou qui, d'autrepart, écartent les hypothèses qui permettent des systèmes purifiants qui, à la façon des couches d›oignons, sont regroupés par niveaux, contribuant ainsi à consolider les sciences sociales. Dans cette section, nous trouvons deux articles importants orientés selon cette philosophie: le premier analyse les effets sur l›information comptable des entreprises publiques du secteur de l'électricité colombien de la mise en oeuvre de la résolution 743 de 2013 concernant l'adoption des normes internationales d›information financière (IFRS) pour certaines entreprises publiques. Ce sujet est l›une des applications des avancées importantes dans le développement de la théorie comptable pour l›économie financieriste qui malgré cela ne parvient pas à établir des racines solides pour les conditions des pays en développement, comme enté moigne cet article qui constate que les transformations supposées sont le résultat d›un changement du modèle économique organisationnel, où, plutôt que de s›intéresser au modèle de réglementation internationale, répond à un processus de concentration des actifs stratégiques par des acteurs qui ont la capacité de saisir la réglementation, démontrant que l'approche interdisciplinaire est un terrain fertile pour mieux expliquer la réalité de ces pays dans l'environnement mondialisant qui caractérise l›économie actuelle de ces pays. Le deuxième article, intitulé "Impact de l›autofinancement sur l'innovation dans les micro, petites et moyennes entreprises colombiennes», donne un aperçu d'un aspect qui n›a pas été explicitement étudié et qui se situe aux frontières de la connaissance entre économie, finance et administration, en particulier dans un secteur important de l›économie des pays en développement, celle des MPME, qui malgré leur grande contribution au bien-être économique de la population, occupant 80% de la population de ces pays, n'a pas fait l›effort intellectuel de nos chercheurs, gaspillant un espace de développement potentiel d'autonomie qui ouvrira la voie à un véritable développement socioéconomique de notre région. Les résultats descriptifs montrent que les PMI colombiennes utilisent principalement leurs propres ressources pour leurs investissements, et les résultats inférentiels obtenus par régression linéaire indiquent que le financement interne a une influence positive et significative sur leur innovation globale, ainsi que sur celle de leurs produits/services, processus de production et gestion. Il s›agit d'une variable d›une importance fondamentale à impliquer dans les politiques de développement de l'industrie latino-américaine et que trèspeu de choses sont prises en considération jusqu›à présent, dans cequ›on a appelé l'économie orange, que des pays comme la Colombie veulent promouvoir. En réalité, les ressources internes ou propres restent la principale source de financement des projets d'investissement de ces entreprises et, bien que cela soit conforme aux postulats de la théorie de la hiérarchie financière, tout semble indiquer que les raisons en sont principalement les obstacles qu›elles rencontrent pour accéder au marché financier extérieur. Notre prochaine section, consacrée à ladiscipline économique, nous présente un article important centré sur l'analyse de la relation entre "La bonne gouvernance et l'efficacité de l'aide"; un sujet de la plus haute pertinence pour nos économies. Il analyse les composantes et les déterminants de la bonne gouvernance, ainsi que sa relation avec des concepts étroitement liés tels que la qualité institutionnelle et, surtout, les idées et les preuves créées sur la relation entre bonne gouvernance et efficacité de l'aide au développement. En fin, il conclut qu'il n'y a pas de consensus général sur l'efficacité de l'aide dans la promotion de la croissance économique, et qu'il y a à la fois des défenseurs et des détracteurs de cette idée. D'une manière réfléchie, elle laisse ouverte la voie à la vérification empirique des effets réels de l'aide économique et des conditions dans les quelles de meilleurs résultats seraient possibles pour le bénéfice de larges masses de la population. Nous clôturons ce numéro avec deux sections : la première, traditionnelle sur les thèmes de l›administration en tant que discipline structurellement intégrée à l'économie, la comptabilité et lafinance, et où deux articles sont développés: le premier d'entre eux estintitulé "Co-création et lesnouveaux défis de création de valeur aux quels les organisations font face. Ce sujet est d›actualité et marque une tendance de la théorie administrative moderne, qui s›articule autour de nouvelles approches de la création de valeur. Il est conclu que, pour générer une valeur durable dans lesorganisations, les actions des gestionnaires doivent être axées sur la création de valeur conjointe avec leurs clients et non sur l›objectif exclusif d'augmenter les ventes de leurs produits ou services habituellement conçus en interne et de façon fermée. Le deuxième article, intitulé "Modèle d'analyse de l'incidence du capital social sur le développement humain à Bogotá, D.C.", vise à identifier s›il existe un type de relation entre capital social et développement humain dans le contexte endogène de la ville de Bogotá. Cette fin, il est proposé demener une recherche descriptive, fondée sur une analyse de régression multiple, qui facilite la proposition d'un modèle qui détermine le niveau d'incidence du capital social dans le développement humain, à partir du calcul de l'indice de développement humain et de l'indice de capital social répartis en composantes du calcul intégral de l'indice de capital social, soit l'indice de capital cognitif, l'ICSE, l'indice de capital social structurel, l'ICSC et l'IRSCS, et de l'indice de représentation du capital social. Sur la base de ces calculs, on constate que l'ampleur et l'utilisation du capital social dans la ville sont inconnues, ce qui engendre la construction d'une société avec un haut niveau d'atomisation et un désintérêt pour les problèmes de citoyenneté. Pouvoir vérifier ces affirmations a une importance capitale pour l'adoption de politiques de développement social et humain à Bogotá, D.C., en tenant compte des différentes composantes analytiques qui ont été utilisées dans l'étude. Dans la dernière partie, consacrée à la gestion des connaissances, le sujet des brimades dues à l'orientation sexuelle chez les élèves de sexe masculin estanalysé pédagogiquement dans l'environnement de l'enseignement secondaire, qui cherche à contribuer à la prévention des comportements debrimades, en raison des effets que cela a sur le bien-être d'une population qui tend à se séparer de manière antidémocratique et qui fait déjà partie des modèles éducatifs qui doivent être orientés vers la formation des valeurs. En tant que pédagogues, nous croyons que l'éducation peut et doit créer des environnements de respect et de valorisation de la différence, où chacun peut y accéder, indépendamment de son orientation sexuelle, de son sexe ou d'autres constructions sociales ou culturelles. L'ensemble des huit articles que nous mettons à la disposition de la communauté académique, organisés en sections orientées selon les principes qui sous-tendent la philosophie scientifique et la politique éditoriale de la revue, s'inscrit dans un nouvel effort qui, nous en sommes sûrs, contribuera à renforcer le développement scientifique et technologique de nos disciplines dans un environnement qui nous est propre mais qui dialogue avec l'universalité du savoir à un niveau global et qui deviendra progressivement les grands piliers de notre développement humain et social. ; A revista Critério Livre tem desempenhado um importante papel em promover a divulgação científica como um mecanismo fundamental nos processos de transformação de nossas nações latino-americanas para sociedades melhor formadas, com um equilíbrio saudável entre o necessário crescimento da produção de bens tangíveis e intangíveis e uma mais justa distribuição da riqueza, em benefício de todas as suas populações, que buscam erradicar a pobreza, que é o maior flagelo que a humanidade ainda não conseguiu superar. Pelo exposto, nos baseamos em critérios do desenvolvimento da ciência que contribuam para esses ideais, escolhendo então os melhores artigos, submetidos a rigorosos processos de avaliação por renomados pesquisadores nacionais e internacionais, que também contribuíram para elevar a qualidade científica dos mesmos através de seus atinadas observações,e também a desenvolver o pensamento científico e a utilização do melhorestilo para sua comunicação, enriquecendo o pensamento científico social em nossos países. Podemos resumir esses princípios assim: o desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia como expressão de sistemas valorativos e socioculturais dados, o desenvolvimento da ciência a serviço da transformação produtiva em benefício da sociedade, a conscientização sobre o papel da ciência e da tecnologia na definição das relações de poder nos níveis nacional e internacional e sua inserção nas políticas de desenvolvimento, a utilização da ciência e da inovação tecnológica como instrumentos de autonomia, a abertura a abordagens inovadoras na consolidação da ciencia social, a liberdade do pensamento crítico em todos os níveis da gestão do conhecimento científico, entre outros. Neste sentido, tentamos fortalecer a análise e o desenvolvimento crítico das ciências econômicas, administrativas, financeiras e contábeis, abrindo um espaço para a discussão e desenvolvimento da epistemologia de estas ciências sociais, que cada vez mais torna-se o eixo central de nossa revista. A presente edição inclui dois itens que fazem parte desta discussão epistemológica: no primeiro deles, o pesquisador José J. Ortiz B. planta um dilema que acompanha o desenvolvimento da ciência contábil, "A crise da representação contábil: problemas da ciência social ou política do poder?", em que busca esclarecer os fatores que originam a problemática da representação contábil a partir de uma reflexão sobre os fundamentos teóricos que sustentam este importante tema e os referentes empíricos que mostram esta problemática, fatores que foram vistos como um obstáculo epistémico na consolidação dessa jovem ciência e o que o autor pretende contribuir para seu esclarecimento epistemológico e a proposta de alternativas de solução, que propõe para discussão com a comunidade científica com uma abordagem interdisciplinar e a partir do paradigma da complexidade. No segundo artigo, o profesor Jean Paul Sarrazin levanta uma interessante dissertação sobre "Religião: nós sabemos do que estamos falando? Análise da viabilidade de uma categoria analítica para as ciências sociais". O objetivo desta revisão foi encontrar uma categoria analítica, precisa, clara e suficientemente ampla para estudar empiricamente a vasta gama de fenômenos sócio-culturais que podem ser ou foram considerados como "religiosos". Conclui que, a pesar da ausência de uma categoria analítica unificada, alguns dos elementos mais destacados nas diferentes definições podem constituir, em si mesmos, categorias analíticas úteis para a investigação empírica. Pode-se deducir que esta seção tem sido fiel aos princípios que expusemos no início deste editorial, e que esperamos que continue transformando em uma tribuna aberta para o desenvolvimento científico de nossas disciplinas. Uma segunda seção, dedicada à contabilidade e as finanças, define temáticas que se tornaram de interesse substancial devido ao forte desenvolvimento teórico que atingiram essas disciplinas, chegando a uma fase em que as disputas dos paradigmas que sustentam várias abordagens foram decantado e é nesse terreno onde surgem contribuições que consolidam os importantes esquemas teóricos ou que, por outro lado, descartam hipótese que permitem depurar sistemas que, à maneira das camadas duma cebola, serão agrupadas por níveis, o que contribui para a consolidação das ciências sociais. Nesta seção encontramos dois importantes artigos orientados sob desta filosofia: o primeiro analisa os efeitos que sobre a informação contabilística das empresas públicas do setor elétrico colombiano teve a implementação da Resolução 743 de 2013, relativa à adopção de Normas Internacionais de Informação Financeira (NIIF) para algumas empresas públicas. Este tópico é um dos aplicativos de importantes avanços do desenvolvimento da teoria contábil para a economia financierista, que apesar disso não consegue establecer sólidas raízes para as condições dos países em desenvolvimento, como o comprova este artigo que encontra que as transformações assumidas são o resultado de uma mudança de modelo econômico, organizacional, onde, mais que atender o modelo de regulação internacional, responde a um processo de concentração de ativos estratégicos por parte de atores que têm a capacidade de capturar a regulação, demonstrando que a abordagem interdisciplinar é um campo fértil para explicar de uma maneira melhor a realidade destes países no ambiente globalizador que caracteriza a economía atual de tais países. O segundo artigo, sobre "o Impacto do autofinanciamento sobre a inovação das micro, pequenas e médias empresas colombianas", permite aprofundar um aspecto que não tem sido explicitamente estudado e que se situa na fronteira entre a economia, as finanças e a administração, dirigido especialmente a um setor importante da economia dos países em desenvolvimento, as empresas Mipymes, que apesar de suas grandes contribuições para o bem-estar económico da população, ao ocupar 80% da mesma em cada um destes países, não lhe foi dedicado um esforço intelectual por parte dos nossos investigadores, desaprovechando um espaço potencial de desenvolvimento da autonomia que permite desbrozar o caminho do verdadeiro desenvolvimento sócio-econômico de nossa região. Os resultados descritivos mostram que as Mipymes colombianas utilizam prioritariamente os recursos próprios para os investimentos, e os resultados inferenciales obtidos através de regressões lineares indicam que o financiamento interno influencia positiva e significativamente na inovação global, assim como a de seus produtos/serviços, processos produtivos e de gestão. Esta é uma variável de importância fundamental para ser envolvida nas políticas de desenvolvimento para a indústria latino-americana e que muito pouco se leva em consideração até agora, no que se tem denominado a economía laranja, que países como a Colômbia querem promover. A realidade é que os recursos internos ou próprios continuam sendo a principal fonte de financiamento para os projectos de investimento destas empresas, e se bem que isso é coerente com os postulados da teoria da hierarquia financeira, tudo parece indicar que as razões são principalmente as barreiras que encontram para acessar o mercado financeiro externo. A nossa seguinte secção, dedicada à disciplina económica, mostra-nos um importante artigo focado à análise da relação entre "Bom governo e eficácia da ajuda ao desenvolvimento", tema de altísima pertinência para as nossas economias. O artigo propõe-se aprofundar na origem e as mudanças experimentadas pela noção de bom governo; analisa os constituintes e determinantes do mesmo, bem como a sua relação com conceitos próximos como a qualidade institucional, e sobretudo, as ideias e a evidência criada sobre as relações entre o bom governo e a efetividade da ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Finalmente chega à conclusão de que não existe um consenso geral quanto a que a ajuda seja eficaz para promover o crescimento económico, e existem tanto defensores como detratores desta ideia. De maneira reflexiva deixa aberto o caminho para verificar empiricamente os verdadeiros efeitos da ajuda económica e as condições baixo as quais seriam possíveis uns melhores resultados em benefício de grandes massas da população. Fechamos esta edição com duas secções: a primeira, tradicional sobre temas de administração como disciplina que se integra estruturalmente com a económica, a contável e financeira, e onde se desenvolvem dois artigos: o primeiro destes se titula "A co-criação e os novos reptos de geração de valor que enfrentam as organizações". Esta temática é de grande atualidade e marca uma tendência na moderna teoria administrativa, que está a girar sobre as novas focagens da geração de valor. Conclui-se que, para gerar um valor sustentado nas organizações, o foco das ações dos gestores deve ser a criação de valor conjunta com os seus clientes e não a exclusiva meta de aumentar as vendas dos seus produtos ou serviços habitualmente desenhados de maneira interna e fechada. O segundo artigo, baixo o título "Modelo para analisar a incidência do capital social no desenvolvimento humano em Bogotá, D.C.", centra-se em identificar se existe um tipo de relação entre o capital social e o desenvolvimento humano no contexto endógeno da cidade de Bogotá. Para tal fim, propõe-se fazer uma investigação descritiva, baseada em análise de regressão múltipla, que facilita a proposição de um modelo que determina o nível de incidência do capital social no desenvolvimento humano, partindo do cálculo do Índice de desenvolvimento humano e do Índice de capital social decomposto em índice de capital cognitivo, ICSC, índice de capital social estrutural, ICSE, Índice de representação social do capital social, IRSCS, componentes do cálculo integral do índice de capital social. Com base nesses cálculos chega-se a comprovar que na cidade se desconhecem o alcance e o uso do capital social, o que gera construir uma sociedade com alto nível de atomização e desinteresse pelos problemas da cidadania. Poder comprovar estes asertos é de soma importância para adotar políticas de desenvolvimento social e humano no D.C., atendendo os diferentes componentes analíticos que se utilizaram no estudo. Na última secção, dedicada à gestão do conhecimento, analisa-se pedagógicamente o tema do bullying por orientação sexual entre estudantes masculinos no ambiente da educação média, que procura contribuir à prevenção de comportamentos de bullying, pelos efeitos que isso tem no bem-estar de uma população que tende a segregarse de maneira antidemocrática e que já faz parte dos modelos educativos que devem orientar à formação de valores. Como pedagogos, achamos que a educação pode e deve criar ambientes de respeito e valoração da diferença, em onde todos possam aceder a ela, sem importar a orientação sexual, o género ou outras construções sociais ou culturais. O conjunto dos oito artigos que pomos ao dispor da comunidade académica, organizados nas secções orientadas segundo os princípios que fundamentam a filosofia científica e a política editorial da revista, se configura em um novo esforço que estamos seguros contribuirá ao fortalecimiento do desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico das nossas disciplinas em um meio que nos é próprio, mas que dialoga com a universalidade do conhecimento a nível global, e que progressivamente constituir-se-ão nos grandes pilares do nosso desenvolvimento humano e social.

Criterio Libre magazine has played an important role in promoting scientific dissemination as a fundamental mechanism in the transformation processes of our Latin American nations towards better formed societies, with a healthy balance between the necessary growth of the production of tangible and intangible goods and a more fair distribution of wealth, for the benefit of all its populations, which seek to eradicate poverty, which is the greatest scourge that humanity has not yet been able to overcome. Therefore, we rely on criteria of the development of science that contribute to these ideals, choosing then the best articles, subjected to rigorous evaluation processes by recognized national and international researchers, who have also contributed to raise the scientific quality of them through his thoughtful observations and also to develop scientific thinking and the use of the best style for their communication, enriching the social scientific thought in our nations. We can summarize these principles as follows: the development of science and technology as an expression of given sociocultural and valorative systems, the development of science at the service of productive transformation for the benefit of society, the awareness of the role of science and technology in the definition of power relations at the national and international levels and its insertion in development policies, the use of science and technological innovation as instruments of autonomy, openness to novel approaches in the consolidation of social science, the freedom of critical thinking at all levels of scientific knowledge management, among others. In this sense, we have tried to strengthen the analysis and critical development of economic, administrative, financial and accounting sciences, opening a space for the discussion and development of the epistemology of these social sciences, which increasingly becomes the central axis of our magazine. The present edition of Criterio Libre includes two articles that enrich this epistemological discussion: in the first one the researcher José J. Ortiz B. poses a dilemma that accompanies the development of accounting science, "The crisis of accounting representation: problems of science social or power politics?", which seeks to clarify the factors that originate the problem of accounting representation from a reflection on the theoretical foundations that support this important topic and the empirical references that show this problem, factors that have been seen as an epistemic obstacle in the consolidation of this young science and to which the author intends to contribute in his epistemological clarification and in the proposal of alternative solutions, which he proposes for discussion to the scientific community with an interdisciplinary approach and from the paradigm of complexity. In the second article, Professor Jean Paul Sarrazin poses an interesting dissertation on "Religion: do we know what we are talking about? Examination on the feasibility of an analytical category for the social sciences". The objective of this review was to find an analytical category that is precise, clear and sufficiently broad to study empirically the vast range of sociocultural phenomena that can be or have been considered as "religious". It concludes that in spite of the absence of a unified analytical category, some of the most prominent elements in the different definitions can constitute, by themselves, useful analytical categories for empirical research. It can be deduced that this section has been faithful to the principles that we exposed at the beginning of this editorial and that we hope will continue to become an open forum for the scientific development of our disciplines. A second section, devoted to accounting and finance, defines topics that have become of substantial interest due to the strong theoretical development that these disciplines have reached, arriving to a phase in which the disputes of the paradigms that support different approaches have been decanted, and it is in this field where contributions arise that consolidate important theoretical schemes or that, on the other hand, discard hypotheses that allow debugging systems that, in the manner of the layers of an onion, are grouped by levels, which contributes to the consolidation of the social sciences. In this section we find two important articles oriented under this philosophy: the first one analyzes the effects on the accounting information of public companies in the Colombian electricity sector of the implementation of Resolution 743 of 2013 regarding the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for some public companies. This topic is one of the applications of the important advances in the development of accounting theory for the financial economy, which in spite of this does not manage to establish solid roots for the conditions of the developing countries, as this article proves that the transformations assumed are the result of a change in the organizational economic model, where, rather than attending to the international regulation model, it responds to a process of concentration of strategic assets by actors that have the ability to capture regulation, demonstrating that the interdisciplinary approach is a fertile ground to explain in a better way the reality of these countries in the globalizing environment that characterizes the current economy of these countries. The second article, about the "Impact of self-financing on the innovation of micro, small and medium-sized Colombian companies," allows us to delve into an aspect that has not been explicitly studied and that is located at the frontiers of knowledge between economics, finance and the administration, especially directed at an important sector of the economy of the developing countries, that of the MSME companies, which despite their great contributions to the economic well-being of the population, occupying 80% of it in these countries, no intellectual effort has been devoted by our researchers, wasting a space of potential development of autonomy that will clear the way for the true socioeconomic development of our region. The descriptive results show that Colombian MSMEs use their own resources as a priority for their investments, and inferential results obtained through linear regressions indicate that internal financing has a positive and significant influence on their overall innovation, as well as on their products/services, productive processes and management. This is a variable of fundamental importance to be involved in the development policies for the Latin American industry and that very little is taken into consideration until now, in what has been called the Orange economy, which countries like Colombia want to promote. The reality is that internal or own resources are still the main source of funding for the investment projects of these companies, and while this is consistent with the postulates of the theory of financial hierarchy, everything seems to indicate that the reasons for this are mainly the barriers they encounter to access the external financial market. The next section, dedicated to economic discipline, shows us an important article focused on the analysis of the relationship between "Good governance and effectiveness of development aid", a topic of high relevance for our economies. The article aims to deepen the origin and changes experienced by the notion of good governance; analyzes the constituents and determinants of it, as well as its relationship with close concepts such as institutional quality, and above all, the ideas and evidence created on the relationship between good governance and the effectiveness of development aid. Finally, it concludes that there is no general consensus that aid has been effective in promoting economic growth, and there are both supporters and opponents of this idea. Reflectively, it paves the way for empirically verifying the true effects of economic aid and the conditions under which better results would be possible for the benefit of large masses of the population. This edition closes with two sections: the first one, traditional on topics of administration as a discipline that is structurally integrated with the economic, accounting and financial, and where two articles are developed: the first of these is entitled "Co-creation and new challenges of generating value that organizations face". This matter is very topical and marks a trend in modern administrative theory, which is revolving around the new approaches to the generation of value. It is concluded that, in order to generate a sustained value in organizations, the focus of the managers' actions must be the creation of joint value with their clients and not the exclusive goal of increasing the sales of their products or services usually designed internally and closed. The second article, under the title "Model to analyze the incidence of social capital in human development in Bogotá, DC", focuses on identifying whether there is a type of relationship between social capital and human development in the endogenous context of the city of Bogota. For this purpose, it is proposed to conduct a descriptive investigation, based on multiple regression analysis, which facilitates the proposal of a model that determines the level of incidence of social capital in human development, based on the calculation of the Human Development Index and the Index Decomposed social capital in cognitive capital index, ICSC, structural social capital index, ICSE, social representation index of social capital, IRSCS, components of the integral calculation of the social capital index. Based on these calculations, it is verified that the scope and use of social capital are unknown in the city, which generates a society with a high level of atomization and disinterest about the problems of citizenship. Being able to verify these assertions has the utmost importance to adopt policies of social and human development in the D.C., taking into account the different analytical components that were used in the study. In the last section, dedicated to knowledge management, the issue of bullying is analyzed pedagogically by sexual orientation among male students in the environment of secondary education, which seeks to contribute to the prevention of bullying behaviors, due to the effects that this has in the welfare of a population that tends to segregate in an undemocratic manner and that is already part of the educational models that should be oriented towards the formation of values. As pedagogues, we believe that education can and should create environments of respect and appreciation of difference, where everyone can access it, regardless of sexual orientation, gender or other social or cultural constructions. The set of the eight articles that we put at the disposal of the academic community, organized in the sections oriented according to the principles that support the scientific philosophy and the editorial policy of the magazine, is configured in a new effort that we are sure will contribute to the strengthening of the scientific and technological development of our disciplines in an environment that is ours, but that dialogues with the universality of knowledge at a global level, and that progressively will become the great pillars of our human and social development ; La revista Criterio Libre ha venido desempeñando un rol importante en la promoción de la divulgación científica como mecanismo fundamental en los procesos de transformación de nuestras naciones hispanoamericanas hacia sociedades mejor conformadas, con un sano equilibrio entre el necesario crecimiento de la producción de bienes tangibles e intangibles y una más justa distribución de la riqueza, en beneficio de todas sus poblaciones que buscan la erradicación de la pobreza, el mayor flagelo que la humanidad aún no ha podido superar. En ese orden de ideas, nos hemos fundamentado en criterios del desarrollo de la ciencia que contribuyan a esos ideales, seleccionando los mejores artículos, sometidos a procesos rigurosos de evaluación por reconocidos investigadores nacionales e internacionales, quienes también han contribuido a elevar la calidad científica de los mismos con sus atinadas observaciones y también a desarrollar el pensamiento científico y la utilización del mejor estilo para su comunicación, enriqueciendo el pensamiento científico social en nuestras naciones. Dichos principios los podemos sintetizar de la siguiente manera: El desarrollo de la ciencia y la tecnología como expresión de sistemas valorativos y socioculturales dados, el desarrollo de la ciencia al servicio de la transformación productiva en beneficio de la sociedad, la concientización del papel que tienen la ciencia y la tecnología en la definición de las relaciones de poder en los niveles nacional e internacional y su inserción en las políticas de desarrollo, la utilización de la ciencia y de la innovación tecnológica como instrumentos de autonomía, la apertura a enfoques novedosos en la consolidación de la ciencia social, la libertad del pensamiento crítico en todos los niveles de la gestión del conocimiento científico, entre otros. En tal sentido hemos querido fortalecer el análisis y desarrollo crítico de las ciencias económicas, administrativas, financieras y contables, abriendo un espacio para la discusión y desarrollo de la epistemología de estas ciencias sociales, que cada vez más se convierte en columna vertebral de nuestra revista. En el presente número se incluyen dos artículos que enriquecen dicha discusión epistemológica: en el primero de ellos el investigador José J. Ortiz B. nos plantea un dilema que acompaña el desarrollo de la ciencia contable, "La crisis de la representación contable: ¿problemas de la ciencia social o de la política del poder?", en donde busca dar claridad a los factores que originan la problemática de la representación contable a partir de una reflexión sobre los fundamentos teóricos que sustentan este importante tópico y los referentes empíricos que muestran dicha problemática, factores que necesariamente se han expresado como un obstáculo epistémico en la consolidación de esta joven ciencia y al que el autor pretende aportar tanto en su esclarecimiento epistemológico, como en la propuesta de alternativas de solución, que pone para discusión a la comunidad científica con un enfoque interdisciplinario y desde el paradigma de la complejidad. En el segundo artículo el profesor Jean Paul Sarrazin nos plantea una interesante 18 Universidad Libre disertación alrededor del concepto "Religión: ¿sabemos de lo que estamos hablando? Examen sobre la viabilidad de una categoría analítica para las ciencias sociales". El objetivo de esta revisión fue encontrar una categoría analítica precisa, clara y suficientemente amplia para estudiar empíricamente la vasta gama de fenómenos socioculturales que pueden ser o han sido considerados como "religiosos". Se concluye que a pesar de la ausencia de una categoría analítica unificada algunos de los elementos más destacados en las diferentes definiciones pueden constituir, en sí mismos, categorías analíticas útiles para la investigación empírica. Se puede deducir que esta sección ha sido fiel a los principios que expusimos al comienzo de este editorial y que esperamos se siga convirtiendo en tribuna abierta para el desarrollo científico de nuestras disciplinas. Una segunda sección, dedicada a la contabilidad y las finanzas, define temáticas que se han tornado de interés sustancial dado el fuerte desarrollo teórico que han venido alcanzado esas disciplinas, llegando a una fase en que las disputas de los paradigmas que sustentan diversos enfoques se han venido decantando y es en ese terreno donde florecen aportes que consolidan esquemas teóricos importantes o que, por otro lado, descartan hipótesis que permiten depurar sistemas que, a la manera de las capas de la cebolla, se van agrupando por niveles, lo cual contribuye a la consolidación de las ciencias sociales. En esta sección encontramos dos importantes artículos orientados bajo esa filosofía: el primero de ellos analiza los efectos que sobre la información contable de las empresas públicas del sector eléctrico colombiano tuvo la implementación de la Resolución 743 de 2013, la cual se refiere a la adopción de Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF) para algunas empresas públicas, siendo este tópico uno de los aplicativos de los avances importantes del desarrollo de la teoría contable para la economía financierista, que a pesar de ello no logra asentar sólidas raíces para las condiciones de los países en desarrollo, como lo comprueba este artículo que encuentra que las transformaciones asumidas son el resultado de un cambio de modelo económico organizacional, en donde más que atender el modelo de regulación internacional, responde a un proceso de concentración de activos estratégicos por parte de actores que tienen la capacidad de capturar la regulación, demostrando que es el enfoque interdisciplinario un campo fértil para explicar de una mejor manera la realidad de estos países en el entorno globalizador que caracteriza la economía actual de dichos países. El segundo artículo acerca del "Impacto del autofinanciamiento sobre la innovación de las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas colombianas", permite profundizar en un aspecto que no ha sido explícitamente estudiado y que se ubica en las fronteras del conocimiento entre la economía, las finanzas y la administración, dirigido especialmente a un sector importante de la economía de los países en desarrollo, el de las empresas Mipymes, que a pesar de sus grandes aportes al bienestar económico de la población al ocupar 80% de la misma en estos países, no se le ha dedicado un esfuerzo intelectual por parte de nuestros investigadores, desaprovechando un espacio de potencial desarrollo de la autonomía que permitirá desbrozar el camino del verdadero desarrollo socioeconómico de nuestra región. Los resultados descriptivos muestran que las Mipymes colombianas utilizan prioritariamente recursos propios para sus inversiones, y los resultados inferenciales obtenidos mediante regresiones lineales señalan que el financiamiento interno influye positiva y significativamente en su innovación global, así como en la de sus productos/servicios, procesos productivos y gestión. Esto es una variable de importancia fundamental para ser involucrada en las políticas de desarrollo para la industria latinoamericana y que muy poco se toma en consideración hasta ahora, en lo que se ha venido denominando la economía naranja, que países como Colombia quieren fomentar. La realidad es que los recursos internos o propios siguen siendo la principal fuente de financiación para los proyectos de inversión de estas empresas y si bien ello es coherente con los postulados de la teoría de la jerarquía financiera, todo parece indicar que las razones de esto son principalmente las barreras que encuentran para acceder al mercado financiero externo. Nuestra siguiente sección, dedicada a la disciplina económica, nos muestra un importante artículo enfocado al análisis de la relación entre "Buen gobierno y eficacia de la ayuda al desarrollo", tema de altísima pertinencia para nuestras economías. El artículo se propone profundizar en el origen y los cambios experimentados por la noción de buen gobierno; analiza los constituyentes y determinantes del mismo, así como su relación con conceptos cercanos como el de calidad institucional, y sobre todo, las ideas y la evidencia creada sobre las relaciones entre el buen gobierno y la efectividad de la ayuda al desarrollo. Finalmente llega a la conclusión de que no existe un consenso general en cuanto a que la ayuda haya sido eficaz para promover el crecimiento económico, y existen tanto defensores como detractores de esta idea. De manera reflexiva deja abierto el camino para verificar empíricamente los verdaderos efectos de la ayuda económica y las condiciones bajo las cuales se harían posibles unos mejores resultados en beneficio de grandes masas de la población. Cerramos este número con dos secciones: la primera, tradicional sobre temas de administración como disciplina que se integra estructuralmente con la económica, la contable y financiera, y donde se desarrollan dos artículos: el primero de estos se titula "La co-creación y los nuevos retos de generación de valor que enfrentan las organizaciones", siendo esta temática de gran actualidad y que marca una tendencia en la moderna teoría administrativa, que está girando sobre los nuevos enfoques de la generación de valor. Se concluye que, para generar un valor sostenido en las organizaciones, el foco de las acciones de los gestores debe ser la creación de valor conjunta con sus clientes y no la exclusiva meta de aumentar las ventas de sus productos o servicios habitualmente diseñados de manera interna y cerrada. El segundo artículo bajo el título "Modelo para analizar la incidencia del capital social en el desarrollo humano en Bogotá, D.C.", se centra en identificar si existe un tipo de relación entre el capital social y el desarrollo humano en el contexto endógeno de la ciudad de Bogotá. Para tal fin, se propone hacer una investigación descriptiva basada en análisis de regresión múltiple que facilita la proposición de un modelo que determina el nivel de incidencia del capital social en el desarrollo humano, partiendo del cálculo del Índice de desarrollo humano y del Índice de capital social descompuesto en índice 20 Universidad Libre de capital cognitivo, ICSC, índice de capital social estructural, ICSE, Índice de representación social del capital social, IRSCS, componentes del cálculo integral del índice de capital social. Con base en esos cálculos se llega a comprobar que en la ciudad se desconocen el alcance y uso del capital social, lo que genera construir una sociedad con alto nivel de atomización y desinterés por los problemas de la ciudadanía. Poder comprobar estos asertos es de suma importancia para adoptar políticas de desarrollo social y humano en el D.C., atendiendo los diferentes componentes analíticos que se utilizaron en el estudio. En la última sección, dedicada a la gestión del conocimiento, se analiza pedagógicamente el tema del bullying por orientación sexual entre estudiantes masculinos en el ambiente de la educación media, que busca contribuir a la prevención de comportamientos de bullying, por los efectos que ello tiene en el bienestar de una población que tiende a segregarse de manera antidemocrática y que ya hace parte de los modelos educativos que deben orientarse a la formación de valores. Como pedagogos, creemos que la educación puede y debe crear ambientes de respeto y valoración de la diferencia, en donde todos puedan acceder a ella, sin importar la orientación sexual, el género u otras construcciones sociales o culturales. El conjunto de los ocho artículos que ponemos a disposición de la comunidad académica, organizados en las secciones orientadas según los principios que fundamentan la filosofía científica y la política editorial de la revista, se configura en un nuevo esfuerzo que estamos seguros contribuirá al fortalecimiento del desarrollo científico y tecnológico de nuestras disciplinas en un entorno que nos es propio, pero que dialoga con la universalidad del conocimiento a nivel global, y que progresivamente se constituirán en los grandes pilares de nuestro desarrollo humano y social. ; La revue Criterio Libre a occupé un important rôle en promouvoir la divulgation scientifique comme mécanisme fondamental dans les procès de transformation de nos nations latino-americaines vers sociétés meilleure conformées, avec un sain équilibre entre la nécessaire croissance de la production de biens tangibles et intangibles et une plus juste distribution de la richesse, au profit de toutes ses populations, que cherchent éradiquer la pauvreté, qu'il est le majeur fléau que l'humanité encore n'a pas pu surpasser. Par l'antérieur, nous basons sur des critères du développement de la science qu'ils contribuent à ces idéals, en choisissant alors les meilleurs articles, soumis à des rigoureux procès d'évaluation par des reconnus chercheurs nationaux et internationaux, qui ont aussi contribué à élever la qualité scientifique des mêmes par leur sages observations et aussi à développer la pensée scientifique et l'utilisation du meilleur style pour sa communication, en enrichissant la pensé scientifique sociale dans nos nations. Nous pouvons résumer dits principes: le développement de la science et la technologie comme expression de systèmes d'évaluation et socio-culturelles donnés, le développement de la science au service de la transformation productive au profit de la société, la prise de conscience du rôle de la science et la technologie dans la définition des relations de pouvoir en les niveaux nationaux et internationaux et son insertion dans les politiques de développement, l›utilisation de la science et de l›innovation technologique comme des instruments d›autonomie, l›ouverture à nouvelles approches dans la consolidation de la science sociale, la liberté de la pensée critique en tous les niveaux de la gestion de la connaissance scientifique, entre autrui. Dans ce sens, nous avons essayé fortifier l'analyse et développement critique des sciences économiques, administratives, financiers et comptables, en ouvrant un espace pour la discussion et développement de l'epistemologie de ces sciences sociales, que de plus en plus se convertit dans l'axe central de notre revue. La présente édition comprend deux articles qu'ils enrichissent dite discussion epistémológique: en le premier d'ils le chercheur José J. Ortiz B. pose un dilemme qu'accompagne le développement de la science comptable, "La crise de la représentation comptable: ¿problèmes de la science sociale ou de la politique du pouvoir?", dans lequel cherche éclaircir les facteurs qu'ils causent la problématique de la représentation comptable à partir d'une réflexion sur les fondements théoriques qu'ils soutiennent cet important question et les référents empiriques qui montrent cette problématique, facteurs qui ont été considérés comme un obstacle épistémique à la consolidation de cette jeune science et aux quels l›auteur entend contribuir dans sa clarification épistémologique et dans la proposition de solutions alternatives qu›il donne à lacommunauté scientifique avec une approche interdisciplinaire et du paradigme de la complexité. Dans le deuxième article, le professeur Jean Paul Sarrazin fait une thèse intéressante sur "Religion: savons-nous de quoi nous parlons? Examen de la faisabilité d›une catégorie analytique pour les sciences sociales". L'objectif de cette revue était de trouver une catégorie analytique précise, claire et suffisamment large pour étudier empiriquement la vaste gamme de phénomènes socio-culturelles qui peuvent être ou ont été considérés comme "religieux". Il conclut qu'en dépit de l›absence d›unecatégorie analytique unifiée, certains éléments les plus saillants des différentes définitions peuvent euxmêmes constituer des catégories analytiques utiles à la recherche empirique. On peut déduire que cette section a été fidèle aux principes que nous avons énoncé au début de cet éditorial et que nous espérons qu'ils continuera à devenir une plateforme ouverte pour le développement scientifique de nos disciplines. Une deuxième section, consacrée à la comptabilité et à la finance, définit les sujets qui sont devenus d›un intérêt substantiel en raison du fort développement théorique que ces disciplines ont atteint, atteignant une phase dans la quelle les différends des paradigmes qui soutiennent diverses approches ont été réglés et c'est dans ce domaine que les contributions surgissent qui consolident des schémas théoriques importants ou qui, d'autrepart, écartent les hypothèses qui permettent des systèmes purifiants qui, à la façon des couches d›oignons, sont regroupés par niveaux, contribuant ainsi à consolider les sciences sociales. Dans cette section, nous trouvons deux articles importants orientés selon cette philosophie: le premier analyse les effets sur l›information comptable des entreprises publiques du secteur de l'électricité colombien de la mise en oeuvre de la résolution 743 de 2013 concernant l'adoption des normes internationales d›information financière (IFRS) pour certaines entreprises publiques. Ce sujet est l›une des applications des avancées importantes dans le développement de la théorie comptable pour l›économie financieriste qui malgré cela ne parvient pas à établir des racines solides pour les conditions des pays en développement, comme enté moigne cet article qui constate que les transformations supposées sont le résultat d›un changement du modèle économique organisationnel, où, plutôt que de s›intéresser au modèle de réglementation internationale, répond à un processus de concentration des actifs stratégiques par des acteurs qui ont la capacité de saisir la réglementation, démontrant que l'approche interdisciplinaire est un terrain fertile pour mieux expliquer la réalité de ces pays dans l'environnement mondialisant qui caractérise l›économie actuelle de ces pays. Le deuxième article, intitulé "Impact de l›autofinancement sur l'innovation dans les micro, petites et moyennes entreprises colombiennes», donne un aperçu d'un aspect qui n›a pas été explicitement étudié et qui se situe aux frontières de la connaissance entre économie, finance et administration, en particulier dans un secteur important de l›économie des pays en développement, celle des MPME, qui malgré leur grande contribution au bien-être économique de la population, occupant 80% de la population de ces pays, n'a pas fait l›effort intellectuel de nos chercheurs, gaspillant un espace de développement potentiel d'autonomie qui ouvrira la voie à un véritable développement socioéconomique de notre région. Les résultats descriptifs montrent que les PMI colombiennes utilisent principalement leurs propres ressources pour leurs investissements, et les résultats inférentiels obtenus par régression linéaire indiquent que le financement interne a une influence positive et significative sur leur innovation globale, ainsi que sur celle de leurs produits/services, processus de production et gestion. Il s›agit d'une variable d›une importance fondamentale à impliquer dans les politiques de développement de l'industrie latino-américaine et que trèspeu de choses sont prises en considération jusqu›à présent, dans cequ›on a appelé l'économie orange, que des pays comme la Colombie veulent promouvoir. En réalité, les ressources internes ou propres restent la principale source de financement des projets d'investissement de ces entreprises et, bien que cela soit conforme aux postulats de la théorie de la hiérarchie financière, tout semble indiquer que les raisons en sont principalement les obstacles qu›elles rencontrent pour accéder au marché financier extérieur. Notre prochaine section, consacrée à ladiscipline économique, nous présente un article important centré sur l'analyse de la relation entre "La bonne gouvernance et l'efficacité de l'aide"; un sujet de la plus haute pertinence pour nos économies. Il analyse les composantes et les déterminants de la bonne gouvernance, ainsi que sa relation avec des concepts étroitement liés tels que la qualité institutionnelle et, surtout, les idées et les preuves créées sur la relation entre bonne gouvernance et efficacité de l'aide au développement. En fin, il conclut qu'il n'y a pas de consensus général sur l'efficacité de l'aide dans la promotion de la croissance économique, et qu'il y a à la fois des défenseurs et des détracteurs de cette idée. D'une manière réfléchie, elle laisse ouverte la voie à la vérification empirique des effets réels de l'aide économique et des conditions dans les quelles de meilleurs résultats seraient possibles pour le bénéfice de larges masses de la population. Nous clôturons ce numéro avec deux sections : la première, traditionnelle sur les thèmes de l›administration en tant que discipline structurellement intégrée à l'économie, la comptabilité et lafinance, et où deux articles sont développés: le premier d'entre eux estintitulé "Co-création et lesnouveaux défis de création de valeur aux quels les organisations font face. Ce sujet est d›actualité et marque une tendance de la théorie administrative moderne, qui s›articule autour de nouvelles approches de la création de valeur. Il est conclu que, pour générer une valeur durable dans lesorganisations, les actions des gestionnaires doivent être axées sur la création de valeur conjointe avec leurs clients et non sur l›objectif exclusif d'augmenter les ventes de leurs produits ou services habituellement conçus en interne et de façon fermée. Le deuxième article, intitulé "Modèle d'analyse de l'incidence du capital social sur le développement humain à Bogotá, D.C.", vise à identifier s›il existe un type de relation entre capital social et développement humain dans le contexte endogène de la ville de Bogotá. Cette fin, il est proposé demener une recherche descriptive, fondée sur une analyse de régression multiple, qui facilite la proposition d'un modèle qui détermine le niveau d'incidence du capital social dans le développement humain, à partir du calcul de l'indice de développement humain et de l'indice de capital social répartis en composantes du calcul intégral de l'indice de capital social, soit l'indice de capital cognitif, l'ICSE, l'indice de capital social structurel, l'ICSC et l'IRSCS, et de l'indice de représentation du capital social. Sur la base de ces calculs, on constate que l'ampleur et l'utilisation du capital social dans la ville sont inconnues, ce qui engendre la construction d'une société avec un haut niveau d'atomisation et un désintérêt pour les problèmes de citoyenneté. Pouvoir vérifier ces affirmations a une importance capitale pour l'adoption de politiques de développement social et humain à Bogotá, D.C., en tenant compte des différentes composantes analytiques qui ont été utilisées dans l'étude. Dans la dernière partie, consacrée à la gestion des connaissances, le sujet des brimades dues à l'orientation sexuelle chez les élèves de sexe masculin estanalysé pédagogiquement dans l'environnement de l'enseignement secondaire, qui cherche à contribuer à la prévention des comportements debrimades, en raison des effets que cela a sur le bien-être d'une population qui tend à se séparer de manière antidémocratique et qui fait déjà partie des modèles éducatifs qui doivent être orientés vers la formation des valeurs. En tant que pédagogues, nous croyons que l'éducation peut et doit créer des environnements de respect et de valorisation de la différence, où chacun peut y accéder, indépendamment de son orientation sexuelle, de son sexe ou d'autres constructions sociales ou culturelles. L'ensemble des huit articles que nous mettons à la disposition de la communauté académique, organisés en sections orientées selon les principes qui sous-tendent la philosophie scientifique et la politique éditoriale de la revue, s'inscrit dans un nouvel effort qui, nous en sommes sûrs, contribuera à renforcer le développement scientifique et technologique de nos disciplines dans un environnement qui nous est propre mais qui dialogue avec l'universalité du savoir à un niveau global et qui deviendra progressivement les grands piliers de notre développement humain et social. ; A revista Critério Livre tem desempenhado um importante papel em promover a divulgação científica como um mecanismo fundamental nos processos de transformação de nossas nações latino-americanas para sociedades melhor formadas, com um equilíbrio saudável entre o necessário crescimento da produção de bens tangíveis e intangíveis e uma mais justa distribuição da riqueza, em benefício de todas as suas populações, que buscam erradicar a pobreza, que é o maior flagelo que a humanidade ainda não conseguiu superar. Pelo exposto, nos baseamos em critérios do desenvolvimento da ciência que contribuam para esses ideais, escolhendo então os melhores artigos, submetidos a rigorosos processos de avaliação por renomados pesquisadores nacionais e internacionais, que também contribuíram para elevar a qualidade científica dos mesmos através de seus atinadas observações,e também a desenvolver o pensamento científico e a utilização do melhorestilo para sua comunicação, enriquecendo o pensamento científico social em nossos países. Podemos resumir esses princípios assim: o desenvolvimento da ciência e da tecnologia como expressão de sistemas valorativos e socioculturais dados, o desenvolvimento da ciência a serviço da transformação produtiva em benefício da sociedade, a conscientização sobre o papel da ciência e da tecnologia na definição das relações de poder nos níveis nacional e internacional e sua inserção nas políticas de desenvolvimento, a utilização da ciência e da inovação tecnológica como instrumentos de autonomia, a abertura a abordagens inovadoras na consolidação da ciencia social, a liberdade do pensamento crítico em todos os níveis da gestão do conhecimento científico, entre outros. Neste sentido, tentamos fortalecer a análise e o desenvolvimento crítico das ciências econômicas, administrativas, financeiras e contábeis, abrindo um espaço para a discussão e desenvolvimento da epistemologia de estas ciências sociais, que cada vez mais torna-se o eixo central de nossa revista. A presente edição inclui dois itens que fazem parte desta discussão epistemológica: no primeiro deles, o pesquisador José J. Ortiz B. planta um dilema que acompanha o desenvolvimento da ciência contábil, "A crise da representação contábil: problemas da ciência social ou política do poder?", em que busca esclarecer os fatores que originam a problemática da representação contábil a partir de uma reflexão sobre os fundamentos teóricos que sustentam este importante tema e os referentes empíricos que mostram esta problemática, fatores que foram vistos como um obstáculo epistémico na consolidação dessa jovem ciência e o que o autor pretende contribuir para seu esclarecimento epistemológico e a proposta de alternativas de solução, que propõe para discussão com a comunidade científica com uma abordagem interdisciplinar e a partir do paradigma da complexidade. No segundo artigo, o profesor Jean Paul Sarrazin levanta uma interessante dissertação sobre "Religião: nós sabemos do que estamos falando? Análise da viabilidade de uma categoria analítica para as ciências sociais". O objetivo desta revisão foi encontrar uma categoria analítica, precisa, clara e suficientemente ampla para estudar empiricamente a vasta gama de fenômenos sócio-culturais que podem ser ou foram considerados como "religiosos". Conclui que, a pesar da ausência de uma categoria analítica unificada, alguns dos elementos mais destacados nas diferentes definições podem constituir, em si mesmos, categorias analíticas úteis para a investigação empírica. Pode-se deducir que esta seção tem sido fiel aos princípios que expusemos no início deste editorial, e que esperamos que continue transformando em uma tribuna aberta para o desenvolvimento científico de nossas disciplinas. Uma segunda seção, dedicada à contabilidade e as finanças, define temáticas que se tornaram de interesse substancial devido ao forte desenvolvimento teórico que atingiram essas disciplinas, chegando a uma fase em que as disputas dos paradigmas que sustentam várias abordagens foram decantado e é nesse terreno onde surgem contribuições que consolidam os importantes esquemas teóricos ou que, por outro lado, descartam hipótese que permitem depurar sistemas que, à maneira das camadas duma cebola, serão agrupadas por níveis, o que contribui para a consolidação das ciências sociais. Nesta seção encontramos dois importantes artigos orientados sob desta filosofia: o primeiro analisa os efeitos que sobre a informação contabilística das empresas públicas do setor elétrico colombiano teve a implementação da Resolução 743 de 2013, relativa à adopção de Normas Internacionais de Informação Financeira (NIIF) para algumas empresas públicas. Este tópico é um dos aplicativos de importantes avanços do desenvolvimento da teoria contábil para a economia financierista, que apesar disso não consegue establecer sólidas raízes para as condições dos países em desenvolvimento, como o comprova este artigo que encontra que as transformações assumidas são o resultado de uma mudança de modelo econômico, organizacional, onde, mais que atender o modelo de regulação internacional, responde a um processo de concentração de ativos estratégicos por parte de atores que têm a capacidade de capturar a regulação, demonstrando que a abordagem interdisciplinar é um campo fértil para explicar de uma maneira melhor a realidade destes países no ambiente globalizador que caracteriza a economía atual de tais países. O segundo artigo, sobre "o Impacto do autofinanciamento sobre a inovação das micro, pequenas e médias empresas colombianas", permite aprofundar um aspecto que não tem sido explicitamente estudado e que se situa na fronteira entre a economia, as finanças e a administração, dirigido especialmente a um setor importante da economia dos países em desenvolvimento, as empresas Mipymes, que apesar de suas grandes contribuições para o bem-estar económico da população, ao ocupar 80% da mesma em cada um destes países, não lhe foi dedicado um esforço intelectual por parte dos nossos investigadores, desaprovechando um espaço potencial de desenvolvimento da autonomia que permite desbrozar o caminho do verdadeiro desenvolvimento sócio-econômico de nossa região. Os resultados descritivos mostram que as Mipymes colombianas utilizam prioritariamente os recursos próprios para os investimentos, e os resultados inferenciales obtidos através de regressões lineares indicam que o financiamento interno influencia positiva e significativamente na inovação global, assim como a de seus produtos/serviços, processos produtivos e de gestão. Esta é uma variável de importância fundamental para ser envolvida nas políticas de desenvolvimento para a indústria latino-americana e que muito pouco se leva em consideração até agora, no que se tem denominado a economía laranja, que países como a Colômbia querem promover. A realidade é que os recursos internos ou próprios continuam sendo a principal fonte de financiamento para os projectos de investimento destas empresas, e se bem que isso é coerente com os postulados da teoria da hierarquia financeira, tudo parece indicar que as razões são principalmente as barreiras que encontram para acessar o mercado financeiro externo. A nossa seguinte secção, dedicada à disciplina económica, mostra-nos um importante artigo focado à análise da relação entre "Bom governo e eficácia da ajuda ao desenvolvimento", tema de altísima pertinência para as nossas economias. O artigo propõe-se aprofundar na origem e as mudanças experimentadas pela noção de bom governo; analisa os constituintes e determinantes do mesmo, bem como a sua relação com conceitos próximos como a qualidade institucional, e sobretudo, as ideias e a evidência criada sobre as relações entre o bom governo e a efetividade da ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Finalmente chega à conclusão de que não existe um consenso geral quanto a que a ajuda seja eficaz para promover o crescimento económico, e existem tanto defensores como detratores desta ideia. De maneira reflexiva deixa aberto o caminho para verificar empiricamente os verdadeiros efeitos da ajuda económica e as condições baixo as quais seriam possíveis uns melhores resultados em benefício de grandes massas da população. Fechamos esta edição com duas secções: a primeira, tradicional sobre temas de administração como disciplina que se integra estruturalmente com a económica, a contável e financeira, e onde se desenvolvem dois artigos: o primeiro destes se titula "A co-criação e os novos reptos de geração de valor que enfrentam as organizações". Esta temática é de grande atualidade e marca uma tendência na moderna teoria administrativa, que está a girar sobre as novas focagens da geração de valor. Conclui-se que, para gerar um valor sustentado nas organizações, o foco das ações dos gestores deve ser a criação de valor conjunta com os seus clientes e não a exclusiva meta de aumentar as vendas dos seus produtos ou serviços habitualmente desenhados de maneira interna e fechada. O segundo artigo, baixo o título "Modelo para analisar a incidência do capital social no desenvolvimento humano em Bogotá, D.C.", centra-se em identificar se existe um tipo de relação entre o capital social e o desenvolvimento humano no contexto endógeno da cidade de Bogotá. Para tal fim, propõe-se fazer uma investigação descritiva, baseada em análise de regressão múltipla, que facilita a proposição de um modelo que determina o nível de incidência do capital social no desenvolvimento humano, partindo do cálculo do Índice de desenvolvimento humano e do Índice de capital social decomposto em índice de capital cognitivo, ICSC, índice de capital social estrutural, ICSE, Índice de representação social do capital social, IRSCS, componentes do cálculo integral do índice de capital social. Com base nesses cálculos chega-se a comprovar que na cidade se desconhecem o alcance e o uso do capital social, o que gera construir uma sociedade com alto nível de atomização e desinteresse pelos problemas da cidadania. Poder comprovar estes asertos é de soma importância para adotar políticas de desenvolvimento social e humano no D.C., atendendo os diferentes componentes analíticos que se utilizaram no estudo. Na última secção, dedicada à gestão do conhecimento, analisa-se pedagógicamente o tema do bullying por orientação sexual entre estudantes masculinos no ambiente da educação média, que procura contribuir à prevenção de comportamentos de bullying, pelos efeitos que isso tem no bem-estar de uma população que tende a segregarse de maneira antidemocrática e que já faz parte dos modelos educativos que devem orientar à formação de valores. Como pedagogos, achamos que a educação pode e deve criar ambientes de respeito e valoração da diferença, em onde todos possam aceder a ela, sem importar a orientação sexual, o género ou outras construções sociais ou culturais. O conjunto dos oito artigos que pomos ao dispor da comunidade académica, organizados nas secções orientadas segundo os princípios que fundamentam a filosofia científica e a política editorial da revista, se configura em um novo esforço que estamos seguros contribuirá ao fortalecimiento do desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico das nossas disciplinas em um meio que nos é próprio, mas que dialoga com a universalidade do conhecimento a nível global, e que progressivamente constituir-se-ão nos grandes pilares do nosso desenvolvimento humano e social.

Ante un contexto de globalización económica como el actual, caracterizado por la libre circulación de bienes y servicios, los empresarios se ven cada vez más forzados a ser competitivos tanto en precio como en calidad, primando el primer factor en el actual modelo económico mundial de escasez de recursos económicos generado por las crisis económicas de orden mundial de diferentes Estados. Por este motivo, los operadores económicos buscan, ante todo, ser más eficientes con sus recursos e inversiones. Así, para la consecución de tal fin, los operadores económicos han procedido, en la práctica, a deslocalizar sus inversiones de sus Estados de origen y localizarlas, no ya donde más renten o logren maximizar sus resultados, sino donde menos tributen. Práctica esta que, en puridad, acaba respondiendo a un indicador de gestión normativo-financiero legal y rehusando la aplicación del indicador empresarial por excelencia: el de gestión económico-financiera, el cual le permite a cada empresario evaluar su real índice de rentabilidad bruta y operativa de su inversión, es decir, la colocación efectiva y eficiente de sus recursos económicos y financieros. Pues bien, del mismo modo, los Estados, autónomos y soberanos en materia tributaria, también han querido ser más competitivos desde un punto de vista tributario en orden a captar inversiones económicas. Para lo cual algunos han realizado ajustes y reformas de sus sistemas tributarios, estableciendo regímenes fiscales privilegiados, mientras que otros han optado por una opacidad de información tributaria que aboque en la localización de rentas en su territorio. De este modo, los Estados pretenden resultar fiscalmente atractivos para la inversión tanto de rentas como de patrimonios en sus respectivas jurisdicciones, habilitando para unas y otros una tributación reducida o, incluso, nula. Su único objetivo es, pues, la materialización de la inversión producto de una deslocalización en otro Estado, sin que ello incentive la generación de nuevas inversiones ni de riqueza. Ello, además, sin medir las consecuencias desfavorables para aquellos Estados que son víctimas de dicha deslocalización, convirtiéndose de esta manera en Estados que ejercen una competencia fiscal perniciosa. No puede desconocerse que tanto la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (en adelante OCDE) como la Unión Europea (en adelante UE) han trabajado arduamente para conseguir la neutralización de este tipo de prácticas fiscales, haciéndose especial hincapié en la lucha contra la competencia fiscal perniciosa llevada a cabo a través de los paraísos fiscales u otras jurisdicciones opacas o no transparentes. Así, de un lado, la implementación de un escenario tributario justo y equilibrado (en el que cada Estado pueda ejercer libremente su soberanía tributaria sin acabar acudiendo a prácticas fiscales nocivas para el resto de economías nacionales) y, de otro lado, la consecución de unos estándares mínimos en materia de intercambio de información tributaria (para que cada Estado pueda conocer la localización última de la riqueza de sus residentes y lograr su efectivo gravamen) se han convertido en las principales metas a alcanzar por dichas organizaciones internacionales y supranacionales. Ahora bien, aun cuando no pueden desconocerse los avances realizados en el ámbito del intercambio de información tributaria y los esfuerzos efectuados para el diseño de ese level playing field a efectos fiscales, en la actualidad la realidad formal dista mucho de la estrictamente material. Valga, a título de ejemplo de este extremo, la nimia exigencia de un mínimo de doce acuerdos suscritos sobre intercambio de información tributaria para salir de la lista negra de paraísos fiscales de la OCDE, de manera que la misma se halla vacía en la actualidad. ¿Significa ello que se ha logrado acabar con la lacra que constituyen los paraísos fiscales? Nada más lejos de la realidad, si se tiene en cuenta la erosión que, para las economías de los restantes Estados, siguen representando a día de hoy tales territorios. Asimismo, otro buen botón de muestra de este clima constante de competencia fiscal perniciosa sería la proliferación de regímenes fiscales preferenciales existentes en el momento presente incluso en Estados con niveles estándar de imposición, más preocupados por captar inversiones económicas foráneas y evitar la deslocalización de las propias que de configurar sistemas tributarios coherentes y, sobre todo, justos. De este modo, ante la insuficiencia de las respuestas dadas a nivel internacional contra el fenómeno de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, el presente trabajo de investigación pretende diseñar o rediseñar, en su caso, una batería de instrumentos jurídicos alternativos para hacer frente al mismo, desde una óptica jurídica pero enmarcada en el contexto global económico de hoy, el cual se erige en la causa principal del auge de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. Se trata de mecanismos que, en última instancia, pretenden evitar la no tributación o la doble no tributación de la operación económica ni en fuente ni en residencia, ahondando en la necesidad del intercambio de información, de la estandarización internacional de un tipo nominal de impuestos sobre sociedades y también en el establecimiento de fuertes medidas coactivas e, incluso, resarcitorias, a efectos de disuadir el ejercicio soberano de una competencia fiscal agresiva y, por ende, perjudicial. I. Objeto de la investigación Antes de entrar en las propuestas de corrección de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, es importante señalar que la dinamización y globalización de los mercados, de las telecomunicaciones y, en general, de todo el contexto económico mundial, hace que cada día los contribuyentes estén en permanente búsqueda de jurisdicciones o Estados que ofrezcan una nula o baja tributación y que, además, ofrezcan cierta opacidad informativa respecto de las rentas y/o patrimonios allí localizadas. Como es sabido, existen ya algunos estudios monográficos de importancia en España en materia de competencia fiscal perniciosa, sobre todo referidos al ámbito comunitario, entre ellos tenemos a MARTÍN LÓPEZ, para quien la competencia fiscal interestatal puede definirse como "la utilización por los Estados de sus sistemas fiscales con la finalidad de captar inversiones foráneas"1 y a LAMPREAVE MÁRQUEZ, quien en cuanto a la competencia fiscal entre Estados, da por cierto "que en un entorno globalizado, las Autoridades de cada Estado, al fijar una determinada política fiscal, ya no sólo se plantean la repercusión de las medidas en su propio territorio, sino sobre aquellos factores de mayor movilidad sitos en otros territorios a los que pretenden atraer". Cierto es que cada Estado, en el ejercicio de su potestad tributaria, es soberano e independiente a la hora de diseñar su sistema fiscal, conforme a su Constitución y resto del ordenamiento jurídico. Pero algunos Estados se extralimitan en dicha configuración, estableciendo regímenes tributarios preferenciales no acordes con los estándares impositivos clásicos, llegando en ocasiones a conformarse sistemas auténticamente opacos diseñados para atraer, no tanto inversiones fruto de la planificación fiscal u economía de opción, sino derivadas más bien de prácticas propiamente elusivas o evasoras. Todo ello lleva aparejada la generación de desajustes fiscales y económicos en aquellos Estados que han sufrido la deslocalización de rentas e inversiones de sus residentes como consecuencia de su traslado a aquellas otras jurisdicciones que ofrecen una baja o nula tributación, surgiendo como tal el fenómeno de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. Fenómeno este que, en última instancia, impide que los Estados puedan atender su gasto público y, por ende, cumplir sus fines sociales, ahondándose más aun en la actual crisis económico-financiera de algunos Estados. En este sentido, se han escuchado ya importantes y duros pronunciamientos sobre los paraísos fiscales, los cuales constituyen el exponente por excelencia de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. Nos resulta difícil creer que en un futuro cercano se logrará la eliminación de los paraísos fiscales o siquiera su declive, cuando es evidente la brecha entre el discurso y su ejecución. En la cumbre anual del G20 celebrada en Cannes los días 3 y 4 de noviembre de 2011, el presidente de turno de esta organización, el entonces Presidente de la República Francesa Nicolás Sarkozy, hizo unas duras declaraciones sobre los paraísos fiscales en la rueda de prensa al final de la cumbre: "(n)o queremos más paraísos fiscales. El mensaje es muy claro (.) Los países que sigan siendo paraísos fiscales con el disimulo financiero serán condenados al ostracismo por la comunidad internacional"; anunciando que el G20 realizará una "publicación sistemática" en sus cumbres de la lista de "países que no hacen lo que hay que hacer para acabar con un comportamiento inadmisible"3. Posteriormente en la cumbre G20 de 2013 celebrada en San Petersburgo el 5 y 6 de septiembre de 20134, se dio un total respaldo al plan de acción creado por la OCDE que tiene por objeto abordar la erosión de la base imponible y el traslado de beneficios empresariales (BEPS por sus siglas en inglés Base Erosion Profit Shifting). Plan de acción que como veremos infra, no ha tenido el mejor respaldo de los expertos, ni de la doctrina científica y menos de los contribuyentes, quedando sólo al buen respaldo de los funcionarios de las distintas agencias tributarias y, por supuesto, de la misma Organización. Pues bien, una de las principales causas de esta competencia fiscal perniciosa se puede encontrar en la globalización económica (caracterizada por la apertura de economías y la libre circulación internacional de capital, bienes, servicios), donde la fiscalidad se erige en un factor importante en la localización de las inversiones económicas y de la riqueza. Razón por la cual los Estados utilizan la misma para intentar atraer, hacia sus respectivas jurisdicciones, el mayor número de rentas y patrimonio, sin tener en cuenta las consecuencias adversas que genera la deslocalización de inversiones en los diferentes Estados de origen. Así, pueden citarse, como consecuencias lesivas derivadas del fenómeno de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, entre otras, el reparto desequilibrado de la carga tributaria, ya que los Estados sólo buscan atraer a sus jurisdicciones "bases imponibles móviles" (rentas del capital o de actividades económicas), reduciendo tan sólo la carga impositiva soportada por éstas. Mas ello no parece suponer una racionalización del sector público, puesto que esa menor presión fiscal prevista para las bases móviles no conlleva un gasto público más eficiente, sino que se compensa mediante un endeudamiento superior y una mayor tributación de las bases no móviles (rentas del trabajo o inmobiliarias). De esta forma, la Competencia Fiscal Interestatal adquiere un perfil nocivo, no cuando se traduce en el establecimiento generalizado por los Estados de unos niveles de imposición ajustados, resultando una fiscalidad más racional y, a su vez, atractiva para toda clase de rentas, sino cuando consiste en el establecimiento de ventajas fiscales específicas y desorbitadas cuyo único objeto sea la captación de determinadas rentas. Así, a lo largo de este trabajo de investigación, realizaremos algunas propuestas de lege ferenda en orden a la corrección de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, entre las que destacamos como aporte propio una propuesta en torno al establecimiento de una suerte de responsabilidad patrimonial como última ratio de aquellos Estados o jurisdicciones que ejerzan una competencia fiscal perniciosa obstaculizando, ocultando o denegando el suministro de información financiera-tributaria efectiva a los Estados perjudicados. Dicha responsabilidad patrimonial podría comprender, además de la imposición de sanciones económicas, el pago a tales Estados perjudicados de una cantidad equivalente a la deuda tributaria dejada de ingresar por sus residentes como consecuencia de la deslocalización de sus rentas, patrimonios e inversiones y su ubicación en aquellos otros Estados que ejercen una competencia fiscal perniciosa. Así, nada obsta a que los diferentes Estados modernicen sus sistemas tributarios y sean fiscalmente competitivos a nivel internacional para atraer inversión extranjera. Ahora bien, sus sistemas tributarios deben responder a un esquema, si no igual a los demás Estados, sí similar en lo que respecta a los estándares internacionalmente aceptados. Nada impide que los Estados puedan establecer condiciones fiscales favorables, mas no desleales frente a las condiciones de los otros Estados. Lo ideal es que observen unos patrones internacionales de tributación de los que se derive un terreno de juego justo y equilibrado en el ámbito fiscal, dejando que sean otros factores de competitividad los que acaben decidiendo qué Estados resultan más atractivos internacionalmente. Factores como vías de comunicación, calidad de materias primas, calidad de la mano de obra, reducción de costes de producción, avanzada tecnología y redes de acceso a las misma o seguridad jurídica, entre otros, que son propios de la libre competencia en un mundo globalizado y dinámico como el actual. Es claro que nuestro propósito con este trabajo de investigación es realizar algunas propuestas de lege ferenda que contengan una aproximación a la corrección de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, tanto en el ámbito internacional como de la Unión Europea, pero unificada como una propuesta global de fiscalidad internacional. Y ello sobre la base de medidas de muy distinta índole, entre las que podrían destacarse, de un lado, la ratificación de un acuerdo multilateral de intercambio efectivo de información de forma automática vinculante para los Estados que se adhieran, la fijación de un tipo nominal estándar de impuesto de sociedades del 22,5%. Y, de otro, el establecimiento de medidas defensivas contra los Estados que ejerzan esa competencia fiscal perniciosa, que abarquen desde las propiamente encuadrables en la técnica tributaria hasta otras coactivas, punitivas o resarcitorias. En efecto, sin desconocer la soberanía de cada Estado como límite infranqueable y modulador del Derecho internacional, un problema como el que representa la competencia fiscal perniciosa requiere una estrategia coordinada y decidida que acabe aislando internacionalmente a aquellas jurisdicciones no cooperantes, de modo que ese ejercicio de competencia fiscal nociva termine teniendo un coste, en términos económicos y jurídicos, mayor que el propio beneficio reportado por tales prácticas. Piénsese, en este sentido, en la posibilidad de exigirle una especie de responsabilidad patrimonial, reclamándosele el pago del impuesto que el contribuyente ha dejado de ingresar en su Estado de residencia o de la fuente donde aquél ejerce sustancialmente actividades económicas; responsabilidad ésta que sería exigible con carácter subsidiario y como última ratio, una vez que el Estado perjudicado demuestre que la normativa o la práctica administrativa del otro Estado ha constituido un obstáculo insalvable para lograr la recaudación tributaria que, en atención al juego de los criterios de sujeción tributaria, le correspondía jurídicamente. II. Metodología Con la presente investigación jurídica, encuadrable dentro del ámbito del Derecho Público, pretendemos estudiar el fenómeno de la Competencia Fiscal Interestatal y, propiamente, aquélla que presenta un carácter pernicioso. No obstante, la investigación respecto de esta materia se llevará a cabo, exclusivamente, desde el punto de vista jurídico, prescindiéndose de la óptica económica, (más centrada ésta última en las graves consecuencias de esta índole que dicho fenómeno acarrea). Es claro que, en este tipo de investigación, usaremos, como principales fuentes directas de estudio, entre otras, las normas jurídicas (Tratados, Leyes, Reglamentos, Directivas, etc.), la jurisprudencia de los Tribunales, informes de organismos internacionales (OCDE, UE) y la doctrina científica, acudiendo a las principales monografías y artículos de aquellos autores que han tratado esta materia. De este modo, se pretende realizar un trabajo de investigación que, de alguna manera, resulte interesante y contenga aportaciones de valor, tanto para la comunidad académica, como para los Estados y Organismos internacionales que luchen contra el fenómeno de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. Es importante dejar sentado que cualquier información de fuente externa que se utilice en esta investigación tendrá su respectiva lista de referencia en la parte bibliográfica, preservándose así los derechos de autor. III. Estructura del estudio La presente tesis doctoral se ha estructurado de una manera concordada, en cuatro capítulos, analizando de manera exhaustiva todos los aspectos de nuestro objeto de estudio (éste es, la competencia fiscal perniciosa) y concluyendo con las oportunas propuestas, en tanto aportación científica propia que todo trabajo de investigación debe necesariamente contener. El primer capítulo aborda el fenómeno de la competencia fiscal interestatal desde su génesis hasta la actualidad, donde podremos apreciar como esta figura jurídico- económica (aun cuando sólo realizaremos su análisis desde el punto de vista jurídico), ha tenido una evolución importante, motivado todo ello por la globalización y dinamización de los mercados. Fenómeno este que, sin duda, constituye uno de los principales motivos por los que, en la actualidad, los diferentes Estados, territorios o jurisdicciones establecen, ajustan o reforman sus sistemas fiscales nacionales, si bien en uso de su propia soberanía estatal. En el segundo capítulo se realiza un análisis de lo que se entiende por competencia fiscal perniciosa, la cual se traduce en la pugna de los diferentes Estados por localizar en sus respectivos territorios, mediante la utilización de instrumentos fiscales, el mayor número de inversiones económicas. Lo que, en la práctica, está generando unas gravísimas consecuencias para los propios Estados en su conjunto y, sobre todo, para aquellos cuyos sistemas tributarios responden a los estándares internacionalmente aceptados. Consecuencias nocivas entre las que destaca la pérdida de ingresos fiscales provenientes de las rentas denominadas "móviles", dada la facilidad de deslocalización de éstas últimas. El tercer capítulo tiene por objeto la descripción y examen de las principales acciones llevadas a cabo a nivel internacional (tanto desde la OCDE, como desde la UE) frente a esta competencia fiscal perniciosa que se ha desatado entre los Estados y que tiene su anclaje en las fuerzas del mercado y la globalización. Acciones, valga de paso decir, que con carácter general no son vinculantes per se, sino por la voluntad política de cada Estado, como veremos infra. Por tanto, en él se hará referencia a las principales propuestas de corrección de la competencia fiscal perniciosa desarrolladas en los ámbitos internacional y comunitario, evaluándose instrumentos jurídicos como la aproximación de legislaciones para lograr una coordinación de la fiscalidad, la igualdad de condiciones entre todos los Estados para lograr un intercambio efectivo de información y unos sistemas fiscales transparentes y la armonización de la fiscalidad directa en el ámbito comunitario, entre otros. Finalmente, en el cuarto capítulo se expondrán propuestas propias, de lege ferenda, para la corrección de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. Demostrada a lo largo de la investigación la nocividad de la competencia fiscal perniciosa (y de la utilización de este fenómeno por estructuras agresivas de ingeniería fiscal cuasi elusivas), procede, como leitmotiv último del trabajo, formular nuestras tesis sobre la viabilidad jurídica de determinados mecanismos alternativos de contención de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, ante la inexistencia de normas jurídicas que sancionen a los Estados que ejerzan la misma. Así, creemos firmemente en la necesidad de actuar en un doble plano: primero, el establecimiento e implementación de unos mínimos de convergencia tributaria a nivel internacional que excedan del restringido ámbito del intercambio de información tributaria, delimitando claramente, de una vez por todas, ese denominado escenario fiscal justo; segundo, la fijación de un tipo nominal estándar del impuesto de sociedades del 22,5% permitiéndose los ajustes de doble imposición internacional o por el contrario del ajuste de lo debido y no abanado; y, tercero, alcanzar un establecimiento generalizado del mismo de manera coercitiva, albergando la posibilidad de que, ante la deslealtad en el ámbito fiscal practicada por determinados Estados, quepa la exigencia de la apuntada responsabilidad patrimonial como última ratio. Objetivo difícil, sin duda, en razón a que el Derecho internacional público se encuentra precisamente soportado en la voluntad de los Estados libres y soberanos, sin que pueda exigírseles el cumplimiento de obligaciones a las cuales no se hayan adherido voluntariamente. Por ello, somos conscientes de las limitaciones de nuestra propuesta y de sus consecuencias en el ámbito del Derecho internacional, pero que los Estados miembros de las distintas organizaciones internacionales habrían de comprender y compartir, construyendo un frente común contra los paraísos fiscales y demás jurisdicciones opacas, los cuales son, en definitiva, los verdaderos agujeros negros del sistema fiscal internacional. CONCLUSIONES 1. En el ámbito del Derecho internacional público, encontramos el Derecho tributario internacional, en el que cada Estado libre y soberano ejerce su potestad tributaria para estructurar su respectivo sistema fiscal, existiendo tantos regímenes fiscales como Estados o territorios dependientes existen, deviniendo con ello una cierta competencia fiscal entre los éstos. Competencia que alcanza regímenes fiscales transparentes, unos menos transparentes y otros en puridad, opacos. Siendo estos dos últimos tipos de regímenes, los propicios para que los operadores económicos ejerciten toda su infraestructura financiera, legal y fiscal para aprovecharse de los desajustes de la diversidad de tantos sistemas fiscales. 2. También es cierto, que esa potestad tributaria de los Estados ha ido desencadenando un escenario de lucha entre éstos, con el único fin de atraer hacia sus territorios inversiones y riqueza foránea, en ocasiones sin dimensionar los efectos nocivos que ello genera en el Estado que sufre la deslocalización, la erosión de la base imponible o el traslado de beneficios hacia esas jurisdicciones que ofrecen condiciones fiscales más ventajosas o preferenciales de baja o nula tributación. Ello ha generado que algunos Estados también constituyan regímenes fiscales con ciertos privilegios, de modo que puedan retener al menos, su riqueza nacional dentro de su territorio, alcanzado esto una pugna entre Estados que ejercen una competencia fiscal perniciosa. Creemos, que lo que resulta inadmisible en el plano internacional, es aquel ejercicio sesgado de la potestad tributaria que acabe perjudicando a aquellos otros Estados con niveles impositivos estándares. 3. Así como una sana competencia en la producción y comercialización de bienes y servicios es útil y necesaria para equilibrar las fuerzas del mercado, también lo es la competencia fiscal, pero a través de sistemas tributarios transparentes. Lo cierto es que el carácter pernicioso que ha alcanzado la segunda, es tal, que hasta los mismos Estados y organizaciones internacionales, como la OCDE, G20, G/7/8 y la UE, han tenido que intervenir para hacer frente a tal fenómeno que viene socavando la hacienda pública internacional, principalmente en lo que respecta al impuesto de sociedades, lo que está generando que cada día la brecha fiscal esté siendo más amplia, no permitiendo a los Estados cumplir sus fines. 4. Sin perjuicio de otras opiniones, definimos la competencia fiscal interestatal como el fenómeno por el cual los Estados, en ejercicio de su poder soberano, erigen y estructuran su sistema fiscal con el objetivo de mantener, retener o atraer capitales móviles, actividades empresariales, inversiones, rentas o patrimonios, logrando así un incremento de sus ingresos públicos y, en general, un mayor crecimiento económico. 5. El ejercicio de esa potestad tributaria en el actual contexto de globalización económica, ha abocado en un uso de la misma dirigido, en última instancia, a configurar Estados fiscalmente atractivos para los inversores internacionales, lo que ha generado una contienda de competencia fiscal, beneficiando especialmente a las multinacionales que a través de su planificación fiscal agresiva buscan la optimización en el pago de la factura fiscal, más que la rentabilidad misma de la inversión; quienes aprovechas todos los resquicios fiscales para ello, y de paso, se benefician al igual que los demás ciudadanos de los servicios y condiciones de bienestar que ofrecen los Estados, sin contribuir con las cargas fiscales que justamente les corresponde, convirtiéndose como dicen los hacendistas públicos en verdaderos free-riders. 6. Fenómenos como la globalización económica y la constante interdependencia de las economías, ha provocado la apertura de las fronteras, la eliminación de normas proteccionistas y la libre circulación de personas y capitales. Escenario en el que los propios Estados se ven enfrentados a una competencia fiscal, similar a la competencia de mercado a que se ven enfrentados los operadores económicos. Por tanto, el fenómeno de globalización económica no hace sino desatar las fuerzas del mercado tanto para los Estados como para los operadores económicos, en donde la competitividad no está basada en factores de rentabilidad operativa sino, en gran medida, en factores de rentabilidad fiscal. 7. Esta globalización y la creciente movilidad de personas y capitales, están creando dificultades para los Estados a la hora de evaluar correctamente las bases imponibles, la recaudación fiscal y la tributación efectiva de los operadores económicos donde sustancialmente ejercen las actividades y generan valor. A su vez, estos fenómenos están afectando el funcionamiento de los sistemas fiscales y facilitando las prácticas de elusión y evasión fiscales, toda vez, que algunos se han reputado insuficientes u obsoletos frente al dinamismo económico vigente, lo que pone en peligro el funcionamiento del mercado global. 8. Defendemos el proceso de la competencia fiscal como un fenómeno beneficioso, siempre que la misma se practique de una manera leal y sana, es decir, en la medida que los Estados ejerzan su potestad tributaria, no de manera uniforme, pero sí dentro de unos estándares internacionales (como los referidos por la OCDE y la UE). En este sentido, la propia OCDE no censura la existencia de diferencias objetivas entre los sistemas fiscales de los distintos países, admitiéndose el carácter beneficioso de una cierta competencia derivada de dicha heterogeneidad, pero siempre que aquélla acabe conformándose como simétrica, proporcionada y justificada, mediante la cual exista una adecuada proporción entre los niveles de imposición y prestaciones públicas, que finalmente, desemboque en la eficiencia del gasto público y que por demás, sean sistemas transparentes e inspirados en principios de justicia tributaria. 9. También consideramos el proceso de la competencia fiscal como un fenómeno perjudicial, siempre que se ejerza de manera desleal, a través de la implementación de sistemas tributarios preferenciales de carácter pernicioso, es decir, estructurados estrictamente por motivos fiscales para la captación exclusiva de rentas y capitales foráneos, sin exigir una actividad real y sustantiva; o, mediante jurisdicciones constitutivas de auténticos paraísos fiscales sin un intercambio efectivo de información y con sistemas tributarios poco o nada transparentes. 10. Lo cierto es que principalmente desde los años noventa hasta nuestros días, la competencia fiscal interestatal presenta una naturaleza más perniciosa que sana, puesto que la globalización económica, unida a la falta de instrumentos jurídicos internacionales vinculantes, hace que internacionalmente los Estados compitan, no desde un punto de vista económico, sino desde una óptica estrictamente fiscal. Lo propio sucede incluso, en el seno de la UE, que ha tenido grandes avances en la armonización de fiscalidad indirecta, y en algunas parcelas de la fiscalidad directa, pero la falta de una armonización adecuada del impuesto de sociedades en sus EE MM, ha generado una gran variedad de 28 regímenes societarios, sin que hasta la fecha se haya podido lograr una coordinación para su armonización, convirtiéndose esta competencia fiscal en un fenómeno lesivo para el mercado interior común. 11. En nuestra opinión, son múltiples las incidencias que la globalización ha ejercido y ejerce sobre el Derecho tributario y su sistema de fuentes, transformando casi por completo algunos sistemas fiscales y corrigiendo o provocando ajustes en otros, pero todos centrados en el mismo fin, i. e. la atracción de inversiones de capital extranjero. Cierto es, pues, que la globalización está incidiendo decisivamente en la configuración de la política fiscal llevada a cabo por los diferentes Estados, provocando una internacionalización del Derecho tributario, que a pesar de no ser un Derecho internacionalizado aún, no puede obviarse la considerable influencia que recibe del exterior, tanto en su configuración, como en lo que se refiere a los principios que ordenan la producción legislativa en materia tributaria y en las fuentes que en la actualidad nutren el Derecho tributario. 12. En todo caso, cuando se afronta el debate sobre el carácter sano o pernicioso de la competencia fiscal interestatal, consideramos que los Estados pasan de una "competencia sana" a una "competencia perniciosa" cuando utilizan sistemas fiscales con el fin exclusivo de atraer rentas y capitales foráneas, generalmente carentes de un sustrato económico generador de valor y que se localizan en tales jurisdicciones por motivos no económicos sino fiscales. Dicho de otra manera, la finalidad subyacente de dichos sistemas tributarios, es la atracción de dichas rentas y capitales mediante una menor presión fiscal, a través del otorgamiento de beneficios a inversores extranjeros, creando de alguna forma una brecha fiscal, que termina compensándose a través de la fiscalidad de las rentas menos móviles (principalmente de trabajo, inmobiliarias y de pymes), desequilibrando los principios de justicia e igualdad tributaria. 13. La estructuración de los sistemas fiscales por parte de algunos Estados, exclusivamente para deslocalizar u ocultar las rentas o capitales de otros Estados, supone una carrera hacia el fondo que sólo lleva aparejada pérdida de recaudación fiscal y, en definitiva, erosión económica, lo que para la OCDE en materia fiscal corresponde específicamente a la erosión de la base imponible y el traslado de beneficios empresariales (BEPS) mediante "una planificación fiscal internacional", que mientras existan y persistan sistemas fiscales que lo permitan, difícil será la encomiable tarea de esta Organización para desmantelar tales mecanismos de planificación fiscal agresiva, toda vez que estamos frente a una economía de opción plenamente válida y legal, donde cada Estado erige su propio sistema fiscal y los operadores económicos el lugar donde mejores ventajas fiscales encuentre. 14. Las escalofriantes cifras en pérdida de recaudación fiscal, en evasión y elusión fiscales, expuestas a lo largo de nuestra investigación, dejan entrever los resultados a que aboca la competencia fiscal perniciosa ejercida, sobre todo, por los paraísos fiscales y por los regímenes fiscales preferenciales, establecidos por Estados o territorios dependientes no calificados como paraísos fiscales, cuyo único fin es la creación de sistemas fiscales atractivos a las inversiones foráneas de fácil deslocalización o movimiento, como las rentas de capital y las actividades empresariales. Donde la reducción de ingresos fiscales que se genera de la existencia de estos regímenes preferenciales para estas bases imponibles móviles, no presenta una proporcionada racionalización del sector público de los Estados, pues tal pérdida de recaudación fiscal ha sido compensada con un incremento de la carga fiscal en las bases imponibles menos móviles (especialmente las rentas del trabajo y de los bienes inmuebles). 15. Los Estados que cuentan con sistemas estándares y transparentes, se han visto gravemente afectados por la proliferación de estos regímenes fiscales perniciosos, por lo que han intentado de encontrar una solución a tal fenómeno, sin lograr un resultado contundente hasta ahora. Y ello sin perjuicio de la consecución de algún resultado positivo de carácter parcial, como la adopción en el ámbito comunitario del Código de Conducta de Fiscalidad de las Empresas o los compromisos adquiridos en el ámbito de la OCDE respecto a la lealtad en la configuración de sus políticas fiscales, de cooperación e intercambio de información, o suscripción de CDIs, o la ejecución de su último plan de trabajo de julio de 2013, encaminado a evitar la erosión de la base imponible y el traslado de los beneficios empresariales (BEPS). 16. Entendemos que este fenómeno de competencia fiscal perniciosa se ha abordado desde instancias nacionales como el propio EE. UU. y supranacionales como la OCDE y la UE. En este sentido, destacamos el instrumento vinculante FATCA adelantando por EE. UU.; el instrumento adelantado por la OCDE sobre "Competencia fiscal perjudicial: Una cuestión global emergente", el cual fue reorientado mediante el Plan de Acción BEPS, ambos no vinculantes; los instrumentos establecidos por la UE como el Código de Fiscalidad de las Empresas, no vinculante pero con resultados muy favorables para eliminar las medidas perniciosas de los sistemas fiscales de sus EE MM y la norma del TFUE sobre el control de las ayudas de Estado de tipo fiscal, vinculante y desarrollado a través del TJUE. Medidas todas, que intentan corregir esta gran brecha fiscal de la que aún falta bastante camino para ser efectivamente corregida. 17. En el dinamizador proceso de globalización económica, el comercio electrónico es el que mayor crecimiento ha experimentado, acarreando serias preocupaciones a las Administraciones Tributarias a la hora de gravar la renta y el consumo, por la dificultad actual para controlar tales operaciones e identificar a los contribuyentes, y de forma muy especial, por lo difícil que resulta recaudar los impuestos que se generan cuando el contribuyente reside fuera del territorio del Estado acreedor de la deuda tributaria. En estos términos, en el plano fiscal las consecuencias derivadas de la realización de operaciones de comercio electrónico parecen reconducirse a una sola: la disminución de los ingresos tributarios. 18. El desarrollo de nuevos medios de pago de naturaleza electrónica, ha supuesto la obstaculización del rastreo de las transacciones comerciales realizadas, dificultando la localización de la corriente económica generada por aquellas, muy especialmente en aquellos casos en los que los fondos utilizados procedan de entidades bancarias situadas en paraísos fiscales. Pero a su vez, esta innovación en las TICs, han provocado una extraordinaria facilidad para el intercambio y procesamiento de la información, que deberá ser adecuadamente utilizada en lo mayor posible por todos los Estados mediante la ratificación de instrumentos jurídicos que así lo permitan. 19. Los múltiples atributos que presentan las operaciones de comercio electrónico tienen difícil encaje en las concepciones y criterios utilizados por los sistemas tributarios clásicos; los mismos han supuesto un cambio de paradigma en muchos de los criterios impositivos utilizados como piedras angulares de todo el sistema tributario, provocando con ello que el sistema tributario, uno de los principales fundamentos del Estado moderno, asuma el reto de adaptarse a los cambios tecnológicos, económicos y sociales para cumplir su función recaudatoria. 20. A las singularidades fiscales que generan las transacciones electrónicas, también ha habido un interés latente de enfrentarlas con mecanismos útiles, los cuales han resultado insuficientes, sin que ello implique la renuncia de las OO II para continuar con sus proclives trabajos. Es así como la UE y la OCDE han dedicado especial atención al asunto y, en especial, en relación con la competencia fiscal. En cabeza de la OCDE se presentó el documento The Emergence of Electronic Commerce de 1997, que establece las bases y los fundamentos esenciales que debían estudiarse del comercio electrónico; luego en 1998, el documento Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions, en el que se refleja el hincapié de luchar contra la competencia fiscal lesiva en el campo del comercio electrónico y la necesidad de luchar contra ésta a través de acuerdos multilaterales entre Estados. 21. En la actualidad, la OCDE adelanta en el sector de la economía digital el Plan BEPS mediante la acción número uno Address the tax challenges of the digital economy, para hacer frente a los entramados fiscales que están ejecutando las multinacionales para erosionar la base imponible y trasladar los beneficios a paraísos fiscales o regímenes fiscales preferenciales. Mediante esta acción, se trata de identificar a todos los agentes que intervienen en la cadena de valor de la economía digital y desentrañar, si en determinado Estado, podría considerarse la presencia de un establecimiento permanente al que se pudieran atribuir beneficios empresariales, dado que la intermediación a través de las cadenas de participaciones de sociedades dificulta esa posibilidad. 22. La pobreza mundial y la desigualdad, también se constituyen en actores del cercenamiento de la competencia fiscal, específicamente en relación con aquellos países en desarrollo que ven una oportunidad de crecimiento económico a través de la conformación de sistemas fiscales preferenciales, o, mediante una imposición directa baja o nula. Por lo que estarán por fuera de una competencia fiscal transparente y obligados a experimentar una caída de los ingresos fiscales, precisamente porque ejercen una mayor presión fiscal sobre una base reducida de contribuyentes, y es allí donde aparecen sistemas fiscales laxos o flexibles de carácter pernicioso, para intentar atraer inversión extranjera a sus jurisdicciones, donde algunos corren con suerte al abrirse al mundo, convirtiéndose en verdaderas termitas fiscales y provocando efectos nocivos para otros Estados. 23. Uno de los efectos gravísimos de la competencia fiscal perniciosa, es el desajuste de los sistemas tributarios nacionales. Ello en consideración a que, al nivel esperado de los ingresos y gastos públicos como determinantes sustanciales de la política fiscal, se ha adicionado la interacción del entorno tributario internacional con las medidas adoptadas por otros Estados, desencadenando en los últimos años un cambio de los postulados fiscales en los sistemas tributarios internos y, por supuesto, generando una competencia fiscal ente los Estados, ya que cualquier cambio tiene su repercusión directa o indirecta en los sistemas fiscales de otros Estados. Todo ello, trae aparejado el menoscabo de los ingresos tributarios y de la recaudación fiscal, producto de la deslocalización de las inversiones de capital y actividades empresariales que tienen que soportar aquellos Estados víctimas de la competencia fiscal perniciosa. 24. Esta competencia fiscal perniciosa, también representa una clara amenaza a los principios de justicia tributaria, toda vez que el carácter asimétrico de los sistemas fiscales han basado su atracción en el establecimiento de regímenes fiscales favorables para aquellas rentas móviles, generando con ello un desplazamiento de la carga impositiva principalmente hacia las rentas menos móviles, lo que trae unas gravísimas consecuencias fiscales como la afectación directa de los principios clásicos de justicia tributaria como generalidad, igualdad, capacidad contributiva y progresividad, afectando la equidad y la redistribución de la renta que, como regla general, se predican de los sistemas tributarios en su conjunto. En definitiva, la desigualdad de estos sistemas, bien podría afectar la neutralidad fiscal de algunos Estados a la hora de establecer el gravamen de las distintas manifestaciones de riqueza, pues sus déficits fiscales podrían obligarles, de una u otra manera, a establecer un mayor nivel de imposición o una mayor presión fiscal para aquellas rentas no móviles, frente a las móviles que escapan a las altas cargas impositivas por su facilidad de deslocalización. 25. De otra parte, esta contienda de competencia fiscal perniciosa lleva aparejada una localización ineficiente de los recursos económicos, en tanto ésta última acaba guiándose, en gran medida, por factores de índole tributaria. De este modo, la riqueza y los factores de producción terminan ubicándose donde menos tributan, y no donde más producen, como sería lo deseable desde la óptica económica. Proceso de competencia fiscal que es desatado por los Estados y aprovechado en gran medida por los operadores económicos, en particular por las multinacionales, quienes son los agentes principales de este tipo de competencia fiscal perniciosa, en razón a su capacidad y poder de decisión para deslocalizar parte o el conjunto de sus actividades, hacia uno o varios Estados, donde su único objetivo es beneficiarse de todos los instrumentos de planificación fiscal internacional que ofrecen los distintos sistemas tributarios. 26. Los gravísimos efectos y consecuencias provocados por esta clase de competencia fiscal, llevaron tanto a la OCDE como a la UE, a adelantar investigaciones y trabajos para desmantelar las medidas perniciosas, los sistemas fiscales preferenciales y los paraísos fiscales. Para la primera, se constituyó como pionero su informe sobre competencia fiscal perniciosa y sus sucesivos informes de revisión y progreso hasta el año 2012, y, a partir de 2013 con la reorientación de los mismos a través del plan de acción BEPS, donde se inicia un trabajo conjunto de la OCDE/G20. Para la segunda, se convirtió en pionero el Código de Conducta de Fiscalidad sobre las Empresas y la normativa comunitaria sobre ayudas de Estado; quien además de sus propios trabajos, ha integrado sus acciones en el plan de acción BEPS. Los regímenes fiscales preferenciales y los paraísos fiscales, constituyen una forma abierta y directa de permear la competencia fiscal, motivo por el cual, generaron la preocupación de todos los países, principalmente de aquellos más desarrollados, tanto por la disminución de la recaudación fiscal y como por la erosión de la base imponible mundial; lo despertó el interés del G7 y G20 para trabajar de manera mancomunada con la OCDE en la lucha contra éstos, en favor de la protección de las finanzas públicas de los países y principalmente de sus Estados miembros. 27. Observamos un retroceso en los trabajos adelantados para la erradicación de los paraísos fiscales, cuando por sugerencia de los EE. UU. que basó su tesis en el poder soberano de los Estados para establecer su nivel de tributación y su organización fiscal, en el año 2001 la OCDE abandona el criterio de carencia de actividad sustancial para catalogar a una jurisdicción o territorio dependiente como paraíso fiscal. Como creemos, ello implicó un gran retroceso, porque era un excelente indicador de los focos de evasión fiscal. Por fortuna, se verificado lo trascendental de tal criterio, por lo que tanto la OCDE como lo la UE han dado pasos favorables para retomarlo, mediante la acción cinco del plan de acción BEPS y la Propuesta de modificación del Código de Conducta sobre la Fiscalidad de las Empresas, respectivamente. La supresión del criterio de carencia de actividad sustancial fue reemplazado por la creación de sistemas transparentes y por un intercambio efectivo de información, elementos que se consideraban suficientes para catalogar a un Estado como una "jurisdicción cooperante". Transparencia referida no sólo al sistema de información fiscal, sino también a aquellos elementos conducentes a su garantía, como la imposibilidad de negociación entre las administraciones fiscales y los contribuyentes para la determinación de las bases imponibles o los tipos de gravamen y/o la concesión de incentivos fiscales. Así mismo, la existencia efectiva de un intercambio de información debería permitir y facilitar a los demás Estados y a las propias administraciones de estas jurisdicciones el acceso a toda la información fiscalmente relevante y conllevar el establecimiento de dispositivos normativos que propicien el suministro de dicha información. Todo ello con el único fin de gravar aquellas rentas de los contribuyentes que han decido invertir en tales jurisdicciones sólo por fines tributarios. 28. El año 2009 fue clave para que el G20 apoyara decididamente a la OCDE en la apertura de trabajos sobre la transparencia y del intercambio efectivo de información, el desmantelamiento del secreto bancario, advirtiendo incluso de la posible imposición de sanciones para quien no cumpliera con los estándares internacionales de intercambio de información aceptados. Además, se insta al Foro Global a seguir avanzando en el uso de instrumentos multilaterales para contrarrestar la evasión de impuestos, a través de la revisión, aprobación y recomendación para la implementación de las normas internacionales de transparencia e intercambio efectivo de información, con fines a que exista una cooperación fiscal adecuada entre los Estados y el seguimiento a quienes incumplan con dicho compromiso. 29. La baja o nula tributación internacional que soportaban algunas multinacionales, a través de la planificación fiscal agresiva, aprovechándose de las interacciones entre los sistemas fiscales de los Estados para disminuir artificiosamente sus bases imponibles o trasladar los beneficios empresariales a otras jurisdicciones de baja o nula tributación, despertó el interés conjunto de la OCDE/G20 para hacer frente a ello, desplegando el plan de trabajo BEPS en el año 2013 de 15 acciones con el que se pretende lograr un cambio en la normativa fiscal internacional, el cual finalizará en diciembre de 2015. Es un plan de acción en el que convergen dos realidades: la primera, es que las empresas multinacionales intentan disminuir su factura fiscal para optimizar su beneficio tributario, valiéndose de mecanismos de planificación fiscal agresiva; la segunda, los propios Estados ofrecen regímenes fiscales diferentes y competitivos entre sí, para atraer rentas e inversiones extranjeras; ambas realidades, se traducen en la erosión de la base imponible y en el traslado de los beneficios empresariales entre jurisdicciones, lo que propició que la OCDE y el G20 centraran su esfuerzo a través de BEPS para hacer frente a tan colosal dificultad. 30. Estimamos que estas 15 acciones en su conjunto, son retadoras pero su aplicación dependerá también de la mera liberalidad de los Estados, es decir, acciones no vinculantes que hasta ahora han carecido de efectividad para la erradicación de los regímenes fiscales preferenciales y más concretamente de los paraísos fiscales, lo que hará que continúe presentándose el mismo choque de intereses que se ha evidenciado en las iniciativas anteriores entre quienes promueven la eliminación material de la competencia fiscal perniciosa y algunos Estados miembros de la OCDE, que sólo promueven su eliminación formal, porque están claramente vinculados a los paraísos fiscales o centros de servicios financieros offshore, a través de sus territorios dependientes. 31. Consideramos que la dificultad manifiesta del proyecto BEPS, radica en que la OCDE tiene una posición ambivalente. Por un lado, trabaja por extender su poder y su influencia a nivel mundial a través de la promoción de la estandarización y la convergencia, pero, por otro lado, siempre se ha visto a sí misma como representante de los intereses de sus Estados miembros y por consiguiente, con dificultades para representar los intereses de otros países, al menos de aquellos que entran en conflicto con los intereses de sus Estados miembros. Sin embargo, independientemente de este tipo de problemas, creemos que BEPS tiene aspectos positivos. El primero de ellos es el avance en materia de intercambio efectivo de información; el segundo, es el reconocimiento de un fracaso de los sistemas de tributación internacional basados en los acuerdos bilaterales que interactúan con los sistemas tributarios internos, los cuales, difícilmente pueden evitar la doble imposición sin crear de manera simultánea oportunidades de doble no imposición, siendo destacable la nueva estrategia orientada a los acuerdos multilaterales; el tercero, es su retorno al requisito de la actividad sustancial que formaba parte del informe de 1998 y como hemos reiterado su eliminación flexibilizó de manera excesiva el cumplimiento de requisitos para que los paraísos fiscales fueran eliminados de la lista negra. En definitiva, su objetivo principal, es en sí mismo, el aspecto más positivo, el cual es evitar la erosión de la base imponible, el traslado de beneficios y encontrar soluciones a los problemas de la planificación fiscal agresiva. 32. No obstante a lo favorable que hemos advertido sobre BEPS, somos de la opinión, que este proyecto no representa una solución real para enfrentar la planificación fiscal agresiva, entre otras cosas porque ha eludido conscientemente el problema de fondo que es la adecuación de un sistema de tributación internacional en el que se consideren temas centrales como la residencia fiscal y la potestad tributaria para distribuir correctamente la recaudación. Creemos que BEPS representa una valiosa entrada hacia la reforma de la normativa fiscal internacional, pero si pretende lograrla requerirá una aplicación consistente de los propios principios de dicho plan, una mejor definición de lo que es o no aceptable, la definición de jurisdicción en función de la creación de valor y debe dejar de evitar los puntos políticamente difíciles por los intereses de sus Estados miembros, como por ejemplo la residencia fiscal. Y si pretende expandir la normativa adaptada a terceros Estados no miembros de la OCDE, deberá tenerse presente que esto debe alcanzarse de forma participativa, de la manera más inclusiva posible a fin de asegurar la efectividad y ganar la mayor legitimidad posible. 33. En relación con el proyecto BEPS, para nuestra investigación, centramos nuestro interés principal en la acción número 5 (Combatir las prácticas fiscales perniciosas, teniendo en cuenta la transparencia y la sustancia), por lo cual valoramos positivamente que mediante ésta, se haya vuelto a replantear el criterio de actividad sustancial en los regímenes preferenciales, que aunque no todos gozan de ser paraísos fiscales para quienes se ha eliminado tal criterio, algunos si lo son. En principio se ha incluido para los regímenes preferenciales de PI, los cuales deberán demostrar que han incurrido en ciertos gastos asociados a actividades de I+D que generen rentas procedentes de la explotación de la PI. Tal criterio, podrá extenderse a otro tipo de regímenes preferenciales, los cuales deberán demostrar la existencia de actividades sustanciales. Otro de esta Acción, que consideramos uno de los más destacables es su apuesta por la transparencia, a través del intercambio automático y obligatorio de información sobre resoluciones relacionadas con los regímenes preferenciales. Se trata de un nuevo direccionamiento que no centra sus esfuerzos en los regímenes perjudiciales o potencialmente perjudiciales como lo hacía en el pasado sino que, se enfoca en los regímenes preferenciales, sean perjudiciales o no. Lo que se pretende es que el país afectado disponga de información oportuna (en un plazo no superior a tres meses) y relevante sobre acuerdos preferenciales en precios de transferencia o en cualquier otra área. Aunque la guía está en proceso de construcción, ya incorpora los elementos mínimos que debe compartir el país que otorga las exenciones dependiendo del tipo de acuerdo preferencial del que se trate. En esta Acción aún está por terminar la revisión de todos los regímenes actuales, con el ánimo de establecer si éstos son perjudiciales, potencialmente perjudiciales o simplemente preferenciales. En todo caso, en el informe de progreso que debe presentarse en diciembre de 2015 deberá quedar constancia de los hallazgos. 34. Paralelamente a los trabajos de la OCDE/G20 para hacer frente a los regímenes fiscales preferenciales y paraísos fiscales, se ha hecho lo propio la finalización de la era del secreto bancario, concretamente en la Cumbre del G20 celebrada en Londres en el año 2009. Contrario sensu, opinamos que, aunque la voluntad política de las grandes economías y países desarrollados ha sido el desmantelamiento del secreto bancario, permeándose incluso de manera limitada el Estado con mayor índice del secreto financiero (Suiza), la realidad es otra. Harán falta años para hablar de una transparencia financiera total, pues en la lista del índice del secreto financiero del año 2013, aparecen los principales países del G20, de la OCDE y otros Estados como Alemania, Austria, Canadá, Costa Rica, EE. UU., Francia, Holanda, Hong Kong, Hungría, Irlanda, Italia, Japón, Jersey, Luxemburgo, Panamá, Reino Unido, Singapur, Suiza; entre otros; con lo cual se demuestra que el ranking del secreto financiero en vez de disminuir, aumenta, ya que en el informe original de 2009 se incluían 60, en el 2011 que se actualizó para la cumbre de Cannes, se incluían 73; y para el 2013 ya eran 82 jurisdicciones. Lo cierto es que muchos depósitos se mantienen en los paraísos fiscales a través de compañías ficticias, que de alguna manera permiten cubrir el rastro del verdadero propietario de los fondos; y lo que se muestra es que unos paraísos fiscales han visto disminuido el nivel de sus depósitos (por ejemplo Jersey, Luxemburgo, Suiza, etc.) y otros han visto cómo sus depósitos se disparan (por ejemplo Hong Kong, Islas Caimán, Singapur, etc.). 35. Un instrumento jurídico clave en el desmantelamiento del secreto bancario ha sido FATCA, el cual ya ha sido instrumentado por EE. UU. con diversos países e incluso con la misma UE en bloque. Los resultados han sido favorables, al menos ya Suiza número uno del ranking de secreto bancario ya está intercambiando información financiera, y así otros países más. Sin embargo, creemos que éste no soluciona el problema fondo (a menos de que sea reestructurado, que no se ve tal intención), por sus múltiples vacíos en su aplicación efectiva, como por ejemplo, las cuentas sobre las que se van a pedir datos son aquellas con montos importantes, lo que permitiría a los bancos ignorar muchas solicitudes en la mayoría de los casos; los registros se mantienen en papel en lugar de por vía electrónica; también permitiría la apertura de cuentas bancarias a través de sociedades ficticias (Shell entities), como entidades no estadounidenses a pesar de que, su propietario final fuera un contribuyente estadounidense; además, los requisitos de información restantes son fáciles de evadir por parte de las personas estadounidenses que abren cuentas por debajo de los umbrales en más de un banco. 36. En la UE encontramos un instrumento eficaz más para combatir el secreto bancario, lo que constituye un gran avance en esta materia, como lo es la Directiva 2010/24/UE, relativa a la de asistencia mutua en materia de cobro de los créditos correspondientes a determinados impuestos, derechos y otras medidas de asistencia en la en la recaudación tributaria. Es a través del intercambio de información que se desmantela el secreto bancario, y, es que esta Directiva indica expresamente que ningún Estado podrá negarse a suministrar información, amparado en que posee disposiciones legales de protección al secreto bancario, o que dicha información está en manos de las entidades financieras. En este mismo sentido, se enmarca el modelo de acuerdo sobre intercambio de información de la OCDE y la cláusula de intercambio de información de los CDIs en el que no se permite alegar el principio de interés doméstico para abstenerse de proporcionar la información solicitada y debe garantizarse el acceso a la información de bancos, entidades financieras, instituciones fiduciarias, es decir, que no haya leyes de secreto bancario. 37. Nos reafirmamos en que la cooperación internacional a través del mecanismo de intercambio efectivo de información de forma automática, sería el instrumento jurídico por excelencia que podrá hacerle frente a la competencia fiscal perniciosa que encierra fenómenos como los paraísos fiscales, el secreto bancario, la financiación de actividades ilícitas, el blanqueo de capitales, el lavado de activos, la planificación fiscal agresiva, etc. Decimos que sería, porque queremos ser optimistas en que la coordinación sistemática internacional de los diferentes Estados así lo han de entender y de continuar el camino que ya se ha iniciado en este sentido. Un optimismo que pretendemos ver de una manera objetiva y concreta mediante la institucionalización de este instrumento multilateral de manera vinculante, reconociendo la complejidad y dificultad que ello conlleva en el ámbito del Derecho internacional público, más aún, frente a la soberanía fiscal de los Estados. 38. Ante la ausencia en la normativa internacional de una definición del concepto de residencia fiscal, y ante el vacío de BEPS para alcanzarlo, nos atrevemos a dilucidar que un efectivo y eficiente intercambio de información financiera con fines fiscales, sin barreras en el suministro de la misma, sería la regla de oro para alcanzar una recaudación justa y evitar la erosión de la base imponible. Podemos ver como la UE y EE. UU., han logrado un avance importante en lo que respecta al intercambio efectivo de información tributaria; aunque con cierta laxitud o flexibilidad que nos lleva a concluir que ninguna herramienta implementada para combatir paraísos fiscales, secreto bancario e intercambio de información han sido lo suficientemente adecuadas, y, todo por falta de vinculación jurídica de los mismos instrumentos jurídicos desarrollados. 39. Creemos que con instrumentos de intercambio efectivo de información de forma automática (en nuestro caso de carácter vinculante), se lograría no sólo garantizar seguridad y efectividad operativa a los sistemas fiscales estatales, sino en brindar eficacia para combatir la evasión y el fraude fiscales, la corrupción, el lavado de dinero y por supuesto evitar la doble tributación internacional, sin que ello, llegare a significar la doble no imposición internacional a través de convenios para evitar la doble imposición, se trata de buscar la máxima transparencia fiscal internacional, objetivo que compartimos tanto en la apertura y clausura de nuestra investigación como a lo largo de nuestra vida profesional. 40. Vemos como favorables los instrumentos con los que cuenta la UE para hacer frente a los regímenes fiscales preferenciales y al falseamiento de la competencia fiscal en el mercado común interior, como son El Código de Conducta sobre la Fiscalidad de las Empresas y la normativa del TFUE sobre ayudas de Estado respectivamente. Sin embargo, consideremos la utilización que se ha hecho de las normas sobre ayudas de Estado con el fin de neutralizar las medidas tributarias que encierren un carácter pernicioso y, por consiguiente, deriven en una competencia fiscal perniciosa, es inadecuada e inoportuna, a pesar de ser la única norma existente en el TFUE para contrarrestar el falseamiento de la competencia. En nuestra opinión, el camino recorrido ha tenido resultados favorables en la lucha contra esta clase de competencia, convirtiéndose la normativa sobre ayudas estatales en la última ratio o límite de la proliferación de medidas fiscales perniciosas. Pero en cierta medida, se nota un grado de bifurcación del poder soberano de los EE MM, pues con una norma no propia del ámbito fiscal, se está tratando de aproximar, en cierto modo, la fiscalidad directa, a través de la utilización de las normas comunitarias sobre ayudas de Estado. Lo que entraña, de suyo, una huida de los mecanismos clásicos de que se nutre la armonización fiscal, como lo son las Directivas. 41. Al tiempo, valoramos favorablemente los trabajos de la Comisión Europea, respecto a la fiscalidad de las empresas y más aún, aquéllos sobre los cuales se busca hacer frente a la evasión y el fraude fiscales en los que propone esquemas para combatirlos. Su permanente preocupación por ello, la ha llevado también a reflexionar sobre la dificultad cada vez mayor para ejercer un control sobre los ingresos en una economía cada vez más globalizada, movilizada y digitalizada, reconociendo que las normas actuales sobre fiscalidad de las empresas ya no se ajustan al contexto moderno y, es ahí donde los modelos de actividad y las estructuras empresariales se han vuelto más complejos y por consiguiente más fácil de trasladar los beneficios empresariales a otras jurisdicciones de baja o nula tributación, lo que hace más difícil determinar en qué país se debe gravar la renta de una multinacional, que a través de la planificación fiscal agresiva logran artificialmente tributar lo mínimo o cero a escala global, según sus mecanismos fiscales utilizados. 42. Somos del criterio que, actores exclusivos en el cercenamiento de los ingresos fiscales y de la recaudación fiscal de los Estados como la evasión y el fraude fiscales, el blanqueo de capitales, el lavado de activos, la financiación del terrorismo, el secreto bancario, la planificación fiscal agresiva (focos de una competencia fiscal perniciosa), deben ser combatidos de manera cooperada internacionalmente, a través de instrumentos jurídicos vinculantes, y no mediante medidas unilaterales o acuerdos bilaterales, sino de tipo multilateral con carácter obligatorio, como por ejemplo el instrumento FATCA, aunque reorientado hacia un esquema multilateral. Cuando nos referimos a una cooperación internacional, estamos incluyendo la asistencia mutua internacional y la implementación coordinada de la propuesta BEPS pero esta última, pensamos que con una reorientación de su trabajo, en el que se ponga fin a las normas sobre precios de transferencia que son útiles sólo para los grupos multinacionales, al permitir fácilmente el traslado de beneficios empresariales entre jurisdicciones; se dé una regulación adecuada al establecimiento permanente; se defina la residencia fiscal para evitar problemas de doble residencia; y, se reestructure el actual y arcaico sistema fiscal internacional de los CDIs que conllevan a la doble no imposición o la doble deducción de gastos o de pérdidas, o de exenciones y deducciones a la vez, que siendo coherentes con la doctrina internacional, son formas de maximización fiscal dentro del marco de la legalidad en una legítima economía de opción, que no siempre se podrá estigmatizar como planificación fiscal agresiva. 43. El socavamiento de la recaudación fiscal y la base imponible mundial en la casi totalidad de los Estados, desarrollados y en vías de desarrollo, en términos de matrices de riesgos fiscales podríamos calificarlo como un riesgo alto, significando con ello, que la probabilidad de ocurrencia de fenómenos como la evasión y elusión fiscales más la planificación fiscal agresiva, es alta y, la situación actual de control insuficiente, con controles bajos o en algunos casos medios, o bien documentados pero poco efectivos, que terminan siendo inadecuados o insuficientes. Un riesgo fiscal de este tipo lleva aparejado un riesgo residual de desconfianza en el sistema fiscal internacional, y por supuesto, en la política fiscal de los Estados en la que se apoyan los ya fracturados principios de justicia, neutralidad y equidad fiscales. Cuando decimos fracturados, nos referimos a las consecuencias que ello genera tanto para los Estados como para los ciudadanos: mientras los primeros soportan cada vez más una mayor pérdida de la recaudación fiscal, los segundos soportan una mayor presión fiscal debido a la carga tributaria desigual que deben soportar como consecuencia de los ajustes fiscales de los primeros para intentar compensar los déficits fiscales generados por fenómenos antes señalados; siendo los más afectados aquéllos con rentas menos móviles como las de trabajo, inmobiliarias y pymes. 44. La sumatoria del traslado de beneficios a jurisdicciones con sistemas fiscales preferenciales de baja o nula tributación, más las cifras estimadas de los abultados fondos depositados en los paraísos fiscales o que circulan por ellos (expuestas supra), más los flujos de dinero ocultados en jurisdicciones con leyes de protección del secreto bancario (propiciando el blanqueo de capitales, el lavado de activos, el terrorismo), arrojan como resultado un sistema capitalista mundial desarticulado política, económica y normativamente, lo que nos lleva a creer que la rezagada crisis económica-financiera como la llama el FMI es producto del mismo riesgo sistémico financiero y, si no se actúa al menos normativamente para hacer frente a los componentes de esta sumatoria, seguiremos participando de crisis económicas-financieras fragmentadas, es decir, mientras haya una leve recuperación de una u otra economía, dos, tres o más se estarán declarando en crisis. 45. Aunque no somos los llamados a juzgar las actuaciones de los operadores económicos que realizan entramados fiscales mediante esa planificación fiscal agresiva, si nos sentimos obligados a hacer una llamado crítico-constructivo a la reflexión de que exista una tributación justa, que se paguen los tributos donde se obtienen los beneficios y se genere valor, toda vez que en la mayoría de los casos dichos operadores se encuentran en sus Estados de residencia o de la fuente donde ejercen sustancialmente actividades económicas, no tributando o en ocasiones tributando porcentajes mínimos no acordes con la realidad de las cifras o de la normativa de sus Estados. 46. Si la normativa fiscal internacional vigente no responde al sistema económico globalizado dentro de un entorno actual, llamado por unos y por otros crisis económico-financiera, estamos en el tiempo y la época oportunos para realizar un cambio total de dicho sistema fiscal, que ponga fin a prácticas fiscales desleales o perniciosas y evite fenómenos de doble no imposición, de doble deducción o exención y, sobre todo, que la planificación fiscal agresiva deje ser el escenario internacional por el cual se están erosionando las bases imponibles y trasladando los beneficios. Frente al fenómeno de la competencia fiscal perniciosa en todos sus frentes, los Estados y organizaciones internacionales han acudido a todo tipo de medidas, con menor o mayor éxito. Así, las acciones unilaterales o bilaterales que sólo benefician a los Estados que las ejecutan no resultan los instrumentos adecuados para resolver los problemas de la normativa fiscal internacional, por lo que se requiere de instrumentos jurídicos internacionales coordinados, con carácter multilateral y vinculante. 47. Desde el inicio de nuestra investigación nos planteamos estructurar una propuesta de lege ferenda que se constituyera en una herramienta de valor y pudiera ser estudiada, validada y en el mejor de los casos ejecutada por los Estados u OO II, que propendan por la protección de la base imponible mundial, por evitar el traslado de los beneficios y por evitar la minoración de la recaudación fiscal. Así también, quisimos diseñar nuestro propio aporte para lograrlo a través del acuerdo multilateral de intercambio efectivo de información de forma automática, fijación de un impuesto sobre sociedades con tipo nominal estándar, o la temida responsabilidad patrimonial subsidiaria como última ratio de los Estados, sin perjuicio de un mejor criterio. Todo ello, conscientes de las dificultades que ello pueda representar en el ámbito del Derecho internacional público, y más aún en la esfera de la soberanía fiscal de los Estados. 48. Finalmente, después de haber recorrido el estudio de la competencia fiscal perniciosa en todos sus focos, los plausibles trabajos de los Estados u OO II, de los cuales hemos pensado que han sido favorables pero insuficientes, creemos que nuestra propuesta de lege ferenda sería concreta y efectiva, fundamentalmente porque a través de ella podría blindarse la base imponible mundial, mejorarse la recaudación fiscal, evitarse el traslado de beneficios y lograr una imposición real donde sustancialmente se ejerzan actividades económicas y se generen los beneficios de los contribuyentes u obligados tributarios. Nuevamente, advirtiendo de que somos conscientes de las dificultades que ello podría implicar en el ámbito del Derecho internacional público, específicamente en la soberanía fiscal de los Estados.

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8233 Security Council Seventy-third year 8233rd meeting Saturday, 14 April 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10891 (E) *1810891* S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 2/26 18-10891 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: I have been following closely the reports of air strikes in Syria conducted by the United States, France and United Kingdom. Last night at 10 p.m. New York time, the United States President announced the beginning of air strikes with the participation of France and the United Kingdom, indicating they were targeting the chemical-weapons capabilities of the Syrian Government to deter their future use. The statement was followed by announcements from Prime Minister May and President Macron. The air strikes were reportedly limited to three military locations inside Syria. The first targets included the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre at Al-Mazzah airport in Damascus, the second an alleged chemical-weapons storage facility west of Homs and the third an alleged chemical-weapons equipment storage site and command post, also near Homs. The Syrian Government announced surface-to-air missile responsive activity. Both United States and Russian sources indicated there were no civilian casualties. However, the United Nations is unable to independently verify the details of all those reports. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is my duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general. The Charter is very clear on these issues. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I call on the members of the Security Council to unite and exercise that responsibility, and I urge all members to show restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate matters and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. As I did yesterday (see S/PV.8231), I stress the importance of preventing the situation from spiralling out of control. Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent, and the suffering it causes is horrendous. I have repeatedly expressed my deep disappointment that the Security Council has failed to agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I urge the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and fill that gap, and I will continue to engage with Member States to help to achieve that objective. A lack of accountability emboldens those who use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity, and that in turn further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons, as well as undermining the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The seriousness of the recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma requires a thorough investigation using impartial, independent and professional expertise. I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in undertaking the required investigation. The team is already in Syria. I am informed that its operations plan for visiting the site is complete and that the Mission is ready to go. I am confident it will have full access, without any restrictions or impediments to its performance of its activities. To repeat what I said yesterday, Syria represents the most serious threat to international peace and security in the world today. In Syria we see confrontations and proxy wars involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militias, foreign fighters from all over the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law in general, in utter disregard of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. They have lived 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 3/26 through a litany of horrors, atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on. At this critical juncture, I call on all States Members to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the norms against chemical weapons. If the law is ignored, it is undermined. There can be no military solution to the crisis. The solution must be political, and we must find ways to make real progress towards a genuine and credible political solution that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity and freedom, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I have asked my Special Envoy to come to New York as soon as possible to consult with me on the most effective way to accelerate the political process. The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia has called this emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the aggressive actions of the United States and its allies against Syria. This is now our fifth meeting on the subject in a week. President Putin of the Russian Federation made a special statement today. "On 14 April, the United States, with the support of its allies, launched an air strike on military and civilian infrastructure targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. An act of aggression against a sovereign State on the front lines in the fight against terrorism was committed without permission from the Security Council and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles of international law. Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria's Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent. Not a single local resident could confirm that such an attack had occurred. "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has sent experts to Syria to investigate all the circumstances. However, a group of Western countries cynically ignored this and took military action without waiting for the results of the investigation. "Russia vehemently condemns this attack on Syria, where Russian military personnel are helping the legitimate Government to combat terrorism. "The actions of the United States are making the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria even worse, inflicting suffering on civilians, for all intents and purposes enabling the terrorists who have been tormenting the Syrian people for seven years, and producing yet another wave of refugees fleeing the country and the region in general. The current escalation of the Syrian situation is having a destructive effect on the entire system of international relations. History will have the last word, and it has already revealed the heavy responsibility that Washington bears for the carnage in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya." Russia has done everything it could to persuade the United States and its allies to abandon their militaristic plans threatening a new round of violence in Syria and destabilization in the Middle East. Today, and at the Council meeting we called yesterday (see S/PV.8231), the Secretary-General expressed his concern about how events are developing. Washington, London and Paris, however, preferred to let the calls for sanity go unheard. The United States and its allies continue to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for international law, although as permanent members of the Security Council they have a special duty to uphold the provisions of the Charter. It was a disgrace to hear an article of the United States Constitution cited as justification of this aggression. We respect the right of every State to honour its own fundamental law. But it is high time that Washington learned that it is the Charter of the United Nations that governs the international code of conduct on the use of force. It will be interesting to see how the peoples of Great Britain and France react to the fact that their leaders are participating in unlawful military ventures that invoke the United States Constitution. These three countries constantly lean towards neocolonialism. They scorn the Charter and the Security Council, which they attempt, shamelessly, to use for their own unscrupulous purposes. They do no serious S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 4/26 18-10891 work in the Council. They refuse to consult with us, while falsely assuring everyone of the opposite. They are undermining the Council's authority. The alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma has been cited as the excuse for this aggression. After an inspection by our specialists, Russia's representatives stated unequivocally that no such incident took place. Moreover, people were found to have taken part in staging the incident, which was inspired and organized by foreign intelligence services. After the matter emerged, the Syrian authorities immediately invited experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to try to establish all the circumstances through a field mission to Douma. The visa formalities were dealt with quickly and security guarantees given. As the air strikes began, the specialists were already in Syria and preparing to begin their work. I would like to remind Council members and everyone else that on 10 April (see S/PV.8228), when our draft resolution (S/2018/322) on ensuring the security of the work of the OPCW's special mission was blocked, we were assured that there was no need for such a document. They said that no additional effort on the part of the Security Council was necessary to ensure that the mission could reach Douma and conduct an investigation of the chemical incident. Now, however, we can see that we were absolutely right. Yesterday, some of our colleagues — some out of naivety and others out of cynicism — told us that this situation had allegedly arisen owing to the lack of an independent investigative mechanism. The aggression today has shown, as we said, that this had nothing whatever to do with it. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mission (JIM) was in place during last year's attack on the Al-Shayrat airbase, but that did not stop the United States from launching a missile attack. After that, the JIM spent six months tailoring its conclusions to justify the strike. We have said over and over again that they do not need any investigations. They did not need them then and they do not need them now. The organizers of the aggression did not even wait for the international organization that is authorized to establish the basic facts to do so. Apparently they had established and instantly identified the perpetrators, after disseminating rumours about them through social networks with the help of the militias they sponsor and the non-governmental organizations that are their clients. This was backed up by mythical secret intelligence. Their masks — or rather the White Helmets — have come off once again. We have become accustomed to the fact that their efforts to achieve their dubious geopolitical aims, the aggressor countries deliberately blame the so-called Assad regime for every evil. There has been a trend recently to shift the blame onto Russia, which, as they tell it, has been unable to restrain Syria's so-called dictator. All of this goes according to a tried-and- true formula, whereby a provocation results in a false accusation, which results in a false verdict, which results in punishment. Is that how these people want to conduct international affairs? This is hooliganism in international relations, and not on a petty scale, given that we are talking about the actions of key nuclear Powers. Several missiles were aimed at the research centre facilities in Barzeh and Jamraya. There have been two recent OPCW inspections there with unrestricted access to their entire premises. The specialists found no trace of activities that would contravene the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria's scientific research institutions are used for strictly peaceful activities aimed at improving the efficiency of the national economy. Do they want Syria to have no national economy left at all? Do they want to kick this country — only a few years ago one of the most developed in the Middle East — back into the Stone Age? Do they want to finish whatever their sanctions have not yet accomplished? And yet they still contrive false breast-beating about the sufferings of ordinary Syrians. But they have no interest in ordinary Syrians, who are sick of war and glad about the restoration of the legitimate authorities in the liberated territories. Their aggressive actions merely worsen the humanitarian situation that they claim to care about so deeply. They could end the conflict in Syria in the space of 24 hours. All that is needed is for Washington, London and Paris to give the order to their tame terrorists to stop fighting the legitimate authorities and their own people. The attacks were aimed at Syrian military airfields that are used for operations against terrorist organizations, a highly original contribution to the fight against international terrorism, which, as Washington never tires of saying, is the sole reason for its military presence in Syria, something that we are extremely doubtful about. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that those in the West who hide 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 5/26 behind humanitarian rhetoric and try to justify their military presence in Syria based on the need to defeat the jihadists are in fact acting in concert with them to dismember the country, a design confirmed by the categorical refusal of the United States and its allies to assist in the restoration of the areas of Syria that have been liberated by Government forces. Their aggression is a powerful blow and a threat to the prospects for continuing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations, which, despite the real difficulties, is moving forward, albeit at varying speed. Why do they bother endlessly pinning all their hopes on the Geneva process when they themselves are driving it straight towards yet another crisis? We urge the United States and its allies to immediately halt their acts of aggression against Syria and refrain from them going forward. We have proposed a brief draft resolution for the Council's attention on which we request that a vote be held at the end of this meeting. We appeal to the members of the Security Council. Now is not the time to evade responsibility. The world is watching. Stand up for our principles. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today. This is the fifth Security Council meeting in the past week in which we have addressed the situation in Syria. A week has gone by in which we have talked. We have talked about the victims in Douma. We have talked about the Al-Assad regime and its patrons, Russia and Iran. We have spent a week talking about the unique horror of chemical weapons. The time for talk ended last night. We are here today because three permanent members of the Security Council acted. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in punishment and not in a symbolic show of force. We acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its crimes against humanity. We can all see that a Russian disinformation campaign is in full force this morning, but Russia's desperate attempts at deflection cannot change the facts. A large body of information indicates that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April. There is clear information demonstrating Al-Assad's culpability. The pictures of dead children were not fake news; they were the result of the Syrian regime's barbaric inhumanity. And they were the result of the regime's and Russia's failure to live up to their international commitments to remove all chemical weapons from Syria. The United States, France and the United Kingdom acted after careful evaluation of those facts. The targets we selected were at the heart of the Syrian regime's illegal chemical-weapon programme. The strikes were carefully planned to minimize civilian casualties. The responses were justified, legitimate and proportionate. The United States and its allies did everything they could to use the tools of diplomacy to get rid of Al-Assad's arsenal of chemical weapons. We did not give diplomacy just one chance. We gave it chance after chance. Six times. That is how many times Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions to address chemical weapons in Syria. Our efforts go back even further. In 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), requiring the Al-Assad regime to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. Syria committed to abiding by the Chemical Weapons Convention, meaning that it could no longer have chemical weapons on its soil. President Putin said that Russia would guarantee that Syria complied. We hoped that this diplomacy would succeed in putting an end to the horror of chemical attacks in Syria, but as we have seen from the past year, that did not happen. While Russia was busy protecting the regime, Al-Assad took notice. The regime knew that it could act with impunity, and it did. In November, Russia used its veto to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the main tool we had to figure out who used chemical weapons in Syria. Just as Russia was using its veto (see S/PV.8107), the Al-Assad regime used sarin, leading to dozens of injuries and deaths. Russia's veto was the green light for the Al-Assad regime to use these most barbaric weapons against the Syrian people, in complete violation of international law. The United States and our allies were not going to let that stand. Chemical weapons are a threat to us all. They are a unique threat — a type of weapon so evil that the international community agreed that they must be banned. We cannot stand by and let Russia trash every international norm that we stand for, and allow the use of chemical weapons to go unanswered. Just as the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons last weekend was not an isolated incident, our response is part of a new course charted last year to deter future use of chemical weapons. Our Syrian strategy has not changed. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 6/26 18-10891 However, the Syrian regime has forced us to take action based on its repeated use of chemical weapons. Since the April 2017 chemical attack at Khan Shaykhoun, the United States has imposed hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities involved in chemical-weapons use in Syria and North Korea. We have designated entities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that have facilitated chemical-weapons proliferation. We have revoked the visas of Russian intelligence officers in response to the chemical attack in Salisbury. We will continue to seek out and call out anyone who uses and anyone who aids in the use of chemical weapons. With yesterday's military action, our message was crystal clear. The United States of America will not allow the Al-Assad regime to continue to use chemical weapons. Last night, we obliterated the major research facility that it used to assemble weapons of mass murder. I spoke to the President this morning, and he said that if the Syrian regime should use this poison gas again, the United States is locked and loaded. When our President draws a red line, our President enforces the red line. The United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement. Last night, our great friends and indispensable allies shouldered a burden that benefits all of us. The civilized world owes them its thanks. In the weeks and months to come, the Security Council should take time to reflect on its role in defending the international rule of law. The Security Council has failed in its duty to hold those who use chemical weapons to account. That failure is largely due to Russian obstruction. We call on Russia to take a hard look at the company it keeps, live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Council, and defend the actual principles the United Nations was meant to promote. Last night, we successfully hit the heart of Syria's chemical weapons enterprise, and because of these actions we are confident that we have crippled Syria's chemical weapons programme. We are prepared to sustain this pressure if the Syrian regime is foolish enough to test our will. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): These are uncertain times and today we deal with exceptional circumstance. Acting with our American and French allies, in the early hours of this morning the United Kingdom conducted coordinated, targeted and precise strikes to degrade Al-Assad's chemical weapons capability and deter their future use. The British Royal Air Force launched Storm Shadow missiles at a military facility some 15 miles west of Homs, where the regime is assessed to keep chemical weapons in breach of Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A full assessment has not yet been completed, but we believe that the strikes to have been successful. Furthermore, none of the British, United States or French aircraft or missiles involved in this operation were successfully engaged by Syrian air defences, and there is also no indication that Russian air defence systems were employed. Our action was a limited, targeted and effective strike. There were clear boundaries that expressly sought to avoid escalation, and we did everything possible, including rigorous planning, before any action was undertaken to ensure that we mitigated and minimized the impact on civilians. Together, our action will significantly degrade the Syrian regime's ability to research, develop and deploy chemical weapons and deter their future use. The United Kingdom Prime Minister has said that we are clear about who is responsible for the atrocity of the use of chemical weapons. A significant body of information, including intelligence, indicates that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack we saw last Saturday. Some of the evidence that leads us to this conclusion is as follows. There are open source accounts alleging that a barrel bomb was used to deliver the chemicals. Multiple open source reports claim that a regime helicopter was observed above the city of Douma on the evening of 7 April. The opposition does not operate helicopters or use barrel bombs. And reliable intelligence indicates that Syrian military officials coordinated what appears to be the use of chlorine in Douma on 7 April. No other group could have carried out this attack. Indeed, Da'esh, for example, does not even have a presence in Douma. The Syrian regime has been killing its own people for seven years. Its use of chemical weapons, which has exacerbated the human suffering, is a serious crime of international concern as a breach of the customary international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and that amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. Any State is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 7/26 take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force for the United Kingdom is humanitarian intervention, which requires that three conditions to be met. First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief. I think that the debates in the Council and the briefings we have had from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and others have proved that. Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. I think that the vetoes have shown us that. Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim. I think we have heard both in my intervention in Ambassador Haley's how that has also been met. The history of the Syrian conflict is a litany of threats to peace and violations of international law. The Security Council has met 113 times since the Syrian war started. It was therefore not for want of international diplomatic effort that we find ourselves in this position today. After a pattern of chemical-weapons use since the outbreak of the conflict, Al-Assad defied the international community in 2013 by launching a sarin gas attack on eastern Ghouta, which left more than 800 people dead. Despite the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) and despite four years of patient engagement, Syria continues to use chemical weapons against its people and has failed to answer a long list of serious questions. The only conclusion we can reach is that Syria has not declared or destroyed all of its chemical weapons, despite its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is not assertion on our part but a matter of record, and I draw the Russian Ambassador's attention to his points about Barazan and Jimrya. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) still has unanswered questions and discrepancies. He knows this. We all know this. The Council was briefed by the OPCW Director-General. Resolution 2118 (2013) decides in the event of non-compliance to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Yet on 28 February 2017, when the United Kingdom together with France, proposed a draft resolution (S/2017/172) taking measures under Chapter VII short of the use of force, Russia vetoed (see S/PV.7893). The very least the Security Council should have been able to do was to follow up on the findings of the report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism by extending its mandate. Yet four times Russia vetoed different proposals from different Council Members to do just that. The Syrian regime and it supporters are responsible for the gravest violations of international humanitarian law in modern history. They have used indiscriminate weapons, notably barrel bombs and cluster munitions, against civilians, and they have deliberately targeted medical facilities and schools, as well as humanitarian personnel and civilian objects. They have used sieges and starvation as methods of warfare, accompanied by attacks on opposition-held civilian areas. The regime has persistently obstructed humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. Tens of thousands of people have been illegally detained, tortured and executed by the regime. This is one of the most serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime we have ever faced. A State party has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has defied the Security Council, and it has broken international law. Repeated attempts over several years to hold them to account have been met with Russian obstruction and resistance. In the Security Council, we have repeatedly attempted to overcome this obstruction without success. We are faced with a litany of violations, no sense of guilt, no sense of regret, no sense of responsibility, a shameful record, wrapped in a mix of denial, deceit and disinformation. I would invite those like the Russian Ambassador who speak about the Charter to consider the following. It is hard to believe that it is in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter to use or condone the use of chemical weapons, and in the United Kingdom's view it cannot be illegal to use force to prevent the killing of such numbers of innocent people. I will take no lessons in international law from Russia. Despite all the foregoing, we would like to look forward. The United Kingdom, together with France and the United States, will continue to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis. My French colleague will say more about our work in a few moments. We believe that it must comprise four elements. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 8/26 18-10891 First, Syria's chemical weapons programme must be ended and the chemical weapons stockpiles destroyed once and for all. Secondly, there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities and compliance with all Security Council resolutions, including those that mandate humanitarian access. Thirdly, the regime must return to the Geneva talks and agree to engage on the substantial agenda put forward by the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Fourthly and finally, there must be accountability for the use of chemical weapons and other war crimes in Syria. The Secretary-General rightly highlighted the political process. We propose that, as we members of the Security Council will all be together next weekend in the retreat with the Secretary-General very kindly hosted by Sweden, we use that opportunity to reflect on next steps and the way back to the political process. And with our allies, we stand ready to work with all members of the Security Council towards this end. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): A week after the chemical massacre in Douma and a day after last night's strikes, I want to say again straight away to those who pretend to wonder that France has no doubt whatsoever about the responsibility of the Al-Assad regime in this attack. This morning we made public a notice comprising information collected by our intelligence services. We dismiss those who try once again to challenge what is obvious and to disguise the facts before the world. For years now, Bashar Al-Assad, with the active support of his allies, has been devising a strategy of destruction designed to crush any opposition with contempt for the most basic principles of humanity and at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Syria. We saw it in Aleppo, in Homs, in eastern Ghouta. For years, the Syrian regime has used the most terrifying weapons of destruction — chemical weapons — to massacre and terrorize its civilian population. We had another demonstration of this in Douma, as we had seen before in Khan Shaykhun, Sarmin, Telemens and Qaminas, where its responsibility was clearly established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). No one can say he or she did not know. For years, the Syrian regime has systematically and repeatedly violated all its international obligations. The list of such violations is long; it is overwhelming. We all know them: violations of all international chemical-weapons obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria has been a party since 2013, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of such weapons against civilians; violations of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality; violations of successive Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and, by the same token, of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; finally, the use of chemical weapons against civilian populations constitutes a war crime within the meaning of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In August 2013, the Secretary-General even described the use of chemical weapons as a crime against humanity. In view of the repeated and proven violations by the Damascus regime of all the rules on which our security is based, France has consistently called for strong action by the international community. We have made every effort to ensure that these horrors do not remain without consequences at the United Nations and the OPCW and that they are stopped. The Security Council had undertaken by successive resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) to impose coercive measures within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the event of new violations. It has been prevented from acting in conformity with its commitments because of the vetoes systematically used by Russia. By making such systematic use of its veto in the Security Council, Russia has betrayed the commitment it made to the Council in 2013 to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal. The Security Council's blockade of the mass atrocities committed in Syria is a deadly and dangerous trap from which we must escape. When it ordered the 7 April chemical attack, the Syrian regime knew exactly to what it was exposing itself. It wanted to once again test the international community's threshold of tolerance and it found it. In the face of this attack on the principles, values and rights that are the basis of United Nations action, silence is no longer a solution. We cannot tolerate the downplaying of the use of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger to the Syrian people and to our collective security. We cannot let the deadly genie of proliferation out of its bottle. We had clearly warned Al-Assad's regime and its supporters that such a transgression would not remain without reaction. We have acted in 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 9/26 accordance with our role and responsibility. We have done so in a controlled, transparent framework, taking care to avoid any escalation with the actors present on the ground. The President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France have spoken on this subject. Some who for years have flouted the most elementary rules of international law now assert that our action is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. I would remind them that the Charter was not designed to protect criminals. Our action is fully in line with the objectives and values proclaimed from the outset by the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization's mission is "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". This action was indeed necessary in order to address the repeated violations by the Syrian regime of its obligations — obligations stemming from the law, treaties and its own commitments. Finally, our response was conceived within an proportionate framework, with precise objectives. The main research centre of the chemical weapons programme and two major production sites were hit. Through those objectives, Syria's capacity to develop, perfect and produce chemical weapons has been put out of commission. That was the only objective, and it has been achieved. My country, which knew at first hand the devastating effects of chemical weapons during the First World War, will never again allow impunity for their use. We will never stop identifying those responsible, who must be brought to justice. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we launched last January. Allow me to stress this point: last night's strikes are a necessary response to the chemical massacres in Syria. They are a response in the service of law and our political strategy to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. To be more specific, we have four imperatives on the Syrian issue that are in the immediate interest of Syrians, but also in the interest of the entire international community, as the Secretary-General reminded us, and I want to thank him for his briefing. Let me recall those four imperatives. First, the Syrian chemical-weapons programme must be dismantled in a verifiable and irreversible way. We must spare no effort to establish an international mechanism for establishing responsibility, to prevent impunity and to prevent any repeat attempts to the Syrian regime to use chemical. Secondly, terrorism must be eradicated by permanently defeating Da'esh. That is a long-standing commitment that still requires genuine effort to ensure a definitive victory. Thirdly, there must be a ceasefire throughout the Syrian territory and humanitarian access to the civilian populations, as required by Security Council resolutions. We need full and unhindered humanitarian access in order to help people in need, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, it is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys safely reach eastern Ghouta on a daily basis. Fourthly, we need a crisis-exit strategy, with a lasting political solution. We can sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis only through an inclusive political solution on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). We have been calling for that for seven years. It has never been so urgent to implement it and to relaunch genuine negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to achieving a political transition in Syria. Only that road map will allow us to finally emerge from the Syrian impasse. France is ready to tackle it, as of today, with all those who are ready to put all their efforts to that end. In that spirit, at the initiative of France and in line with President Emmanuel Macron's statement tonight, we will submit as soon as possible a draft resolution on those different aspects with our British and American partners. Today I ask Russia, first and foremost, to call on the Damascus regime to enter into a plan for a negotiated solution so that the long-lasting suffering of Syrian civilians can finally be brought to an end. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Just yesterday we were gathered in this Chamber for a meeting on the situation in Syria, during which China made clear its position on the issue of Syria, expressed profound concern about the further escalation of the tensions in Syria and made a clarion call for a political solution to the issue of Syria (see S/PV.8231). I would like to restate the following. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 10/26 18-10891 China has consistently stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes and against the use of force in international relations. We advocate respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military actions that circumvent the Security Council contravene the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations, and would hamper the settlement of the Syrian issue with new compounding factors. We urge all the parties concerned to refrain from any actions that may lead to a further escalation of the situation, to return to the framework of international law and to resolve the issue through dialogue and consultation. China believes a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation of the suspected chemical-weapons attack in Syria is necessary in order to arrive at a reliable conclusion that can withstand the test of history. Until that happens, no party must prejudge the outcome. There is no alternative to a political settlement in resolving the Syrian issue. The parties concerned in the international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator and should work together unremittingly towards a political settlement of the Syrian issue. I would like to restate that China stands ready to continue its positive and constructive role in the efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Syrian issue in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East and in the world at large. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan expresses its serious concern about the sharp escalation of the situation in Syria. We call on all parties to prevent further military escalation and take effective steps aimed at restoring confidence and establishing peace and ensuring security in the long-suffering land of Syria on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We called yesterday and the day before yesterday, and every time when we have observed increasing tensions, in this Chamber for responsible action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Who else, if not Council members, should show the world an example of compliance with the principles and provisions of the Charter? We are telling others to strictly follow international law and order, but sadly, yesterday we witnessed a different example. Whatever action taken under whatever good pretext cannot and will not justify the military use of force. Violence carried out against violence will never bring about peace and stability. Kazakhstan's position has always been, and continues to be, that military action is the last resort, to be used only in cases approved by the Security Council. There was no approval by the Council of the military strikes that took place yesterday. "Humanity hoped that the twenty-first century would herald a new era of global cooperation. This, however, may turn out to be a mirage. Our world is once again in danger and the risks cannot be underestimated. The threat is a deadly war on a global scale. Our planet is now on the edge of a new cold war that could have devastating consequences for all humankind." (S/2016/317, annex, p.2) That is an exact quote from the manifesto of my President, entitled "The World. The Twenty-First Century", of 31 March 2016. Just yesterday Secretary- General António Guterres confirmed, to our regret, that the Cold War is back with a vengeance (see S/PV.8231). Kazakhstan appeals to the parties to adhere to both the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We think that the time has come for serious talks encouraging the United States and the Russian Federation, given their standing as the co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group and their respective influence on the parties, to move actively in the direction of finding middle ground and a political settlement to the conflict in Syria. The United Nations has a vital role to play in convening those negotiations and helping the parties resolve their disputes. My delegation is also extremely concerned about recent developments and the lack of unity among Security Council members with regard to the chemical attack in Syria. From its early days of independence, through a series of practical steps, Kazakhstan has consistently promoted peace initiatives in the international arena to achieve disarmament, non-proliferation and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and strongly condemns their development, testing and use. I repeat: Kazakhstan strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 11/26 It is important to conduct a thorough, objective and impartial investigation into all aspects of the alleged chemical attack in Douma so as to enable the international community to render a fair verdict against the perpetrators, in full compliance with international law. The Government and other parties must thoroughly execute their obligations to comply with the relevant recommendations made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations by accepting designated personnel, while providing for and ensuring the security of the activities undertaken by such personnel. We would like to remind the members of the Council that Kazakhstan's principled position is not only to condemn in the strongest terms the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, in particular against the civilian population, but also to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means. President Nazarbayev stressed in his manifesto that the main tools for resolving disputes among States should be peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-inference in the domestic affairs of other States. Preventing the escalation of conflict and ending wars are the most challenging tasks; there are no other reasonable options. World leaders must treat such tasks as the highest priority on the global agenda. We must also respect the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter. We urgently need a political solution. Only a political, diplomatic approach, dialogue and confidence-building measures in the spirit of the Charter and Security Council documents on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace can bring about proper results. We therefore call upon the international community to show political will to overcome differences and resume negotiations, in the belief that only a United Nations-led political transition in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) can end the Syrian conflict, which, in turn, can advance only if the Council is united. There is great need to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further the Geneva negotiations in order to see positive results. All parties at the international, regional and Syrian levels should support an immediate ceasefire and seriously and objectively move forward without any preconditions within the framework of the International Syria Support Group, under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Geneva. We believe that the Syrian people are capable of determining their own future. However, achieving their aspirations for democracy, reconstruction and stability is impossible without genuine international support to contain the negative impact of spoilers and to help Syrians combat terrorism and build their State on a firm and stable foundation. Kazakhstan has always stood for dialogue and the resolution of international conflicts. All parties must ensure that the situation does not further deteriorate. Military means will not work; only political solutions will succeed. My President warned that there will be no winners in any modern war, as everyone will be on the losing side. He proposed to work towards the total elimination of war and a world without conflict. Finally, we again call upon all relevant parties to persist in diplomatic efforts, seek political solutions, engage in dialogue and support the United Nations as the main mediation channel. Kazakhstan is ready to work with all colleagues to preserve peace and security on the basis of mutual understanding, goodwill and determination to make the world a safer place. Mr. Radomski (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Poland views the recent events in the context of repeated chemical-weapons attacks against Syria's civilian population as a consequence of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators so far. The lack of an appropriate response encourages a greater number of attacks with the use of weapons that are both banned under international law and blatantly inhumane. In such circumstances the international community cannot remain passive. It should take all the necessary measures to prevent such attacks from being repeated in the future, in particular against a defenceless civilian population. At the same time, the competent international bodies should take decisions that will enable the perpetrators to be identified and brought to justice. We fully understand the reasons behind the action taken last night by the United States, the United Kingdom and France against Syrian chemical-weapons capabilities. We support that action, as it is intended to deter chemical-weapons attacks against the people of Syria. Let me underline that it is the primary responsibility of the Security Council to set up an S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 12/26 18-10891 investigative mechanism to examine the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that context, we reiterate our disappointment with the politically motivated Russian veto on the proposal for establishing an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Poland will continue its international efforts aimed at the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The use of such weapons is unacceptable and should be prosecuted vigorously in every instance and location in which they are used. Poland calls for refraining from actions that could escalate the situation. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank you, Sir, for convening today's important meeting. I also thank the Secretary- General for his briefing. The conflict in Syria is now in its eighth year. That is longer than the Second World War. President Al-Assad is responsible for one of the worst and most enduring humanitarian disasters of our time. From the beginning of the crisis, we have witnessed terrible violations and violence and a flagrant lack of respect for international law, in particular by Syrian Government forces. We must also never forget the atrocities committed by Da'esh. As the Secretary-General stated yesterday, we have witnessed "systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law tout court — in utter disregard for the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter". Indeed, there are numerous and flagrant violations of Security Council resolutions, international protocols and conventions Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in Syria. The Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that the Syrian authorities were responsible for four chemical-weapons attacks, and Da'esh for two. The use of such weapons is abhorrent, intolerable, a war crime and a crime against humanity. That is why, as has been noted here before, the international community banned their use in the international armed conflict more than a century ago. Subsequent developments have confirmed the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as a norm of customary international law. We will spare no effort to end the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable; there can be no further impunity. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to act in response to threats to international peace and security. It is our joint responsibility to uphold the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. It is our common legal and moral duty to defend the non-proliferation regimes that we have established and confirmed. That is best done through true multilateralism and broad international consensus. In that regard, we welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon's Fact-finding Mission to Syria and we look forward to its findings. It is regrettable that the Council was unable to come together and agree on a timely, clear and unified response to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria. We regret that Russia, again this week, blocked the Council from setting up a truly impartial and independent attribution mechanism. That has contributed to the situation in which we find ourselves now. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Deterrence and prevention of their use is the concern of the entire international community. We therefore share the rage and anger and are appalled by the repeated use of such weapons in Syria. It is necessary to rid Syria of chemical weapons once and for all, and hold those responsible accountable. At the same time, as the Secretary-General said in his statement yesterday, there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and international law in general. We are at a dangerous moment. We call for restraint and for avoiding any acts that could escalate, or further fuel, tensions. We need to avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond are exhausted. We worked tirelessly so that no stone was left unturned in efforts to find a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibility in accordance with the Charter. We have shared a proposal with Council members to achieve that objective by inviting the Secretary-General to come back to the Council with a proposal. In order to be successful, diplomacy needs to be backed by clear demands. The Secretary-General called on the Council to take action, but regrettably the Council could not unite. It was indeed a missed opportunity, but we stand ready to continue those efforts. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 13/26 In the light of all that has now happened, it is more critical than ever to avoid an escalation and revert to the track of diplomacy for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015). We reiterate our total support for the United Nations-led political process, which urgently needs to be reinvigorated, as well as the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) for the cessation of hostilities. Humanitarian access can wait no longer. A sustainable political solution is the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian people. Let us all then rally around that objective. Let us redouble our efforts and put an end to the long, brutal and meaningless conflict once and for all. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): I would like to begin by thanking the Secretary-General for his briefing today. Both yesterday and today, he spoke of the litany horrors that the Syrian population has experienced in the past seven years, of which the chemical-weapons attacks are among the most gruesome. The world hardly needs reminding of the unspeakable suffering that countless Syrian men, women and children have endured. It is a suffering that comes at the hands of Al-Assad and his allies. The Syrian regime has left the world no doubt as to its willingness to unleash terror on its own population. The repeated use of chemical weapons counts as the most cynical expression of that campaign. Just a week ago, the world was yet again confronted with reports of chemical-weapons use — that time in Douma. All the while, the Russian Federation has made clear to the world its readiness to stand by Al-Assad every step of the way. It has blocked draft resolutions in the Council that could have stopped the violence. I call upon all members of the Security Council to support a collective, meaningful response to the use of chemical weapons. But even if the Council fails to act, it should be clear to the world that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Against the background of past horrors and the unabated risk of recurrence, the response by France, the United Kingdom and the United States is understandable. The response was measured in targeting a limited number of military facilities that were used by the Syrian regime in the context of its illegal chemical-weapons arsenal. The action taken by those three countries made clear that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. Last night's response was aimed at reducing the capabilities to execute future chemical attacks. But do not let the Syrian regime and the Russian Federation think for a moment that we will waver in our pursuit of full accountability for the perpetrators of past chemical attacks. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism, so that the culprits of those heinous attacks can be identified and held accountable. We call on the Russian Federation to stop opposing that. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. The Kingdom of the Netherlands strongly believes that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Impunity cannot, and will not, prevail. However, should the Council continue to suffer from the paralysis inflicted by a single permanent member, we must not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the top of the United Nations Organization, and we have a powerful General Assembly. Both have to consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes every option to establish an independent and impartial mechanism, whether within the framework of the United Nations framework or of other relevant international organizations, as long as it results in a mechanism that can establish who is responsible, so that the perpetrators can subsequently be held to account. Any new mechanism should build upon the important work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the ongoing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission. It is therefore crucial that the Mission have complete and unhindered access to all information and sites it deems necessary to conduct its investigations with regard to the attack with chemical weapons in Douma last weekend. The international norms against the use of chemical weapons must be respected, and the Syrian people must be relieved from the violence, hardship and injustice that has haunted them for so long. To that end, we call for a political solution and an immediate cessation of violence, as agreed upon earlier by the Council, as well as full, unhindered and immediate humanitarian access. We reiterate our determination to achieve justice for the victims. The need to collectively stand up for the fate of the Syrian people is now more apparent than ever. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and participation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 14/26 18-10891 in this meeting. Bolivia would also like to thank the Russian Federation for its initiative in convening this emergency meeting of the Security Council. Today is a dark day in the history of the Council. Three permanent members have made the decision, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to take unilateral action against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State Member of the Organization. Bolivia would like to clearly and categorically express its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical substances as weapons, as it is unjustifiable and criminal wherever and whenever it happens, by whomever, given it constitutes a serious crime against international law and international peace and security. Those responsible for committing such terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Bolivia continues to demand a transparent and impartial investigation to determine who the culprits are. Aside from that topic, the purpose of this meeting is linked to the fact that, as I stated, three permanent members of the Council have used force in breach of the Charter. It is impossible to combat the alleged violation of international law by violating international law. Bolivia is surprised by the fact that, given that, they have a greater a greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the permanent Council members bypass the United Nations when it suits them. They advocate for multilateralism as long as it serves their purposes and then simply discard it. When multilateralism is no longer in their interest, it no longer concerns them. This is not the only case in which, sadly, unilateral action has been used. We recall, and will not tire in recalling, such use in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011. Any such action must be authorized by the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations. All unilateral actions run counter to international law, as well as to the values and principles of the Charter. Bolivia rejects the use and the threat of the use of force. Unilateral actions not only respond to the specific interests of those who carry them out, but are also measures that are — allow me to use the word — imperialist. It so happens that the empires that we mentioned earlier consider themselves morally superior to the rest of the world. They consider themselves exceptional and indispensable, and therefore believe that they are above the law and international law, but in reality the interest of those who unilaterally use force and violate the Charter is not to advance democracy or freedom or to combat the use of chemical weapons. Their goal is to expand their power and domination. What we have witnessed over the past few hours is an attack on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which has not begun the work that was scheduled to begin today. A unilateral attack is an attack on multilateral organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is an attack on the Council and its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It is an attack on the Charter, and it is an attack on the entire international community. I wonder, with regard to the permanent members that used force just a few hours ago, how much money have they invested in arming and training the armed groups in Syria? What natural resources are they after? With what moral authority will they be able invoke the Charter in the future? Sadly, the history of violating the purposes and principles of the Charter is a long one. We mentioned Libya and Iraq, which were recent cases. The unilateral decision concerning Jerusalem also sent another absolutely clear signal of the lack of respect for international law. Who are the ones selling weapons to those who are bombing civilians in Yemen? Who are the ones who rejected the Paris Agreement on climate change? Who are the ones who stepped away from the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration? Who are the ones who build walls? We nevertheless believe that it is also important to talk about history over the long term. Above all, we have been experiencing the consequences of the havoc wreaked by some of the colonialist Powers and of their disdain for international law in the Middle East that dates back over 100 years. We are currently reliving the same scenario in Syria, characterized by total disregard for international law. To a certain extent, we relived it, for example, when the United Kingdom refused to return the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands to Argentina or when the Chagos Archipelago issue was not resolved. I hope that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning that matter will be respected. In other words, we are talking about a whole range of policies that are detrimental to international peace and security. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 15/26 The Permanent Representative of the United States said that the United States, her country, has its finger on the trigger — "locked and loaded". Of course, we clearly heard her words with a great deal of concern and sadness. We know that the United States has aircraft carriers, satellites, smart bombs and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and we also know that it has nothing but scorn for international law. But we have this — we have the purposes and principles of the Charter, and ultimately, as history has shown time and again, those principles will prevail. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing at the beginning of this meeting. The State of Kuwait believes in and is committed to the Charter and principles of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whereby it can act on behalf of Member States to carry out that mandate. Article 25 stipulates that the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. What we have witnessed in the Syrian crisis is an impasse concerning the international community's efforts and the flagrant violation of its resolutions. We have followed very closely and with great concern the dangerous developments in Syria relating to recent military operations in response to the use by the Syrian authorities of chemical weapons prohibited by international law. We underscore that those developments are the result of the impasse in the international community's efforts embodied by the Security Council to reach a political settlement to the bloody conflict in Syria, which has gone on for more than seven years. It has led to hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Syrians and resulted in the major destruction of civilian infrastructure in several cities. The chemical weapons issue long enjoyed a unified approach in the Council, which condemned the use of all chemical weapons in Syria regardless of who uses such weapons. Moreover, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013) unanimously, imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in case of the non-compliance of various parties with its provisions or the continued use in Syria of chemical weapons, which, as we have said, are internationally banned weapons. In order to ensure the implementation of that resolution, in August 2015 the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine those responsible for any crime involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In fact, the Mechanism identified the perpetrators of such crimes on several incidents. The unfortunate divide in the positions of the Council encouraged the parties to the crisis to continue their violations of resolutions of international legitimacy, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions. The most recent resolution 2401 (2018), adopted unanimously, is another example of resolutions being violated. It calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to allow for humanitarian access to the besieged areas. Unfortunately, that humanitarian resolution was not implemented, as we know. The State of Kuwait regrets this escalation and calls on members to overcome their differences within the Security Council and to restore the unity of the Council so that it can shoulder its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We also call on members to bridge the existing gap by establishing a new, independent, impartial and professional mechanism to investigate the use of any chemical weapons in Syria and to determine who is accountable for such crimes. We reiterate our full readiness to participate in any effort aimed at achieving a compromise among the positions of members of the Council so as to ensure that those who are responsible for these crimes will be held accountable and punished, and to preserve the non-proliferation regime. It is certain that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis. Intensive efforts must be made to spare the Syrian people further suffering. We reiterate our principled and firm position regarding the Syrian crisis, which is in line with the position of the League of Arab States calling for the preservation of the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria; putting an end to acts of violence and the killing; avoiding bloodshed; saving Syrian lives; and reaching a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the United Nations on the basis of the 2012 Geneva First Communique, and resolution 2254 (2015), through a process of political transition S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 16/26 18-10891 with the involvement of all Syrian parties so that the Syrian people can achieve their legitimate aspirations. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I would like to thank the Peruvian presidency for responding quickly to the request for the holding of this meeting, and we would like to express our appreciation to Russia for making the request. It would have been a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the Council if it had failed to meet in the light of what transpired yesterday. We also thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his presence today. For those of us who are elected members of the Security Council, the responsibility is indeed extremely heavy, to the point of being unbearable. Let us not forget that we are here representing 193 countries, to which, like permanent members, we have made solemn promises that are generally encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations. For those of us who are members of the African Union, an organization that for obvious historical reasons attaches huge importance to scrupulous adherence to the principles of the Charter, the obligation that we have to tell the truth and to stand up and be counted for peace is also enormously heavy — all the more so when the parties involved, from our own national perspective, are friends. It was only yesterday that the Secretary-General urged Member States to act responsibility in these dangerous circumstances and stressed the need to avoid the serious situation from spiralling out of control (see S/PV.8231); indeed, he repeated the same sentiment today. We have also been repeatedly expressing our concern that the dynamic in Syria could lead to devastating consequences not only nationally, but regionally and internationally. No doubt, the strike undertaken by the three countries yesterday appears not to have led to the situation spiralling out of control. We do not take that lightly, even though it might be difficult to be consoled by that fact in the light of the potential danger we still face. That is why we call for maximum restraint, the exercise of wisdom and a quick return to dialogue among the major powers that have enormous influence on the current situation in Syria. As we stressed yesterday and previously, it is absolutely vital to resume the path of diplomacy. The alternative is without a doubt catastrophic beyond our imagination. We hope that no one wants to see that happen, but it could if we do not act together with a huge sense of urgency to defuse the current tension and reduce further military escalation. By no means do we overlook the genesis of this tragedy we are facing. It has to do with the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma. At least, that is what ratcheted up the tension, leading to what took place yesterday, which is difficult to defend as being consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. But there is also one point that makes it difficult for us to understand what took place yesterday. The Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is arriving, or, as just said by the Secretary-General, has already arrived in Syria to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons, which is the cause of all this tension. In the light of that, you must excuse us, Mr. President, if we were a little perplexed. While the priority of the time is clearly to avert the further escalation of the latest development, we are not underestimating the importance of ensuring accountability for any confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should be allowed to conduct a thorough investigation to establish the facts related to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma. The sustainable way to end impunity, which we believe is extremely important, to deter and stop the use of chemicals as weapons is through united and concerted action, including through an attribution mechanism that the Council could and must set up. That has become all the more critical now, when, as we all know, truth is becoming very difficult to establish. An opportunity has been created for parties and even individuals to claim the veracity of their own facts. We know that we are all disappointed by the current deadlock, but that should not justify overlooking the obligation to adhere to the principles of the Charter. Let me conclude by referring to what the Secretary-General said yesterday. I wanted to refer to it again because it reflects the truth and is, therefore, worth repeating: "[T]he Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present." (S/PV.8231, p. 2) That is why we must appeal to the members of the Security Council, especially the Permanent Five, to help create a situation where diplomacy would have the upper hand and the primacy of politics will be our guide for coming out of what is a troubled moment in our 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 17/26 recent history. The Geneva process and Special Envoy de Mistura need the unqualified support of the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his statement, which clearly illustrates the perspective of the United Nations on this issue. What took place last night was clearly not a surprise to any member of the Security Council. It remained to establish only the day and the time. In fact, as we said in our statement yesterday (see S/PV.8232), we are concerned about the rhetoric that we are hearing and where it will lead us. It has now led us to where we feared and did not want to go — military attacks against Syria. Yesterday in this Chamber, Secretary-General António Guterres spoke about the memory of the Cold War, which in fact returned with a vengeance in the early hours of the morning, reminding the peoples of the world of the conflict of interests that still exists between two blocs. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has followed with great concern the reports on the attacks carried out by the United States, with the support of the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom. According to estimates, the coalition fired more than 100 cruise missiles and air-to-ground missiles from two United States naval ships stationed in the Red Sea, as well as from tactical warplanes that overflew the Mediterranean and B-1B bombers from another area. The coalition launched a coordinated attack on three targets, which included a scientific research centre in an area of Damascus, a facility to the west of Homs and a command post near that facility. While surgical and very selective, last night's strikes are a violation of Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles and norms of international law. It is important to recall that, according to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members of the Council must therefore refrain from creating situations of insecurity and instability. The Security Council should not highlight or disregard the fact that those strikes may have unpredictable and potentially tragic consequences for the Middle East by encouraging or justifying the development of nuclear programmes in order to prevent any further aggression. Experts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are already in Douma to carry out investigations. Until we have reliable and irrefutable proof of the alleged chemical attack in Douma last week, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is of the view that no aggression can be justified. Our delegation also reiterates that, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, in the case of any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it is imperative to seek a solution first and foremost through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means. History continues to show us that military interventions never resolves conflicts but, instead, cause them to proliferate and to continue, causing devastation and destruction. We must ensure that that does not happen again in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic. We again point out that the military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its consequences today should be a clear lesson to the international community. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea opposes the use of force in international relations. We accept its use only when it is in line with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. As we have already said, in the case of Syria, it would not bring about any substantial change in the overall situation in the country. We reiterate that political agreement is the only viable way to find a lasting solution to the Syrian problem. All the parties involved must resolve their differences through dialogue, agreement and consultation. That process requires the support of the international community. The failure of diplomacy only exacerbates the suffering of the Syrian people and is the highest expression of the Security Council's failure. Equatorial Guinea continues to believe that, in order to fully clarify the 7 April events in Douma, a thorough, impartial and objective investigation must be carried out in order to reach a reliable conclusion. We urge the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to promptly carry out an investigation and to report to the Security Council on its conclusions as soon as possible. We also again reiterate the urgent need to establish, under the auspices of the Secretary- General, a professional, independent and transparent investigative body to attribute responsibility for and identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons so that those responsible, whoever they are, are brought to international justice. Only in that way can that thorny issue achieve consensus and unity among the members of the Security Council. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 18/26 18-10891 I conclude my statement by reiterating the unequivocal position of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, which is that we wholeheartedly condemned the use of chemical weapons by whomever. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Cote d'Ivoire would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and for his briefing on the latest developments in Syria following the air strikes carried out by certain members of the Security Council during the night of Friday, 13 April. Côte d'Ivoire requests all the actors involved in the Syrian conflict at the various levels to show restraint and not to further complicate the disastrous situation in which the Syrian people find themselves. Weapons and bombs have struck Syria too often in disregard for our collective action towards peace. Is it necessary to recall that, by signing the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the founding Members sought to establish a new world order based on multilateralism and its resolve to make peace a universal common good, the maintenance of which was entrusted to the United Nations and the Security Council as its primary responsibility? The Secretary- General has just reminded us of that. In every situation in which the Charter of the United Nations has guided the action of the international community, respect for its principles has always enabled us to overcome the most inextricable challenges, thereby preventing many disasters for humanity. Based on its strong conviction in the virtues of multilateralism, my country therefore believes that resorting to force in order to maintain international peace and security must be authorized by the Security Council in order to preserve its essential legal authority and to thereby prevent any deviation or abuse. Only a Security Council that is strong and representative of our time will be able to mobilize all Member States of the United Nations in support of its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Côte d'Ivoire would therefore like to express its deep concern over the inability of the Council to relaunch the dialogue in Syria and to sideline the supporters of a military solution. Côte d'Ivoire would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, no matter who is responsible, and we call for the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to attribute responsibility and to bring those responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice in the appropriate international tribunals. In that context, my delegation reiterates its support for the investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to shed light on the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma in eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire once again urges the members of the Security Council to unite with a view to putting an end to their differences and to effect the establishment of this mechanism to establish responsibility, which all the members of the Council would like to see set up. Côte d'Ivoire would like to reassert its conviction and its position of principle that the response to the crisis in Syria cannot be a military response. Quite to the contrary; it must be sought in the framework of dialogue and an inclusive political process, as envisioned in the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015). The time has come to decisively give every opportunity for dialogue a chance and to make sure that the Council is in step with history. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. Peru notes with great concern the developments in Syria. In the face of military action, as a response to information on the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population in the country, we reiterate the need to keep the situation from spiralling out of control and causing a greater threat to stability in the region and to international peace and security. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons as an atrocity crime. For that reason, we have supported the urgent deployment to Syria of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, as well as the establishment of a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial attribution mechanism. We regret the stalemate in the Security Council and our inability to take a decision on the issue. In that regard, Peru encourages the Secretary-General to redouble his efforts in accordance with the prerogatives entrusted to him in the Charter of the United Nations with a view to helping to resolve the stalemate in the Council and to establish the attribution mechanism. Peru believes that any response to the crimes committed in Syria, as well as a solution to the conflict in Syria overall, must be consistent with the Charter, with international law and with the Council's resolutions. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 19/26 As the Secretary-General has reminded us, the Council is the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is up to its members to act in unity and to uphold that responsibility. Peru joins the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to all Member States to act with restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation reaffirms its commitment to continue working in order to achieve sustainable peace in Syria, to guarantee protection for the civilian population, to ensure that there is no impunity for atrocious crimes, as well as to help defuse the situation. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I should like to respond to the remarks made by the Ambassador of Bolivia about the United Kingdom. We have no doubt about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and surrounding maritime areas. Successive British Governments have made clear that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islanders voted overwhelmingly to maintain their current constitutional arrangements with the United Kingdom. Turning to the Chagos archipelago, the United Kingdom is participating in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice, even as we disagree with jurisdiction in that case. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I will be very brief and limit myself to reading out what it says in the special declaration on the question of the Malvinas Islands, signed by all the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Heads of State and Government: "Reiterate their strongest support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and the permanent interest of the countries of the region in the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland resuming negotiations in order to find — as soon as possible — a peaceful and definitive solution to such dispute, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations .". That would include in particular General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I welcome the presence of the Secretary- General at this very important moment in the history and the work of the Security Council. In his important statement yesterday, the Secretary-General warned that the Cold War had returned (see S/PV.8231). That is exactly right. We all agree with the relevance of this remark. I take this opportunity to recall those who relaunched the logic of the Cold War. Of course, we all remember, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, that a number of philosophical books were published here in this country, including The End of History and the Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama. Another author, American thinker Samuel Huntington, wrote an essay entitled The Clash of Civilizations. Those two works marked the return of the Cold War logic. Indeed, the message of those two books was as follows: To the people of the world, you must take the American approach and surrender to the American will or we will attack you. "My way or the highway", as the American saying goes. That marked the return of the Cold War philosophy. Lies serve no purpose. They serve the person who lies once and only once. Lies deceive only once. When a lie is repeated it becomes exposed and exposes the person who is lying. My colleague the Ambassador of France announced that the aggression of his country, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, was carried out on behalf of the international community. If that is the case, I wonder which international community my colleague the French Ambassador is speaking of. Is he speaking of a real international community that S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 20/26 18-10891 actually exists? Has the international community that he represents authorized this tripartite aggression against my country? Did their Governments obtain a mandate from this international community to attack my country? My American, French and British colleagues claimed that they have bombarded centres for the production of chemical weapons in Syria. If the Governments of these three countries knew the actual location of these production centres that they claim to have bombarded, why did they not share that information with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? Why did they not share this information with the Fact-finding Mission in Damascus before attacking my country? It is just a question I am putting to the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like to assure Council members that the OPCW investigation team arrived today at noon. Obviously, the team was delayed for a full day getting from Beirut to Damascus before the attack, for reasons that we do not know, as though the team was asked not to go to Damascus until after the bombing took place. But the team did reach Damascus today at noon and will hold a meeting in two hours, at 7 p.m., Damascus time, with the local authorities. My Government will, of course, provide every support to the team so that it may carry out its mission successfully. The facility of the Barzah Research and Development Centre, the building that was targeted by the tripartite aggression, was visited twice last year by experts from the OPCW. They inspected it, after which they gave us an official document stating that Syria had complied with its obligations under the OPCW and that no chemical activities had taken place in the inspected building. If the OPCW experts gave us an official document confirming that the Barzah Centre was not used for any type of chemical activity in contravention to our obligations with respect to the OPCW, how do Council members reconcile that with what we have heard this morning? How do they reconcile that with all the accusations and claims that the aggression targeted a chemical-weapons production centre? My American colleague said that the time for discussion is over — that it was over yesterday (see S/PV.8231). If that is so, then what are we doing today as diplomats an ambassadors at the Security Council? Our mission here is to speak, to explain what happened, to shed light on all the issues. We are not here in the Security Council simply to justify an aggression. How can we state that the discussion is over? No, the discussion is continuing in this Chamber, if the idea is to put an end to aggressions or to implement the provisions of the Charter and international law. That is why we are here. My British and French colleagues spoke of a plan of action and have invited the Secretary-General to implement it before the Council and the Syrian Government have agreed to it. Their plan of action is in fact a very strange one. But I would like to present on behalf of my Government a counter plan of action, which, I assume, should have been presented today. First, we should read the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and define and recall the responsibilities of the three States in maintaining international peace and security, rather than threatening it. I happen to have three versions of the Charter, two in English and one in French. Perhaps these three States should read what the Charter actually states. Secondly, these three States must immediately stop supporting the armed terrorist groups that are active in my country. Thirdly, they should put an end to the lies and fabrications being used to justify their aggression against my country. Fourthly, these three States should realize that, after seven years of a terrorist war that was imposed on my country, Syria, a war carried out by these three countries and their agents in the region, their missiles, airplanes and bombs will not weaken our determination to defeat and destroy their terrorists. This will not prevent the Syrian people from deciding their own political future without foreign intervention. I will repeat this for the thousandth time — the Syrian people will not allow any foreign intervention to define our future. I promised yesterday that we will not remain inactive in the face of any aggression, and we have kept our promise. I will explain how we have kept our promise. Allow me now to address those States that remain committed to international law. I would tell them that the Syrian Arab Republic and its many friends and allies are perfectly capable of dealing with the brutal aggression that my country has had to face. But what we are asking the diplomats and ambassadors today who are committed to international legitimacy and the Charter to call on the United States, Britain and France to read the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular those pertaining to respect for 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 21/26 the sovereignty of States and to the non-use of force in international relations. Perhaps the Governments of these three countries will realize, if only once, that their role in the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security rather than to undermine it. As I just said, I have three copies of the Charter, and I would ask the Council's secretariat to distribute them to the three delegations so that they might enlighten or awaken themselves from their ignorance and their tyranny. In flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States, Britain and France, at 3:55 a.m. on Saturday, 14 April, Damascus time, attacked the Syrian Arab Republic by launching some 110 missiles against Damascus and other Syrian cities and areas. In response to this terrible aggression, the Syrian Arab Republic has exercised its legitimate right in line with Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself, and we have defended ourselves against this evil attack. Syrian air defences were able to intercept a number of rockets launched by the tripartite aggression, while some of them reached the Barzah Centre in — not outside — the capital Damascus. The Centre in that location that includes laboratories and classrooms. Fortunately, the damage was only material. Some of those modern, charming and smart rockets were intercepted, while others targeted a military site near Homs, wounding three civilians. The Governments of these three States prepared for this evil attack by issuing aggressive statements through their senior officials, saying that their only excuse for preventing the advance of the Syrian Arab Army against armed groups was these allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Indeed, in a race against time, the armed terrorist groups did receive instructions from those aggressors to fabricate this charade of the use of chemical weapons in Douma. They found false witnesses and manipulated the alleged crime scene as they did before, which served as the pretext for this scandalous aggression. This can only be explained by the fact that the original aggressors — the United States of America, Britain and France — decided to interfere directly in order to avenge the defeat of their proxies in Ghouta. In fact, those who fabricated the charade of the chemical attack in Ghouta were arrested and admitted on television that it was a fabricated attack. We have a video of that if the presidency wishes to see it. I would like to draw the attention of those who align themselves with the Charter of the United Nations and international legitimacy to the fact that this evil aggression sends another message from those three aggressors to the terrorist groups that they can continue using chemical weapons in the future and committing their terrorist crimes, not against Syrian civilians only but in other countries. There is no doubt about that. In 146 letters we have drawn the Council's attention to the plans of the terrorist groups to use chemical weapons in Syria. There are 146 letters that have been sent to the Council and the Secretariat. Today, some Council members are suddenly reinventing the wheel. The Council knows that this aggression took place just as a fact-finding team from the OPCW was supposed to arrive in Syria at the request of the Syrian Government to examine the allegations of a chemical attack in Douma. Obviously, the main message that these aggressors are sending to the Council and to the world is that they are not actually interested in the Council's mandate and that they do not want a transparent and independent investigation. They are trying to undermine the work of the investigative mission and anticipating the results. They are trying to put pressure on that mission to conceal their lies and fabrications, just as happened six years ago, in 2013, when Mr. Sellström went to Khan Al-Assal from Damascus, as I have explained in a previous statement to the Council. This morning's attack was not just an attack on Syria, as my dear friend, the representative of Bolivia said; rather, it was an attack against the Charter, the Council, international law and 193 members of this Organization. The attempt by Washington, D.C., London and Paris to ensure the failure of the United Nations working groups and fact-finding missions is systematic. While those three States boast of their support for these bodies, behind the closed doors of the Organization they pressure and blackmail them not to carry out the mandates for which they were established. We recall what took place with the investigative missions in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia and Africa. No investigative mission can be successful if it is subjected to political blackmailing. It cannot succeed. Of the three aggressors, I say they are liars. They are compulsive liars. They are hypocrites. They are attempting to ensure the failure of any action of the Organization that does not serve their interests. Ever since the Organization was established, they have tried to undermine the efforts of international investigative bodies. They have tried to exploit them. I need only mention Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Africa. The aggressors exhausted the Council agendas for decades S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 22/26 18-10891 with their attempts to divert its attention from its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. They used the Council to pursue their aggressive policy of interference and colonialism. Yesterday, in the press of the United States and of the West, the main theme was lying in the context of a campaign that was claiming success, but they know it was a lie. While these three Governments were launching their evil aggression against my country, Syria, and while my country's air defence system was countering the attacks with a great deal of bravery — one hundred missiles were destroyed and did not reach their target — the American Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff were before the American and international press in an outrageous surrealist scenario. They were not actually able to answer objective questions. Millions of television viewers must have pitied those two men because they were like dunces, repeating phrases without any meaning, and were unable to respond to the legitimate questions of a journalist about their attempts to target chemical weapons facilities and the danger that posed to civilians if the alleged chemical weapons were to spread. They did not respond. They were also unable to respond to a journalist who asked the Secretary of Defense, "You said yesterday that you had no proof that the Syrian Government was responsible for the attack in Douma. What happened in the past few hours? What made you change your mind?" His answer was that he received confirmation from intelligence services. The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms this tripartite attack, which once again shows undeniably that those three countries pay no heed to international legitimacy, even though they repeatedly say they do. Those countries have revealed their belief in the law of the jungle and the law of the most powerful even as they are permanent members of the Security Council, an organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security and with stopping any aggression, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Syrian Arab Republic is disgusted by the scandalous position of the rulers in Sheikhdom of Qatar, who supported this Western colonial tripartite aggression by allowing planes to take off from the American Al Udeid air base in Qatar. It is not surprising that the little boys of the Sheikhdom of Qatar took that position. They have supported terrorist gangs, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others, in a variety of ways in order to destabilize Arab countries, including Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic is asking the international community, if it exists — we have heard a new definition of the international community today — and the Security Council to firmly condemn this aggression, which will exacerbate the tensions in the region and which is a threat to international peace and security throughout the world. I call upon those who are committed to international legitimacy to imagine with me the meeting in which the United States National Security Council decided to carry out this attack. I cannot help wondering what was said. "We have no legal basis for attacking Syria. We have no proof that a toxic chemical weapons attack took place in Douma, but let us set that aside. We did not need international legitimacy or any legal argument to conduct military interventions in the past." I am just imagining the discussion that might have taken place among them yesterday. "This military action is necessary for us and for our allies in order to distract public attention in our countries from the scandals involving our own political elite and ensure that the corrupt system in some Gulf States pays the price of such aggression. Most important is how to protect the terrorism that we have sponsored in Syria for years." The President (spoke in Spanish): Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/355, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation Against: Côte d'Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 23/26 Abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 3 votes in favour, 8 against and 4 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements after the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We voted against the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/355) because we believe that its language was unbalanced. It was not comprehensive and failed to address all of our concerns about the current situation. At the same time, we agree with the Secretary-General that actions must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in general. In our national statement delivered earlier today, we explained our view on the current situation in Syria and condemned the use of chemical weapons and the many other flagrant violations of international law in Syria. We also underscore the importance of a sustainable political solution. As members of the Security Council, we reiterate that we must unite and exercise our responsibility with regard to the situation in Syria. If there is any encouragement today, it is that it appears that everyone around the table insists on a sustainable political solution as the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian population. We therefore reiterate our full support for the United Nations political process, which must now be urgently reinvigorated, including through strong support for the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to explain why we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution proposed by Russia (S/2018/355). We abstained not because the text does not contain a great deal of truth — indeed it does — or because it does not adhere to principles to which we should all adhere; it does. We abstained on the grounds of pragmatism. We know that even if it had received nine votes, it would have been vetoed. Therefore it would have had only symbolic value. Nonetheless, that is not unimportant. However, for us, it is critical to defuse tensions and prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. We would like to play a constructive role in that regard. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan abstained in the voting today on draft resolution S/2018/355 because we believe that all disputes among States should be resolved through peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security. As I mentioned in my statement earlier today, we call for all parties to refrain from actions that could aggravate tensions and cause the situation to spiral out of control. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Our abstention reflects the frustration of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea with regard to the failure to adopt a resolution to establish an attribution and accountability mechanism to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. We reiterate our call for a consensus-based resolution that would establish that mechanism and prevent a repeat of the action we witnessed yesterday. In that regard, we recall that the Swedish initiative was endorsed by the 10 elected members of the Council. We could introduce the required changes into the draft resolution to enable its adoption by consensus, which would allow the mechanism to be established under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): The draft resolution submitted by Russia (S/2018/355) has just been categorically rejected. The result of the voting sends a clear message that the members of the Council understand the circumstances, reason for and objectives of the military action taken yesterday. The Council understands why such action, which has been acknowledged as proportional and targeted, was required. No one has refuted the fact that the use of chemical weapons cannot be tolerated and must be deterred. That is the key point. It is important that we now look towards the future. As I have just said, the air strikes were necessary and served to uphold international law and our political strategy to end the tragic situation in Syria. It is for that reason that, together with our American and British partners, France will work with all members of the Security Council to submit a draft resolution on the political, chemical and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict with a view to devising a lasting political solution to the conflict. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands voted against the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 24/26 18-10891 (S/2018/355) because the text does not provide for the urgent action that the Security Council must take in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It ignores the very essence of the action that must be taken by the Council. It should condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria, protect its people and hold accountable those responsible. Today's draft resolution does none of the above. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): Kuwait voted against draft resolution S/2018/355. At the time when the State of Kuwait reiterates its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use of force as a means to settle disputes and requires them to be settled by peaceful means, yesterday's use of force was the result of efforts to disrupt the will of the international community, specifically by hindering the Security Council in its determination to take measures at its disposal to end the ongoing use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons in Syria. That is a flagrant violation of resolution 2118 (2013), which unequivocally expresses the Security Council's intention to act under Chapter VII of the Charter when one party or several parties fail to comply with its provisions or in the case of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Council must once again show its unity and bear its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. It must agree on a new independent, impartial and professional mechanism for investigating any use of chemical weapons, bring those responsible for such crimes to account, and ensure that they do not enjoy impunity. We call for intensified efforts and a return to the political track, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim of reaching a peaceful settlement to the crisis based on the first Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has always opposed the use of force in the context of international relations. We advocate for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity, and the territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military action bypassing the Security Council runs counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violates the principles of international law and the basic norms governing international relations and, in the present case, will further complicate the Syrian issue. Based on that principled position, China voted in favour of draft resolution S/2018/355, proposed by the Russian Federation. I would like to emphasize here that a political settlement is the only viable pathway to solving the Syrian issue. China urges the parties involved to remain calm, exercise restraint, return to the framework of international law and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiations We support the role of the United Nations as the main channel for mediation, and we will spare no effort to reach a political settlement of the situation in Syria together with the international community. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today is the day when the Security Council and the world community should raise their voices in the defence of peace, security, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Every delegation in this Chamber is a sovereign country, and no one should attempt to pressure or dictate to any of us how to interpret international law and the Charter of the United Nations, or how to consult our own consciences. We have never hesitated to vote in accordance with the dictates of international law, the Charter, our conscience and truth. Today's meeting confirms that the United States, Britain and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, continue to plunge world politics and diplomacy into a realm of myths, myths that have been created in Washington, London and Paris. That is dangerous work, representing a kind of diplomacy that traffics in myths, hypocrisy, deceit and counterfeit ideas. Soon we will arrive at the diplomacy of the absurd. These three countries create these myths and try to force everyone to believe in them. We counter their myths with facts and a true picture of what is going on. But they do not want to see or hear. They simply ignore what they are told. They have come up with a legend about Russia as a constant wielder of the Security Council veto whom they purposely provoke into using the veto so as to then present themselves in a favourable light, especially right now. They are distorting international law and replacing its concepts with counterfeits. They are unabashedly hypocritical. They demand an investigation, and before the investigation has even started they name and punish the guilty parties. Why did they not wait for the result of the investigation that they themselves all called for? The Security Council is paralysed because of these countries' persistent deceptions both of us 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 25/26 and the international community. They are not only putting themselves above international law, they are trying to rewrite it. They violate international law and try to convince everyone that their actions are legal. The representative of the United Kingdom gave three reasons justifying the missile strikes based on the concept of humanitarian intervention. They are trying to substitute them for the Charter. That is why we and other countries did not support it then and do not support it now, because we do not want it to become the justification for their crimes. We demand once again that that they halt this aggression immediately and refrain from the illegal use of force in the future. Today we once again showed the whole world how we play our underhanded games. In Soviet times there was a pamphlet entitled Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From? that described Washington and the NATO countries' military preparations. Nothing has changed. The threat to peace comes from exactly the same place. Look at what they say and listen to the war drums that they are beating in Washington today in the guise of hypocritical concern for democracy, human rights and people in general. The five-minute rule in the latest presidential note's rules of procedure (S/2017/507) will not allow me to list them, because the list is too long. I could cite other examples, as for example how the President of France showed interest in a conversation with President Putin in an investigation in Douma and was ready to send French experts there when that idea suddenly disappeared. Because a different algorithm was put forward. That is obvious. Today is a sad day. It is a sad day for the world, the United Nations and its Charter, which has been blatantly violated, and the Security Council, which has shirked its responsibilities. I should like to believe that will not see another day as bad as today. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make another statement in my national capacity. Peru abstained in the voting because we believe that the draft resolution did not adequately reflect the need to guarantee due accountability for the use of chemical weapons throughout Syrian terrority and because its language is imbalanced and would not help to restore the Council's unity, which is critical to addressing the events in Syria in a comprehensive manner. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to make another statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I think it is obvious why we voted against the draft resolution. We support completely what the French representative laid out about next steps and we will work tirelessly to that objective, along with partners on the Council. The Russian Ambassador referred to myths. These are not our myths. The way forward in the Council has been blocked. The second of our own criteria for taking this action on an exceptional basis must be objectively clear. There is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. In the 113 meetings of the Council on Syria, I think that has been demonstrated absolutely crystally clear. The United Kingdom believes that it cannot be illegal to prevent the use of force to save lives in such numbers as we have seen in Syria. The reason we took this action — our legal basis — was that of humanitarian intervention. We believe that that is wholly within the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has ask for the floor to make a new statement. I now give him the floor. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I apologize for requesting the floor once again. The scene that we have just witnessed is quite sad. There are those in the Council who prefer to overlook an enormous elephant that we have spoken of before. The elephant is the direct American military occupation of one-third of my country's territory — a direct American military occupation of one-third of the Syrian Arab Republic territory. However, there are those who speak of minor details which they believe to be pivotal. No, the political scene is far more dangerous than that. We are a State whose sovereignty has been facing a direct military violation by a permanent member of the Council. That is the true scene, and not the allegations and the film prepared by the terrorist organization known as the White Helmets established by British intelligence. We need to focus on the main scene here. Some would claim that they are fighting Da'esh in Syria and Iraq. However they have given air cover to Da'esh. Whenever the Syrian Arab Army makes advances against Da'esh, United States, British and French war planes bombard our military sites. Why? To prevent our decisive victory against that entity. However, they failed S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 26/26 18-10891 and we were able to achieve victory against Da'esh with our brothers in Iraq in three years and not in thirty, as former President Obama predicted. We understand that the capitals of the three countries that launched the aggression against my country are frustrated. Some colleagues who voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/355) claim to support a political settlement. We tell them now, after their shameful vote against the draft resolution, that those who voted against it are no longer partners of the Syrian Government in any political process. The British Ambassador explained things about the Malvinas Islands. That testimony reveals the facts about the imperialistic policies of Britain. I am actually the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) and I work under the agenda of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. My task and that of my colleagues in the C-24 is to end colonialism throught the world. The Malvinas are on the list of territories that do not enjoy self-governance. We are working in accordance with the United Nations agenda to end the British occupation of the Malvinas. As for my colleague the Ambassador of Kuwait, I remind him — although he and his Government are well aware of it — that when my country participated in the liberation of Kuwait, we did not justify our principled position to the people of Kuwait. Our position was a principled one. We did not need draft resolutions, meetings or any tripartite aggression. We did not look into the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or undermine our national obligations to our brothers in Kuwait, nor did we join any bloc that was hostile to Kuwait. We fulfilled our national duty towards our brothers in Kuwait. The Ambassador of Kuwait will also recall that my country could have played a different role at the time and could have negatively impacted the peace, safety and security of Kuwait, but we chose not to do so. We acted pursuant to a national principled position that was not subject to negotiation or discussion. The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

Objetivos: Desarrollar una escala de probabilidad de morir por Infección respiratoria aguda en menores de un año, según los determinantes sociales de la salud. Metodología: Se revisó y analizó la información de la base de datos de la cohorte de nacidos vivos del 2011 en Bogotá, incluyendo 106.758 menores de edad, para establecer un modelo de regresión de Cox, que prediga la mortalidad por infección respiratoria aguda. Resultados: El riesgo de morir fue 2,5 veces entre los de bajo peso al nacer, ( 2500 gr), (IC 95% 1.3-4.66), en presencia de prematurez, HR 2,67 (IC 95% 1.4-5.09), pertenecer al sistema general de seguridad social subsidiado, riesgo HR 2.6 (IC 95% 1.62-4.15) y residir en localidades tales como: Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Santa Fe, Usme, Rafael Uribe, Barrios Unidos y Teusaquillo, riesgo HR 4,8 (IC95% 1.9-12). La escala de vulnerabilidad, predijo mejor el riesgo de morir por IRA, al comparar con los no fallecidos, que al comparar con los fallecidos por otras causas y presentó una discriminación aceptable. Conclusiones: Este estudio permitió identificar y cuantificar el peso de determinantes que se pueden relacionar con la predicción de muerte por IRA en menores de un año en Bogotá, los cuales han sido descritos por otros estudios a nivel mundial. Palabras clave: (MeSH terms): Proportional hazards models, Infant mortality, Respiratory Tract Diseases, Pneumonia, Social Determinants of Health. ; Abstract. Objectives: To develop a scale of probability of dying for acute respiratory infection in children under one year, according to the social determinants of health. Methodology: Data from the 2011 live birth cohort database in Bogotá, including 106,758 minors, were reviewed and analyzed to establish a Cox regression model predicting mortality from acute respiratory infection. Results: The risk of dying was 2.5 times among those with low birth weight (2500 g), (95% CI 1.3-4.66), in the presence of prematurity, HR 2.67 (95% CI 1.4-5.09 ), belong to the general subsidized social security system, risk HR 2.6 (IC 95% 1.62-4.15) and to reside in localities such as Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Santa Fe, Usme, Rafael Uribe, Barrios Unidos and Teusaquillo, risk HR 4,8 (95% CI 1.9-12). The vulnerability scale, better predicted the risk of dying from ARI, compared with those who did not died, compared to those who died from other causes and presented acceptable discrimination. Conclusions: This study allowed us to identify and quantify the weight of determinants that can be related to the prediction of ARI death in children under one year of age in Bogotá, which have been described by other studies worldwide. Key words: (MeSH terms): Proportional hazards models, Infant mortality, Respiratory Tract Diseases, Pneumonia, Social Determinants of Health. ; Maestría

Transcript of an oral history interview with W. Russell Todd conducted by Joseph Cates at the Sullivan Museum and History Center on May 16 and May 19, 2016, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project. W. Russell Todd graduated from Norwich University in 1950 and was president of the university from 1982 to 1992. In his interview, he discusses his thirty-two years of active duty in the U.S. Army as well as his experiences at Norwich University. ; 1 W. Russell Todd, NU '50, Oral History Interview Interviewed on May 16, 2016 and May 19, 2016 At Sullivan Museum and History Center Interviewed by Joseph Cates JOSEPH CATES: This is Joseph Cates. Today is May 16th, 2016. I'm interviewing General Russell Todd. This interview is taking place at the Sullivan Museum and History Center. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. OK, first tell me your full name. RUSSELL TODD: William Russell Todd. JC: When were you born? RT: I was born on the first day of May, 1928, in Seattle, Washington. JC: What Norwich class are you? RT: Class of 1950. My father was 26. My son was -- I'll think about that. JC: Well, we'll get back to that. Tell me about where you grew up and your childhood. RT: For the first year of my life we lived in Seattle, Washington. Dad had a job with a lumber company out there, getting experience to come back to work for his father, who ran a lumber company just outside Milton, Massachusetts. So I grew up for the first nine or ten years in Milton, Massachusetts, a very nice place, right on the edge of where Mattapan and Milton come together. There was a lot of traffic. Well, just for an example, during that period of time I came up with my dad to his fifteenth reunion, and the difference in traffic between where we lived and what we found up here was considerable. When I got back to school on Monday the teacher said, "Russell had a day off. He's now going to tell us what he saw." Well, nothing came to mind, and I stood and told them that I had seen something they had never seen, miles and miles and miles of dirt roads. Now I live on one. (laughs) JC: Was that the first time you were ever at Norwich? RT: Yeah. JC: What was your impression of it when you first saw it? RT: It was a very interesting period of time. It was just before World War II affected the United States, and many, many people were sending their sons to Norwich -- rather than perhaps better prepared schools -- because they could get a commission. They assumed that everyone was going to go to war, and the opportunity of getting an education and a commission together at the same time really appealed to a lot of people. Our football team got everybody we wanted of great quality. We won all the games in that time 2 frame. And we had some very, very fine people who came back in 1946, the year I entered the university, and they made a big impression on my life. JC: I'm sure. I assume the buildings were the same. There weren't any new buildings between the time that you went and -- RT: As a matter of fact it was 1941 I believe, and two buildings on the main parade ground were being dedicated. One wasn't quite finished, and the other was, and two new dormitories shows you an example of what I was saying, how it was a golden period in Norwich's history. But saying that, the opposite is true when the war ends. You remember that we had, what, 15 cadets come up here after the Civil War. They all got off the train, (laughs) yeah, we don't think much about that. It's happened each time there's been a war. The incentive, or the idea, or the concept of perhaps having to serve didn't appeal to a lot of people at the end of wars. JC: Right. You kind of have a boom before the war and a bust after the war. RT: Yeah. JC: What made you decide to come to Norwich? RT: I think probably that trip did, that and the fact my dad was always talking about it. He would make us on Saturday nights -- eating beans and franks -- to sing Norwich songs around the table. (laughs) JC: Do you remember any of those Norwich songs? RT: There's a good one. What is it? "Oh, My First Sergeant" "Oh, my first sergeant, he is the worst of them all. He gets us up in the morning before first call. It's fours right, fours left, and left foot into line. And then the dirty son of a buck, he gives us double time. Oh, it's home, boys, home. It's home we ought to be. Home, boys, home, in the land of liberty. And we'll all be back to Norwich when the sergeant calls the roll." JC: That's wonderful. (laughter) I've heard in some of the oral histories "On the Steps of Old Jackman," but I haven't heard that one before. (Todd laughs) So when you came here with your father, was that during homecoming? RT: Well, homecoming and graduation were the same period of time. It was fascinating to me. It was a cavalry school. They had all kinds of drills that we went to and watched, and prizes were awarded. People loading up the water-cooled submachine guns on horseback and racing around, then taking them down, and putting in ammunition blanks, and firing -- you know, first, second, and third prizes kind of thing. Oh, yeah, that impressed me. Then, of course, the parades were fun to see. But it took about three days to get through graduation and homecoming as a single entity. JC: When you came to Norwich what did you major in? 3 RT: That's an interesting story. As I said, Norwich was having trouble at that time recruiting people, and I got recruited by the president of the university. We met in Boston, and he asked me all the things I was interested in, and to him it looked like I should be an engineer, and he wanted me to take an exam that would carry that forward. Well, I took the exam, and I became an engineer, and about the first part of the second semester I discovered you really had to do the homework. I really didn't like that much, and I wasn't doing very well, so I changed my major to history and economics. I really found that fascinating. JC: Well, tell me about what it was like being a rook here. RT: Yeah, another interesting thing. I was sold on the rook system, and my dad had always talked about it. When he brought me up here, people would drop off their suitcases, and go right out onto the parade ground, and start being ordered around by the corporal. I thought that was great. I never seemed super. But I didn't have many followers on that. I was very anxious that my father leave, and get out of there, and go home, and I convinced him to do that. But after, oh, maybe a month the class, who had elected class officers by that time, called a class meeting, and we all got together -- I've forgotten where now. "We got to stop this. We got to tell these guys we're not going to put up with this nonsense. We've got to show our power." I stood up and said, "Gentlemen, this isn't what we want to do. We want to put up. We want to show him we can do it," and I got booed right off the stage. However, they eventually made me class secretary, so I didn't lose all my friends that day. (laughs) JC: Now let's talk about post-war Norwich, because you did say there's kind of a bust. There isn't as many people. RT: Yeah, I think we had 200 in our class, and there was no really classes of Bubbas. Norwich toward the end of the war, when they were really desperate to get money to pay salaries to the faculty, had a high-school level. I think it was two years, the high-school level, and many people went into that and came up here, and that toward the end made some income for the university. But what it did for us, as an incoming class of freshmen, we had our officers, lieutenants, who were younger than we were, but they'd been here two years. You know, that didn't sit over very well either. That was difficult. JC: And the cavalry was still here at that time. RT: It was, yeah, for the first two years of my term and tenure at Norwich, at that point. JC: What do you remember about the horse cavalry? RT: Oh, my God. Oh, my God. Well, let's just put it this way. The first person I visited in Northfield when I came back as president was my old sergeant [Kenoyer?], who we hated. He was tough. But on the other hand, we really liked him, and I felt very, very sorry for him, and I really wanted to see him. His son had won entry into West Point, and 4 about two nights before he was to report in he and a bunch of his buddies were in an automobile accident. I think they were hit by a train and killed. Sergeant [Kenoyer?] was never the same after that. He continued to ride horses in the parades in Northfield and that kind of thing. But he was a character. His education was perhaps at the level he was working, taking care of the horses, and taking care of the riding. He was a good man, but, for example, I had a roommate named George Pappas who was scared to death of the horses, and some of the horses knew it. They knew when you were afraid. And old George would step into the stable area, ready to put on the harness, and that old horse would just back him into the wall and lean on him -- oh, you win. Then, of course, [Kenoyer?] would come by and say, "Kick him in the neb with your knee!" Well, no one was going to do that, trapped in there. So George, he decided that he would skip equitation classes, and instead he took 10 demerits for every single class that he was supposed to be at, and he spent his first semester walking around the parade ground on Saturdays carrying a rifle, doing tours. Many things can be said about George. That's a whole other story of absolute wonder. But it was difficult. We only went down once a week actually to use them, but there really wasn't a hell of lot you can learn in one-hour time once a week. But toward the end of the freshman year we were out trotting around in the neighborhoods, etc. I remember one time one of the captains in the Army ROTC program there, officers, Army officers, lead us on a parade, and we went out across the railroad tracks and up into the hills. And on the way back the horses got the idea they themselves would like to jog back to the stables, and we came charging down that hill totally out of control. Some of the horses and men went all the way to downtown before they came under it. I went through the football practice. (laughs) It wasn't everything it was cracked up to be. Now there were some people here, including a classmate by the name of Bob [Bacharat?] [00:13:18] who really was a polo player. He came from Switzerland. I think that's the reason he came to Norwich was to be able to play polo, and we played polo in that time frame with people like Miami who flew their horses up here. Now, I never saw the plane, but we were told all this and a few years earlier, before the war, that Norwich was playing the big colleges and winning. Toward the end of the first year we played something called broom polo, which they'd throw out a basketball on the floor, and then you'd have to hit it with a broom to get it to go to the goal. Those kinds of things were fun to watch. I remember one time George, my roommate, in skipping class went up into the stands, which are on the south end of the hall, but up above in a balcony, and he opened the window and got a snowball, several of them, and put them up there. When somebody would go by, the stove down on the floor -- there were four stoves in that place -- they'd get red hot, but they really didn't make a hell of a lot of difference when the temperature was 30 below or whatever it might have been outside. And the horses, when you'd take them from the stable to the riding hall, would fight you all the way; they didn't want to go out in that cold. But George, on one occasion, dropped snowballs on those red-hot stoves, and you can imagine, they hissed. As the horse went by, this great hiss came out, and the horse would throw the guy, or run for the far -- I went hell bent for election to the far wall. And when he stopped, I went right up onto his neck and was hanging on. Sergeant [Kenoyer?] came over and gave me hell, you know, "You didn't take control of that horse." (inaudible) [00:15:36] There are people lying down all 5 around, and the horses are running around. Well, there's a certain romance in having the horses, so long as you're sitting in the stands watching a polo game. (laughs) JC: Had you ever ridden a horse before? RT: No, never. JC: So you didn't have any experience with horses. RT: Neither did anybody else. Yeah, yeah. They were wonderful animals though, for the most part. JC: Now you said a lot of the people that were there before the war came back after the war to finish up. RT: Mm-hmm. A lot may be too much of an adjective to use, but Alumni Hall was essentially filled with non-married veterans, or veterans who hadn't brought their wives back. Civilian clothes and having nothing to do with the military. The rest of the dormitories were filled with 200 and whatever it was cadets, and the very few upperclassmen like the one I mentioned who came up through the high school route. We didn't have a lot to do with them, and they were very serious about their studies in the classrooms, very serious about their studies. The fraternization took place after the first of the year when we could go into a fraternity house, and I remember the older veterans -- older, 22 maybe -- who were in Theta Chi, where I was, were a remarkable bunch of people and very, very much appreciated. They didn't always come to dinner with us, but they were in the house and participated with it. They ranged all the way from a parachutist in Europe to a lieutenant colonel in the air force. So that's a big gap. But they were great guys who made fraternity life reasonable. JC: Well, tell me about Theta Chi. Why did you choose that one? RT: Oh, yeah, the same old story, the same reason I came here. My dad was a Theta Chi. Why, of course that's what I'd do. This is my father's fraternity, you know. JC: So what were the fraternities like? RT: They weren't too bad. When General Harmon eliminated them, I thought it was the right thing to do, because there weren't fraternities at other military colleges. And when they were started I really believe they were very useful. They were much more an eating club, and since there wasn't a mess in the university in the 1850s. If you look into some of the old records you'll see at graduation time they invited the alumni back to have dinner, and they had dances. They had inter-fraternity baseball and football, etc. We were trying at my time, in my fraternity, to replicate that. It wasn't perhaps as successful as it might have been. It was great fun to beat SigEp in baseball or something. But it was a different part of the university. I remember one time when I was a corporal, and one of the men in the rank under me, in the barracks, was in the fraternity. We get down to the fraternity, 6 and he would give me a hard time for giving him a hard time. It wasn't what I thought it should be, but it was a good time. I mean, don't misunderstand me. Well, it was a fraternity. (laughs) The girls came in by train, if they were away. Carol came up several times on a train to spring break, or a winter carnival, and that kind of thing. That was good sport to have a place where we could party. There was no drinking - baloney, there wasn't. (Coates laughs) I remember one time we were having lunch, and one of the seniors, one of the veterans that had come back, was the president of the house, and he said, "Our Theta Chi member on the faculty, old Professor Woodbury, is going to be our chaperone for the party. Does anybody know Professor Woodbury?" "I know Professor Woodbury. My father told me about him. I've met him once." He said, "Good. You and your date will sit in the living room with the Woodburys while we're down in the basement drinking." (laughter) It wasn't much fun that night. We had the bars hidden behind sliding doors, or doors that pulled down, and all this kind of stuff, so if we got word that there was someone from the faculty coming we could close it up and all sit down, smile, and look like there was no alcohol in the place. JC: Can you tell me a little bit about winter carnival and some of the dances that you all had? RT: They were good sport. Much of the fun though centered around the fraternity at that time. Yes, of course we went to the dance, etc., but before going to the dance we probably went to the fraternity, and certainly after the dance we went to the fraternity, and that was really good sport. In my senior year my roommate, Rollin S. Reiter, from Ohio decided that in his fraternity they were going to have a special Christmas party. Now, it didn't make an awful lot of sense, because it was right at exam time. We took exams right in that time frame, so he really had to work to get these guys. They were going to do it in tuxedoes, not in our uniforms, so that slowed it down a little, too. But one of the guys, Chubby Jordan, who has since passed away, he was a brigadier general in the Massachusetts National Guard later on, an ex-marine. He didn't want to go do it, so they convinced him that he had to do it, and they would get him a date. When he went to the fraternity house, he was introduced to the worst looking girl in the place, and he immediately started drinking beer and avoiding her and all this. It wasn't even the girl they were going to match him up with, and they just were teasing him something awful. When he got very sleepy they put him on the pool table, laid out flat like in a mortuary and put two lit candles, one at either end of him on the pool table. It was a sight for sore eyes. (laughs) JC: I bet it was. Now you were on the rook committee while you were there? RT: Yeah. In my sophomore year I was the head of the rook committee, elected by the class. During the summer period of time I had to get together with the printers and the university and go through this business. There were big posters that said "Beware, Rook, Beware," and then they listed all the things down. We'd get them printed up here by John Mazuzan down in the Northfield Press, and then we'd sell them to the rooks at $1 apiece. I don't know what we did with the money, in the class coffers I guess. Yeah. I remember that President Dodge, who had no military experience previous, but was a very, very well known scientist and had been the dean of one of the big Midwestern schools in that area, 7 he was brought in by some hefty people on the board of trustees. He didn't fit. He didn't understand us. He was a great academic and did some very fine things for the university. But he called me in one day, as head of the rook committee, and said, "When will this period end?" This was right after supper. I said to him, "Sir, it's very clear. It's right on the chart." He said, "I want it to end at Thanksgiving." I said, "Sir, I don't think you're talking to the right guy. You should really be talking to the commandant of cadets, your left-hand man." He said, "Well, I don't know if I can convince him," and I thought, oh, my God, what have we got here, you know. (laughter) He was a fine gentleman, but the minute it was possible for the alumni to discover that General Harmon might be available, in May of my senior year, Dodge was gone. The alumni just -- it wasn't working the way they wanted to see it work. JC: So Harmon was not president any of the time that you were here? RT: His inauguration was held at the same time as my graduation. It was one thing. He had been here for maybe a month, and I remember that we had a football banquet, and they invited General Harmon to come. And he stood up and told us all that he had been here as a cadet, and he had come back in 1935 as the commandant of cadets, and he loved and understood this university, and he was going to make it famous, you know, kind of, "Yeah!" Just the kind of story we needed. Then he told us a story that just curdled me. It was a dirty story. I'd never heard some guy stand up in a dinner and tell a dirty story. It sort of surprised me. He had that reputation. As a matter of fact, one time later in my career, when I was in the army, I was asked by my boss if I would go back to Hamilton, Massachusetts, where I had lived at one time and see Mrs. George Patton, and tell her that her son-in-law -- as a brigadier general -- was about to be sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky. He was married to one of Patton's daughters, and he is now a bachelor. I was to go with three sets of quarters' plans and say, "Which of these, General, would you choose, because we at Fort Knox can now get the house painted up and ready for you, and all this kind of stuff ahead of time?" Well, Mrs. Patton agreed. When the time actually came general orders was late in his itinerary and couldn't be there, so she said, "Why don't you and Carol just come to dinner, and we'll talk about this? I will pass your message to Johnny when he comes through next week, and your leave is over." So that was just fine. But we had a quiet period in that Mrs. Patton was at one end of a long table, and I was at the other end, and Carol was in the middle, and there was a little old maid with a bonnet on her head, and an apron moving around quietly around the room. Everything went silent, and I said, "I can handle this." I said to Mrs. Patton, "Mrs. Patton, do you happen to know General Harmon?" And she said, "Indeed, I do, Russell, and he's a very disgusting man." (laughter) Now as it turns out, she gave an award right after that, she gave an award at Norwich of a similar pistol of General Patton's famous (inaudible) [00:29:38] to the leading cadet. But she was clear. (laughter) JC: Yeah, I've heard stories about General Harmon. RT: He did a great job. He stayed too long, but he did a great job. 8 JC: Well, what clubs were you in when you were here at Norwich? RT: Yeah, I went out for football. I'd come from a little school in Wenham, Massachusetts, where we played six-man football, and if one guy was sick, it didn't look like we were going to play, you know, kind of thing. I went out for football in Beverly High School, and that was danger. I mean, I wasn't up to that. When we got to Norwich I said, "I'm going back out for football. This looks like --" They were mostly freshmen. There were some veterans that came back, and there were some very good veteran players who came back but weren't interested in playing football. They wanted to study and have a family life. So Norwich had a terrible football team during that period of time. About the second day of practice Joe Garrity, who'd been a friend of my dad's who I had known, put his arm on my shoulder as we walked back to the locker room and said, "I've got a job for you." And I thought to myself, I'm going to be quarterback for the freshman team. And he said, "You're my manager, how about that?" and I said, "Oh, OK." Later in life, when I became president, the alumni director here, Dave Whaley, took me out to visit various alumni clubs. In Chicago a fellow named Hale Lait, who played football and was co-captain in his senior year, started to walk up to us, and Dave says, "Mr. Lait, do you know General Todd?" Hale Lait says, "Shit, he used to wash my jock." (laughter) And it was true! We had a big laundry over there. JC: Were you in any other clubs while you were here? RT: Yeah, I'd have to think upon it. We had an international relations club that I became president of at some point of time under -- oh, come on, his name is skipping me. I'll come back to it. But we brought I people to speak on the issues, and then Norwich formed an alliance with the other colleges where we were all working together, and that was sort of fun working that out. Oh, incidentally, when I was manager for the freshman team I had to write all the letters to the other schools and make all the arrangements, all that kind of thing. It sort of surprised me that the university wasn't doing that; the athletic department wasn't doing that. JC: Did you have a favorite professor when you were here? RT: Yeah, and I just told you I couldn't remember his name. (laughter) Sidney Morse. JC: Oh, OK. RT: Old Sidney Morse was a terrible lecturer, but he was a genius, you know. He understood American history, and that was his forte, and he also was a wonderful human being and understood us. He really got me to dig in and start getting decent grades. He would lecture, but he would have side comments on this thing, and there we are taking notes left and right. I never wanted to miss a class under any circumstances. He invited some of us -- one of them being me -- over to dinner, and he was just a great sport. He was not a big man in stature, but a big man in intellect. JC: Was there a professor you particularly didn't like? 9 RT: Oh, there were some who I'd rather not name who I didn't appreciate or think that they were at the level they should be. JC: What was the favorite class you ever took here? RT: I guess it was history. That's what I worked at. Let me go back to what I didn't like. We lost -- somehow, I don't know how -- one of the economics professors, and President Dodge brought in somebody in mid-semester, and this guy had written many books and was well appreciated around the world, but he was terrible. He couldn't remember any names, he refused to take any attendance, so people didn't come. You could answer him back and forth. I was told, I can't vouch for this, I was told by the people that say they did it. They invited him out the night before his final exam to join them for dinner in Montpelier, and when the time came, they picked up the tip, and went down to the railroad station, and put him on a train going to Montreal. (laughter) I believe it was true. But he just wasn't accustomed to teaching at our level in that circumstance. He was someone that should have continued writing his books. He was essentially a sociologist, but that was a while. I got called in by the dean for skipping class, and the dean was a great guy at that time. I was a little embarrassed by it, but the class was mostly veterans in this particular -- in economics. You know, they had their way. They weren't required to come to class. If they didn't come to class it chalked up one of a series you could have freer, but cadets didn't have that, so I just played like I was a veteran to old Mumbles [McLeod?]. That's what they called him, Mumbles. When the dean called me in, I got right back on it. JC: Decided you'd rather go back to class. RT: Yeah. JC: Did you ever get in much trouble when you were here? RT: Not really. I came close a number of times. Well, let me go back and talk about Carol. Carol and I met one time when we were in about the ninth grade. She was in Beverly, Massachusetts, and we were living in Hamilton, Massachusetts, at the time, and the Congregation youth groups met at a third place, Essex, Massachusetts. There were lots of people of our ages. You know, these groups didn't know each other. And I spotted her. She was -- wow! Wow, yeah. But I never got to speak to her before we broke up and went back. A couple of years later in Beverly High School -- we'd moved to Wenham, and Wenham didn't have a high school, so I went to Beverly High School. Todd with a T and Wyeth with W happened to have lockers opposite each other on the wall, and I said, "My God, there's that girl." I went over and spoke to her, and she invited me to her birthday party, and that'll show it all started with us. But it came to a point in our sophomore year when I had changed from engineering into history and economics. I had to make up some subject material that I didn't get in the first part, and I went to the University of New Hampshire trying to make it up. I went down on the weekend to her house in Beverly, and I stayed with her aunt 10 who lived next door. She was on my team. But Carol when we were -- she said, "Let's stop this tennis game for a minute. I want to talk to you." We walked up to the net, and she said, "You know, I'm through with this relationship. You're never going to be serious about anything you do in your life; you're going to be a perennial sophomore. I want to do more with my life than you are going to do, and this isn't going to work out." OK, I'll show you. I came back and studied like hell for the last two years I was here and sort of caught up. But it was interesting, when I was invited back at graduation time to be the officer who commissions everybody, and at that time the university ordered a master's or a PhD, you know, honorary to the speaker. Loring Hart didn't tell me whether I was supposed to say anything or not, so I had in my pocket a little thing I would say. It went something like this. It is indeed an honor to be here. I represent my classmates in this ceremony, and I'm very proud of the way Norwich is moving. But I would like you to know that 25 years ago, this very day, I received a letter from the committee on academic degrees and standings that read to this effect: "Dear Cadet Todd, The committee has met and has agreed to allow you to graduate (laughs) based on the circumstances that were not your fault." (laughter) So, you know, that's the way life went for me. I dug in and did relatively well. But another interesting thing about that. I don't know about anybody else, but I had a picture in my mind of VMI, and the Citadel, and all these places as being superior to Norwich in their military training, etc. But when I got in the army I discovered that 50% of them were duds, and it just changed my life around and my feelings about my institution. Yeah, it was strange. JC: When you graduated from Norwich what was the first -- you went into the army. RT: Yeah. JC: Did you go straightaway into the army, or was there a period? RT: Well, some of us -- I think it was 12, maybe as many as 15 -- received an opportunity to go into the regular army, not into the reserve army. I was one of those. About half of my classmates who were given that ability to do that chose not to do it, so there were a number of us that went. Upon graduation we received our commission in the United States Army Reserve, and then two weeks later I was brought into the regular army with another commissioning thing, which happened to be by my father's Norwich roommate, Colonel [Rice?] in Boston. He was running something in Boston for the army at the time. That was sort of fun. Then I went immediately off. We graduated about 15 or 17 May or something, June rather. On the second day of July, I reported in to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment Light at Fort Meade, Maryland, as one of these people you had a regular army commission. So there wasn't any time -- there was time enough in between that the family all went down to Cape Cod for a two-week vacation, but I graduated and went into the army. JC: Now did you get married before you were in the army? 11 RT: No, no. No, no. I was still trying to get back in Carol's good graces. Before I left -- well, I went, as I said, to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Now the army was doing something really stupid at that time. They had been told to reduce the army's personnel requirements, and rather than reducing in any reasonable way, they chose to take one-third of every squad, one-third of every company, one-third of every battalion, one-third of every regiment. It was a paper army. It couldn't really operate well at all. But when the war broke out in Korea they took from those drawn-down forces and sent them over as individual replacements, supposedly to go into units that also had the same kind of vacancy that was created now. So we had almost no reasonable training while I was in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment before going to Korea, and these people went into units for which they were not trained. The army was really messed up, really messed up. General Abrams one time in discussing this with a group of officers, after he'd become chief of staff of the army, had tears running down his face. "No army should ever do that to its people. There is no excuse for it, and as long as I'm chief of staff I guarantee you that our units will be ready to fight, if we have to fight." You know, oh. It was a terrible mess over there. So before leaving that unit in which I had a miserable career for that short period of time. For example, it wasn't two weeks later that the post's military police battalion left Fort Meade and went to Korea. Company A of my organization, of which I was a lieutenant, became the post's military policemen. Now, we know nothing about being the post's military policemen, not a thing. There wasn't anything in ROTC, there wasn't anything that lead us to believe. What I knew about policing was I'd seen in movies, and I hid behind the "Welcome to Fort Meade" sign in my sedan, and chased down someone that was speeding, and discovered it was the chief of staff of the post. At midnight I went over and had a bed check in the post's prison, to see that there weren't any knives in there. But I got called in and said, "Hey, come on, get off it. You can go to jail for what you're doing," you know. (laughs) It was crazy. I was trying to do my job as I knew it, but no one was there to supervise me in any way. JC: And how long were you doing that? RT: I left there in September. I went in in July, left in September, and got to Korea in late November, first having leave and then going to the West Coast, going through the checks and balances of travel over there. Just about that time MacArthur announced that the war would be over by Christmas, and as a result the army slowed down the number of replacements they were sending over. This was just about the time that the marines invaded Inchon, and it was followed up with the 7th Division behind them, and trapped the North Vietnamese soldiers below us. It was really a magnificent maneuver. So we were just sitting around in California waiting to get orders. Every weekend we'd go into town, and we'd go into some bar and then talk out loud about how we've got to go, and waiting to go to war, this kind of thing. Somebody would pick up the bar tab. (laughs) Then we crossed the Pacific during a hurricane, and that was something most unusual, as you might imagine. The piano broke loose in the lounge. It had been a troop transport in World War II, and they converted it to be a troop ship but for families to go to Japan or other places. At that time these ships were the property of the army, it wasn't the navy. 12 I remember distinctly there was a captain on board, mostly lieutenants, but this captain on board was a ranger, and he'd a big, puffed-up chest, and walked among us, and told us to stand up straight, and "Take your hands out of your pockets." When he'd get tired of doing that he decided we should have bayonet drill, and issued the bayonets, put them on our rifles, and went up on the deck. Oh, God. I said, "I'm not playing this game." There was a ladder still going up the funnel, in wartime where they had a station to look for submarines, OK. I went up there while everybody else was screaming and hollering down below and got away with it. It's a wonder I ever went anywhere in the army. (laughs) JC: So what was Korea like? RT: Well, let me describe it. We arrived the day before Thanksgiving in Inchon, got off the boat. There was a long, long tidal process; the ship couldn't get close to the docks or anything else. So they threw the nets over the side, and we were to go over the side of the ship and climb down into a small boat to go in. But we had all our personal gear with us. We were carrying great bags of stuff. I had two bottles of whiskey in my bag, and some damn fool says, "Drop your bag into the boat." I did. (laughs) But as a matter of fact, they took our uniforms away from us at that time and said, "We will hold them here, because if everybody goes home at Christmas it won't affect you for a while, and you'll be in a regular army uniform." But we got on the boats and went on the shore. They fed us what was left over from the Thanksgiving dinner, and a lot of canned fruits, put us on a train, and sent us up to North Korea. Each of us, each lieutenant, was on an open freight car, you know, enclosed but with doors on both sides, and each one of them had a little stove in it. It was cold, and we headed north, and every time the hospital train came south on that one track we would pull over maybe an hour before it came by, and then stick around and get back onto the thing. In my one car I had 27 people. Those cars were small. They were Japanese-style freight cars, and they were small. We had nothing but straw on the floor and a sleeping bag, but it was a summer sleeping bag, not a winter sleeping bag, and the stove didn't really heat the thing at all. There were slots in the side of the thing. Anyway. We didn't have any ammunition, and we would get shot at on the train. Now, nobody I know of got hit, but it made quite an impression. But still they didn't issue us any ammunition. There was a major in charge, and he was in the last car, which was a caboose kind of car, tight, a good stove, etc., etc. So whenever the train stopped we as lieutenants would run back and sit in his car with him and then take off again. Many of the soldiers would get off and run in to find somebody in the little town we stopped in and buy rot-gut whiskey. Boy, they were in trouble. One of the people in the car behind me, I was told, went blind on the spot. Maybe he was cured later, but it made an impression. We finally got to the capital of Pyongyang, and they put us on trucks and took us to what used to be a hospital. We went on about the fourth floor and were on cots, or on the floor, kind of thing, and at midnight that night some captain in the army came in and said, "OK, everybody out. Get down on the truck below. Let's go. Get your gear together." Well, we all didn't get there first, and the last of us were turned around and sent back. That batch was never heard from again. The next morning we were loaded on trucks and sent up. But before going they fed us a good breakfast. We went down into 13 the basement of this place -- it was steaming and dark down there -- and we had breakfast on some slate or granite tables. Steam is pouring out of the coffee pots, etc., and I filled my cup with coffee and took a big drink to discover that it was maple syrup. I went forward that day sick as a dog, sitting at the end, at the tail of that truck yurking all the way. I'm sure all those men I was traveling with, "Look hey there, look at that lieutenant. He's so scared he's puking," you know. We went on and eventually we came to a stop, and the captain who was leading this convoy came back and told us to get off the trucks and go into these schoolhouses that were available, right immediately, I mean, just saw them and said, "Take them." We went into the schoolhouse, and he turned around and went back to get "another load," quote, unquote. We never saw him again; he never came back. Here we are with no ammunition, carrying guns, living in a schoolhouse, and the Chinese are moving in on us. They were moving down the mountains on both sides of this thing, and then there was a tremendous, tremendous loss of life up the mountain further, coming toward us. The 38th Regiment that I joined after we got out -- I get the men out, and then I jumped on a mess truck headed south, all trying to find where the headquarters for the 38th Regiment was. The 38th Regiment was part of the 2nd Division, and it lost in about two days, coming through a real tight trap -- there was a river, there was a road that wasn't wide enough for two tanks to pass, and then there was a mountain again on the other side, and the Chinese are up on both sides just raking the convoy. One truck stops, you know, they've got to push it off the edge to get the convoy going again. Now I wasn't a part of that, but I joined the company that did, and when I finally caught up with my unit, it was because I had stopped in from the schoolhouse when I saw the 1st Cavalry Division people pull on in close to us, so I went over and inquired. I walked into the TOC, the tactical operation center, and there was a major sitting in front of a map, on a stool, making little marks on it. I waited a while, and he didn't notice me, and finally I said, "Sir, could you tell me where the 38th Regiment is?" and he turned around and said, "No, but where's the division? Where is the 2nd Division?" I said, "Sir, I have no idea. We're trying to find it. We were left off down here." He said, "I don't know where they are. If you --" It was that confusing. They lost something like 4,000 men coming out of that gap. Now, I wasn't affected, not at all, in any way. I was scared to death at times, but then after that I joined the 38th Regiment. When I went in to meet Colonel Pappal -- yeah, something like that -- he shook hands with one, and passed me a bottle of whiskey with the other one, and said, "Son, you're going to need this." I reported in to the battalion commander, and he at the time was meeting with his staff in a little hutch where the Vietnamese -- the Vietnamese -- the Koreans built their houses of mud and mud brick, and they would cook in an open room attached to the house, and the smoke would go under the floors and heat the house. We were sitting on one of those floors, warm and toasty, and they were passing the bottle of whiskey around this circle as we talked about (inaudible) [00:59:47]. By that time the bottle of whiskey got pretty hot. (laughs) It was a very strange circumstance. When he finally got to it, the battalion commander said to me, he said, "Todd, you're going down to A Company." I said, "Sir, and who commands A Company?" He said, "You do." I had about as much opportunity to learn infantry tactics and lead a rifle 14 company as nobody at all. My buddy who I was traveling with who had some experience in World War II in combat in Europe, came back and went to the University of Illinois, and then came into the army the same as I did, through the (inaudible) [01:00:34], he was sent down to a company that already had an experienced commander. You know. Nobody was thinking. I sent the first sergeant back to division headquarters, he got commissioned, and he came back, and essentially he told me what we ought to be doing. Then we did it. Until MacArthur issued an order, that probably came to him to do it, that said all armored officers that had been assigned to infantry units are to be returned to armored units. So I went down to the regimental tank company of the regiment where my company commander, before coming over there, was an infantry officer who was aide to camp to the commanding general who gave him the tank company in the 38th regiment who didn't know a damn thing about tanks. It was really screwed up everywhere. At a point when I was running the rifle company, I was told that a replacement was on the way, flying in, and he would replace me as company commander. Oh, great, that's good news. The guy showed up, and during World War II he had been in the air force as a bombardier. He had absolutely no infantry experience. He had joined the nearest reserve unit to his home when he was discharged. It really wasn't working out. Where we got replacements, the adjutant would go down and say, "Has anybody been through armored training?" Nobody. Nobody. So there wasn't anybody to send to the armored company except the people that came in (inaudible) [01:02:41]. So we were training these guys, but we weren't -- there were some old sergeants that really knew what they were doing, and that's we made. We eventually had a pretty good tank company. I remember my sergeant was a gruff, old son of a bitch. I walked up to a formation he was holding one day, and his back was to me, and I was walking toward the platoon. And I heard him say "The kid says we got to --" I said uh-oh. "Sergeant [Beach?], come with me," and we went in to see the company commander. I told the company commander that I couldn't resolve this one. He said, oh, very well, I'll assign someone else." Sergeant [Beach?] remained behind. Wow, I've done it. Sergeant Beach comes out. I said, "What happening Sergeant?" and he said, "I'm going to be the lieutenant in charge of the other platoon." Ahhh, God, you know. (laughs) It just wasn't the army I knew later on. Yeah. It was a very sad arrangement. It really wasn't until General Walker was killed in a jeep accident, and he was the 8th Army commander, and they sent General Van Fleet over to run it, and we by that time had moved 125 miles to the rear. We were running as an army. Word got out very quickly that General Van Fleet's orders were "I don't want to see your plans of defense, I want to see your plans of attack." And everyone says, "Sure, sure, General. You look at them, and you'll be all alone up there." Well, by God, he took that army and straightened it out and moved it forward and stopped the Chinese, without much additional support. It was amazing to see that happen. I'll never forget that, that one man deciding that he's going to turn the army around and you'd better fall in line. I did have one experience before that happened when I was with the tank company, and I was in a jeep riding down a road, and the division commander had decided that since we had all these losses, and we're all screwed up, that he had a way to make us all feel proud of ourselves and identify. The methodology he used was that one regiment would have a mustache, another regiment would have sideburns, and another 15 would have goatees. Crazy, just crazy. But I'm driving down the road, and an assistant division commander, a one star, is coming this way, and he went right by, and I saluted, and then he stopped and hollered back at me. I jumped out and ran down to his jeep. He said, "You're not obeying the division commander's orders." I said, "Sir, what do you mean?" He said, "You shaved." I said, "No, sir, I've never shaved." (laughter) God. Yeah. But General Van Fleet really pulled that into order, and he relieved a lot of people. He relieved my brigade commander, gave us a lieutenant to be the colonel's slot in the brigade, who turned out to wind up with four stars in the end. They made the mechanism work. JC: Amazing. Now, you were awarded the Medal for Valor in Korea, weren't you? RT: Yeah. I got a Bronze Star for Valor and a Silver Star for Valor, neither of which I really want to talk about much. I think somebody else would have done better to have them than me. I mean, I was pleased, happy to receive it, proud to wear it on my uniform kind of thing, but there was a lot of that going on to bolster up morale of everybody. JC: Is there anything else you want to say about Korea? RT: I don't know. At the end it was a pretty good experience. When we had gone into a stalemate, we started a rotation system back to the United States, and it was a point system. If you came within a certain period of time, then you could go back at a date specific, so we all knew when we'd be going back. There were points for the kind of job you had and all this kind of thing. It was interesting, I went back to Japan, spent a few days in Japan. When we got on the boat I was assigned -- as I had on the way over -- to a large stateroom, and I think there were 12 of us in it, and up and down cots. It was the same gang I went over with. You know, the timeline of where you engaged in combat were the same for all of us, in different units, and that was really pretty special. Two of them, only two of them, didn't come back, and they were both infantry officers. To the best of my knowledge, from the 38th Regiment that I was familiar with, the lieutenants didn't go back whole. The majority of them were killed. Those that were wounded were wounded seriously enough that they didn't come back to the unit. So it was us armored guys that, essentially, came back together, went over together and came back together. Stopped in Hawaii on the way back, pulled into the port, and there's all these hula girls down on the thing, people with big signs, "Welcome Home, Veteran." I said, "Hell, I'm not a veteran. That's a guy that sits outside the post office trying to sell pencils." (laughs) That came as a bit of a shock to us. But, yeah. JC: Well, once you got back to the United States where were you stationed? RT: Before I got back to the United States, on R&R in Japan, I knew of my rotation date. I called Carol, who by that time had finished her year after Smith at Radcliffe, taking the first year of the Harvard Business School program at Radcliffe -- business school faculty, business school-devised location, Radcliffe. I called her and said, "How about meeting me in New York City on such and such a date at the Biltmore Hotel? We'll meet under the clock." Now, meeting under the clock, there'd been a movie about that whole 16 business. So she did, and we went to my family's house. They'd moved to Scarsdale, New York, at that point. I asked her to marry me. She said, "Give me a couple of weeks." So I went back to visit my family. They're not my immediate family, my grandparents in Quincy, Massachusetts, and my other grandparents in Dorchester, Massachusetts. I went to -- my uncle, my mother's brother, ran a hardware store that had originally been his father's, and he said, "What are you going to do about a car?" I said, "I got to get one." I sold my car before I went over. He said, "Well, I've got a good friend who's honest, and I think we can get a good car." So I went over that afternoon and bought a car and called Carol, and I said, "I bought a car today." She said, "A convertible?" and I said, "Yes," and turned it in the next day and got a convertible. (laughter) I'd do anything to make sure she's sweet. She said yes, we were married on the nineteenth of June of that year, and she obviously had to quit her job to become an army wife. JC: So where did you all go after that? RT: The first station when we returned, and I'm talking now about the same group of army officers that went over and came back together, also went to Fort Knox, and we lived in newly-built quarters that were built by a civilian contractor on the edge of there, which were great for a newly-married couple, but they certainly weren't anything special. George and Joanne Patton lived next door to us, a small world, yeah. I've lost my train of thought here now. (break in audio) JC: And we'll get back started. All right, so we were talking about Fort Knox. RT: Fort Knox being a first assignment together in the army was really great. So different. I mean, Fort Knox was organized. Everything was working well. People were happy. Not that we weren't working hard, because we really were. My first assignment was to a training division. It took the number of the division, the third, and replicated it and then trained, basic training. I was in the 2nd Brigade headquarters working on the planning and that kind of thing. I really was disappointed that I wasn't one of the company commanders, but it turns out that that was a tough job. In the tank company, the guy that headed the tank company had more tanks than a tank division, and it was a mess to keep them all straightened out and going around. So one day I went back home for lunch, and Mrs. George Patton, Sr., was sitting in the living room of our house talking to Carol. She had come down to Fort Knox because George and Joanne had just been married, and Joanne got some kind of disease when they were on the honeymoon in the Caribbean. And I reintroduced myself to Mrs. Patton, and we sat down and talked. She asked me what my job was, and I told her. I said, "But I've got to go. I've got an appointment this afternoon to see the commanding general. They're looking for an aide to camp to the commanding general, and I really don't want that job. I really would prefer to get an opportunity to command a company in the division here." She said, "Russell, General Collier is a very, very fine man. He has a 17 fine family life. He is a very, very successful soldier who commanded the 2nd Armored Division at the end of the war in Berlin. You could learn an awful lot working for him." So I went over, and I got the job, and for the next two years I was the junior aide to the commanding general. I did such things as travel with him when he went to different places for different purposes. My buddies all got a hold of me when they found out I was going to do this job, and all had things they wanted changed at Fort Knox, and I was to be their agent in telling the commanding general how he could change the place. Very early on we went out of the headquarters, down the steps, into the car, went past the post theater. I thought, well, here goes. I said, "Sir, do you realize that on this post now an officer must be in his full dress uniform in order to go to the movies?" He said, "Yes, I know that, and it will remain that way." I didn't have many new ideas for him after that. (laughs) He'd go over to the armor school, and the people that are teaching in the combat kinds of business would say, "This is what we're doing now, General, and what do you think? We'd like your approval of it," and I'd sit in the back of the room and listen to what was going on, and understand it. I would hear the people that had served in combat talk about what you ought to do, and I got a great education. Also, every year there was something called the Armor Warfighting Conference. Twice I was there for that. They bring in all the people that belong to the Armor Association, or were serving in an armored position, all the senior people, and they'd talk about what the army ought to be doing in armor. One of my jobs was to go into the airport in the general's big sedan and his chauffer and pick these guys up and drive them back to the post, and I'd chat with these guys, and it was really fun. I got to know an awful lot of people, army commanders, army staff members, and all this. I really felt pretty special that I'd had this kind of an opportunity. Then we also had at Fort Knox in that time frame an armor board. This armor board, when General I. D. White was the commander at Fort Knox -- before General Collier -- that the chief of staff of the army was not pleased with the way the chief of ordnance was managing the tank program and gave the responsibility to the commanding general at Fort Knox. All the bigwigs gathered at Fort Knox to make decisions about what the next tank would look like, what the next armored personnel carrier would look like, etc., etc. Again, I sat in the back of the room, and young captains and majors, most of them West Point graduates who'd gone off to graduate school and were coming back and using their talents. It was a great, great opportunity for me. We were always invited to the house when the Colliers were having a party, and people would say, "Oh, you're going over there and pass the cigarette butts around with them, aren't you?" "No, we don't do that. We're part of that group." Mike Popowski here in town, his dad was one of those colonels on the post at that time. I really got to know all those people. Not that it was doing me any good, but I learned from them, you know. I learned how to act, I learned when to shut up. It was very useful, and it was a great time. The Colliers were magnificent to us. We had a child while we were living there -- it was Tom, and Tom got burnt badly in an accident at our house. He was crawling across the floor, and there was a coffee pot that started percolating, and he looked up and pulled on the cord, and it came over and broke open on his back. The Colliers came over and relieved us of our 24-hour duty, and they took it over; they sat with that baby. We were their family. It was amazing; it was wonderful. 18 Yeah. I began to really understand what the army was about, that it could be a good army. JC: Well, after Fort Knox where did you go? RT: Let's see. Oh, yeah. When General Collier left, he was to be promoted and going to go to Korea, and he offered me the opportunity to go with him, and I told him that I would much prefer to have a tank company in Europe. While I loved the guy and his family, I wanted a tank company in Europe. He said, "We'll take care of that," and he called up the commanding general of the 2nd Armored Division in Europe, the one that they call Chubby Doan, and told him the situation and that I would be on orders to go over to the 2nd Armored Division and a tank company. He said, "I'll give him a tank company." So, wow! You know, we made it, and off we go to Europe. We pull into Bremerhaven, which is the northern port in Germany, and they send forth a little craft to meet the boat. A sergeant first class climbs up the rope ladder and comes over and starts telling people what their orders are going to be, and I was ordered to something called the 13th Military Intelligence Group. I thought, oh, my God, something's wrong here. The colonel who was in charge of us all on the boat, for the boat trip, he got his orders, and he opened it up, and it's the 13th MIG. He said, "What's an MIG?" I said, "The best I know it's a Russian airplane." (laughs) It turned out that he thought he was going to the 1st Infantry Division for a regiment. Well, we got off the boat, and both of us went down to this intelligence group, went through two different fences, guards posted in towers and all the rest of it, and slept in an open bay area over the officers' club. There were a number of other offices there, and they said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "I don't know. I'm here by mistake. I'm headed to the 2nd Armored Division." They said, "No, no, you aren't. We're all in the same business, fellow. Tell us where you're going." And I said, "No, no. I'm an officer, and I'm going to --" They said, "We understood an armored officer was coming, and he was going to go underground and behind the Iron Curtain, and report on the Russian movements." Holy Crow! That's not for me. So the next morning I went down and asked authority to see the commanding officer of the 513th [sic] MIG. He spoke with me, and he said, "No, you're going down. You're not going to do that; that's rumor. You're going down to the headquarters in Heidelberg, and you're going to be an intelligence officer in that headquarters." I said, "I'm not an intelligence officer." He said, "That's your orders." OK. So I went down to Heidelberg. General Jim Phillips was the G2 at the time, and I asked to see him, and I went right up to his office and told him my sad story, that I was going to go to the 2nd Armored Division -- and he was an armored officer -- "Now here I am an untrained specialist in your department." He said, "What were you going to do?" I said, "Well, General Doan in the 2nd Armored Division had accepted me to come and be in tank company." He says, "I'll talk to him about that," and he reached over -- they had a red phone system that red phones went to the different generals in different locations -- he picked it up and dialed 27 or whatever it was, and General Doan answers the phone, and I'm sitting there. He said, "I got a young captain sitting here that tells me he's supposed to be in the division. Tell me about him, what are you going to do with him?" Well, poor old General Doan hadn't remembered much about the phone conversation a couple of 19 months before or something, and said, "Well, I'm going to make him my aide." And he said, "Like hell you are. I'm keeping him here for that." (laughs) I did it all over again for another two years in the headquarters at [Usera?]. [01:26:32] It was a great experience. General and Mrs. Phillips were a mother and dad to us; they'd invite us to Sunday dinner, and little Tom would crawl around the floor or under the table, and General Collier would feed him peanuts or something. It was a wonderful time, and when the Colliers would take a trip and borrow the commander in chief's train, we went with them. It was marvelous. I saw all of Europe. I knew most everything that was going on in the intelligence field, and it was a great experience with wonderful people. But when he got assigned to go back to the United States, I took the Colliers up to the port to put them on. When I came back, this again on the commander in chief's train, I had the train stop in Mannheim, and I got off in Mannheim. I wasn't going to be stopped again and reported in to the 57th Tank Battalion and for the last year there had a tank company. That was probably the greatest experience of my life. It really was a good experience. We were hard training, we were well trained, good people. In the beginning we had a wonderful commander who was a major, and the division commander, General Doan, didn't want to put a lieutenant colonel in that slot. He wanted this man to get that experience, but eventually they had to pull him and let -- the lieutenant colonels were backing up. So we were out maneuvering and we came to the last day of the maneuvers, and the new battalion commander arrives, and we have this party in a beer hall. The new commander arrives, and one of the company commanders in Charlie Company walked up to the head table with two boots of beer. You know what that is? Glass things that replicate a boot. Big. He puts one in front of each of the two commanders and says, "Let's see who's the better man." This poor guy that has just got off the train coming down from Bremerhaven and crossed the ocean picks up his boot and starts to drink. The battalion commander we love drinks it down and wins the contest, and the new battalion commander was so tight from drinking that beer too fast his feet slipped out from under him as he sat at that table and went right down under the table. (laughter) That was his first day of duty, and he didn't improve much after that. We were all pretty cocky, the company commanders; we were doing a lot of good things. But he knew nothing about it. We told him -- we were told that he had served in a tank battalion in World War II, and that's all we knew about him. It sounded great to us, a guy with some real experience. Well, it turns out that he reported in to a replacement company, and they said, "Take this truckload of men and go forward to point A. There will be a sign on the road at so many miles or kilometers. Turn left in there, and that's where your unit will be." Well, he got down there and made the turn, then went up, and three Germans come out and say, "Achtung! Put him in the compound!" and he went directly to the prisoner-of-war camp. He never had any experience. He'd been a public information officer before, and he was terrible. He was so bad that in a morning meeting every time, when he would suggest something the other three company commanders, we'd sort of nod or shake no. And "Well, what's the matter?" You know why? We didn't get any leadership out of him at all. When it came time to leave there, I had probably the most frightening experience in my life. He stood up in front of the entire battalion officer group and said, "Well, now that Captain Todd is leaving maybe I can take command of this battalion." Oh, my God. 20 Oh, my God. He gave me an efficiency report that would sink anybody, but it just turned out that in that moment of time the army changed the efficiency report system whereby your commander rates you, and his boss rates you, and then a third person rates what they did. Well, the third person turns out to have been the fellow that had been recently the brigade commander, and he knew me, he knew my performance, etc., and he sent back the efficiency report to be redone. Ho. (laughs) Yeah. Those were good times though, good times. Scary times, but testing, really testing you. JC: Because you were right there in Germany during really the height of the Cold War. RT: Yeah. As a matter of fact, one time we were out on maneuvers, 200 miles from our base, when the French and British moved into Suez, because the Egyptians said they were taking over the canal. There we are sitting out in the woods saying, "Oh, my God," because the president had said, "Oh, no, you don't." Eisenhower said, "No, you don't. You can't do that. We give you a lot of money to bring your economies back from the war, and we'll stop it tomorrow unless you withdraw." But we didn't know all that, and my guys are saying "We're going to gyro to Cairo," you know, that (laughter) kind of stuff. We finally came back. But if we'd had to go, I haven't seen a unit that would be any more ready than we were. Yeah. It was really a great exper-- In a company command, everybody doesn't have to bypass the battalion commander who's a dud. But when you do have to do that, then you're really thinking on your feet. It was great. JC: What was your next assignment after that? RT: Would you believe back to Fort Knox? JC: Oh, really? RT: Yeah. I went back there to go to the Armor Officer Advanced Course, which was a nine-month course in there, in which they were teaching you at the next level. Now the course we took before at Fort Knox was a course we should have had before we went to Korea. I came away with a great impression of how good that was. It was excellence. When I saw General Collier working with the instructors and telling them how to handle this kind of thing. When I came back three years later, it was a well-organized organization. In fact, General Abrams had been there as the head of the command department. It was a first class education. I really and truly look back upon my Norwich experience as not up to that standard that the army was producing there. At the end of that course I had talked my way into becoming one of the instructors in the command department, and I was thrilled to death about that. On graduation day I'm sitting in my chair on the aisle, and as the assistant commandant went by my seat he stopped and said, "You're going to be working in my office." (laughs) So I then worked for Colonel Chandler, who was a first-rate soldier. He had been horse cavalry, in the Philippines, and was on the Bataan death march. He was really very much a gentleman, very much strong willed, and very much of a tutor, and I worked out of his office. My job was to arrange the schedules of the classes, and we had all kinds of classes -- enlisted classes, officer classes -- so that they would mesh how 21 many people, how many classrooms do we need, how many instructors do we need, on what day are we going to do it? I was bringing home page after page of long paper, and on the kitchen floor working out the details of making this thing work. It was great, but, again, there was an intermediary. There was a lieutenant colonel who was my immediate supervisor who, again, I thought to be a dud. On my first day of working there he said, "That's your desk right over there." And I'm, "Yes, sir." I went over to my desk. Now what do I do? Here I am, I found my desk. There was a major sitting at a desk facing me who never looked up. He was just scribbling away, scared to death of this guy evidently. A few minutes later he came over and said, "Well, here's the first project I want you to do. This is it. I want you to study this, and then rewrite it, and we'll discuss it." Fine. It wasn't five minutes later, he came over and said, "No, I want you to do this one instead." I went through about six of those before I understood what I was doing. I was hopeless that anything was really going to happen. That same day he came over and looked over my shoulder, and I looked up, and he said, "What are you writing there?" I said, "Well, sir, I'm writing myself a note so that I will be able to put these things in the appropriate order." He said, "Well, you're not saying it very well." (laughter) It was awful. My out was Colonel Chandler, and a major got assigned to the office, and he very quickly understood what was going on here and went in and talked to Colonel Chandler, and Colonel Chandler moved him out. Again, we got a very, very fine operating organization going. It was good; it was very successful. But, you know, every time there's some kind of a roadblock in your career, you've got to stop and figure out how the hell you're going to get around it. JC: What was after Fort Knox? RT: Twenty more years of -- let's see. I graduated from Fort Knox. I was selected below the zone for a promotion. Do you know what that means? JC: Uh-uh. RT: When you're considered for promotion a board meets in Washington, and everybody whose career appears between this date and this date is considered. Isn't that right? Well, what they started, and I don't know if they're still doing it or not -- I think they are -- they would go below this zone and choose certain people to be examined with this group, and I was lucky enough to do that and really jumped ahead. In the headquarters there was Major Howard from Norwich University. Major Howard didn't graduate from here, but he was an instructor when I was a student here. He was in another department, or I didn't see much of him. But when I came out on the below-the-zone list, there were two of us at Fort Knox that came out on it, and he called me on the phone, and he said, "Well, I thought Frank would make it, but I never thought you would." (laughter) So things are weird, but Leavenworth was an exciting time. I was a captain. The majority of people were majors and lieutenant colonels. A real shock of my life in the first day was seated at tables, and there's a blank card in front of you, and the instructor said, "Now write your name on it, not your rank. Write your name on that card." Well, the guy sitting opposite me was a lieutenant colonel, and I was a captain, and I don't know his rank. What do I call him? We were all calling each other by their first names 22 rather than you find in a unit. That (inaudible) [01:41:04] like that, I'm up against it here. So I worked hard, harder than I've ever worked, and at the end of the halfway mark in the course they gave us standings of where you stand in the course, and I was number five or something. I said, "I'm working too hard." Yeah, that was good, a good period in our life. We had Saturdays and Sundays off. I had a little golf group I played with on Saturdays, and Michelob beer was local out there. We'd buy a pitcher -- the loser would buy a pitcher of beer, and that was a big deal. That was a big deal. JC: So when did you go to graduate school at the University of Alabama? RT: Strange you should ask that. When I came to the end of the course at Leavenworth a general officer, a brigadier general, came out to the course to announce to the armor officers, to the infantry officers, etc., what your next assignment would be. About the third name he read was a good friend of mine, and when he read off where he was to go this guy went "Ooohhh." The general looked down at him and said, "What's the problem?" He said, "Sir, I don't think anybody in your office ever read my request." "Oh." He said, "Major so-and-so, come out here." The guy comes out from behind the curtain with a big notebook, and the guy flaps through it, and he looks down, and he says, "I don't know what you're complaining about. It says right here, 'Anywhere in the world but Fort Knox.' And you're going to Fort Knox, your second choice." (laughter) Then he got to my name, and he said, "I want to see you right after this." I thought, oh, God, what now? So I went in, and he was in his office. There was a temporary office. And he said, "We've got a problem here," and I said, "Sir, what is it?" He said, "Well, they've got you going to graduate school, and as the chief armor officer I want you to go to an armored unit." I said, "I have a choice?" He said yes. I said, "Where will I go if I go to an armored unit?" He thought for a minute, and he said, "You'll go to the tank battalion in Hawaii." I said, "Can I discuss this with my wife at lunch?" and he said, "Sure," and I came back and said, "We have decided that we're going to go to graduate school," and that's how that worked out. JC: So you went to Tuscaloosa instead of Hawaii. RT: Yeah. (laughs) JC: Now, what degree did you get at Alabama? RT: MBA. It was a good tough course, but it was in the process of changing the curriculum of business schools, and some of it was very tough. Part of it was very simple, but some of it was very tough. I established a schedule where I went in very early in the morning, got in there before 7:00 every morning, went down to the basement of the library where I had an assigned carrel and started working until it was time for a class to begin. I'd go up to the class and go back to the basement, eat my lunch in the basement, go home at 5:00, and hardly ever did any midnight work at home. We lived a good, wonderful family life in Tuscaloosa. Now, it wasn't all easy. There had been the problems of the colleges not admitting blacks, and the president of the United States pushing hard to make them do it. 23 Then there were the riots at Ole Miss, right at that time. The army sent down its chief person who determines whether the applicants will go to college -- army applicants -- and to which college they will go to. So we all gathered, and there were people taking nuclear physics, and [we have to?] discuss with him, and he talked it back and forth, etc. Finally one young captain in the back said, "Sir, this is all very interesting, but the army's practically at war with our citizens. What the hell happen-- What do we do? What are our orders, and what are our instructions here at the University of Alabama, if the same kind of thing breaks out on this campus?" This poor old duffer who'd been the president of some college someplace sort of shook his head and said, "Well, I hope you'd be on the side of the government." (laughter) That hit right in the heart of soldiers. But it was a good program. When I left I was going to be assigned to the headquarters in US Army Europe in the comptroller's office, and you're required to stay in that position for three years to make up for your being chosen for that job. They want to use your knowledge and experience. Just before I left they changed it, and I went to the US Army Support Command in France, which had 57 separate organizations that it commanded, to include a pipeline that came in at St. Nazaire and went out to all of the air bases and army refueling, etc., and repair of tanks, repair of everything. We took German factories over, used Germans. It was a very, very exciting assignment in terms of technology, but I got assigned to the comptroller's office in that damn headquarters, and I was one of three soldiers. The rest were all civilian employees, or French. One of the people that worked for me was from Yugoslavia; he'd escaped Yugoslavia. So it was a mixed up kind of place. We lived at a French house down by the railroad station. We didn't want to live in the government quarters, we'd done enough of that. We wanted to have an experience in France. From that point of view, it was wonderful. The job was terrible, just terrible. They expected me to know everything that they did in their routine because I'd been to this business program. Well, I had to really move fast to catch up with them. My boss was a man by the name of [Birossi?]. He'd been an Italian-American soldier in World War II who married an Italian and never went home, and when they created the support command then he stayed on in Europe and became a very important man in the headquarters as the budget manager of this very vast organization. I worked like hell to try and get it straightened out. They first gave me the responsibility of working the budget of a couple of the major organizations, one the tank rebuild plant, which was -- God, it looked like General Motors out there. I finally got frustrated with it all. We'd all sit in a room, roll out our papers, and bring in the guy, the comptroller, from that organization, and you'd sit facing each other with Mr. [Birossi?] looking over your shoulder, and you'd work out a budget for them. How the hell did I know? I didn't have any basis for doing it, but we'd discuss it to get it. When this was all over and calmed down I said, "This is stupid as hell," to [Birossi?]. He said, "What are you talking about?" And I said, "We've got the world's best information technology program right in this headquarters, those guys that are working the plants do it all by technical means, punch cards, and here we are sitting around trying to argue about a number on a sheet of paper that doesn't mean a damn thing." He said, "What do you suggest?" I said, "I suggest we go to talk to them, get onto their system somehow, and work this thing out that we can make a reasonable stab at it." He said, "OK, wise guy, do it." 24 Now, there was a lieutenant colonel in this overall office who was Birossi's boss, and I went to see him and told him, I said, "Now, I'm not competent to do this. There's no question about it. However, if you give me two of those young captains of finance that work down the hall from me, I can get this thing started and going." So he assigned these two guys to me, and we changed the whole system of how we did the budgeting of US Army Europe. I got some kind of an award for that. Then they put me in another job where I had all kinds of stupid responsibilities. I had a responsibility for efficiency of each of these many, many organizations, and I got permission to send people -- Frenchmen -- back to the United States to be trained in each of those depots to do it. Then we pulled all of this together right as the secretary of defense had initiated a program to improve work force relationships, his program, and they sent it out and said, "Everybody in the army, navy, and the air force will use these procedures." And my two-star boss said, "No, we won't. We're not doing that. We got a god system, we just got it started, and, well, that's the way it will be." OK, you're the boss. So six weeks later, maybe two months later, there's a message sent to the commanding general that said "We're sending over someone from the Department of Defense to look at your program." I got called in to the CG's office, and he said, "You got two weeks to put this program in place." Well, you know, I was put into a position where I got attention, and I could do what I wanted to do, and I could get help to do it, and everything just sort of worked together. It was a great experience. But, again, it's a case of speaking up and saying what you think is wrong and finding a way to do it. I went in on the train from Orleans into Paris to the IBM plant with boxes of punch cards in my (inaudible) [01:53:43] and brought them into IBM, and we worked it out with them to do it at first before we turned it over to our own organization. That's because if we screwed it up, we'd screw them up badly. But those two finance captains did all the work. I just plowed ahead. Another time, in that same job -- I really thought -- when I got there I said, "My career is ruined. My career is ruined. Who's going to believe that I was in a damn headquarters for a support group? No, uh. I'm an armored guy. No." But anyway, they came up with another program, again, out of the Department of Defense. This time it was to work specifically with -- I can't remember the name of it, but, again, it came out of the secretary of defense's office, and again I got the job to do it. But this time I had an opportunity to start from the beginning with it. It was a matter of saving money, and we were supposed to put out programs, out to our subordinate units, and help them find money and other ways of doing business (inaudible) [01:55:09]. We started with the laundries, a simple thing, and went into the laundries with the people we trained, and they would say to the laundress, "How can you do your job better?" They'd say, "Well, I've been working at this for six years. If we did this, and that, and the other thing," and all of a sudden we weren't doing anything but saying "How do you do it?" and then helping them do it, and getting their boss to agree to it. Well, then you had to take all this information and turn it over to another agency who would check your figures, and numbers, and back and forth, and everything. That all seemed to work out, and things were going along rather well when they put me in for an award as the civilian of the year for product improvement. I was called (laughs) into Heidelberg, and they put on a parade, and the commanding general and I are -- there were other people, for other reasons, being recognized that day. I'm standing 25 beside the commanding general when the troops are passing in review, and he said, "What the hell are you doing here? This is a civilian award." I said, "Sir, you signed it." (laughter) And off we went. I just kept working. Living there was great sport, except the French are crazy. We lived in a neighborhood, as I said, on Rue de la Gale, and the house was an old one. It was rent controlled, and we had to slip the landlord money on certain days, and you'd walk up to his house with a paper bag full of money. A door would open, a hand would come out and grab the paper bag out of your thing, the extra money for the -- crazy. In the neighborhood we never made close friends except in one instance. Our youngest daughter, Ellen, went to French school. The other two kids refused; they were smart enough not to do it. Ellen and her friend [Pascale?] (inaudible) [01:57:36] walked to school with her mother and Carol, over to school. The ladies walked back from school. After lunch, walked over, back to get, march them over, again, at the end of the school day. And they talked, and they talked, and they talked. Not a single word of English was ever spoken for three years between these two women. We get back to the United States and got a very nice letter from her, in English, and she said, "You never would have improved your French the way you did if you knew I had been a nanny in Great Britain and speak English." (Cates laughs) Now, that's the dirtiest, rottenest trick I can ever imagine happening. (laughter) When we had a problem with the house, you'd try and go out and find someone that would fix the faucet. Now, there are four sizes of pipe, and there are 12 sizes of faucets, and there are 14 sizes -- and they ask you which one do you want? You don't know. So somebody has to come and measure it and go back, and two days later you've got water running again. When it came time to buy coal, we went down to the place you buy coal, and it was a storefront on the main road, right in the main store, and he's got little glass canisters with different kinds of coal in the window. You don't buy coal that way anywhere else in the world. We went in, and he wanted to know how many radiators we had in the house, and how many veins each radiator had, and how many sections were in the stove, and then he could figure out how many tons it would take to heat the house. He didn't ask if there was any broken windows, or open doors, or boards off on the roof. They did it totally unscientific. Then when you come to that decision, then they say, "Now do you want it from Belgium? Do you want it from --" you know, down the list. We want anthracite from Belgium, OK. Then they come and dump it in the house with buckets in the window of the cellar, and the whole house is covered with coal dust everywhere. And it was expensive. Living there was not easy, but we made a pact that we were going to go once a month with the kids to Paris, every time, every month, and we did, and we traveled a lot. Not any great distances, but we loved parts of France. But the French were very difficult to live with. JC: Oh, I'm sure. I've been there once. (laughs) RT: The worst one was my father had a cousin who was, in relationship to Dad, it was about six up from him in the corporation, and he was the chairman of the board. We got a call that he was coming to visit the French company that was owned by the American company, and they were going to come down and see us in this hovel (laughs). And just about the time we knew that they were coming but not exactly when they were coming, 26 the French left us with a bit of a problem. When they put in the sewer system, they left the septic tank in the house, in the basement, made of clay, and it began to leak. Do you have any idea what living in that house was like? You couldn't flush a toilet. When I'd go off to work and leave Carol, they had a deal with these crazy guys coming in, and eventually they came in. One guy came in, and he took off the top of this thing, and then he went away. She chased him down, and he said, "Oh, you've got to hire somebody else. The union won't allow me to put the hose down in here and suck out what's left. You've got to find that guy." And it went on, and on, and on, and trying to live in that house. Fortunately we got it cleaned up before Uncle George showed up for lunch. (laughter) JC: Sounds like it was quite difficult living in that house. RT: It was very difficult. Every single day one of us crossed the street to the bakery that was directly across the street from us, and we'd order a demi pan, and bring it back for breakfast, or something else. And every single day that one of us went, my own experience was I'd walk in the door -- "Bonjour, Madame." (laughter) The only guy that spoke to us lived next door, and the reason he spoke to us was that nobody else in the neighborhood, or the town, or the city would speak to him, because he had been a butcher during the Nazi occupation and gave the Nazis all the best cuts of meat. We had no phones. It took three years to get a phone, and it was a three-year tour. If you got a phone, you had nobody to call; they'd all gone home. They're crazy, just crazy. (laughs) JC: So what was the next assignment after France? RT: Well, while in France the Vietnam War broke out, and people lieutenant colonel level in Europe were being pulled back to the United States and given a command in Vietnam. So I applied to get a command in Vietnam, and they said, "Oh, no, no, no, no, you haven't finished your tour for having gone to graduate school. You can't possibly go." This is talking to somebody back in Washington. Then another job opened up, and they needed a lieutenant colonel in an armored battalion, and I called them back again. I said, "I'll come back to this job after that. How about that?" "Nope, we can't do that. We can't do that." Eventually they said, "OK, when you come home from --" I put enough pressure on them. "When you come home from France, we'll send you to Vietnam." And when we came home from France, they said, "No, you're going to go to the Armed Forces Staff College. You've been selected among the army, navy, and air force to go to the Armed Forces Staff College, for six months. After that, we'll get you a job that will get you to Vietnam." Well, you know, it's frustrating, just terribly frustrating. After the Armed Forces Staff College they told me I would go to Vietnam, but first I would go to pick up 57 tanks that had just been manufactured of a new design, and I was to form the tank battalion in the United States, train it in the United States, and take it to Vietnam. When that day came, ready to go, we had three rounds blow up in the chamber back at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and they said, "Hold it. You're no longer on the list to go. But you are going to go to the Naval War College." I couldn't get to Vietnam! It was very difficult. 27 JC: What was the Naval War College like? RT: Terrible. The Naval War College, well, we called it the sleeping room. They had two major speakers every day, one in the morning, and one in the afternoon. That was fine. I mean, I loved to hear them, and they did have a message, but it wasn't work. It was sitting there like you're turning on the television. There was no challenge to this thing at all. Now you could go and get a master's degree along with it from George Washington, but I couldn't, because I had a master's degree, so they weren't going to let me take that program. So they hired somebody the University of Massachusetts had fired from their Economics Department, an old man, to be my mentor and take me through a separate program -- nothing comes out of it other than a dissertation at the end. OK, I'll put up with it, but he was awful, and it was a waste of my time. You never had time between these people to really go to the library and do something. It was 20 minutes. What can you do in the library in 20 minutes? No, you don't. Everyone went and get good coffee, sat around and talked, etc. Oop, time to go back into the bedroom. There was nothing going on in terms of substance in the place. When I had my first time as directing my little group, I worked long and hard on the assignments, and came in the next morning and said, "OK, let's see. Now we had readings in this one, and then we had a differing opinion from this requirement, and then this one, and another one. Commander Jones, what do you think about this?" "Oh, shit," he said, "You don't think I pay any attention to that, do you? I'm in the George Washington program. I'm not going to do any of this." That was a general attitude. There wasn't any depth to what we were doing. One day the admiral in charge, who'd married a British lady and had just come back from another tour in London, said, "How would you like to have lunch at my house with a guest speaker, Todd?" I said, "Gee, that would be very nice, sir." I got up there to discover there were 12 or 13 of us at separate tables and he and the speaker was at another table. What did we do? We sat around and chatted, and ate his food, and left. He said, "How'd you like that?" I said, "What are you referring to, sir?" He said, "Well, the opportunity to be with the speaker." I said, "We weren't with the speaker. You were with the speaker." "Well, how would you handle that?" "I'd put in a round table, and we'd all sit around and talk." "What a great idea." Really, really bad stuff. So he did, and then he invited me to come, and I went, and he said, "How did that go?" I said, "Sir, that was wonderful. But if you did that in the classrooms it might help, too." "We don't have round tables in the classrooms?" He'd never been in a classroom. We didn't have one single naval officer who was nuclear qualified come to the course. They sent them to the National War College. We didn't have one single graduate of a senior college who was on the faculty. I could go on, and on, and on about how bad it was. But one day, in Vietnam, I was sitting at my desk outside General Abrams's office, and I got a call from the naval head in Vietnam. I'm trying to think of his name. I know it as well as I know my own. But anyway, he called me and said, "Russ, I got to see General Abrams." I said, "Well, he's tied up at the moment. Come on up and sit down, and I'll get you in just the minute I can break into it." He said, "Good," and he came up. We sat there, and he said, "I got to talk to General Abrams. They're going to announce this afternoon that I'm the new chief of naval operations, and I don't want him to hear it from anybody else but me." I said, "Oh, have I been waiting for this." He said, 28 "What are you talking about?" I said, "You can do something about the Naval War College that I couldn't," and I laid it out for him, and he fired the guy when he got back there. This is Zumwalt, Admiral Zumwalt. He fired the guy and changed all the programs. I mean, they were tough on him, and they've got a good school there now, or at least the last I knew of it, a very good school that has been accredited. But it was awful. JC: Did you finally get to Vietnam after the Naval War College? RT: Yeah, that's why I was sitting in General Abrams's office. I was to be sent over to be on the command list, which meant this list of people the army feels are capable of doing a job as colonel in a combat unit. They sent my name over, and then they called me back and said, "We've withdrawn your name." (sighs deeply) I said, "Come on, guys. This isn't fair." He's "Hold it, hold it, hold it. They're looking for an assistant to General Abrams, and we've sent your name in." I said, "Look, I've met General Abrams a few times. I don't think he was very impressed with me. I don't think he'll select me off of any list of yours." He said, "There is no list. We only sent your name." (laughter) So I went over there, and I sat for, oh, eight months I guess in General Cao Van Vien's office, who was the head of the Vietnamese armed forces, and I acted as a liaison between General Abrams and General Cao Van Vien, of which there was no requirement. Those guys talked to each other whenever they wanted to. But I represented General Abrams when General Cao Van Vien called the other -- the Koreans, the Australians, the New Zealanders, etc., etc. -- together on a Monday morning to have a meeting, and that was interesting, and I learned a lot, and I met a lot of people. Eventually the secretary of the staff rotated home, and I took his slot. You actually work for the chief of staff, but I read and decided which messages that came in that night would go into General Abrams the next morning, so I got to work very, very early and stayed very, very late, day after day after day, seven days a week. But I really loved working for the guy. Every Saturday morning we would meet with the commanders of the army, navy, air force, etc., the CIA, in the basement of our building, and it was general so-and-so, admiral so-and-so, etc., and Colonel Todd. And Colonel Todd sat in the back of the room and checked -- again, a great learning experience. Watching the interrelationship between these very, very senior commanders was a great experience. Then I went with General Abrams every Monday morning down to brief the ambassador. We'd drive down in his sedan. On Sunday I'd prepare a book for him that he'd go over, and then he'd have that in front of him. He never read it. He never sat in front of the ambassador and read it. I'd be on pins and needles all the time that he'd turn to me and say, "What the hell's this?" (laughs) But he was great. Then I got a command. I left the headquarters and went out and joined the 24th Division as a brigade commander, and I'd been there about eight days when it was announced that the brigade was to go home. (laughs) The next day I got a call on the radio, out flying around in my helicopter -- I had seven battalions in the brigade at the time -- from the corps commander, General Davidson, and General Davidson said, "Meet me at coordinates so-and-so," and we both flew into a point. He said, "I'm pulling you out of this. I've got a problem with the Royal Thai Army. The officer we have working 29 with them is not acceptable any longer to the Royal Thai Army. I need somebody tomorrow, and you're it." That was the craziest thing I've ever been involved in. Wonderful, wonderful Thai commander, who began his military experience at age five in a military academy run by the government. He finished his education in France. The French owned Indonesia. Thailand (inaudible) [02:16:30]. So there we were. Day in and day out, he and I would receive the same briefing. He'd get it in Thai, and his aide-de-camp would give it to me in English. We never ever, ever came to the same solution. We were generations in thought apart. For example, in World War II Thailand never declared war on anybody, but went to war against the Allied forces when they thought Japan was winning. This fellow was a captain in the Thai Army, and he did something very spectacular -- whatever it was, I don't know, very heroic. He was called back to the capital, and he was given the Royal Order of the White Elephant or something. They'd give out five for every war. This was something very, very special, parades, the whole business. He went back to his unit, and then the Thais decided that the Japanese weren't winning the war, and they changed and became our allies. Now you're not going to believe this. They called him back and took the medal because he was fighting on the wrong side. (laughs) I could go on forever on this. My brain couldn't absorb it. When I'd left that and gone back to the United States, I guess when this happened -- I don't remember where I was, but anyway, I wrote him a letter, and I said, "What in the world is going on in Bangkok? You were the commander of the 1st Division, responsible for the security of Bangkok. Your father-in-law is the dictator. They're rioting in the streets, and, to the best I know, nothing's happening." He wrote back to me, after some (inaudible) [02:19:06] time, and said, "Well, you just don't understand our way of thinking. The soldiers had killed some civilians who were rioting, so I went back to my BOQ and stayed there two weeks, and when I came back my father-in-law had been deposed, and the fighting was over." Huh? (laughs) And it wasn't that he wasn't a good soldier, and it wasn't that he was afraid of anything. No, we'd fly around in his damn helicopter and take it places I never would have gone. On the other hand, he had some VIPs coming over, and he said, "We can't take the helicopter today. I'm going to use it tomorrow for some Thai VIPs, and I don't want any fingerprints on it, I don't want to make sure there's no bullet holes in the thing. We'll just take this other thing." What? We couldn't come together. At one point, the real one that almost got me in trouble -- I think it was on Thanksgiving -- our base camp also had three units in it from the 1st Cavalry Division, and the Thais, and the Thais who were responsible for the security, and I was responsible to the US headquarters. Well, on the big army base, maybe 15 miles away, on Thanksgiving night everything went up in the air, flares, and shooting, and machine guns, and all the Thais thought this was great, and they all did it. He called me in the next morning, and he laid me out. He said, "No Thai would ever do that. Your Americans did this." Well, OK, I'll suck it up. "I assure you it won't happen again, sir." So come New Year's time, I put out to my staff with each of his units, where they normally served, to stay with them all night and record everything that happened in that TOC. Next morning he got me again when I went in there. I said, "Sir, before we say anything else, I suggest you talk to your TOC officer." He went down there, and those 30 guys, we made them record everything, and he discovered that it was his units that were doing it. What do you suppose his answer to that one was? JC: I don't know. RT: He called in his senior officers and said, "I'm resigning from the army. You've let me down." And he went back into his hooch and stayed there for about three days. I woke up at the end of three days early in the morning, and the whole goddamn Thai Army that was posted in Vietnam was out there in a formation. I walked out to see what was going on and stood behind him -- he was up on a platform -- and they all apologized, etc., and he forgave them, and they went back into the woods to their positions. They'd left their fighting positions to come back and apologize to the commanding general. JC: Oh, wow. RT: (laughs) You can find one worse than that, I'll bet. My goodness. JC: Want to stop again? (break in audio) JC: Let's stop here, because we've done about another hour and 10 minutes. (break in audio) RT: Let's -- (break in audio) [02:23:15] JC: All right, this is Joseph Cates. Today is May 19, 2016. This is my second interview with Major General Russell Todd. This interview is taking place at the Sullivan Museum and History Center. This interview is sponsored by the Sullivan Museum and History Center and is part of the Norwich Voices Oral History Project. So when we left off last time we had gone through Vietnam, and you're ready for your next assignment. What was that? RT: OK. When the Royal Thai Army left Vietnam I moved out to a brigade, as I said earlier. But the time with the brigade was very unsatisfactory to me as a professional. It was a little more than a month, and that's not what I considered to be a command. So thinking about what would happen when I got home, I called to the Pentagon, talked to the people in armor branch. A lieutenant colonel sits on a desk and shuffles the papers for colonels and helps make the decisions. I told him I wanted to have a particular command at Fort Lewis, Washington, that I knew the command was about to change. And they said, "Oh, we've already appointed somebody to that port. But you are coming back to go to the Pentagon." 31 I had fought off the Pentagon earlier in my tour. When I was working for General Abrams I got a call from the Pentagon that said "We're bringing you back to the United States because a new position has opened up, and it calls for a brigadier general, and although you're only a colonel, we want you to fill that position." And I said, "Tell me about it." They said, "Well, you're going to be the army's first drug-and-alcohol-abuse officer." I said, "You've been watching what I'm drinking." He said, "No, this is what we've got in mind for you." And I said, "That isn't going to work. It just isn't going to work. I'm over here on a two-year tour, and if you want me to leave here, I'll give you General Abrams's telephone number, and you can call him and ask him to release me." Well, no, they didn't think they would do that. (laughs) So when I went back I went to the Pentagon, and there I went to work for a four-star general who I had met several times, because he traveled to Vietnam back and forth, General Kerwin, a wonderful, wonderful soldier. And when I reported in he told me that I was going to be the head of the department that he supervised for the Modern Volunteer Army. My job would be to coordinate all of the programs that were going on both at posts, camps, and stations around the country and around the world, and also within the Pentagon, to evaluate where we ought to be going. Well, OK. It wasn't my first choice. I had about, oh, 10 lieutenant colonels working for me in a very small office that didn't have any windows, and there was a lieutenant general working in the chief of staff's office whose title was the chief of modern volunteer army. So I was torn between two very senior officers who didn't agree with each other very often, and the job went on, and back and forth, and up and down, but a lot of answering letters from the Congress and this kind of thing, and then evaluating things that came from the field. Well, one day I was up in the next level in the Pentagon, because I'd been called by that lieutenant general, and he started chewing me out just something awful for reasons I couldn't explain. Finally he said, "I'm going down and see General Kerwin." My boss. What the hell's this about? So I was standing alone in his office. He went out a side door, and I said, "I've got to get to General Kerwin quick." So I picked up -- they have red phones that go between the very senior officers. I picked it up and dialed General Kerwin's office, and he has to answer that, no matter what's going on. And I said, "Sir, we got trouble," and told him what was going on. I saw him later in the day. He said, "Thanks. That really made a difference." From that moment on, he treated me like I was one of his best friends and had faith in what I was doing. Now, they did bring back in a major general who had just stopped commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, and he came in, and he was my immediate supervisor. But General Kerwin made a proposal -- not a proposal -- instructions to everybody about that time that said "Everybody that works for me in the deputy chief of staff personnel office is going to spend four years in this job." I could see my chances of getting a second shot at a brigade just going out the window. Carol and I had bought a house in Washington, the first home we ever owned. In France it was a rental, and everything else was army quarters. So this was special. She loved that house. She took a job in Washington, DC, in the personnel department, and then she had done a lot of that before, and that was sort of a big part of what she had done at Radcliffe after Smith, and she loved that job. In fact, everywhere we went she tried to find a job that would keep her busy and active. 32 So there we were, balancing back and forth. Now what do I do? Well, I'll go back to my old trick and call the people in my branch on the phone, and I called this young man early one morning before anybody else was in the office, and he happened to be there. I told him my plight, that I'd been really cheated in that one month I'd had in the thing, and General Davidson had said I was coming to Europe with him to command a brigade, and that didn't work out once he found out I'd never been in the Pentagon. "So I want a command, and I want to lay it out right now. I want you to start working on it." He said, "Sir, I'm not sure I can do that." I said, "Well, what time do you come to work?" He said, "Well, I'm in here by 8:00 every morning." I said, "Get in at 7:30 on Monday, because I'm going to call you every goddamn Monday I'm sitting at this desk," and I did. Eventually he said, "I've made an appointment with you with my boss, Colonel [Touche?], who oversees all the branches for colonels." I walked over, and it was my old friend from Fort Knox who had been the senior aide when I was the junior aide to General Collier. He had talked it over with the committee that makes these kinds of decisions, and they were going to put my name in nomination to go back onto the brigade commanders list. Great. A few weeks later I get a phone call that says "We put your name before the committee, and you are on the list, and you're number two." Uh-oh. I'm supposed to spend four years working for General Kerwin? (laughs) So a little later they call back and said, "Whoa. Wait. In the 2nd Armored Division the brigade commander has moved up to be chief of staff, and that brigade is open." I said, "OK. Now you guys call General Kerwin and tell him that you're pulling me out." They said, "Like hell we will." (laughter) So I went to see General Kerwin, and he sort of grimaced and (inaudible) [02:32:24]. He said, "You know my policy." I said, "Yes, I do, sir, but this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for me." And he said, "I'll tell you tomorrow." So the next day he called me, and he said, "Against my better judgment I'm going to let you go to that command. But let me tell you this. The day that's over you're coming back to work for me." I said, "Yes, sir. Thank you." I ran home. (laughs) A little later, in time, the moving truck was in front of the house. I'd gone home, checked out of the office, done everything appropriately, and gone back, and there was a phone call waiting for me at home. General Kerwin. He went on to say what he really wanted me to do, wouldn't I know, is that -- "Sir, we've made our deal," and he says, "OK, but remember, I'm going to get you when you get (inaudible) [02:33:21]." And that was very pleasing to me. I loved the idea of working for him. But, again, it was a matter of just working your way through the system. It was terribly important to my career and to me. People were telling me that "You don't have to do this" kind of thing. You know, "You've done all those kinds of things." But no, that wasn't the career I wanted. So I went to the 2nd Armored Division and took over the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, and that was a real fun thing. I really enjoyed it. I had a lot of good people working for me. Some of them went on to become general officers later on. The first thing that happened was they told me that the brigade in one month is going to move to Germany on Operation [Forger?]. Does that mean anything to you? Well, in the Cold War we had built all kinds of home hutches and places to store tanks and materials that take a lot of time to get into the theater. If they said, "OK, the balloon went up. Come over here," you wouldn't have had any -- you'd have to wait for your 33 tanks for a month. So they had all those vehicles and stuff over there, and every year we went over and exercised the idea of flying over -- not me, the army did. It was my brigade's turn, and it was just great. I had planned that thing for every possible contingency, in my mind, and we laid it out with the staff. I said, "Now if this happens, or that happens, or this happens, this is what we'll do. Plan A, B, C, and D." And damn, I figured everything except it was going to snow at Fort Hood, and the air force wouldn't show up. (laughter) So we were about two days late getting there, and it slowed things up. But we went out on maneuvers for about a month and a half, and that was a great experience. I'd done it as a company commander when I was stationed in Europe, but as a brigade -- when I went over I've been detached from the 2nd Armored Division of the United States and attached to the 1st Infantry Division, when I got over to Europe. There for the first time I met a fellow named (laughs) -- I met someone, a senior officer, a brigadier general who, because my brigade wasn't part of his division, I had to go through the ropes of him looking over my shoulder for the first three weeks of what we were doing. It wasn't easy. Eventually he and I had a good reputation among each other, and then we're good. It worked out pretty well. Well, his name is Fuller, Fred Fuller. Just to move that part of the story a little further forward, when I went to Forces Command he was the DESOPS, and I was the assistant -- correction, he was the DESPER, personnel, and I was the assistant DESOPS. And again, good friends, you know. No, sir. I had to prove myself all over again to him. That was tough. That was tough. Then when I became division commander at Fort Hood, would you believe they made him the corps commander, and my boss again? And again, I went through the process. I called it rook training, he wanted to test me on everything that was going on, and then eventually he agreed, and we got along. That was a very difficult relationship I had with that individual. So we came back from Germany after the Reforger, and it was time to change division commanders. A general officer that I had met once or twice but didn't know came in as the two-star commanding the (inaudible) [02:38:26]. This was a fight for my life. He, in my opinion, didn't represent a good soldier. He would drive in his jeep with the two stars on the front, down the street, and the men in the division would say, "Hi, General," and he'd wave back, "Hi." No saluting, none of this. He would come around in my battalion and ask the company commander and the battalion commander to see their operational reports, and particularly the readiness reports, whether or not this tank would go or that one. He required them, not required them, but pushed hard for them to like take something off this tank and put it on that tank, and now we've created another tank that this one isn't working, this one if you take the parts and put it on this one, that's one less tank, but will look that much better. It was everything how you looked. Eventually he was promoted to lieutenant general and shipped to Europe, and his chief of staff caught on to his way of life, reported it. He got thrown out of the army, reduced to major general, and was retired. But that was a tough fight, that was a tough fight. In town now there's a major general, retired, John Greenway. Maybe you've met Phyllis. JC: I have. RT: Well, John Greenway was my chief of staff in the brigade, and I don't know how many times he saved my life. He'd say, "No, no, no, don't go up there and tell that general off. 34 Don't do it. Stop here." One time I actually said, "The hell with you, John, I'm going up there." I was really mad. Again, he had ordered my people to do something that was not proper. So John called up the division chief of staff, who was a good friend, and said, "Russ is on the way. Stop him." (laughs) So I never got in to see him, and I calmed down, and the chief of staff discussed it with me in a way. But it was a difficult, difficult system to live with, but I had wonderful people working for me. JC: Well, that's good. RT: Yeah. JC: What year is this? RT: Oh, my God. (inaudible) [02:41:04] I can't remember my birthday. (laughter) It was about '60 something, yeah. I came back to the United States, and I was assigned to forces command, where General Kerwin was, the man that said, "You're going to go work for me," and I went to work for General Kerwin just as I'd been promoted by the system to be brigadier general. I worked for him for two years and then another year with General Rogers, who went on to be the chief of staff of the army, and it was great. Real professionals who understood various ways of handling people beautifully. I must admit, he had a chief of staff who wasn't quite up to speed in my opinion, and as a result I found myself bypassing the chief of staff, which really isn't a very good idea. But both General Kerwin and General Rogers, when I was there, would call me on the phone directly and ask me to do something. As the junior brigadier general at Fort McPherson, Georgia, they immediately appointed me to be club officer, and to be the president of the Association of the United States Army chapter at Fort McPherson. I was really the junior guy in that headquarters as far as a general officer is concerned. The biggest thing that happened to me really there was that that's when we had the baby lift out of Vietnam, and then we had the evacuation of Vietnam. In the operations business at forces command, we had the responsibility of preparing those units in the United States, wherever they might be involved, to prepare them for the influx of people. I was up a lot of nights and really mad at the air force sometimes. They would bring in planes early, before we could finish taking people off the previous planes and get them, kind of thing. They finally came around. But it was a real wonderful experience as far as I'm concerned. I had the thrill of getting a thank you letter from the president and being called in by the State Department, who had the responsibility of taking these people once they arrived in the United States -- when they arrived in the United States the army was responsible for them. We took old barracks and tried to fix them up to be for families and all the rest of it. And the next step was to put them out into the population in America, and that was done by the State Department. At the end of this, the State Department gave me an award and invited me over to Foggy Bottom, and it was carried out in the formal part of that. It's a very ordinary-looking building, but inside, on the top floor, they have collected and put in there all the furnishing and antiques of America. They would go to somebody that had something that the State Department wanted, and they would say "We would like to have it, and we will replicate it exactly, and give you back the replication." They built -- it's a museum, it's a wonderful, wonderful museum of 35 American furniture through time. I was really impressed with it being there. I wasn't that impressed with the State Dept- people in Vietnam. (laughs) It was very interesting. JC: Yes, sir. So this was around 1975, that would be (crosstalk; inaudible) [02:45:47]. RT: Yeah, that's right. Yeah. I did one or two year. JC: Where were you from Fort McPherson? RT: From Fort McPherson, when my immediate boss left General Rogers called me in and said, "I want you to be my full-time top guy and deputy chief of staff operations." I said, "No, General, that isn't right." "What are you talking about, it isn't right?" I said, "You want someone that's been a division commander to be in that job. I mean, you're dealing with all those division commanders, and if the guy that's passing the instructions hasn't had the experience of being a division commander, it doesn't come through right." And he said, "All right. All right." About a year later I was on a board in Washington. You're sent in to do a lot of those things. Interestingly enough, on this particular one I was the head of the board for captains being promoted to major, and I got in trouble with General Rogers. The instructions we had were "These are the formulas, etc., that you follow when you're looking at the history of their being in the service. You can add to this other things, if you, as a board, want to do it." The first thing we added to it was that any captain who had served a normal period of time as a captain in the combat arms branches and had not had a company wasn't to be promoted on this occasion to major. Passing up a captain, you pass up the real army and the real understanding of the army, and, oh, boy. It turns out that we eliminated from being promoted five captains at West Point, instructors, and that reverberated around the world. (laughs) General Rogers finally calmed down. Then on another occasion when I was away in Washington he called me on the phone and said, "The major generals promotion list has just come out." I said, "Oh, good. Who's on it?" and they said, "You are." Oh, wow. After I went back he called me in his office and said, "Now, I'm going to send you to Fort Hood to command a division." Previous discussion, you got to have a command. I said, "Oh, my. Where's George going?" And he looked at me with this great strain on his face and said, "George who?" I said, "George Patton, 2nd Armored Division." I had been in the 2nd Armored Division twice. Four men have commanded the 2nd Armored Division, three of them during World War II. I knew that was my place in life. Well, he said, "You're going to the 1st Cav." Of course, when I'd been there as a brigade commander the 1st Cav was the enemy. (laughter) It was a little difficult to change my mindset that I was now the head of the 1st Cavalry Division, but it turned out to be a good assignment, too. We were immediately assigned a mission of working on something that was called Division '86, and this was the '76-'77 time frame. What we would do is to experiment with different organizational concepts, try them out, and another R&D organization would evaluate whether this was a good idea, or whether it wasn't a good idea. But, man, was that a lot of work. We had soldiers picking up their mattresses and marching over two streets, and then joining another company, because now we were trying -- we were going to have tank platoons with only four tanks rather than five tanks, 36 and these guys had to fill in for the -- you know, back and forth, and up and down. It was a crazy time, but it was very, very rewarding. We lived next door to George Patton and Joanne Patton, and as a matter of fact we had become very close friends over the time we were in the army. We went home on vacations sometimes by accident at the same time, back in New England, and other times purposefully. But we celebrated our twenty-fifth wedding anniversary together, both divisions, at the club, and it was officers. It was really good sport. JC: Was that your last command? RT: No. They sent me to -- at one Fort Hood, after two years of commanding the division, I went down and commanded something called [Tecada?] [02:51:38], which was a research and development experimental station kind of thing. I was doing to the rest of the world what they'd been doing to me, for two years I guess, at which point I was shipped over to Europe to be the deputy chief of staff for operations under General Kroesen. He was one of the most magnificent soldiers I'd ever met. I worked for him once before for a short time, but he was first class. Then I got a call from Loring Hart, president of Norwich University, who I'd gotten to know -- over his 10-year span as president -- pretty well. In my traveling around at various times, I was the head of the Norwich Club of Georgia, the Norwich Club of Fort Hood, the Norwich Club in Europe. They'd come over to visit, and we became close. I had come home on leave to see my dad, who was in bad trouble health wise, and I got a call from Loring Hart to my dad's home down in New Hampshire. He said, "I need you to come up here. I need to talk to you; it's important." And I said, "Gee, I don't know. Dad is not well, I don't know how long he's going to live, and I can't be here very long, so I really and truly want to see as much of him as I can." He said, "Well, afterward, after this weekend" -- it was a big alumni weekend -- "I'll stop in to see you." I said OK. Well, Mother got a hold of me, and Dad got a hold of me and said, "Go on up there." Dad said, "Get a hold of my classmates and tell them I'll be there next year." Well, I knew most of his classmates. When I arrived I found them at lunch in the Armory, and I walked down to the table, the half where they were, and started saying this lie about my father, he's going to be getting well, and he'll see you next year when he comes. All of a sudden the most unusual thing happened. There was this great noise in the Armory, and it kept getting louder and louder and louder. As this individual coming into the room got closer to our table, I discovered that it was General Harmon coming back, and all of these people were saying, "Ernie, Ernie, Ernie, Ernie." I couldn't believe it, you know, really and truly. It showed me just exactly how much he was loved by this institution. That doesn't mean he didn't make a lot of mistakes at times, but he really pulled us out of the woods. So Loring Hart stops in at the house and says, "The board at Norwich University has told me that 10 years is enough, and I'm going to retire. I want you to put your name on the list to be considered." I said, "You're a PhD, you taught English, you became the dean of the university. I don't have any of that." He said, "And you don't need it either, because I'm absolutely certain they're going to choose a soldier." I said, "What do you know, I'm qualified." I went back to Europe, told my boss, and then came back. I made a couple of trips back and forth. I told my boss, which was General Kroesen, what was 37 going on, and then went to see the chief of staff of the army to tell him that I was putting in my papers. You know, after you've been division commander you owe the army something, because of the experience they've given you. So I went to see General "Shy" Meyer, who I'd known in Vietnam, and I was a little dubious here. What will he say? So I told him, and he jumped up from behind his chair, rushed around to my side of his desk, shook my hand, and said, "Boy, that's just exactly what I want to do when I get out." (laughter) Then, unfortunately, and this doesn't have to be spread around, he told me that my name had been submitted to be promoted to Lieutenant General, and it is now before the Congress. Had I not put this in and had I been selected, I was going to go to one of two different jobs, and neither one of them sounded as much fun to me as coming home. Not that I could change my mind. Once you've told the army you're retiring, you're retiring. You don't change your mind. So that's how I got here. JC: What were the other two choices? RT: To be the chief of staff of USEUCOM, which was for the European theater of all of the activities there, and the other one was on the joint staff, doing the DES-OPS kind of work, which is called the J5. JC: So you come to Norwich. Talk a little bit about the application process, because I know Phil Marsilius says in his oral history that they gave you an eight-point plan that they wanted implemented. RT: Yeah. Very unusual I thought, and very useful. Before I get to that (laughs), Carol and I came. We went to New York City and joined a committee of the board who were involved in the selection process. The plane was late, the taxis weren't running, and we were late getting to this thing. Carol was a little nervous that that showed that maybe we weren't working hard enough to get there. They said to me, "We've just finished lunch. Do you want something to eat?" and I said, "Oh, yeah. How about a bowl of onion soup?" Carol said to me afterward, "You could have chosen anything but that cheese dangling out of your mouth." (laughter) But, to me, we had a wonderful conversation, and quite frankly I left in the cab going back to the airport with a member of the board who sat there and congratulated us, because they were certain that the board was now going to select us. Yeah, interesting. Where were we in our discussion? JC: The eight-point plan. RT: Yeah. I can't tell you what the eight-points are right now, but they were all reasonable, one of which was to make Vermont College work, the system of the two institutions together, and that's interesting, too. On that point I tried very hard -- they put a lot of pressure on Loring to go up to Vermont College at least twice a week. He'd go home, changed out of his uniform into civilian clothes, go up to Vermont College, and I don't know what he did, presumably he did good things, and came back again. I got into that routine with him, and I found that Vermont College was in deep trouble, I mean, in my opinion. Over time Vermont College had reduced the quality of their education in order 38 to sustain the number of students they needed, and they had all kinds of programs going that didn't make a lot of sense. They had a nursing program that was excellent. Excellent. They had just bought some programs from -- oh, what's the name of it? JC: Goddard? RT: Goddard College, and they were difficult to mesh into the family. For example, I hadn't been here very long, and I got a call from Mrs. Lippincott, who was the chief officer of Vermont College and had previously been Loring's assistant. I got a call that said, "There's going to be a graduation on Friday" -- this was about Wednesday -- "and it's going to be outside at Vermont College. It's going to be one of the Goddard programs that's graduating at this time. They would like to invite you to be part of their graduation." So I said, "Fine, I'll be there." But before I went I hadn't heard anything more, so I called up to find out, and I said, "Now, what's my role in this? Do I hand out the diplomas? Do I make a speech, do I congratulate them from the platform? What do I do?" They said, "Oh, no, they just want you to sit there and be present. They do all this themselves." OK. I can live with that, and we'll see what happens. The first student to graduate came up, gave a little speech, each one of them, and then took their diploma and put it from their left hand to their right hand, and went back to their chair. The institution wasn't involved. This happened seven or eight times before I really said this is something we've got to look at. Then they decided, or they didn't then decide, the next thing was to have a musical rendition. They had a fellow with a fife and a piano player, and they pushed the piano out toward the group, and the front leg broke off pushing it through the grass. They somehow got it jacked up and started, and the flute player -- well, it was awful, just awful. The next day I said to my vice president, Jim Galloway, major general, retired, I told Jim what had happened, and he said, "You know, you weren't the first. I was the first. The same sort of thing went on, but it was crazier when I was up there." I said, "Tell me." He said, "The flute player was in a tree." (laughter) So we spent some time trying to bring it into the focus. Quite frankly they had some fine professors. They just didn't have a system involved. JC: I've always heard Goddard is a little strange. RT: Well, put it this way. One time Carol and I invited the president of -- oh, in Burlington. JC: UVM? RT: N

La presente tesi non è solo l'esito di una ricerca su un precetto giuridico controverso, ma è anche la narrazione di un processo personale di scoperta, che a partire dallo studio di una specifica norma ha fatto emergere la complessità delle interazioni nell'ambito delle politiche in materia penale, economica, e finanziaria. Partendo da un approccio microsociologico focalizzato sull'analisi di una determinata norma penale, il reato di riciclaggio,1 la ricerca ha dovuto confrontarsi con temi di interesse macrosociologico, al fine di inserire l'analisi della legge all'interno di un contesto più ampio di politiche nazionali, europee e internazionali, di attori e di governance transnazionale. Per mantenere la scientificità dell'elaborato ho omesso di esprimere opinioni personali sui temi, talvolta di carattere fortemente politico, e ho cercato, invece, di presentare aspetti critici e discussioni aperte fornendo una visione completa e imparziale delle contrastanti argomentazioni in modo da lasciare il lettore libero di trarre le proprie conclusioni. Il riciclaggio di denaro sporco è il processo tramite cui a proventi di reati viene data un'apparenza di essere stati guadagnati in modo illecito. È un reato tipico della cosiddetta 'zona grigia', poiché avviene al confine tra la sfera della legalità e quella dell'illegalità. Nel momento in cui profitti realizzati illecitamente si mescolano ai flussi di denaro lecito è molto difficile discernere ciò che ha un'origine legale da ciò che è stato guadagnato illegalmente. Il reato di riciclaggio di denaro sporco è stato introdotto proprio per affrontare questa difficoltà ed impedire che le strutture legittime dell'economia e della finanza globale venissero abusate da trasgressori al fine di ripulire i proventi di reato. Infatti i flussi di denaro sporco utilizzano spesso gli stessi canali usati per le transazioni lecite; la loro riuscita dipende dalla cooperazione di professionisti quali avvocati commerciali, agenti finanziari, commercialisti, la cui reputazione è raramente sospetta. Data questa promiscuità spesso la gravità del fenomeno è sottovalutata dal pubblico che non ha gli strumenti per riconoscerne la pericolosità, anche a causa dell'assenza di vittime dirette. Dall'altra parte le stime sulla quantità di proventi di reato riciclati a livello mondiale (che oscillano tra il 2,5 % e il 5,5 % del PIL globale) richiamano l'attenzione su quella che Dalla Chiesa definisce la mitologia del volume dell'economia criminale,2 e una parte della letteratura descrive il riciclaggio come il lato oscuro della globalizzazione,3 e come uno dei maggiori problemi dell'era moderna.4 Con questa ricerca ho voluto mettere in discussione l'efficacia del reato di riciclaggio nel far fronte al fenomeno dell'infiltrazione dei flussi di denaro sporco nell'economia lecita. Sebbene la pratica di nascondere i proventi di reato in modo da evitare la persecuzione giudiziaria risalga probabilmente a molto tempo addietro, il concetto giuridico di riciclaggio è relativamente recente ed è stato introdotto nei codici penali nella maggior parte del mondo a partire dalla fine degli anni 80.5 Nel frattempo un gran numero di autori si è scagliato contro la scarsa efficacia delle legislazione anti-riciclaggio6, nonostante le innumerevoli novità introdotte e i cospicui ammendamenti che hanno in larga parte espanso il campo di applicazione della normativa. La decisione di scegliere il contesto tedesco come caso di studio deriva dal fatto che il paese è considerato avere un rischio particolarmente alto di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Secondo il rapporto emesso dal 2010 dal GAFI (Groupe d'Action Financière), dal FMI (Fondo Monetario Internazionale) e dall'OCSE (Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo economico)7 ci sono alcuni fattori che rendono la Germania propensa ad essere usata al fine di riciclaggio di denaro sporco: il volume del sistema economico-finanziario, la locazione strategica al centro dell'Unione Europea con forti legami internazionali, l'uso diffuso di denaro contante,8 l'apertura delle frontiere, la vastità del settore informale, l'importante ruolo a livello di economia globale, e il coinvolgimento nei flussi di denaro transfrontalieri. Anche i media, a partire soprattutto dalla pubblicazione del citato rapporto, hanno attirato l'attenzione del pubblico sul fenomeno, descrivendo la Germania come "paradiso" o "Eldorado" per i riciclatori. Alcuni recenti scandali hanno visto coinvolte prominenti banche tedesche, come la Deutsche Bank, la Commerybank e l'Hyopovereinsbank, contro cui procure straniere hanno sollevato l'accusa di riciclaggio di denaro sporco.9 La legislazione in atto, ed in particolare l'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco, non sembra essere sufficientemente efficace per contrastare il fenomeno, nonostante gli abbondanti emendamenti e il continuo processo di aggiornamento e di espansione del campo di applicazione della norma. Al fine di spiegare questa per lo meno apparente incapacità della norma di fare fronte al fenomeno del riciclaggio, ho costruito l'ipotesi di ricerca sulla base delle teorie sociologico-giuridiche relative all'efficacia del diritto, alle funzioni manifeste e latenti delle norme e quindi alle intenzioni espresse e non dal legislatore, all'efficacia simbolica del diritto e di singole legislazioni e all'impatto, inteso come comprensivo degli effetti indesiderati o collaterali. L'ipotesi di ricerca è che la norma esplichi una funzione simbolica di allineamento dell'ordinamento nazionale a quello europeo e transnazionale, di compromesso tra gli interessi politici in gioco, e di creazione di consenso pubblico verso il legislatore per essersi occupato della questione. Si ipotizza che il legislatore abbia quindi consapevolmente accettato o addirittura scelto di formulare una norma strumentalmente poco efficace, ma simbolicamente capace di raggiungere i suoi obiettivi latenti. Si solleva inoltre l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata appositamente approvata con lo scopo di non modificare lo status quo delle relazioni e strutture economiche, e di permettere quindi l'ingresso di capitali sporchi nel paese, sulla base del motto pecunia non olet. La suddetta ipotesi viene parzialmente smentita dai risultati della ricerca empirica. La ricostruzione del processo di produzione legislativa mette in risalto l'esistenza di svariati e contrastanti interessi e della forte pressione esercitata dagli organismi internazionali per l'introduzione e lo sviluppo del reato di riciclaggio, e conferma, quindi, l'argomentazione che la norma sia stata approvata in un contesto di pressione politica esterna e di necessità di trovare un compromesso tra diverse parti politiche. Anche l'analisi degli aspetti problematici dell'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco messi in risalto dalla dottrina supporta l'ipotesi della simbolicità della norma. Il fatto che il legislatore abbia formulato un reato così complesso crea evidenti problemi di integrazione dello stesso all'interno del sistema penale tedesco, e quindi di accettazione da parte degli studiosi e potenzialmente da parte degli operatori del diritto. Inoltre, la scelta di costruire un reato così complesso riflette la necessità di venire a compromesso con opposti interessi, ma potrebbe essere anche essere interpretata come un disinteresse al raggiungimento di un'efficacia materiale. La ricerca empirica sull'implementazione dell'articolo 261, invece, smentisce l'idea che la norma abbia un'efficacia puramente simbolica. Infatti il numero di condanne, di investigazioni, ed in generale l'uso ricorrente della legge riscontrato nelle statistiche criminali provano che essa conduca ad effetti strumentali, oltre che simbolici. Inoltre, nella prospettiva di alcuni degli operatori del diritto e degli esperti intervistati, l'articolo 261 è percepito come una norma particolarmente efficiente, sia in relazione alle quote di chiarimento, che come strumento di demarcazione tra comportamenti leciti e illeciti, in un contesto di deregolamentazione del settore finanziario. Da un'analisi piè ravvicinata delle statistiche e di altri rapporti emessi da enti internazionali e nazionali emerge però un quadro non così univoco: La norma sembra colpire più le vittime dei network criminali che operano a livello transnazionale che gli autori, perché spesso i colpevoli sono coinvolti in transazioni sospette in cambio di guadagni monetari. Le cospicue indagini finanziarie non riescono a raggiungere coloro che operano dietro gli esecutori dei reati minori, ed infatti la maggior parte di esse si concludono senza una condanna per riciclaggio. Questo a fronte di un volume di denaro sporco circolante nel paese che rimane allarmante, secondo alcuni degli studi analizzati. Se da una parte i risultati dell'applicazione della norma, sebbene strumentali, non possono considerarsi soddisfacenti, perché non sono riusciti ad evitare l'ingresso di capitali illeciti nell'economia nazionale, dall'altra parte sembra che l'esistenza di interessi profondamente contrastanti in gioco renda quasi impossibile la formulazione di un reato piè efficace. La tesi è composta da cinque capitoli, un'introduzione e una conclusione. Nel primo capitolo espongo le teorie sociologiche adottate per la valutazione di efficacia della norma e il metodo della ricerca. Inizialmente richiamo concetti di efficacia forniti da discipline affini alla sociologia del diritto - tra cui per esempio il concetto di efficienza e di efficienza indipendente rispetto allo scopo (zielunhabhängige Effizienz) riferito agli apparati amministrativi - che torneranno utili per l'interpretazione dei risultati delle interviste. Successivamente procedo con una panoramica sulle definizioni di efficacia del diritto fornite in sociologia del diritto, sulla ci base adotto una nozione "elastica" -riprendendola da Ferrari- di efficacia di una norma che guarda alle funzioni della norma e alle intenzioni del legislatore, in una prospettiva "intenzionalistica": "la corrispondenza fra un disegno politico di utilizzo di uno strumento normativo e i suoi effetti". Tale nozione, oltre a prestarsi ad un'analisi critica del diritto, fornisce indicazioni utili per l'analisi empirica dell'efficacia della legge in questione. In particolare ritengo utile considerare le seguenti variabili: le intenzioni latenti e manifeste del legislatore, gli scopi diretti e ed indiretti, l'eventuale efficacia simbolica del diritto, l'implementazione, la ricezione della norma nel senso di accettazione nel sistema giuridico e di interpretazione e percezione da parte degli operatori giuridici. Nella seconda parte si evidenzia il rilievo di tali variabili con riferimento specifico al diritto penale. In conclusione, sulla base delle riflessioni teoriche, formulo l'ipotesi sull'efficacia simbolica del reato di riciclaggio nell'ordinamento tedesco, che verrà poi verificata nei capitoli successivi. Nello specifico, presumendo che il reato di riciclaggio, introdotto come strumento fondamentale della lotta alla criminalità organizzata, così com'è formulato non adempie agli scopi dichiarati, nonostante gli innumerevoli emendamenti finalizzati proprio ad aumentarne l'efficacia, ipotizzo un'efficacia simbolica della norma, introdotta per offrire un'immagine di efficienza al pubblico (elettori). Inoltre sollevo l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata emanata appositamente inefficace per neutralizzarne le aspirazioni di punizione delle condotte illecite tipiche dei colletti bianchi, in una lettura moderna del conflitto sociale che avviene tramite l'emanazione di norme, con la volontà di decriminalizzare secondariamente comportamenti tipici delle classi forti. Nel secondo capitolo analizzo il processo legislativo a livello internazionale, europeo e nazionale. Il processo che ha portato alla creazione del reato di riciclaggio a livello internazionale viene ricostruito tramite dichiarazioni di intenti degli attori partecipanti, opinioni pubblicate, trascrizioni dei dibattiti parlamentari. Una particolare attenzione è posta sulle diverse intenzioni degli attori che hanno partecipato alla formulazione del reato. Il processo legislativo che ha portato alla formulazione dell'attuale legislazione anti-riciclaggio è un processo complesso, in cui diversi attori partecipanti hanno contribuito con differenti aspettative e dunque attribuendo diverse funzioni alla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio. Al fine di permettere svariate interpretazioni del dettato normativo in modo da soddisfare i differenti bisogni, e con lo scopo di trovare un compromesso tra gli interessi divergenti, il reato di riciclaggio è stato formulato in modo vago. Mentre alcuni Stati (ad esempio la Francia) inizialmente sostenevano l'introduzione del reato con lo scopo di combattere i paradisi fiscali e rafforzare la lotta all'evasione fiscale, altri Stati, come la Svizzera, hanno accettato di firmare l'accordo internazionale sulla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio solo a condizione che l'evasione fiscale non fosse inserito nella lista dei reati antecedenti. Con la nascita del GAFI la policy viene usata allo scopo di difendere l'integrità del sistema finanziario dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito e dal 2001 si aggiunge la funzione di lotta al finanziamento del terrorismo. Tramite la soft law emanata dal GAFI per la prevenzione del riciclaggio, si trasferiscono compiti solitamente pubblici al settore privato: banche e istituti finanziari devono segnalare alla polizia ogni transazione sospetta, devono raccogliere e mantenere informazioni sui clienti e verificare le identità dei clienti. L'Unione Europea finora ha emanato quattro direttive nell'ambito del riciclaggio, l'ultima risale al 20 maggio 2015. Inizialmente la CE non aveva competenza in ambito penale, perciò la materia riciclaggio fu assorbita nella sfera economica (DG Economia e industria). La funzione dichiarata dal legislatore è la protezione del mercato interno, con particolare riguardo al fatto che i criminali possano sfruttare la libera circolazione dei capitali e l'eliminazione delle frontiere. Le direttive esprimono anche la volontà di impedire agli stati membri di emanare regolamentazioni che possano bloccare il libero mercato al fine di difendere le proprie economie dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito. Emerge dunque un ulteriore conflitto di interessi. Nella seconda parte ricostruisco il processo legislativo e le evoluzioni interne alla Germania fino al momento della scrittura e fornisco il quadro del sistema repressivo e di prevenzione anti-riciclaggio. L'articolo 261 StGB è stato introdotto con legge Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität, quindi nell'ambito della lotta alla criminalità organizzata. Il dibattito parlamentare rileva che la norma è il frutto di un compromesso sotto diversi aspetti, non ultimo il fatto che è stata emanata del 1992, a pochi anni dalla riunificazione, e che quindi è parte del processo di negoziazione per la formazione di un diritto penale adattabile alle due culture giuridiche. Il legislatore tedesco evidenzia alcune funzioni della norma: la lotta al consumo di eroina e al traffico di stupefacenti, la diffusione e la pericolosità della mafia alla luce dei fatti recenti italiani, la volontà di proteggere l'amministrazione della giustizia e di isolare i criminali puntando alla criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti gate-keepers. Nel terzo capitolo individuo alcuni dei problemi sollevati dalla dottrina tedesca sul piano teorico con riferimento alla criminalizzazione del reato di riciclaggio nel contesto del sistema penale tedesco. Uno dei temi più discussi è relativo al bene giuridico protetto. La dottrina non ha ancora trovato un accordo su quale interesse sia protetto dall'articolo 261 StGB, le ipotesi sono: gli interessi dei reati antecedenti, l'amministrazione della giustizia, il sistema finanziario e la sicurezza. La vaghezza del dettato normativo non aiuta a trovare un interpretazione dottrinale univoca. La questione del bene giuridico protetto, lungi dall'essere una mera questione teorica, risente delle diverse funzioni attribuite alla norma dagli attori partecipanti al processo legislativo. Finora la giurisprudenza, che pur è intervenuta a chiarire altre questioni relative alla norma, non è intervenuta sul tema. Un altro tema su cui il dibattito è ancora aperto è il fatto di aver previsto al comma 5 l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, in controtendenza rispetto al legislatore europeo. Questo, secondo alcuni studiosi porta all'assurdo per cui anche il panettiere Tizio che vende del pane ad un evasore fiscale Caio potendo aver riconosciuto che Caio fosse un evasore, si rende colpevole di riciclaggio. La questione del livello di mens rea richiesto per una condanna per riciclaggio era sorta anche durante il dibattito parlamentare e l'introduzione del comma 5 è stato sostenuto da un emendamento della SPD che avrebbe voluto criminalizzare anche l'ipotesi di colpa lievissima. Questo, secondo la CDU avrebbe messo un freno al mercato e alle transazioni, poiché avrebbe costituito una minaccia per chiunque avesse intrapreso operazioni economiche. Essendo la funzione della norma incerta, la dottrina si divide tra chi sostiene che questa vasta criminalizzazione faccia perdere il senso del reato che sarebbe invece colpire i criminali che agiscono con intento, e chi invece sostiene che la norma abbia lo scopo di impedire qualsiasi infiltrazione di denaro illecito e quindi richieda una responsabilizzazione di tutti colori i quali prendano parte in operazioni finanziarie o economiche. Ancora una volta l'indeterminatezza del precetto legislativo è di ostacolo ad un'interpretazione univoca. Il quarto capitolo offre un'analisi qualitativa delle statistiche officiali sull'implementazione della legge dal 1992 ad oggi da parte delle istanze repressive e di prevenzione. Tra i dati analizzati i più rilevanti sono per esempio il numero di segnalazioni di transazioni sospette ricevuto dalle procure, il numero delle investigazioni condotte, il numero di condanne effettivamente inflitte ed eseguite e per quale delle ipotesi di riciclaggio, il volume di denaro confiscato. Essendo tali numeri indici del funzionamento del sistema penale e non del fenomeno del riciclaggio per sé, in conclusione si confrontano tali statistiche con le stime sul volume di flussi illeciti in Germania. Tale analisi, non potendo dare conto del numero dei reati evitati, sulla base dell'efficacia deterrente della norma, non intende esaurire il giudizio di efficacia della legislazione. Tra i risultati più rilevanti vi sono il fatto che il 60% delle persone condannate vengono condannate per l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, che solitamente consiste in casi in cui una persona poco abbiente ha accettato di far usare il proprio conto a terzi per operazioni sospette in cambio di un guadagno. Nel 5% dei casi le condanne sono inflitte per le ipotesi aggravate di commissione da membro di un'associazione criminale o in forma commerciale. Nel 90% dei casi le transazioni sospette segnalate alle procure portano a una chiusura dei procedimenti per mancanza di indizi che possano sostenere un rinvio a giudizio. La norma sembra colpire delinquenti minori e non grandi gruppi criminali, né altri delinquenti più potenti. Si ipotizza inoltre che l'incapacità di sostenere un rinvio a giudizio nonostante le informazioni acquisite e le indagini preliminari riduce la capacità deterrente della norma e permette, invece, ai criminali di conoscere le modalità di funzionamento del sistema repressivo e agire di conseguenza. Inoltre, le transazioni sospette sono segnalate nel circa 90% dei casi sa parte di istituti di credito, mentre gli altri enti obbligati dalla legislazione non sembrano partecipare attivamente al processo preventivo, in particolare il settore forense e immobiliare e del gioco d'azzardo. Sulla base di questi dati si ipotizza un effetto spill-over, ossia un trasferimento di illegalità dai settori più controllati a quelli meno controllati. I rapporti pubblicati dalla polizia, invece, considerano l'articolo 261 StGB come una norma con una delle più alte quote di chiarimento (ca 90%), quota calcolata sul numero di casi chiariti dal sistema penale, a prescindere dalle modalità di chiarimento. Per quanto riguardo il volume di denaro riciclato, il capitolo richiama alcune delle stime pubblicate da diversi enti, tra cui il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, il GAFI e la polizia criminale federale. Essendo il fenomeno del riciclaggio un campo in cui la cifra oscura è stimata essere molto alta, tali dati non possono essere presi come misura obiettiva del fenomeno. Infine il capitolo si conclude richiamando alcune analisi del tipo costi-benefici per misurare l'efficacia delle politiche anti-riciclaggio o alcune delle sue norme, condotte da enti terzi. Tali analisi sembrano concordare nel considerare i costi di implementazione della politica più alti rispetto ai benefici conseguenti. Nel quinto capitolo, infine, vengono discussi i risultati della ricerca empirica con gli operatori giuridici e con alcuni osservatori privilegiati, in modo da fornire una prospettiva interna sul funzionamento della norma. Tramite le interviste condotte si mettono in luce aspetti della prassi giuridica non fotografati dalle statistiche, allo scopo di offrire un'immagine dell'impatto della legge quanto più vicina possibile alla realtà. La ricerca empirica si avvale di interviste con operatori del diritto e con osservatori privilegiati che siedono in posizioni ministeriali rilevanti nella lotta al riciclaggio. La metodologia adottata è di tipo qualitativo, è stato fatto uso di interviste semi-strutturate a operatori del diritto e a osservatori privilegiati. Il capitolo presenta le percezioni degli intervistati su quattro temi principalmente: la dimensione del fenomeno del riciclaggio, l'adeguatezza tecnica della legislazione, i conflitti di interesse intrinseci alla legge e sorti dall'applicazione della norma e l'efficacia delle legge. A fronte di un rapporto emesso da quattro ONG nel novembre 2013, sulla base di statistiche prodotte dall'UNODC e dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale, e immediatamente riprese dai media, che descrive il paese come "Eldorado" per i riciclatori,10 le interviste sono dirette a cogliere l'opinione dei rispondenti sulle dimensioni del fenomeno del riciclaggio in Germania. Un intervistato ritiene inaccettabile desumere dal PIL tedesco il volume di affari del crimine organizzato nel paese, e obietta che non si possa, sulla base del giro d'affari del centro finanziario di Francoforte, definire lo stesso come centro di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Un altro intervistato, dichiara, al contrario, che sicuramente il fatto che la Germania abbia un'economia stabile ed un settore bancario affidabile attiri coloro che vogliano investire proventi illeciti, neppure quest'ultimo possiede, però, dati affidabili sulla quantità di denaro riciclato. Il riciclaggio, come altri fenomeni legati alla criminalità organizzata, è una fattispecie che per definizione sfugge alle autorità e ai confini nazionali. Lo scopo dello stesso è nascondere proventi di reato e sottrarli in questo modo al sistema repressivo, questo è sicuramente un elemento che rende complessa, se non impossibile, la sua quantificazione. D'altra parte, osservano i soggetti intervistati autori del Rapporto del 2013, l'incapacità di fornire statistiche rilevanti dopo più di 20 anni di lotta al riciclaggio, sembra essere un sintomo di una carente volontà politica nel contrastare efficacemente il fenomeno. Secondo gli osservatori privilegiati se la Germania fosse davvero un paradiso per i riciclatori, ciò non sarebbe collegabile ad un deficit legislativo, dato l'impegno del governo nella lotta al riciclaggio, negando, quindi, l'accusa rivolta dai media per cui i criminali sceglierebbero il paese tedesco ai fini di riciclaggio di denaro sporco sulla base delle lacune normative. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto di evidenziare aspetti positivi e problematici della legislazione. Tra i più rilevanti vi sono: la necessità di bilanciare il bisogno di punire la condotta di riciclaggio e rispettare i principi fondamentali del sistema giuridico, il disinteresse da parte degli istituti finanziari nell'indagare l'origine del capitale investito dai clienti, anche in caso di sospetto di provenienza criminale, a causa della possibile conseguente perdita di reputazione nell'ipotesi di apertura di investigazioni da parte delle autorità sul cliente sospetto. Vi è poi una difficoltà materiale nel condurre indagini finanziarie, che spesso, conducono a condotte illecite commesse all'estero; sul punto si osserva che le condotte di riciclaggio, intese come operazioni atte ad ostacolare la provenienza delittuosa, non avvengono su territorio tedesco, bensì all'estero, il denaro che entra in Germania, è, quindi, già "pulito". Inoltre, l'articolo 261 è stato introdotto nel sistema tedesco come trasposizione di una direttiva Europea e non rifletteva una necessità interna dello Stato; la formulazione così vaga, infatti, si presta più per il sistema giuridico degli Stati Uniti, in cui non vige l'obbligo dell'azione penale, mentre in Germania, dove i pubblici ministeri hanno l'obbligo di azione penale, tale norma porta ad iniziare numerose indagini senza avere la capacità di proseguirle. In generale, gli intervistati rappresentanti dei Ministeri rilevano la forte pressione subita da parte del GAFI e dell'Unione Europea per l'emanazione della legge anti-riciclaggio e concordano nel dire che se la norma fosse stata creata sulla base di una necessità e di un dibattito nazionale sarebbe stata scritta diversamente. C'è chi individua nel sistema penale le cause di inefficacia dell'articolo 261, nello specifico, la limitata possibilità di effettuare intercettazioni telefoniche, le restrizioni in materia di inversione dell'onere probatorio, e lo scarso utilizzo della confisca dei proventi di reato a causa del disinteresse da parte delle procure (gestite a livello di Bundesländer) nell'investire risorse in tal senso dato che i beni confiscati non resterebbero in mano al Bundesland ma verrebbero raccolti in un fondo federale e poi spartiti. Si osserva una generale mancanza di risorse pubbliche che porta ad una carenza di personale coinvolto nelle investigazioni e, quindi, ad una incapacità di far fronte ai processi in corso in modo efficace. Per questo motivo, i pm non hanno la capacità di indagare più a fondo casi di riciclaggio all'apparenza semplici, ma che potrebbero portare alla luce organizzazioni criminali operanti nell'ombra. Alla totalità degli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'efficacia della legge. L'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco è stato definito da un soggetto "una legge scritta in modo indecente, che produce risultati banali sul piano delle statistiche criminali, soprattutto con riferimento alle condanne per riciclaggio in grossi casi di criminalità economica". Il reato è così difficile da provare in giudizio, che risulta facile, per la difesa, sfruttare le lacune legislative per evitare una condanna per riciclaggio. I rappresentanti dei Ministeri confermano che la lettera dell'articolo 261 crea confusioni e che quindi l'accusa, pur trovandosi di fronte ad un caso di riciclaggio spesso preferisca perseguire i delitti presupposto. Questo non è, però, un sintomo di inefficacia, dato che l'effettività a cui mira il Ministero dell'interno non è data dal numero di condanne per riciclaggio, ma dal numero di casi risolti, e quindi dal numero di condanne in generale, a prescindere dall'imputazione. D'opinione opposta un altro intervistato che ritiene che l'articolo 261 non abbia alcuna capacità deterrente nei confronti della criminalità organizzata, "la norma ricorre così raramente nella prassi giudiziaria che di fatto non rappresenta una "minaccia" per i potenziali criminali". I soggetti intervistati esprimono più soddisfazione a riguardo della legislazione di prevenzione (GWG); in particolare, con riferimento alle piccole e medie imprese, per le quali è difficile riconoscere tra i partner commerciali coloro i quali investono denaro di provenienza illecita, la possibilità di affidarsi alle autorità investigative, in caso di sospetto è fondamentale. Un avvocato specializzato in compliance per società, descrive la norma preventiva come molto efficace e severa, tanto che è impossibile per le aziende, specialmente per quelle di medie o piccole dimensioni, adempiere a tutti gli obblighi prescritti dalla norma, ma, egli osserva, l'efficacia del sistema sta proprio nel fatto che le autorità di controllo, consapevoli dell'elevata rigorosità della legge, chiudono un occhio di fronte a lievi inadempienze. Una legge meno severa e un controllo più fiscale non otterrebbero la stessa efficacia, perché la norma non avrebbe lo stesso potenziale deterrente. L'efficacia all'interno delle amministrazioni responsabili per la lotta al riciclaggio è interpretata come efficienza dell'apparato, per questo motivo, non ci sono verifiche sull'efficacia degli strumenti giuridici sulla base degli scopi dichiarati, quanto piuttosto sulla correttezza del funzionamento dell'amministrazione e sulle possibilità di migliorarlo; il punto è capire come migliorare, non se il sistema sia efficace o no. Agli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'eventuale efficacia simbolica della legislazione. La maggioranza delle risposte è stata negativa, gli sforzi compiuti da parte dello Stato -e quindi delle procure, della autorità competenti e della polizia- nel contrastare il riciclaggio e la criminalità economica non possono essere considerati simbolici. Alcuni intervistati ritengono assolutamente necessaria e strumentale – e quindi non simbolica- l'esistenza del reato nel codice penale come demarcazione di illegalità di tali condotte e come strumento atto a contrastare la criminalità economica perché mette in chiaro entro quali limiti le società possano perseguire profitti in modo legittimo. Di opinione diversa, invece, gli avvocati penalisti i quali si sono detti favorevoli a tale definizione sulla base dello scarso numero di condanne e soprattutto sulla mancata previsione da parte del Governo di mezzi adeguati per l'implementazione della legislazione. Lo stesso è osservato dal terzo settore, il quale sostiene che, a fronte di una legge complessa, oggetto di svariati emendamenti nel corso degli anni, non c'è stato un sufficiente impegno sul versante dell'implementazione; il coinvolgimento del GAFI e dell'OECD nella lotta al riciclaggio è percepito come un modo per creare posti di lavoro e nuove figure professionali, più che un'arena dove discutere efficaci strumenti di lotta ai reati economici. Altri elementi interessanti riscontrabili nelle interviste sono i conflitti di interessi che emergono dall'applicazione delle leggi anti-riciclaggio. Tra essi, vi è il dibattito tra il Ministero dell'Interno e quello di Giustizia in riferimento all'adeguatezza dello strumento penalistico nel contrastare la criminalità economica, dibattito già affrontato dalla dottrina, a cui, però finora, non è stata data una risposta univoca. Da una parte il Ministero dell'Interno auspica un intervento giuridico più deciso, che, per esempio, ricomprenda il reato di riciclaggio nella responsabilità penale degli enti (non ancora esistente in Germania) e sollecita una svolta politica generale in tema di criminalità economica dalla deregolazione del mercato finanziario all'intervento dello Stato in ambito economico ai fini di chiarire i comportamenti leciti e quelli illeciti. Dall'altra parte, il Ministero della Giustizia considera erroneo il ricorso al diritto penale ai fini di risolvere problemi di tipo economico o finanziario e cerca di frenare la tendenza moderna alla proliferazione penale, a favore di un intervento di tipo preventivo-sociale. A tal proposito, si osserva che agli incontri del GAFI a cui partecipano i rappresentanti dei Ministeri di Giustizia, coloro che provino a richiamare l'attenzione sulla necessità di rispettare i principi fondamentali costituzionali e di limitare l'intervento penale a tutela dei cittadini, vengano tacciati di non voler combattere la criminalità organizzata in modo efficace. In conclusione riapro la prospettiva a livello globale ed inserisco il reato di riciclaggio in una riflessione più ampia sulla governace finanziaria. In una prospettiva storica di analisi delle politiche economiche recenti si osserva come vi sia stata una tendenza a deregolare il mercato per mano delle istanze tradizionali pubbliche, e al contempo un aumento di strumenti transnazionali di cosiddetta soft-law che si sono fatti portatori di interessi particolari. Finché questa conflittualità non verrà risolta sarà impossibile impedire il riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Con particolare riferimento al contesto europeo, si prende atto che è stato molto più facile chiudere le frontiere per le persone fisiche e non a quelle giuridiche o ai capitali. ; This paper aims to question the sociolegal1 effectiveness of the money laundering offence.2 The literature that assesses the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system is abundant. While most of it does not question the regime's goals this paper takes a step back and critically looks at the law-making process. In addition, while most studies have assessed the effectiveness of anti-money laundering law by looking at statistical outcomes, this paper takes a step forward and tries to explain those statistics by looking at legal praxis and at indirect effects. The significance of the research derives from the insertion of the analysis on money laundering offence in a broader political, economic and historical context. The methodology adopted is qualitative, with the intended purpose of underlining the complexity of the issue tackled, rather than reducing it through a quantitative approach. While most of the existing literature has quantitatively assessed the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes on the basis of statistical data and other quantitative indexes and has tried to reduce the complexity of the issue by measuring it numerically, this research adopts a qualitative methodology, which instead highlights the entanglement and the different perspectives on the question. Money laundering is the process of giving profits originated illegally an appearance of having been made lawfully.3 Due to the tightening of economic criminal policies that limit the possibility of integrating ill-gotten gains in the legitimate economy, offenders have developed more and more complex methods and subterfuges to launder proceeds of crime, so the rise of a proper 'money laundering industry' (industria del riciclaggio) is mentioned.4 The total volume of money laundered is estimated to amount to between 2,5 and 5, 5 % of the world GDP.5 Due to the borderline nature of money laundering, which happens between the so-called 'legitimate economy' and the 'dirty economy', and thus involves different actors such as banks, the financial sector, certain professions and businesses, offenders, victims and law enforcement agencies, the legal response needs to compromise with all the various economic, political, social and financial interests at play. Furthermore, where legitimate business intermingles with illegal business and legitimate funds with illicit funds, it is very difficult to distinguish what is legal from what is not. The criminalisation of money laundering was specifically supposed to tackle this fine line. The goal of this research is to assess whether the choice of criminalising money laundering has been effective to tackle this fine line. In order to assess the impact of the domestic implementation of the existing legal framework, the research uses a case study that specifically questions the effectiveness of the money laundering offence in the German national criminal legal system. The interest in the German case derives from the fact that, according to the IMF, the OECD and the FATF, Germany might have 'a higher risk profile for large scale money laundering than many other countries'.6 There are some factors identified as enablers of money laundering activities, such as the large economy and financial centre, the strategical location in the middle of Europe, with strong international links, the substantial proceeds of the crime environment involving organised crime operating in most profit generating criminal spheres, the open borders, the large informal sector and a high use of cash, the large and sophisticated economy and financial sector, the important role in world trade, and finally the involvement in large volumes of cross-border trade and financial flows. The media have kept on reporting the fact that Germany is an ideal country, or even a paradise for money launderers.7 According to most recent media reports, corruption is increasing in Germany along with money laundering and organised crime,8 and illicit financial flows are estimated to amount to 50 Billion Euros annually.9 Renowned banks such as Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Hypovereinsbank have been the focus of recent scandals due to their involvement in large tax evasion and money laundering schemes, investigated mostly by US law enforcement agencies.10 The legal framework has been considered as not being sufficient to tackle the estimated volume of money laundering. In 2007 and 2010 the European Commission initiated two proceedings against the German government for having contravened the European treaty by not having effectively transposed into national law the European framework to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.11 In response to this wave of criticism, some important changes have been made.12 With specific regards to penal law, the legislature has amplified the scope of the money laundering offence and the sphere of criminal liability in order to improve the effectiveness of the existing legislation.13 Yet the continual expansion process has raised legal challenges that could constitute an obstacle for the effective enforcement of the measure. With regards to international legislation, scholars have often criticized the ineffectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime to not be able to achieve its goals and thus to be only appearance of public action. 14 While there is theoretical support for the perception that policies have contributed to a decrease in the incidence of money laundering, there is no evidence that this goal has actually been achieved.15 The official discourse describes the regime as a crucial tool to prevent and combat money laundering, and lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering laws. This work however takes a critical approach towards the existing legal framework and presents the view that questioning the effectiveness of the money laundering offence is essential before expanding the scope of the existing legal framework.16 On the background of the reflections based on the sociolegal framework that sets the definition of legal effectiveness with specific respect to criminal law, and on the critical literature on the inadequateness of the international anti-money laundering system to eliminate the targeted activity recalled in the introduction, the hypothesis underlying the case study is the following: Article 261 Gcc may be an example of a symbolic legislation, whose latent functions prevail on its declared functions. In particular, it is hypothesised that the law is an example of a 'compromise-law' that satisfy all parties taking part in the law-making process, thanks to the vagueness of the wording that allows a broad range of possible interpretations, and also thanks to the actual ineffectiveness, which pleases those who were contrary to the introduction of the provision. It is here necessary to recall the considerations on the 'legislator' being an heterogeneous group of parties not only constituted of members of the Parliament but often also by external actors, who can influence more or less transparently the law making-process. While the manifested function of tackling money laundering has in fact remained in the background, the thesis hypothesises that other latent goals have been pursued. It is further hypothesised that the 'law inaction' is part of a process of decriminalisation that intentionally grants impunity to a certain group of actors, in this case those laundering money, while giving the appearance that the practice is not accepted by law by labelling it as criminal. By using the concept of function, the study focuses on eventual conflicting interests emerging throughout the policy-making process and/or being displayed through the implementation of the provisions. In order to verify these hypotheses the research proceeds with a case study that aims at empirically assessing the sociolegal effectiveness of Article 261 Gcc. In particular, by applying the 'elastic' definition of effectiveness, the following chapters analyse the law-making process, the level of acceptance by legal scholars, the implementation, and the opinions of legal experts and professionals. The methodology adopted is qualitative. The research consists of a case study that includes a documental research, a qualitative analysis of statistical data and the conduction of interviews with privileged observers and legal actors. The study is a macro-sociological assessment of the effectiveness of a criminal legislation through the analysis of the motives that have triggered lawmakers to enact the current legal framework and the practical effects of the 'law in action'17 and of the 'law inaction'.18 Thanks to the use of sociological conceptual tools, as the ones of function, symbolic effectiveness, power, labelling, and legal culture, the research critically approaches the legal framework. In addition, the sociolegal perspective allows us to take into account the multidisciplinary nature of the phenomenon of money laundering and of its countermeasures and the diverse conflicting interests at play. The work has been conducted by a single person and not by a team of researchers; this has imposed a limit on the interviewing sample and the impossibility of undertaking, along with the qualitative analysis of the provision, a qualitative analysis of the jurisprudence and a quantitative analysis of the case law. In addition, criminal provisions have a deterrent purpose, yet in certain cases it is almost impossible to quantify the deterrence effect of those provisions, as in the case of the money laundering offence, and this represents a shortcoming of the current research. Official numbers are highly problematic, this element, despite impeding an objective quantification of the phenomenon, can represent a partial result for the qualitative analysis, because it highlights the complexity of the matter. The anti-money laundering regime is constantly evolving, and this would require continuously updating the assessment, instead the research provides a picture of the current situation. Yet the work offers the reader an instrument to critically interpret also possible changes in the wording of the money laundering offence that may be made following the publication of this work. The outcomes of the critical study on the reasons and effects of the current legislation can be used as a starting point for further research; the methodology set for the empirical analysis can be applied to assess the effectiveness of following developments. The structure of the thesis is the following: The first chapter presents the theoretical sociolegal framework and provides an operational definition of the concept of effectiveness that directs the empirical research. At the end the chapter describes the methodology of the qualitative research. Chapter two traces the genesis of the money laundering offence, as well on an internal, European and domestic level. The chapter analyses legislative intents, parliamentarian debates and other external contributions as declarations of intents and opinions through a desktop-study. The third chapter is dedicated to the doctrinal debate about the money laundering offence regulated in the German penal code. In particular the chapter highlights the controversial issues that have emerged through the abundant legal scholarship production, which might affect the effectiveness of the money laundering offence. Chapters four and chapter five present the empirical research. The fourth chapter analyses the quantitative data of the implementation of the money laundering offence from a qualitative perspective. The last chapter presents the results of the interviews. The main outcomes of the research are that the interests expressed more or less manifestly from the actors taking part in the initial phase of the creation of the anti-money laundering regime were strongly conflicting with each other. One representative example is the question whether to use the policy also to tackle large scale tax evasion or to leave proceeds deriving from fiscal crimes outside of the regime. Very different justifications were given for the criminalisation of money laundering at different stages. Often the declared motives did not correspond to the real goals of the actors taking part in the law-making process. The rhetoric connected to the seriousness of the drug issue was the manifest function of the new criminalisation of money laundering. However, other latent goals, for instance, the desire of financial institutions to clean their reputation and gain customs confidentiality or the interest of some governments to curb tax evasion were already present during this initial phase. Another controversial issue concerns the fact national states have adopted anti-money laundering measures under the pressure of the FATF, which is led by most industrialised countries.19 Despite lacking democratic legitimation, the FATF has imposed worldwide a brand new regime of criminalisation, prevention and enforcement. The legal framework has been used to address ever-new challenges, and this expansion process has been coupled by a rhetoric that scholars have defined the securitisation rhetoric.20 The most recent function manifestly attributed to the anti-money laundering legal framework, that is, in short, the protection of the soundness of the financial system. Especially in times of financial insecurity, the tendency of hardening laws against economic crimes increases. Having previously deregulated the financial system to enhance economic liberties, legislatures resort to criminal law to control illegality in the economy. As a response to the European financial crisis of 2007-2011, legislatures, instead of rethinking the approach towards the protection of the global finance, called for a tightening of economic crimes regulations. The European discourse on money laundering has mostly been related to the destabilisation of the market, the abuse of capitals' movement liberty, the disintegration of the internal economy. But, why was the EU so keen on imposing a common standard for the criminalisation of money laundering, without even enjoying competence in penal matters? The introduction of a common anti-money laundering control policy served to a latent function, namely to the purposes of the creation of the 'Single Market', by way of avoiding that Member States would have adopted measures inconsistent with the completion of the Internal Market, while taking action to protect their own national economies from money laundering.21 This was done by avoiding that domestic regulations implemented for protecting national economies from the infiltration of ill-gotten capital could have hampered the freedom of movement of capital within the European borders. The tension emerges, also in the wording of the most recent EU money laundering Directives, due to lack of Community action against money laundering could lead Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt measures which could be inconsistent with completion of the single market.22 There are thus conflicting interests between the claim for regulation to avoid the infiltration of illicit capital, and the demand for deregulation to foster the free market. The European legislature, however, did not declare completely this intention and justified, instead, the imposition of anti-money laundering rules given the threats posed by money laundering to the financial system and thus to society. According to this critical approach, the criminalisation of money laundering turns out to be more of a political tool aimed at achieving governance within the EU, while being presented to the public as an essential intervention to guarantee security and well-being. Once again, thus, the declared goals of the lawmakers did not correspond with the real intentions. It is especially in the interest of a research on the law's effectiveness to unveil functions that were undeclared, in order to evaluate the outcomes in a more critical way. Also from the analysis of the national law-making process emerged divergent opinions and expectations relating to the criminalisation of money laundering. The Parliamentarians debate that took place with regard to the introduction of the money laundering offence and other instruments to tackle drug-trafficking shows that the discussion was deeply embedded in the political-historical context. Given that Germany was just reunified after a period of two dictatorial regimes, the hearing gives the impression that lawmakers felt the responsibility of creating a new legal system against such historical background. In order to balance the very different legal cultures, the divergent approaches had to be compromised. The introduction of a new crime was particularly delicate due to the discriminatory and arbitrary use of criminal labels by the previous dictatorial regimes. Therefore, delegates would not easily give up on fundamental rights for the cause of persecuting criminals. The legislation can be seen as an attempt to balance the need to adopt more effective measures to tackle crime and the necessity of respecting the rule of law and creating a 'militant democracy'. Yet, given the external pressure of the FATF, the EU and of the media, the text was less of a compromise and rather a ratification of 'internationally' accepted standards. The rule of law was not the only issue emerged in the initial phase of the political debate. Controversial opinions were raised also with regard to the questions of the mens rea and the interest protected by the new criminal provision: Certain political parties supported the broadest criminal liability to ensure an effective prosecution of money laundering, other parties were worried that a widespread liability would have been cumbersome for the economic system. Moreover, along with the expansion of the international criminal legal framework to fight against money laundering, also the scope of Article 261 Gcc was extended to include ever-new predicate offences. From the analysis of the doctrinal debate, it emerged that legal scholars have revealed technical hindrances that hinder the provision's legitimacy and thus hamper a positive integration of the act in the criminal legal system. In addition, given that most controversial issues are caused by the wording of the offence, the chapter seems to uphold the idea of an intentional potential decriminalisation of money launderers. The wording of Article 261 Gcc has the potential of frustrating some of the intentions expressed by the legislature in occasion of the adoption of the provision. While the vague formulation of the money laundering offence was thought to tackle ever-new emergencies and has been justified by legislatures as necessary to ensure a more effective fight against money laundering, it has also raised issues that, far from being purely dogmatic, have undermined the acceptance of such law. If law makers have designed the offence in a broad way to allow the criminalisation of conducts that could not have been prosecuted by the existing offences before, the large discretion left to prosecutors, has resulted in a cumbersome element for the prosecution of money laundering. In addition, criminalising the reckless conduct without envisaging a specific criminal liability for security positions has widened the scope of the offence to the point that the law has missed its function of isolating criminals by criminalising gate-keepers' activities. In addition it emerged that there are some open questions with regard to the wording of the offence, for example the question of the interests protected by Article 261 Gcc. On one side a state intervention is considered necessary to contain the impact of economic misbehaviours to protect citizens, on the other side it is important to limit the resort to criminal law only for safeguarding individual or collective situations and not for defending an existing economic structure. The economic system may, in fact, not be considered as a collective interest that needs protection. Also, safeguards provided by penal law need to be substantial and not symbolic, because they urge to change a given situation of inequality, where criminals can profit from illegal practices while legitimate economic actors undergo unfair competition. From the doctrinal analysis it has instead emerged that the legislator seemed to be more interested in drafting a symbolic legislation that can be hardly integrated in the legal system and that raise strong challenges. Lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering in order to improve its effectiveness, yet without providing legitimacy for such expansion. One of the most meaningful fact observed in the qualitative analysis of statistical data is that organised crime and 'gross money laundering' are not persecuted through Article 261 Gcc. This fact can be inferred by the low number of convictions pursuant to Article 261 (4),23 by the low number of money laundering proceedings categorised as organised crime and by the low number of investigations in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic crimes recorded by public prosecutors offices in 2013, where more than one person was involved (18 %). Yet, this does not mean that the criminal justice system does not act against them, but rather that it uses other tools to achieve the goal. While the low conviction rate for serious money laundering cases could be also a symptom of a high degree of deterrence of the provision, it seems that law enforcement uses the money laundering charge as a fallback for authorities who are unable to acquire sufficient evidence in a preliminary phase for the predicate crime and necessitate further information otherwise not accessible. The charge of money laundering allows investigators to access the vast amount of information recorded pursuant to the GwG, which would not be otherwise accessible. Yet, after the investigative phase, prosecutors seem to prefer to modify the charge and opt for indictment for predicate offences instead. The law seems to be effective to the extent that it facilitates the initial investigations, while it does not serve directly the function of punishing money launderers. Besides having a substantial nature, the provisions seem to have a procedural function. It can be inferred that prosecutors find particularly difficult to bring evidence against organised money launderers also due to the fact that professional offenders do not leave traces. From the scarce use of Article 261 Gcc for tackling organised criminality, it can be inferred that the measure is not serving for one of the purposes declared by the legislature when introducing the offence. In addition, it can be hypothesised that other measures may be more suitable to tackle 'gross money laundering'. Given the high number of STRs filed and the low number of money laundering charges and of convictions deriving from the STRs since the introduction of the laws, it can be assumed that the system has been anyway maintained because it still provides some sort of benefits. It can be hypothesised that one benefit is the number of information provided to law enforcement agencies. This amount of recorded information is helpful not only to support further indictments, but also to increase the personnel awareness about the ever-changing money laundering techniques and schemes. Again the effect of the 'law in action' differs in respect to the declared legislative intentions, which justified the criminalisation of money laundering with the necessity of tackling organised crime's economic power. By spelling out this function, the assessment on the effectiveness of the law - as the possibility of collecting information - can be positive. Yet, this effect could be considered a social cost rather than a benefit. On a theoretical side, many scholars see the recording of personal information by private actors as an infringement of the right to privacy.24 On a more practical side such mechanism imposes significant costs on the designated businesses and professions that are in charge of collecting the data.25 When compared to the effective outcomes of the preventive regulations, in terms of law enforcement results, this aspect does not seem to win a cost-benefit analysis, as showed in the quoted researches. If one considers the advantages in terms of information collected, the policy may be considered worth the burden imposed, instead. However, the fact that the laws would have an effective impact on the long run on the fight against money laundering and organised crime may be seen as a diminished deterrence effect, because perpetrators would have the time to adapt to the new laws and find new ways of circumventing them. A collateral effect of the long-run effectiveness of the policy hypothesised on the basis of the outcomes of the research on the implementation is the fact that perpetrators could take advantage of the initiated but not completed cases, by acquiring knowledge about law enforcement strategies and thus develop subterfuges to elude them. On the contrary, it seems that the legislature is always running after to cope with the offenders' ever-new strategies. In fact, regulations about a new sector are updated when there is evidence that there is a risk of money laundering in that specific sector. Yet, offenders might have already moved their laundering activities to another sector. On the assumption that the inclusion of the reckless conduct would have potentially criminalised daily activities, a focus was posed on the number of convictions related to Article 261 (5) Gcc26 to verify the target of the criminal provision. Since 2005 a high number of convictions have been actually referring to reckless money laundering. This shows that the offence is used to punish primarily 'petty money laundering'. This fact can also be inferred from the relevant number of money laundering cases to the detriment of senior citizens, signalled by the FIU in the recent years. Also the fact that a significant number of STRs is filed in relation to the 'financial agents' phenomenon' is a symptom that the preventive mechanism targets more 'small fishes' rather than big perpetrators. Individuals convicted for the reckless conduct may be even victims of a fraud perpetrated by criminal networks. However, the criminal network acting behind the offender remains undetected. If on the one side it cannot be claimed that such offenders, given the lower degree of culpability should not be punished at all, on the other side this effect of the law involves a change of paradigm. The money laundering offence was initially introduced with the goal of tackling serious crimes. The observed effect, however, changes the function and the nature of the law, so that Article 261 Gcc could be considered rather a 'blue collar crime' more than a 'white collar crime'. From the analysis on the quality of STRs filed to the FIU, it can be inferred that certain designated professions and businesses are very reluctant in filing STRs, despite their notably exposure to money laundering risks. The list of designated professions and businesses has been amplified over the years exactly with the goal of facing this transfer of crime from one area to the other. Yet some professionals, such as legal advisors, do not report them, although they possess the capacity of recognising illicit transactions. The fact that some sectors do not actively participate in the effort of preventing money laundering, by allowing criminal proceedings to enter the legitimate economy, may lead to a general ineffectiveness of the system, because it can significantly hinder the capacity of the whole anti-money laundering system to respond to the ability of offenders to move their field of activity there where the law is lax. The provision does generate some instrumental effects by punishing offenders and by triggering a cooperation directed at signalling suspicious transactions between the obliged entities and law enforcement. However, some of the effects do not seem to completely fulfil the legislature's declared goals. For example the chapter seems to prove wrong the legislature's expectation of tackling the grey area by punishing gate-keepers or the attributed function of eliminating organised and serious crime. Given the high costs of implementation highlighted by the cost-benefits analyses, the rather low outcomes seem to be insufficient to fulfil the legislature's goals. Since it is sufficient that without latent functions it would be impossible to explain the adoption and maintenance of a legal act,27 it can be concluded that the intents declared by lawmakers do not satisfy the reasons why the provision was introduced. This opens up the hypothesis that Article 261 Gcc is an example of a symbolic legislation, which has been enacted with the purpose of compromising a complex parliamentarian debate. The analysis of the law-making process has revealed the existence of different expectations attributed to the introduction of Article 261 Gcc. Expectations that were conflicting with each other had to be negotiated and were compromised through the formulation of a vague offence that allowed different interpretations. Yet, the implementation of the law has led to the re-emersion of some of the conflicting situations. In addition, given that the policy regulates a complex and multifaceted issue new conflicts have emerged through its enforcement. The effects triggered by the norm can be indeed perceived positively or negatively by the different actors involved. In particular five principal conflicting situations have surfaced from the interviews. The first issue is the role played by external actors in the law-making process and the constant influence exercised by those actors in the process of updating the policy. The imposition of a US American approach to money laundering control through the role of the FATF has also been highlighted in the second chapter. Specifically, some scholars see the development of a global prohibition regime fostered by the US in the diffusion of anti-money laundering law. According to this literature, the powerful state creates an international regime focussed on achieving its own goals through global acceptance triggered by the securitisation rhetoric and compliance processes imposed through the menace of exclusion by international business relations. The second conflict that emanates from the words of the respondents is the one of the demand for criminal law to face financial misbehaviours and the necessity of limiting the tendency of expanding criminal law on the background of a situation of financial instability. Given the previous deregulation of the market, policy makers need to control and sanction economic abuse in order to protect fair competition and law-abiding individuals. On the other hand, the state needs to respect fundamental principles, such as the rule of law and the principle of ultima ratio that imposes a restriction of the use of criminal law in situations in which no other measures are suitable. This conflict has already been raised along the formulation of the money laundering offence with regards to the question of the interests protected by the law. Despite the legislator tying to limit the scope of the offence by attributing to Article 261 Gcc the protection of the administration of justice and of the interests protected by the predicate offences, this explanation was not considered suitable to the peculiarity of the offence. Indeed, shortly after the enactment, legal scholarship and the judiciary entered in a vivid debate in order to identify more suitable interests protected by the law, among them the financial and economic system under different perspectives. However, as chapter three shows, no solution could be found. In fact, the question concerning the suitability of criminal law to tackle illicit financial flows is perceived in the current research as still unsolved. The matter does not only concern money laundering control. On the contrary, it is a fairly widespread issue that has recently emerged due to the tendency of hardening economic crimes on the background of a situation of financial instability. The third conflict can be summarised as the following: on the one hand the policy being required to interfere with the personal sphere of suspected money launderers; on the other hand private institutions being interested in protecting their relations with loyal and trusted customers. Therefore, they are reluctant to give law enforcement the possibility to interfere too much in their business. The interest manifested by the private sector involved in the prevention of money laundering seems thus to collide with the legislative intent of preventing the infiltration of dirty money by way of preventing gate-keepers to help money launderers. The clash emerges at a micro-economic level and is triggered by the fact that the anti-money laundering policy demands an active participation by private sector in the detection of suspects. Private actors, are not appropriate to bear the burden of detecting offenders, moreover they need to protect the relationships with customers by avoiding unnecessary interferences. At the same time, the privatisation of crime control is questionable also from a governance point of view. It seems therefore that the public interest in persecuting crimes through having access to personal information from the private sector only marginally collides with the interest of protecting the right to privacy. Businesses and professions are predominantly interested in not interfering with their clients and in not bearing the burden of detecting offenders. The issue was also addressed during the national Parliamentarian debate, with regards to the degree of mens rea required for money laundering criminal liability. Making everybody taking part in economic or financial activities actively participating in the monitoring of the economic system under the threat of criminal liability for negligent money laundering was considered harmful for the business market. The same debate has been picked up by legal scholarship too. Yet, it seems that, despite the law being the result of negotiations, the question is still open. The fourth issue consists of discording opinions with regards to the opportunity of including tax evasion as predicate offence for money laundering. On one hand there is the interest of tackling tax evasion through the anti-money laundering regime, on the hand the concern of keeping the two phenomena distinct in order to avoid an overrating of money laundering. Since the genesis of the anti-money laundering policy, some actors taking part in the international law-making process, opposed the labelling of 'black money', naming money deriving from tax violations, as 'dirty money', indicating all proceeds of crime typically committed by organised crime. This distinction was based on the perception that tax-related offences were less serious and less harmful than capital flight and were advocated by financial centres in order to maintain a good reputation while still granting peculiar financial services, such as bank secrecy. This issue is a good example of the labelling theory, to the extent that it shows how a practice that was firstly not considered criminal enough to amount to a predicate offence for money laundering, has become part of the scope of the anti-money laundering regime on the basis of a political decision of labelling it as such. Respondents of the current research show to have different perceptions of the degree of the seriousness of tax laws violations and thus about the appropriateness and necessity of tackling them under the umbrella of the anti-money laundering policy. Again, the matter, which seemed to have been resolved through the negotiations on an international and European level, is still being debated at national level. The last two contrasting interests are the necessity of regulating the flows of money and the free movements of capitals in a neoliberal economy. The question is intrinsic in the nature of money laundering, which is a phenomenon that happens at the interface between legality and illegality. Regulations that facilitate the licit exchange of goods, capitals and services do also facilitate the flow of ill-gotten gains; there are thus conflicting interests between the public interest of persecuting crime and the claims for less regulation in a free market economy. From the interviews surfaced that not only opinions on the effectiveness of the law differ, but the very concept of effectiveness is perceived differently among the interview partners. Perceptions about how effective the anti- money laundering policy is appear to be similar among respondents belonging to the same experts' group. In particular, given the fact that the policy triggers many preliminary investigations, investigators work on a daily basis with the provision. This led to their opinion on the implementation of the legislation being rather positive. Positive opinions have common ground: they assert that the policy is not a simple one to implement, however, they believe that the legal practice has found its way through. On the contrary, defence attorneys specialised in economic crimes do not receive a significant amount of clients suspected for money laundering. For this reason they tend to have a rather negative opinion on the policy's effectiveness, also driven by the perception that the policy is not able to achieve the indirect goals. The diverse concepts of effectiveness provided by disciplines close to the sociology of law and the different definitions of effectiveness given by sociologists of law turn out to be useful here. Particularly the notions of 'efficiency' and of 'efficiency regardless of the goals' are proved very useful to interpret the respondents' opinions. Efficiency, is according to the administrative legal approach, the optimal relation between the goals achieved and the instruments used. A subcategory of this concept is the efficiency calculated through a cost-benefit analysis, of which some examples have been presented in the fourth chapter, which defines efficiency as the functioning of a legal order without assessing the goals achieved. This type of analysis focuses on the correctness of the operating system since the purpose of the system is its own existence. It refers to a whole legal order rather than to a specific single provision. Given that the anti-money laundering policy constitutes a legal order, due to the diverse regulations involved and the competent authorities created in order to achieve the goals of the policy, this notion can be applied. In the field of administrative legal theories, the first chapter has focussed on the approach that considers the (in)effectiveness of a law depending on its (failing) enforcement. A high degree of compliance of the anti-money laundering legislation might correspond to a high level of effectiveness of the policy with respect to its direct function, but at the same time to a rather low level of effectiveness with regards to its indirect purposes. The way to evaluate the degree of effectiveness is therefore also different. While compliance with legal provisions is calculated through a quantitative assessment of the processes in force and of the functioning of the system, the achievement of the indirect functions is measured on the impact of the policy. Interview partners have different perceptions about the indirect functions of the legislation too. This reflects, once again, the fact that the policy was a result of a compromise between different expectations and that the legislator was not able to limit the scope of its application to a particular goal. The different expectations and intents, which already emerged in the doctrinal debate about the legally protected interests, appears again in the different perceptions of the interviewees. The respondents were asked about the legislation's effectiveness with regards to one of the indirect functions, namely the capacity to deter organised crime. The legislator enacted the money laundering offence in the context of the fight against drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime, thus Article 261 Gcc's expressed rationale is the prevention and repression of organised crime. Finally, a relevant outcome regards the respondents' opinions on article 261 Gcc's latent symbolic function. Some of them agree with this. Others strongly oppose the hypothesis. They argue instead that the policy has instrumental effects on their daily practice, which cannot be defined as purely symbolic. According to most respondents, the law cannot be defined as symbolic, because it has led to instrumental effects. In the first place information gathered thanks to the GwG is used to start preliminary investigations under Article 261 Gcc. Secondly, the structure enacted to comply with the anti-money laundering policy is attainable and is visible and cannot be denied. Thirdly, the law is considered necessary because it labels a deviant behaviour. In particular, despite the fact that investigations do not lead to a conviction for money laundering they allow investigators to collect information in support of criminal cases for the predicate offences or to start a preliminary investigation for a predicate offence. In this sense, the function of the 'law in action', despite being questionable, is objectively instrumental. However, the fact that the law serves the purpose of tackling predicate offences through the support of investigations does not exclude the hypothesis that the law was enacted to pursue latent functions too. According to the sociologist Aubert, it is not necessary that the latent goal is the only one that plays a role, but it is necessary that the other purposes would not explain the analysed phenomenon completely. Indeed, in the opinions of those who exclude the symbolic function, yet the results achieved through compliance do not legitimate the burden imposed by the legislation. In other words, it seems that they recognise that the purpose of compliance cannot completely explain the policy makers' motivation, which re-opens the doors for the hypothesis of the existence of latent functions. In fact, such a demanding policy cannot be accepted for the sole purpose of re-enforcing the action of the criminal justice system in tackling predicate offences. On the other hand, compliance with the policy in terms of building of a structure and of expertise does not automatically mean fulfilling the policy's purpose. Particularly the creation of new professionalism, has been interpreted by scholars as a sign given to the public that the policy has produced certain effects. In conclusion, on the background of the research's outcome, the paper tries to reply to the question: (How) can the effectiveness of the money laundering offence be improved? While technical hindrances can (and perhaps) will be removed through legal reforms, 28 the inherent political economic and financial conflicting interests that impede a higher level of effectiveness are more difficult to solve. In contemporary industrialised economies there is a complicated and sometimes shifting boundary between legitimate and illegitimate transactions. This is particularly exacerbated in the context of financial capitalism, which 'subordinates the capitalist productive process to the circulation of money and monetary assets and hence to the accumulation of money profits'. Since the very beginning, determining the boundary between an area defined as 'criminal' and the space of 'legality' has been controversial. In fact, money has a neutral nature, pecunia non olet, making profit, irrespective of the monies' origin, is a very strong interest for both private and public entities, which collides with the one of eliminating illicit financial flows. In other words criminal policy goals diverge from purely economic interests. While one can assume the justice and correctness of the current financial system, and thus describes money laundering as harmful because it interferes with the existing economic order, one can also assume that the capitalist system leads per se to injustice and inequality, and that money laundering is actually embedded in this profit-oriented system and represents just the darker side of the capitalist economy. A compromised viewpoint is the one that describes money laundering as an accepted collateral effect of the capitalist system, that is to say 'a certain amount of illicit financial flows may be considered an acceptable price to pay for a market where free mobility of capital is guaranteed'. In other words, money laundering is intrinsic in or at least exacerbated by the capitalist system.

Letter From The Representatives Of France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The United States Of America To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council ; United Nations S/PV.8217 Security Council Seventy-third year 8217th meeting Tuesday, 27 March 2018, 11.10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Blok . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Dah Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-08569 (E) *1808569* S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 2/21 18-08569 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Lowcock is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/243, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). Recalling the latest note by the President of the Security Council on its working methods (S/2017/507), I want to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: As all members of the Council know, the Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year. When weapons speak, civilians pay the price — a relentless price with horrific violence, bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. The past few months have been some of the worst yet for many civilians in Syria. Today I want to start with the situation in eastern Ghouta. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February, military operations in eastern Ghouta, in particular air strikes, have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people. Thousands more have been injured. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, such as medical facilities, continue to be reported. There have been at least 28 reported attacks on health facilities since mid-February and more than 70 verified incidents since the beginning of the year. The World Health Organization has reported that attacks on health facilities, health workers and health infrastructure were recorded during the first two months of the year at three times the rate that we saw during 2017. In recent weeks in Damascus city, at least 78 people were reportedly killed and another 230 injured by shells fired from eastern Ghouta. That includes reports of at least 35 people killed and scores wounded on 20 March, when Kashkul market in Jaramana, a suburb in the south-eastern part of the city, was struck by a rocket. Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from Douma, Harasta, Sagba and Kafr Batna in recent days and weeks. So far, reports indicate that some 80,000 civilians have been taken to places in Damascus city and rural Damascus. Nearly 20,000 combatants and civilians have been transported to locations in north-western Syria. Nearly 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta are currently being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus. That displaced population has endured months of limited access to food, medical care and other essential items. In the words of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Ali Al-Za'tari, who met and spoke to some of them, those people are "tired, hungry, traumatized and afraid". Most of the collective shelters do not have the capacity or infrastructure to accommodate such large numbers of people. They are extremely overcrowded and severely lacking in basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. There are a number of serious protection concerns related to risks of gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children and restrictions on movement. The United Nations is not in charge of the management of those shelters. However, since 13 March, together with humanitarian partners, we have mobilized a rapid response to provide evacuees with basic support in close coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local partners. So far, more than 130,000 non-food items have been distributed, 130 emergency 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 3/21 toilets have been installed, and water trucking services have been provided to most shelters. In addition, supplies to feed more than 50,000 people and a total of 38 mobile health teams and 18 mobile medical teams are currently providing support to those in need inside the shelters. Humanitarian organizations also need access to the people still trapped within eastern Ghouta, in particular in Douma, where fighting and siege continue. The United Nations and its partners are ready to proceed to Douma with food for up to 16,500 people, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, but facilitation letters need to be signed by the Government of Syria. I reiterate the Secretary-General's call on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to ensure immediate humanitarian access and guarantee the protection of civilians, including in relation to displacements and evacuations. The United Nations and its partners require unimpeded access to all those affected by the situation in eastern Ghouta. That means access to the areas where civilians remain, through which they transit and to which they exit, such as collective shelters, in order to ensure that effective protection mechanisms are in place so that we can deter any possible violations and provide remedial protection support. Eastern Ghouta is not the only place in which humanitarian needs continue to increase. In north-western Syria, in recent weeks, an estimated 183,500 people have been displaced by hostilities in Afrin district in Aleppo governorate. The majority — some 140,000 people — have fled to Tell Rifaat and the remainder have gone to Nubl, Al-Zahraa, Manbij, Hasakah and surrounding areas. That massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is putting a strain on host communities, which are already overwhelmed. Two days ago, on 25 March, an inter-agency convoy to Tell Rifaat delivered assistance for some 50,000 people. However, overall, humanitarian partners are still struggling to gain sustainable access to the area. Moreover, access to Aleppo city for IDPs from Afrin district is currently restricted. Of particular concern are medical evacuations that are urgently required for severely sick people to receive care in specialized hospitals in Aleppo city. Four deaths due to the lack of proper health care have already been reported. Between 50,000 and 70,000 people are estimated still to be in Afrin city. Humanitarian access to the city and its outer perimeters is possible through cross-border operations mandated by the Council. Today, the Government of Turkey told us that it is positively disposed towards such access, and we plan to run convoys in the very near future. We know that needs are very substantial. In Idlib governorate, the situation remains catastrophic, with almost 400,000 people displaced since mid-December. Local capacity to assist is overstretched. Thousands more people are now arriving there from eastern Ghouta, with no sites or shelters available for the vast majority of them. We have received reports of an increase in violence in Idlib in recent days. According to local sources, on 20 March air strikes hit an IDP shelter on the outskirts of Haas village in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killing at least 10 displaced people and injuring another 15. On 21 March, air strikes on Kafr Battikh village, also in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killed scores more. The next day, the central market in Harim town was hit by an air strike, reportedly killing 35 people, including many women and children. On 12 March, air strikes also resumed in southern Syria, with attacks being reported in and around Dar'a city. There have been no air strikes in those areas since an agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a de-escalation zone for parts of the south of the country. That therefore appears to be a major unwelcome development. Let me turn to Raqqa. On 19 March, we received approval from the Syrian authorities for an assessment mission to Raqqa city by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. As Council members know, we have been seeking agreement to that for some time. That was on 19 March. Three days later, on 22 March, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security deployed a team to conduct a security assessment. They report that while the city is considered calm and stable, considerable risk remains. Raqqa city is still highly contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnances, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. We hope that access to Raqqa city will be possible for humanitarian aid deliveries via Qamishli, Manbij, Aleppo, Hamah S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 4/21 18-08569 and Homs, depending on operational and logistical arrangements. The United Nations and our partners are now preparing a humanitarian assessment mission, which is likely to take place next week. Next I shall address Rukban, on the Syria-Jordan border. United Nations partners received permission from the Syrian authorities on 8 March to organize a humanitarian convoy from Damascus to reach people in need along the Syria-Jordan border. Last week, on 19 March, the United Nations itself received permission to join that humanitarian mission. Preparations are ongoing, and a first humanitarian convoy is expected to deploy soon. As the Council knows, we have been seeking approval for that for many months. As we sit here today, almost at the end of the month, we have reached some 137,000 people in need through inter-agency convoys — that is, cross-line convoys sent to hard-to-reach and besieged areas — to Tell Rifaat, Al-Dar al-Kabirah and Douma. That is limited, incremental progress, compared to the first part of the year, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the team on the ground and some of those around this table. But we are essentially just given crumbs — an occasional convoy here and there, often, coincidentally, shortly before our monthly briefings to the Council. A total of 5.6 million Syrians in acute need cannot live on crumbs, and with a quarter of the year gone, our level of access is currently far worse than it was this time last year. We need the support of all Council members and members of the International Syria Support Group humanitarian task force to do their part to exert their individual and collective influence over the parties. A few days ago, the Government of Syria and others asked for more United Nations help with humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta. In response, we have, first, proposed that a team of United Nations emergency response experts be deployed to strengthen efforts on the ground. Visa requests for the team have been submitted. Secondly, we have confirmed a new allocation of $20 million from the Syria Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by my Office, for eastern Ghouta and those displaced from Afrin to provide shelter materials, improve sanitation for displaced people, ensure that safe water is available, provide life-saving medicines and medical services and put in place measures to enhance protection in relocation sites. The United Nations and its partners, on average, reach 7.5 million people every month with life-saving humanitarian assistance across the whole of Syria. Clearly, without that assistance, the situation would be even more catastrophic than it is now and the loss of life even greater. The United Nations has no money of its own to do those things. We can do them only because we receive voluntary contributions from our donors. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has supported our appeal over the last year, including our top donors: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Qatar, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted just over a month ago. I ask all in the Council to make the resolution a reality. Whatever the difficulty, the United Nations and its partners remain determined to follow through, for the sake of the Syrian people. The President: I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Recently, a Dutch photographer working with Save the Children published a photo album featuring 48 Syrian children, all seven years old. Those photos were school portraits, like we all had taken when we were young. The children were born in Syria, but they had to flee. They are as old as the Syrian war, so they have never seen their country at peace. Their memories of their homeland are fading. Sometimes they cannot remember their country at all, nor their family members left behind. But by giving those young children a public face, the photographer has tried to restore some of the dignity sacrificed to a war in which all humanity seems lost. I have here a photo of Nour. Those children were relatively lucky; they were able to escape. At the same time, inside Syria, during seven years of war, thousands of children have been killed. I myself am a father, and I am certainly not the only parent in this Chamber. Images of children affected by war should leave no one unmoved. Despite any differences between us, we should at least have one thing in common: the belief that protecting children should come first. Yet, such protection is lacking. The Syrian crisis is, above all, a protection crisis — a grave violation of the long-established norm to protect civilians and their belongings in the time of war. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 5/21 Together, we — the international community — have expressed our determination to prevent conflict and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And where conflict cannot be prevented, we have agreed to regulate the conduct of warfare. One of the very first steps to that end was taken in Russia, almost 150 years ago. In Saint Petersburg, it was decided to forbid weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Since those first steps, the body of international humanitarian law has grown considerably, including through the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The imperative of those laws has always been to protect civilians in conflict, to spare them from disaster, save them from harm and respect their dignity. Sadly, what we see in Syria today is the exact opposite. Every day, many are showing total disregard for civilians. In eastern Ghouta, the Syrian regime and its allies, including Russia, have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians and are relentlessly continuing their offensive. The United Nations has reported air strikes on densely populated areas, blatant attacks targeting hospitals and medical personnel, the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the use of chemical weapons. Many innocent children, women and men are suffering. They should be protected. Yet instead, families are seeing their homes destroyed, their loved ones killed and their dignity shattered. In Afrin, the effects of the Turkey-led offensive are clear for all to see: a worsening of the already precarious humanitarian situation, with more than 160,000 displaced people and a further obstacle to efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). I ask Turkey not to extend its military activities to other border regions in Syria or Iraq. Four weeks ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). It is telling that in 2018, the Council should need to spell out that warring parties should immediately lift all sieges in Syria and grant unimpeded humanitarian access to those in acute need. Those are by no means exceptional demands. They are basic obligations under international humanitarian law, developed over decades to instil minimum standards of human decency in warfare. Not even the presence of terrorists is an excuse for disregarding those standards. It is humiliating that the Council is unable to enforce those minimum standards. If the Council is not willing or able to do it, who is? With all that in mind, we should not forget that the responsibility, and indeed the obligation, to execute the Council's decisions lies with individual Member States. So what should be done? First, we should reaffirm these norms and enforce the relevant resolutions. We call on all parties to the Syrian conflict — including the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey and armed opposition groups — to respect and implement the Council's decisions. Secondly, we must strengthen resolution 2401 (2018), with United Nations monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire and with full access for fact-finding missions to sites and collective shelters housing internally displaced persons. These missions are ready to go; we need their impartial information. Thirdly, with regard to accountability, if there is to be any credible, stable and lasting peace in Syria, the current culture of impunity must end. All those guilty of crimes must be brought to justice. The perpetrators of crimes, including ISIS and Al-Qaida, must know that they are being watched, followed and identified. They must know that files are being compiled with a view to prosecuting them for crimes that may include genocide. They must know that one day they will be held accountable. We urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which aims to ensure that information about serious crimes is collected, analysed and preserved for future prosecutions. The Netherlands again calls on all Council members to support referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. What will become of the children in the photographs I mentioned? Will they one day be able to return to Syria? Like all children, they long for a normal life, for stability, for safety. The Syrian regime believes in a military solution. But there is none. There are no winners in this war. But it is clear who is losing — the ordinary people of Syria. In these most extreme circumstances we commend the incredible courage and perseverance of the humanitarian aid workers. It is up to us to restore credibility to the Council. It is up to us to ensure a negotiated political process, in which all Syrians and other relevant actors are represented. And it is up to us to end the agony and restore dignity and humanity to the people of Syria. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 6/21 18-08569 I give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): We welcome you, Sir, in presiding over this important meeting. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, for his briefing. Today I will address three main areas: first, the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018); secondly, measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation; and thirdly, the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution. First, on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), we are meeting today one month after its unanimous adoption by the Security Council, calling on all parties to cease hostilities without delay for 30 days following the adoption of the resolution. We deplore the fact that it has not yet been implemented. However, we must continue to do everything in our power to ensure the resolution's full implementation throughout Syria. The increased number of humanitarian convoys entering the besieged areas during the month of March shows that partial delivery was achieved by comparison to the complete deadlock in access in previous months. That indicates that progress can be made in implementing the resolution, and we must build on that progress. We affirm that the provisions of the resolution will remain valid beyond the first 30 days after its adoption. We look forward to continued reports from the Secretariat on the status of implementation through monthly briefings, as stipulated in the resolution. In that regard, we support the proposal for providing the Council with further regular updates. We appreciate the continued efforts of the United Nations to facilitate talks among all parties in eastern Ghouta with the goal of securing a ceasefire. We are particularly concerned about the continued military offensive by the Syrian authorities in eastern Ghouta, as well as air strikes on Dar'a and Idlib. The shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta is also a matter of concern. All of those acts of violence have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Secondly, on measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation, we must take the necessary measures to protect civilians fleeing eastern Ghouta and to improve the humanitarian situation in collective shelters. As we have said before, implementing the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation and to achieve tangible progress in that regard. Those provisions stipulate that there must be a cessation of hostilities and that access for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population must be enabled. Regarding the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, we have five points to convey to the relevant parties, which represent our special concerns about the protection of civilians. First, all evacuations must be voluntary. People must have the right to return and to choose safe places to go to. Secondly, any negotiations on the evacuation of civilians should include civilian representatives, such as local councils. Thirdly, humanitarian aid convoys should continue to enter eastern Ghouta for the benefit of those who decided to stay there. Those convoys should occur on a weekly basis, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), according to the United Nations assessment of needs, including medical supplies, and with full access for United Nations staff. Fourthly, human rights violations, including detentions, disappearances and forced conscriptions, must end. Those are serious protection concerns for civilians staying in eastern Ghouta and for those leaving it. We therefore encourage the United Nations to register the names of those evacuated and their destinations and to reinforce its presence in the collective shelters for internally displaced persons, including through the use of monitors to protect them and prevent sexual violence. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate permission for that. Fifthly, the deteriorating situation in the collective shelters for the internally displaced persons should be improved as quickly as possible as the number of new arrivals continues to rise. We are deeply concerned that the United Nations partners are bearing the brunt of a burden beyond their capacity. It will therefore be essential to make the maximum use of the United Nations, its staff and its resources in order to assist in managing the increasingly crowded collective shelters. We welcome the United Nations plans to increase staff on the ground to that end, and we encourage the United Nations to do the same for eastern Ghouta as soon as the security situation allows. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant visas for additional United Nations staff immediately. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 7/21 Thirdly, on the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution, we have a collective responsibility, as members of the Council and, specifically, as parties with influence, to work with the Syrian authorities and urge them to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) according to international humanitarian law. We expect the guarantors of the Astana agreement, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to achieve progress towards the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken in the statement they issued on 16 March in advance of their summit meeting, to be held in Istanbul on 4 April. Those commitments include, first, ensuring rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict; secondly, increasing their efforts, as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement, to ensure observance of the respective agreements; and thirdly, pursuing their efforts to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). In conclusion, we affirm our full commitment to continuing to follow up closely on the status of the implementation of the resolution in the monthly reports to the Council. We will spare no effort to make progress in its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for an end to the violence, sustained humanitarian and medical aid through weekly convoys across conflict lines, evacuation operations, the protection of civilians and hospitals, and the lifting of the siege. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank you, Foreign Minister Blok, for presiding over this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for once again laying out the facts about what is happening in Syria. I also want to personally welcome Karen Pierce to the Council as the new Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I know all of us in the Chamber look forward to working with her. Today we have a very difficult subject to address: siege, starvation and surrender. That is the awful, unceasing rhythm of the Syrian war. As we meet today, the third step, surrender, is taking place in eastern Ghouta. After years of enduring siege and starvation, residents are surrendering eastern Ghouta. The terrible irony of this moment must be stated and acknowledged. In the 30 days since the Security Council demanded a ceasefire, the bombardment of the people of eastern Ghouta has only increased and now, at the end of the so-called ceasefire, eastern Ghouta has nearly fallen. History will not be kind when it judges the effectiveness of the Council in relieving the suffering of the Syrian people. Seventeen hundred Syrian civilians have been killed in the past month alone. Hospitals and ambulances are being deliberately targeted with bombs and artillery. Schools are being hit, like the one in eastern Ghouta that was bombed just last week, killing 15 children. Siege, starvation and surrender. I would like to ask my Security Council colleagues to consider whether we are wrong when we point to the Russian and Iranian forces working alongside Al-Assad as being responsible for the slaughter. Russia voted for the so-called ceasefire in Syria last month (see S/PV.8188). More than that, Russia took its time painstakingly negotiating resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded the ceasefire. If we watched closely during the negotiations, we could see our Russian friends constantly leaving the room to confer with their Syrian counterparts. The possibilities for what was going on are only two. Either Russia was informing its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations, or Russia was taking directions from its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations. Either way, Russia cynically negotiated a ceasefire that it instantly defied. Russia even had the audacity to claim that it is the only Council member implementing resolution 2401 (2018). How can that possibly be true when in the first four days after the so-called ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions on Damascus and eastern Ghouta, while the people of Syria remained under siege? The so-called ceasefire was intended to allow humanitarian access to sick and starving civilians. Russia even doubled down on its cynicism by proposing five-hour pauses in the fighting. It said that they were necessary to allow humanitarian convoys to get through, but Russian and Syrian bombs continue to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only after territory falls into the hands of the Al-Assad Government and its allies do they allow food and medicine to be delivered. Russia and Syria's rationalization is that they have to continue to bomb in eastern Ghouta in order to combat what they call terrorists. That is a transparent excuse for the Russians and Al-Assad to maintain their assault. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the opposition groups in eastern Ghouta expressed their readiness to implement the ceasefire. They told the Council that they welcomed the resolution. Russia's response was to call those groups terrorists and keep pummelling S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 8/21 18-08569 civilians into submission, while the people of Syria continue to starve. Last week, after Syrian civilians had spent years barely surviving, an agreement was reached to allow them to leave eastern Ghouta. Who brokered it? Russia. So we see the cycle being completed. The people of eastern Ghouta are surrendering. That is the ugly reality on the ground in Syria today. Cynical accusations of bad faith from Russia will not stop us from speaking out, and their blatantly false narratives will not keep us from telling the world about Russia's central role in bombing the Syrian people into submission. Fifteen days ago, when it was apparent that the Russian, Syrian and Iranian regimes were utterly ignoring the ceasefire, the United States developed a plan for a tougher and more targeted ceasefire focused on Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. Despite overwhelming evidence that the ceasefire was being ignored, some of our colleagues urged us to give resolution 2401 (2018) a chance to work. Reluctantly, we agreed and put off introducing the resolution. Now, more than 80 per cent of eastern Ghouta is controlled by Al-Assad and his allies. Their deception, hypocrisy and brutality have overtaken the chance of a ceasefire in eastern Ghouta, and for that we should all be ashamed. If we were upholding our responsibility as a Security Council, we would adopt a resolution today recognizing the reality of what happened in eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Syrian authorities, along with Russia and Iran, for launching a military offensive to seize eastern Ghouta the same day that we called for a ceasefire. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Al-Assad regime for deliberately blocking convoys of humanitarian aid during its military campaign and removing medical items from convoys that attempted to reach eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would recognize that the provision of humanitarian aid was never safe, unimpeded or sustained, and that there was no lifting of sieges. A responsible Security Council would express its outrage that at least 1,700 civilians were killed during a military campaign that it demanded to come to a halt — 1,700 civilians who should have been spared in the ceasefire we demanded, but who died on our watch. But we cannot. We cannot take those actions because Russia will stop at nothing to use its permanent seat on the Council to shield its ally Bashar Al-Assad from even the faintest criticism. And we cannot take those actions because instead of calling out the ways in which Al-Assad, Russia and Iran made a mockery of our calls for a ceasefire, too many members of the Council wanted to wait. That is a travesty. This should be a day of shame for every member of the Council and it should be a lesson about what happens when we focus on fleeting displays of unity instead of on what is right. For those who think otherwise, the people of eastern Ghouta deserve an explanation. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to thank Mark Lowcock for his briefing and to commend him on his tireless efforts and those of his team in their response to the urgent and severe humanitarian situation in Syria. To address that urgency and severity, a month ago almost to the day the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We thus collectively and unanimously demanded that all the parties to the conflict cease hostilities throughout the country to allow for sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians in need and for medical evacuations. A month later, what is the situation? Not only has resolution 2401 (2018) not been implemented, but the humanitarian situation in Syria has worsened. The civilian population is living in despair, trapped between bargaining and fighting, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Over the past few weeks, not only has the fighting has not subsided; it has doubled in intensity, with a land offensive launched by the regime, supported by its allies Russia and Iran. The carefully planned offensive was unremitting, using the double strategy of terror and parallel negotiations that was used in Aleppo to obtain the surrender of combatants and the displacement of civilians. For a month there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, which has been besieged and starved for years, has not suffered indiscriminate shelling by the regime and its supporters. They have systematically bombed schools and hospitals and killed more than 1,700 civilians, including more than 300 children. Those deaths are the result of a deliberate strategy of the Syrian regime to forcibly bend an entire population, annihilate any form of opposition and remain in power. Nothing should justify breaches of international humanitarian law. Not one humanitarian convoy has been authorized to enter eastern Ghouta since 15 March, and almost no humanitarian assistance has 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 9/21 been delivered in recent weeks. Meanwhile, there are immense needs among those still in eastern Ghouta, the majority of whom are women and children. For several days we have been witnessing forced evacuations of populations from eastern Ghouta, which could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. We have demanded humanitarian access to eastern Ghouta in order to provide assistance to people in their own homes, where they wish to stay as long as the ceasefire allows. That was the reason for the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). Instead, we have witnessed just the opposite — an escalation of violence to force a massive displacement of civilians. Bombing has forced civilians, approximately 80,000 people, to flee. The displacement of people from eastern Ghouta is an integral part of the military strategy of the Syrian regime to force the opposition to capitulate. Once again, civilians are the primary victims. As I said, those forced displacements could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Evidence of such crimes will be collected, preserved and used. We were clear on that point during the Arria-formula Council meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a few days ago. Some 55,000 civilians are now in eight collective camps managed by the Syrian regime around eastern Ghouta, without water or electricity and in disastrous sanitary conditions. Their lot has not improved; their hell has simply moved a few kilometres away. We are extremely concerned about the fate of those civilians who now live in overcrowded conditions, with no assurances of protection or security, with no guarantee that they will return home. How do we protect civilians in the situation I have just described? It is absolutely urgent to protect those who can still be protected. Although the 30-day cessation of hostilities demanded by resolution 2401 (2018) has still not been implemented, that demand remains, more urgent and relevant than ever. The resolution is still the framework for our collective action. In that regard, and in line with the briefing just given by Mark Lowcock, I would like to underscore three vital demands. First, it is indispensable and urgent that humanitarian convoys be allowed to enter eastern Ghouta daily and with adequate security. Although humanitarian needs are great, the regime continues to deliberately block aid. United Nations convoys must be able to enter and make deliveries. Fighting must cease long enough to allow for delivery, unloading and distribution of supplies, including of medical assistance. The second demand concerns civilians who remain in Ghouta, who have the right to emergency humanitarian assistance and to protection. Aid must reach them where they are. To that end, the United Nations and its international and local humanitarian partners must be able to work safely on site to assess the needs of those populations. It is an obligation under international humanitarian law, but it is the minimum required to provide tangible assistance to those concerned. The protection that is due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. In that regard I call again on the responsibility of all actors with influence on the Syrian regime. The third demand, which has taken on new importance in recent days, is for assistance to be provided to the displaced civilians in camps outside Ghouta. Very concretely, that means that those populations, who have been forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, must be assured of their safety, access to basic necessities and a chance to return home when they so desire. Care must be taken that they are not threatened with retaliation, threats or persecution of any kind. In order to ensure that they are protected, the United Nations and its partners must be able to escort civilians who have been evacuated from their point of departure to their destination in the collective shelters. The United Nations and its partners must be granted continuous access to civilians living in those camps. We hope that the United Nations can strengthen its support to displaced persons who have fled eastern Ghouta. That would call for an increase in the number of international staff on site. We hope that approval will be granted to that end as soon as possible. It would also call for security guarantees for humanitarian workers. The situation in Afrin is also extremely worrisome. A great many civilians are in a critical situation. More that 180,000 people have been displaced. A single convoy was authorized, yesterday, which is insufficient given the tremendous needs of the population. Ongoing fighting in Afrin has forced the Syrian Democratic Forces to halt operations against Da'esh, whose threat, as we all know, has not dissappeared. Our position on the issue is the same. The legitimate concerns of Turkey with regard to the security of its borders cannot in any way justify a lasting military presence deep inside Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 10/21 18-08569 More than ever, we need the fighting to end. We call on all parties on the ground to conclude the negotiations under way and respect a cessation of hostilities. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his commitment to resuming the Geneva process and to reaching a lasting political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015) that starts with the establishment of an inclusive constitutional committee, under the auspices of Mr. De Mistura. It is the only way to end the Syrian crisis. It is absolutely essential to work on both the humanitarian and political fronts. I appeal on behalf of France, first, to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. It is never to late to save lives. Let us be well aware that without urgent, decisive action, the worst is undoubtedly yet to come in the form of a worsening and enlargement of the conflict. The time has come for us to learn seriously the lessons of the Syrian tragedy. This tragedy is the illustration of a new global disorder where the rappelling ropes have disappeared due to a lack of strong international governance, a lack of a power of last resort and a lack of convergence among key actors — to which we add the well-known attitude of Russia. In other words, if we want to avoid other tragedies of this type in future, it is essential to structure the multipolar world in which we now find ourselves around a robust multilateralism embodied by a reformed United Nations. It is the only alternative to the fragmentation of the world and the return to the zones of influence — and our history teaches us all the dangers of that — and it is with the settlement of the Syrian crisis, which is our priority today and which is the emergency before us, one of the other challenges of our generation. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, both for being here today to underscore the vital importance of this topic and, in particular, for your very powerful statement. The United Kingdom supports your call for a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. I also wish to express our thanks to the Under- Secretary-General for his continued efforts to keep the Security Council informed of the toll that hostilities are having on civilians in Syria. We also thank him for the heroic efforts of all his teams on the ground. Their efforts are much supported by most of us on the Council. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing eloquently underscores why it is essential that the Council comes together to agree on concrete steps to allow the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for everybody who needs it. Ambassador Haley has laid the situation bare, Ambassador Delattre has set out the regime's intentions, and Ambassador Alotaibi has focused on the need for protection and registration. I support their calls. I will not rehearse a catalogue of suffering that we have heard expressed so eloquently today, but that omission should not be taken as any indication that the United Kingdom is not as horrified as others by what is happening on the ground. Specifically, it is diabolical that access is actually worse in the face of such suffering. Diabolical is a strong word, but there are no others to describe what is happening. The worst destruction and suffering has continued in eastern Ghouta. Those who support Al-Assad have not taken steps to help stop the violence. Instead, Al-Assad and his supporters have violated the strong words of the Security Council in resolution 2401 (2018), making mockery of the Council's authority, as Ambassador Delattre stated. Since 11 March, an estimated 100,000 people have left eastern Ghouta and are in makeshift reception sites in rural Damascus. Thousands more have been bused to Idlib. Because there is no independent monitoring nor provisions for civilian safety, those fleeing and those staying remain vulnerable and at risk of mistreatment and abuse by the regime, including being detained, disappeared or separated from their families. Humanitarians, health workers and first responders on the ground report that the regime is deliberately targeting them. That is illegal, and those who help the Al-Assad regime are complicit in that illegality. The situation continues even for those who are left behind. An estimated 150,000 civilians remain in eastern Ghouta. They suffer from acute food shortages and lack of medical supplies. They are afraid, and above all they remember how the regime punished the civilians who fled from eastern Aleppo in December 2016. That is why Ambassador Alotaibi's call for protection and registration is so urgent. We welcome United Nations plans to scale up support to deal with the dire situations in the internally displaced persons camps and collective shelters. We call on Russia to use its influence with the regime to 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 11/21 ensure that the United Nations and its partners can also provide assistance and protection for those who remain in eastern Ghouta. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, it is essential that they be protected against attack and have access to the essentials to survive. This is not just a plea on the grounds of humanity; it is a requirement under international humanitarian law. It is the job of the Council and all members of the Council to uphold international humanitarian law. Those who side with the regime in its actions are themselves guilty of violating that law. In concluding, I would like to highlight two further areas. The suffering of the Syrian people continues in Idlib, where civilians have been under attack by regime forces for many years. More than a million internally displaced Syrians live there, including those who have fled eastern Ghouta. In Afrin, we recognize Turkey's legitimate interest in the security of its borders, but at the same time we remain concerned about the impact of operations on the humanitarian situation, and my Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have raised the need for protection of civilians and access with President Erdoğan and his Ministers. It was good to hear from the Under-Secretary-General that there may at last be signs of progress in Afrin. After seven years of conflict, over 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Al-Assad regime has created the situation and is now preventing humanitarian actors from relieving some of the horror it has inflicted. We call on Russia to use its influence to ensure that at a minimum the United Nations can fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians on the basis of need, regardless of any other considerations. I was at Geneva in 2012. I think we all feel that that was a huge missed opportunity, in the light of events. The situation has escalated every year since that time, and, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the level of access is worse. The Council has a small opportunity to put measures in place to reduce the risk of reprisals. As you said, Mr. President, if the Security Council cannot do it, who can? Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. I also wish to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Stephanus Abraham Blok, who is presiding over today's meeting. Kazakhstan remains committed to all Security Council resolutions aimed at solving humanitarian issues in Syria. We believe that it is most important to preserve all possible humanitarian-access modalities, including cross-border assistance, which are indispensable in bringing humanitarian aid to millions of people in Syria. Implementing resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member and State Member of the United Nations playing a significant role. We must all continue to do everything we can to ensure full implementation across Syria. We look forward to continued reporting on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) to the Council through the regular Syria briefings and reports of the Secretary- General, as stipulated in the resolution. Urgent attention must be focused on long-term humanitarian assistance, with the assurance of safe humanitarian access by the United Nations and other aid agencies, and evacuation of the wounded. We commend the sterling contribution of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for their provision of increased medical supplies and life-saving services, including surgical procedures. In that regard, we welcome the increase in humanitarian convoys gaining access to besieged areas in Syria in March, compared to previous months. It is necessary to take note of the worrisome humanitarian situation in Syria, as fighting in different parts of the country are causing massive displacement. We endorse the appeal of the United Nations to help stem the catastrophic situation for tens of thousands of people, from both eastern Ghouta and Afrin. We look forward to the next round of talks, to be held in mid-May in our capital, Astana, where the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of the relevant agreements will be addressed. We also believe that the dialogue between Under- Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Government of Syria should be ongoing. We reiterate that all obligations under international humanitarian law must be respected by all parties. A further United Nations needs-assessment mission to these troubled areas, similar to that which Under-Secretary-General Lowcock led recently, may be required very soon. The Syrian authorities must cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations in S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 12/21 18-08569 facilitating the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and thereby mitigating the suffering. Lastly, we are of the view that the crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the briefing by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We also welcome your presence here today, Sir, in presiding over our meeting. Peru deeply regrets that violence and human suffering continue to characterize the situation in Syria, 30 days after the humanitarian ceasefire demanded by the Council. Resolution 2401 (2018) remains in full force, and we consider that the Syrian Government and other actors with the capacity to influence developments on the ground are obliged to ensure its full implementation. The ceasefire should be immediate and enable unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance throughout Syrian territory. While there has been some limited progress in that regard, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be continuous and unrestricted. In view of the Council's responsibilities in line with international law and international humanitarian law, Peru will continue to advocate for the protection of civilians in all conflicts and humanitarian crises. An indeterminate number of Syrian citizens, including thousands of women and children, have been driven out of eastern Ghouta by the violence. We note with concern that the shelters in the vicinity of Damascus cannot cope and that they lack food, clean water and medical supplies. We must remember that international humanitarian law has mandatory provisions for the evacuation of civilians. It is also compulsory to take measures to safeguard private property from looting and destruction. Syrian citizens must be able to return to their homes and businesses when security conditions improve. We must also protect the majority of the remaining population in eastern Ghouta, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals, forced recruitment and sexual violence. We are also concerned about the humanitarian situation in Afrin, Idlib and Raqqa, among other areas of Syria. The responsibility to protect civilians cannot be conditional or subordinated to political or strategic interests. We highlight the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to assist people in such a difficult situation. They have our full support. Given the intensification of violence in recent weeks and its devastating consequences for the population, we must once again reiterate how urgent it is to make progress towards achieving a political settlement on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). In that regard, we hope that progress will soon be made in the establishment and composition of the constitutional committee agreed on in Sochi. All the Syrian parties, and especially the Government, must engage constructively in this. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. We want to express our appreciation to the United Nations and humanitarian partners for their continued selfless and courageous service in providing assistance to all Syrians in difficult circumstances. We remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis in all the areas of Syria where it is prevalent. As the Under-Secretary-General said, the Syrian war has entered its eighth year, bringing unspeakable suffering to the people of the country. The escalation of violence that we witnessed last month in eastern Ghouta and other parts of the country has been a source of extremely grave concern. According to the statement issued on 21 March by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, shelter, protection, water and sanitation remain the key priority humanitarian needs of the internally displaced. In that regard, we thank the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for providing much-needed assistance. Alleviating the suffering of Syrians requires urgent and coordinated action on the part of all actors, while respecting the relevant resolutions of the Council, particularly resolution 2401 (2018). It was encouraging that the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. In that regard, while much remains to be done to fully implement the resolution, compared to the previous month there has been positive 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 13/21 action, including aid delivery to some of the areas that are especially badly affected and difficult to reach. The conflict has also diminished in intensity in some areas, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). However, this does not mean that the action taken has been sufficient. We therefore stress that it is vital to redouble our efforts to do everything possible to fully and comprehensively implement the resolution with a sense of urgency and enhanced political will. We believe that what the people of Syria need is a cessation of hostilities, along with protection and access to basic goods and services. All of those demands are contained and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). All Syrian parties should therefore respect and fully implement resolution 2401 (2018), and all States that have influence over the parties should try to bring the maximum pressure to bear on them, with the ultimate objective of helping to fully operationalize the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. In that regard, we hope that the Astana guarantors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will play their role in implementing resolution 2401 (2018), strengthening the ceasefire arrangements and improving humanitarian conditions, as stated in their final statement of 16 March. In addition, while we acknowledge that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have been able to reach millions of Syrians using all modes of aid delivery, the fact remains that humanitarian access, particularly inter-agency convoys, remains a critical challenge. In that connection, it is absolutely vital to ensure safe, sustained and need-based humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach all Syrians in need. Let me conclude by reaffirming that only a comprehensive political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, can ultimately end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. We reiterate our position that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is a political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015). We support the continued efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage all Syrian parties to engage with him constructively and meaningfully in order to revitalize the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and support the establishment of a constitutional committee, in line with the outcome of the Sochi congress. We fully concur with the Secretary- General, who states, in his report of 20 March, "Political efforts to bring the war to an end must be accorded priority and redoubled by all parties to the conflict." (S/2018/243, para. 48) While the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with the Syrians themselves — a principle that is firmly embedded in resolution 2254 (2015) — the Council also has an important role to play in supporting the efforts in a spirit of unity, which we believe can have a positive impact on the ground in alleviating the suffering of all Syrians. That may be a tall order, in the light of the fragmentation that Ambassador Delattre mentioned earlier. However, the effort must be made. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome your presence, Sir, and the fact that you are presiding over the work of the Security Council today. We would also like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his briefing. We support him in the difficult work with which he is entrusted. We must once again express our regret that this conflict has continued for eight years and that we are still witnessing the ongoing sieges and violence being endured by the Syrian people, particularly women and children. In addition to living with the psychological consequences of the situation, they urgently need humanitarian assistance. We unequivocally condemn the ongoing bombardment of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and the military activities in residential areas in the cities of Damascus, Afrin and Idlib, as well as in eastern Ghouta. They have only led to more civilians being killed, wounded and displaced. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General (S/2018/243), between December and February alone, there were 385,000 internally displaced persons and 2.3 million people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We regret that so far there are still obstacles preventing the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all parties involved to make every effort to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, sustained and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as well as to enable the medical evacuation of those who are seriously ill or injured. In addition, according to the same report, since October 2017, 86,000 civilians have returned to the city of Raqqa, of whom 20,000 arrived in February alone. Regrettably, 130 civilians have died and 658 have been seriously injured by explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would like to highlight the visit by the United Nations mission to Raqqa last week. We reiterate that the work of clearing S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 14/21 18-08569 anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war is crucial to facilitating the safe return of the displaced. While it does not reflect what has gone on throughout Syrian territory, it is important to highlight the recent delivery of humanitarian aid through convoys, of which the first, on 5 March, was to Douma in eastern Ghouta, bringing food for more than 27,000 people. We also believe that cross-border assistance is an important part of the response to the situation, and we highlight the food assistance to 2 million people and the dispatch by the United Nations to areas of northern and southern Syria of 449 trucks carrying aid for 1 million people. We welcome the efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, all the humanitarian agencies concerned and the Russian Federation that have enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered to various populations, in particular in eastern Ghouta, which three convoys recently entered. We call for that assistance to continue as safely as possible. In that regard, we believe it is important to strengthen the dialogue and coordination among the humanitarian agencies, the United Nations and the Syrian Government in order to facilitate the entry of convoys and humanitarian aid workers, as well as the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. We emphasize the dangerous work of the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance bodies, whose staff risk their own lives in carrying out their dangerous work on the ground. We therefore reiterate the importance of full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We want to take this opportunity to reiterate how important it is to build on the political momentum following the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. That should be the channel for reinforcing the Geneva process, led by the United Nations in the context of resolution 2254 (2016). We hope for the speedy implementation of the Sochi outcome and, as a result, the establishment of a constitutional committee that can facilitate a viable political transition. In that regard, we support the results of the latest Astana meeting, which enabled the agreements establishing de-escalation zones to be strengthened. We hope they will be reflected on the ground so as to reduce the violence and meet the urgent humanitarian needs. We condemn any attempt to foment fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria and believe that it is the Syrian people who must freely decide their future and their political leadership in the context of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and agreed political process, led by and for the Syrian people, and aimed at achieving sustainable peace on their territory without foreign pressure of any kind. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to welcome you as you preside over the Council today, Sir. We also welcome Ms. Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who is now here with us. We thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. The difficult humanitarian situation continues in a number of areas in Syria. The Russian Federation has been taking active steps to normalize things, including within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). While some here may not like it, it is a fact that we are the only ones who have been making concrete efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018). Since we first established humanitarian pauses, with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the participation and oversight of the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, nearly 121,000 people have been evacuated, on a strictly voluntarily basis — let me stress that — from eastern Ghouta. Many of them have talked about how difficult it has been for them to live under the repressive regime established by the armed group militants. Civilians continue to flee eastern Ghouta through the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin humanitarian corridor. There is real-time video of this running on the Russian Defence Ministry's official website. In just the past few days more than 520 civilians have left Douma. Russian agencies have organized the distribution to them of hot food, food kits and individual food rations, as well as bottled drinking water. Yesterday alone, Russian military doctors treated 111 civilians, including 42 children. At the same time, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation continues to organize the return of residents of Saqba and Kafr Batna. On 24 March, as a result of an agreement reached by the Centre with leaders of illegal armed groups, another checkpoint was opened for fighters and their family members to leave from Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Jobar. In the past few days, militias from the Ahrar Al-Sham 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 15/21 and Faylak Al-Rahman groups and their relatives have been evacuated along the corridor and bused to Idlib governorate. In three days, more than 13,000 people were evacuated from Arbin alone. However, many have decided to remain, taking advantage of the presidential amnesty. Incidentally, there have been active efforts to plant stories about detentions and torture and possibly even executions. They are lies. The Syrian police are ensuring that these operations are safe, under the oversight of specialists from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation and representatives of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Yesterday 26 Syrian soldiers and civilians who had been taken prisoner by Faylak Al-Rahman were freed. In our view, those facts clearly attest to the difficulty and extent of the work being done by the Russian specialists on the ground, in communication with the Syrian authorities and the leaders of the armed groups. There are some members of the Security Council who prefer wasting their time on inflammatory speeches and letters making groundless claims about our country, probably to conceal their own unwillingness to do anything constructive to implement resolution 2401 (2018) in cooperation with the groups they sponsor. At the same time, yesterday the fighters from Jaysh Al-Islam who remain in Douma detonated four mines yesterday in several districts in Damascus. Six civilians died and another six were wounded. Al-Mazraa, a residential neighbourhood in the capital was shelled earlier. As a result of mine explosions around the Al-Fayhaa sports complex, a 12-year-old boy died and seven children were injured. Hundreds of people have died from mine explosions in Damascus overall. This is apparently the message that the militants are sending every day about the willingness to implement the ceasefire that they loudly proclaimed in their famous letter to the Secretary-General. I want to again point out the importance of clarifying the data used in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138), including on possible attacks on civilian infrastructure and the victims of such attacks. Where does that information come from? The February report has a footnote that mentions various United Nations agencies and departments of the Secretariat. The main source cited is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which does not have a staff presence on the ground. The big question, and what we are trying to get to the bottom of, is who is providing the United Nations staff with this kind of information? Is it the anti-Government groups and terrorist accomplices like the White Helmets? But they are interested parties. So why is there only a sprinkling of the information provided by the Syrian authorities? We call on the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and States to deliver urgent assistance to help the people who are evacuating eastern Ghouta. It is also essential to strengthen the United Nations presence around the humanitarian corridors. The Syrians need immediate assistance with the infrastructure reconstruction that the Syrian Government has begun in the liberated residential areas of eastern Ghouta. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock to oversee that issue personally. We also hope that as soon as possible the coalition will create the conditions and provide the necessary security guarantees enabling a United Nations assessment mission to be sent to Raqqa and humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp. The Syrian authorities gave their official consent to this some time ago, as Mark Lowcock confirmed today. We should note that we were shocked by the recent reports that more than 2,000 civilians may have died during the coalition forces' assault on Raqqa. Let me ask it once again — where were the weeping and wailing and calls for humanitarian aid then? We have noted the statistics in the Secretary-General's report on the numbers of people who have returned to Raqqa, but we would like to see similar information on other parts of Syria and the country as a whole. How many people are returning to their permanent homes? We would like to propose to the United Nations representatives that they designate the areas where those indicators are the highest as a priority for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitor how effectively it is being implemented. We also think it would be appropriate to include information on reconstruction assistance in the reports. Resolution 2401 (2018) stipulates that Syrian districts, including those that have been liberated from terrorists, need support in restoring normal functioning and stability. One of the key areas in that regard is mine clearance. We get the feeling that external donors are losing interest in delivering assistance to residents in areas under Syrian Government control. We are seeing signals from some capitals that only opposition-held enclaves should be helped. Such double standards go completely against the core principles of neutrality and impartial humanitarian assistance. We hope that we are wrong about this and that Mr. Lowcock will refute the S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 16/21 18-08569 possibility of such a trend. But if our suspicions are borne out, how does the United Nations intend to deal with the issue? Just the other day a meeting of senior officials was held in Oslo under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. No representatives of the Syrian authorities were invited. How does Mr. Lowcock view the prospect of another assessment of the humanitarian situation in Syria without the participation of its official representatives? Does he consider that a productive format? That is a very urgent question considering that the forthcoming second donor conference is scheduled for the end of April in Brussels. I would also like to ask Mr. Lowcock what is known at the United Nations about the facts of sexual services being provided in exchange for humanitarian assistance in the context of cross-border operations. There is information about that in the November report of the United Nations Population Fund, and the BBC did a journalistic investigation of the issue. If this issue is known about, why is it avoided in the Secretary- General's reports? And if it is not known about, it should be investigated. We hope that in close cooperation with the Syrian authorities and consideration of their views, the United Nations will agree on an emergency humanitarian response plan for this year as soon as possible, with an emphasis on the delivery of assistance to liberated areas. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to welcome you here today, Sir, and to commend the presidency's leadership. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock for his comprehensive but once again alarming update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency on this issue, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously a month ago. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that it has not been implemented in the first 30 days since its adoption. We are meeting again when there has been no substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from over. The military offensive in Syria continues and the human suffering is growing as a result. Any action, even against terrorists, cannot justify attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. That must stop, and the parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Accountability for serious violations is a requirement under international law and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. As indicated in the last report of the United Nations-mandated Commission of Inquiry, there is a need for the international community to take a broader view of accountability and to take urgent steps to ensure that the needs of Syrian conflict victims for justice and accountability are met both immediately and in the long term. We call upon all parties to alleviate the suffering of the civilians, including children, by granting them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance, including voluntary medical evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and the implementing partners in order to ensure the voluntary character of the process. While discussing evacuations, let me underline that people must have the right to return and to a safe location for settlement. Any evacuation negotiations should also include civilians. Humanitarian aid convoys to eastern Ghouta must continue for those who choose to stay. We would like to stress that all actors should use their full influence to immediately improve conditions on the ground. We urgently call for the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Syria. Attacks against civilians, civilian property and medical facilities must stop in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Some small positive steps have taken place, such as a larger number of humanitarian convoys reaching the besieged areas in March, especially when compared to previous months, when humanitarian access was almost completely blocked. That improvement shows that it is possible to make progress, although much more is needed. In that context, we call on Russia, Iran and Turkey — as the European Union did, and as the High Representatives did through their respective ministers after the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in February — to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities as Astana guarantors. It is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also provide a chance for the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva to gain momentum so that a political solution may finally be reached. Once again, let me underline that we should seek to reach an intra-Syrian framework political agreement, in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015). In that connection, we strongly believe that the conclusions of the Congress of Syrian 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 17/21 National Dialogue in Sochi could and should be used to advance the Geneva process, especially with regard to the creation of a constitutional committee by United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. In conclusion, let me stress the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the full implementation of the humanitarian resolution across Syria. The civilian population of Syria has already suffered too much. The adoption of the resolution was just the beginning of the process. We call on all with influence on the ground to take the necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and, finally, our joint humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations continue. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome Mr. Stef Blok, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to New York. We take this opportunity to congratulate him for the commendable presidency of the Netherlands during the month of March. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is grateful for the holding of this informative meeting, which enables us to once again assess humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), which we approved one month ago. We thank Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, who, as he always does, has just given us a very informative and detailed briefing on the developments on the ground in Syria. The 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria, established under resolution 2401 (2018) in order to carry out humanitarian operations, has expired. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations team in Syria, violence has increased in eastern Ghouta, in Damascus, in Idlib and in Afrin, where there is an ongoing Turkish military offensive. Daily air strikes and bombardments have increased, including in residential areas, among Government forces, opposition forces and non-State armed groups, making it difficult to ensure the protection of all civilians and the immediate, secure and sustained provision of humanitarian aid. That excessive resurgence of violence, orchestrated by the various parties, only serves to exacerbate and aggravate the already grim humanitarian situation in those conflict zones. As we have reiterated, the solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is tightly linked with a ceasefire. The prolongation of the conflict can only further aggravate the tragic humanitarian situation, which in turn creates greater instability and negatively affects neighbouring countries that take in the millions of refugees fleeing the war. As the Secretary-General underlines in his 20 March report: "Our common objective" — and one of high priority — "should be to alleviate and end the suffering of the Syrian people. What the Syrian people need immediately has been made abundantly clear and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). Civilians need a cessation of hostilities, protection, access to basic goods and services" — and access to humanitarian and sanitary assistance — "and an end to sieges." (S/2018/243, para. 48) All parties involved in the Syrian crisis must accept that none of them can achieve a military victory. Government forces, opposition forces and armed groups must accept that no matter how much death and destruction they cause in their country, there will be no victor but rather one single loser — the Syrian people. Similarly, national parties and international partners that have significant political and geostrategic interests and that have the capacity to exercise their influence on their respective allies must redouble their efforts and political commitments in order to bring sustainable peace and stability to the country. Any party that insists on political red lines that block the necessary commitments must also consider the setback caused by the loss of innocent human lives. It is evident that the Council has not entirely reached its goal by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018). The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will support any humanitarian initiative that seeks to definitively put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. In conclusion, I renew the tribute of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Mr. Lowcock and to the entire humanitarian team of the United Nations for their noble and tireless work in Syria to provide relief to the Syrian people living through a humanitarian catastrophe. Mr. Dah (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Like others, my delegation would like to welcome Mr. Stef Blok to New York and to congratulate him on the holding of the current meeting in the Security Council. My delegation also wishes to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his informative briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 18/21 18-08569 As we are all aware, the war in Syria has unleashed one of the most serious humanitarian crises in recent history and continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian people. My country remains particularly concerned about the attacks and bombings, including those against hospitals and civilian infrastructure, that continue to punctuate the daily lives of people subjected to forced displacement in the areas of Afrin, Idlib and eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire condemns those actions and calls on the parties to take the steps necessary to protect people, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. More than a month after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), on which so much hope was pinned, has fallen woefully short of our expectations, much to our regret. The fact is that the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and related services, as well as medical evacuation of the seriously ill and wounded, in accordance with relevant international humanitarian law, has still not been adhered to, despite our joint efforts. The ongoing fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps and makeshift shelters where living conditions are extremely difficult. Côte d'Ivoire calls once again for the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) with a view to resuming the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical evacuations from besieged areas and camps for internally displaced persons, in order to ease the suffering of people in distress. We urge the Council to overcome its differences and to demonstrate unity in order to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution, which is more relevant than ever. My delegation reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve unless significant progress is made at the political level, as the two issues are closely linked. We therefore encourage the parties to prioritize political dialogue and resume peace talks in the framework of the Geneva process, in accordance with the road map established by resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his briefing. China commends the active efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies to alleviate the humanitarian situation in some areas of Syria. The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year and has caused terrible suffering for the people of Syria. The humanitarian situation in parts of the country has recently deteriorated. China calls on all parties in Syria to put its country's future and destiny, as well as its people's safety, security and well-being first, cease hostilities and violence without delay, resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation and ease the humanitarian situation in Syria as soon as possible. United Nations humanitarian convoys have now gained access to eastern Ghouta in order to deliver aid supplies to the people there. China welcomes Russia's establishment of temporary truces in eastern Ghouta, opening up a humanitarian corridor for Syrian civilians. As a result of the efforts of the parties concerned, some ceasefire agreements have been reached and a large number of civilians evacuated through the corridor. In the circumstances, it is important to continue to promote the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) so as to alleviate the humanitarian situation in areas such as eastern Ghouta. China welcomes the meeting between Foreign Ministers held by Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, and commends Kazakhstan for hosting the meeting. We hope that the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State of the three countries and the next round of the Astana dialogue will contribute positively to restoring the ceasefire momentum in Syria and supporting the Geneva talks. The international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and back Special Envoy de Mistura's diplomatic efforts to relaunch the Syrian political process. Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be respected, and all Syrian parties must be encouraged to reach a political solution to the Syrian issue, based on the principle of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned peace process, and in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to fundamentally easing the humanitarian situation in Syria and continuing to advance the counter-terrorism agenda, as mandated by the Council's resolutions. The Council should remain united on the Syrian issue and speak with one voice. China stands ready to work with the international community and to contribute actively and constructively to a political settlement of the Syrian issue. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 19/21 Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): As the representative of Kuwait has already delivered a joint statement on our behalf, I will make my remarks very brief. One month ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) by consensus, in response to the deafening calls for action to address the horrific humanitarian situation in Syria. Today we have heard around this table a continued commitment to moving forward with the implementation of that important resolution. I wanted to speak last in order to identify some points of convergence. From the discussion today, I believe that there are a number of critical areas where there is broad agreement within the Council. First, we all share a deep disappointment and sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with the lack of implementation. While a limited increase in access for humanitarian convoys shows that progress is possible, much more is needed. The resolution remains in force and all parties remain obliged to comply. Secondly, we have heard a common concern about the continuing hostilities throughout the country, particularly the ongoing military offensive in eastern Ghouta. Those who leave the area should do so voluntarily, with the right to return and a choice of safe places to go to. At the same time, humanitarian aid convoys must continue to support those who choose to remain. Thirdly, we agree that efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians must be stepped up by the United Nations and its partners, both inside eastern Ghouta and for those leaving and in the collective shelters. I want to emphasize that preventing sexual and gender-based violence should be an integral part of those efforts. We condemn the attacks in February that affected health facilities. Many colleagues also reiterated today that resolution 2401 (2018) applies across the whole of the country. I just wanted to mention our concern about the Turkish operation in Afrin and the statements that Turkey has made about expanding its military operations in the north, beyond Afrin. We are also concerned about the protection of civilians fleeing Afrin, as well as the difficult conditions for those remaining. We call on all relevant parties, especially Turkey, to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate cross-border and cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as freedom of movement, for internally displaced persons. The need for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) remains as urgent today as when it was adopted. As Ambassador Alotaibi has said, we will spare no effort in making progress on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We will continue to work actively and tirelessly to that end, be creative in considering possible further steps, and remain ready to reconvene the Council at any time should the situation warrant its renewed action. We are convinced that the unity of the Council, as difficult as it may be, is the only way to effectively make a real difference on the ground and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. For our part, even when terribly frustrated, we will never give up trying to achieve that change. The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to convey the condolences of the Government and people of my country to my colleague on the Russian Federation delegation in the wake of the tragic incident that claimed children's lives in the commercial centre in Kemerovo. A few minutes ago, I was checking the list of the States members of the Security Council and I realized that two — only two — of its 15 members have embassies in Damascus. That is why the statements made by the representatives of those two countries offered the most accurate description of the humanitarian situation in my country. They were able to provide an objective and fair assessment of the situation there. In late 2016, right here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7834), we announced the good news to our people in Syria that the Syrian Government would liberate eastern Aleppo from armed terrorist groups, and as a Government, an army and a responsible State we have done just that. Today we announce to our people the good news that the time has come to liberate all of eastern Ghouta from these armed terrorist groups. We declare that we will liberate the Golan, Afrin, Raqqa, Idlib and the rest of our occupied territory because, as a State, we reject the presence on our territory of any illegal armed group or occupying Power, regardless of the excuses, just like all other States represented in the Council. Such victories would not have been possible if we had no just cause. They would not have been possible without the sacrifices made by the Syrian Arab Army, the support of our people and the support of our allies and friends. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 20/21 18-08569 Facts that have come to light recently with the liberation of eastern Ghouta from armed terrorist groups again prove what we have always told the Council since the first day of the global terrorist war waged by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and France against my country. We said that the suffering of Syrians is the result of the practices of armed terrorist groups against civilians. The testimonies of the tens of thousands of our people leaving eastern Ghouta underscore that those groups have continued to deprive them of their freedom, destroy their livelihoods, disperse their families and prevent them from leaving to areas under State control in order to continue using them as human shields. They have seized control of humanitarian assistance in order to distribute it to their supporters or sell it to civilians at exorbitant prices. They have also targeted the safe corridors allocated by the Government with explosive bullets and mortar shelling, which has led to the death of dozens of people, including some Palestinian brethren. We have borne witness to a state of hysteria in recent days and weeks in the Council as the Syrian Government has sought to exercise its sovereign right, combat terrorist groups and eliminate terrorists in Syria in order to restore security and stability to all Syrians and implement Council resolutions against terrorism. That state of hysteria proves that the States supporting those terrorist groups have never sought to end the suffering of Syrians. They have sought only to perpetuate and prolong their suffering in order to blackmail the Syrian Government, at the political and humanitarian levels, and save terrorists from their certain deaths. I would like to assure the supporters of terrorism, some of whom are present in this Chamber, that the plan that they have promoted for the past seven years has failed. Their plan was to deny that the Islamist takfiri groups were terrorists and instead present them as moderate Syrian opposition. That plan has failed. Eastern Ghouta has not fallen, as my colleague the representative of the United States stated. It was liberated in the same way we liberated eastern Aleppo. It is terrorism that has fallen in eastern Ghouta, not civilians. As the representative of the United States said, today should be a day of shame for the supporters and sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. They have supported those terrorist groups for years in order to topple the Syrian Government by force in favour of Islamist takfiri groups. Such actions have led to considerable suffering among the Syrian people, and I have proof of it. Two days ago, at the Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by Senator Lindsey Graham, the Chief of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, stated that "the change of the Government in Syria by force in favour a number of Islamist opposition groups has failed". The Security Council has to date held 49 formal meetings to discuss the so-called humanitarian situation in Syria and a number of informal emergency and Arria Formula meetings. The Council has read reports and heard briefings that were replete with falsehoods that senior officials of the United Nations sought to present in order to serve the policies of some influential Western countries that are members of the Council and to pressure the Syrian Government. Such reports and briefings were completely devoid of professionalism and objectivity. They have failed to take note of the attacks on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the attacks by the international coalition, led by the United States, and those by the Turkish regime and the Israeli occupying force. Those same parties have also sought to provide all kinds of support to terrorist groups associated with Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other militias fabricated in those countries. After 49 reports and hundreds of meetings, briefings and thousands of working hours, some countries continue to refuse to recognize that the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the result of an external investment in terrorism and unilateral coercive measures. Forty-nine reports have been issued, and I say today that my words are falling on deaf ears. People from the Netherlands say that beautiful flowers have thorns. The Netherlands is famous for its flowers. Perhaps that saying reflects the situation on the ground. Mr. Lowcock stated that the Kashkul was targeted by a missile but he did not specify its origin. He said there are eight shelters for those leaving eastern Ghouta. He did not mention the efforts of the Syrian Government to host the 150,000 civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. He does not know who manages those shelters. Perhaps aliens are taking care of the 150,000 civilians. Mr. Lowcock stated that the United Nations, its partners and the Syrian Red Crescent are helping people from Ghouta. He did not mention the Government at all. If the Government has no role to play, why ask it to help the Council? Why does the Council request its approval for the entry of humanitarian convoys? Mr. Lowcock stated that 153,000 people left Afrin and went to Tell 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 21/21 Rifaat because of military operations. Who forced 153,000 people to leave Afrin? Was it not Turkey that forced them to leave? Was it not the Turkish aggression against Afrin that forced these people to leave? Mr. Lowcock mentioned the Syrian Government only once, saying that it approved the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Rukban camp. He did not say that the United States was behind the obstacles preventing the deployment of the humanitarian convoy in question. The United States occupies the Rukban camp and the Tanf area. I will not go into detail now for the sake of time. I will not even go into the details of the forty-ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). I will give only one example to prove that the report lacks objectivity and impartiality. The report devotes nine paragraphs to the suffering of civilians in eastern Ghouta and the damage to the infrastructure there as a result of Government military operations, as the report claims — nine paragraphs. As for the situation of the 8 million civilians in Damascus, the targeting by terrorist groups of the capital with more than 2,500 missiles, the killing and injury of thousands, and the destruction of homes, hospitals and clinics, the report dedicates only one sentence to Damascus. The report says, "Attacks on residential neighbourhoods of Damascus also continued from eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure." (S/2018/243, para. 8) We hope that the United Nations will not adopt in eastern Ghouta the same approach that it has taken in previous situations by not providing support to the areas liberated or achieving reconciliation. We hope that the United Nations will adopt a new approach in line with the Charter and international law, based on full coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the only party concerned with the protection and support of Syrians. We hope that the United Nations will not succumb to the dictates of certain influential Western countries in the Council that run counter to humanitarian action, the Charter and international law. During the past week alone, the Syrian Ministry of Commerce has distributed 4,000 tons of food to civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. I am not sure about the sources mentioned by the representative of France, because France does not have an embassy in Damascus. So its sources of information cannot be credible. In conclusion, the States sponsoring terrorism have instructed armed terrorist groups to use chemical weapons once again in Syria. I ask the Council to pay attention to this information. They asked them to fabricate evidence, as they have in the past, in order to accuse the Syrian Government. We sent this information to the President of the Security Council yesterday. According to that information, this theatrical act will be produced by the intelligence agencies of these countries, and the starring roles will be the White Helmets. The production will be directed by foreign media. This theatrical act will take place this time in the areas close to the separation line in the Syrian occupied Golan. Terrorist groups will use poison gas against civilians in Al-Harra. Afterwards, the injured will be moved to the hospitals of the Israeli enemy for treatment there. Council members can already imagine the testimony that will be offered by doctors of the Israeli occupation forces. The information we submitted also refers to another theatrical act in the villages of Habit and Qalb Lawza in the suburbs of Idlib, where a number of satellite transmitters and foreign experts have been spotted. This time, the cast will include women and children from an internally displaced persons camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. Once again, I provide the Council with this serious information. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8225 Security Council Seventy-third year 8225th meeting Monday, 9 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-09955 (E) *1809955* S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 2/26 18-09955 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: This emergency meeting of the Security Council underscores the gravity of the events in recent days in Syria, of which there are severe consequences for civilians. It takes place at a time of increased international tensions, drawing national, regional and international actors into dangerous situations of potential or actual confrontation. It is an important meeting. There is an urgent need for the Council to address the situation with unity and purpose. How did we reach this point? The month of March saw devastating violence in part of eastern Ghouta, which resulted in at least 1,700 people killed or injured in opposition-controlled areas, dozens and dozens of people killed or injured in Government-controlled areas and, ultimately, the evacuation of 130,000 people, including fighters, family members and other civilians. However, in Douma there was a fragile ceasefire, which continued for most of March. The United Nations good offices played an important role in that regard. Since 31 March, the United Nations has no longer been able to be involved in talks, since, at that time, the Syrian Government did not agree to our presence, although we made efforts to propose concrete ways to address the issues that we understood were arising in the continuing contacts, including the proposal to activate the detainee working group agreed in Astana. However, that proposal was not taken up at the time. From 2 April, the evacuation of some 4,000 fighters, family members and other civilians from Douma to northern Syria took place. However, on 6 April there was a major escalation in violence. There were reports of sustained air strikes and shelling against Douma, the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks damaging health facilities. There were also reports of shelling on Damascus city, which reportedly again killed or injured civilians. Jaysh Al-Islam requested our involvement in emergency talks in extremis, but there was no positive response to that request when it conveyed the same message to the other side. At approximately 8 p.m. local time on 7 April, reports of an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma started to emerge. Pictures immediately circulated on social media showing what appeared to be lifeless men, women and children. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground claimed to have received hundreds of cases of civilians with symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. The same NGOs claimed that at least 49 people had been killed and hundreds injured. I wish to recall what the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, noted, namely, that the United Nations "is not in a position to verify these reports". However, he also made it very clear that he cannot ignore them and that he "is particularly alarmed by allegations that chemical weapons have been used against civilian populations in Douma" once again. He further emphasized "that any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation". I note that a number of States have strongly alluded to or expressed the suspicion that the Syrian Government was responsible for the alleged chemical attack. I also note that other States, as well as the Government of Syria itself, have strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations, depicting the attacks as a fabrication or/and a provocation. My comment is that this is one more reason for there to be a thorough independent investigation. 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 3/26 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said that it has made the preliminary analysis of the reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and is in the process of gathering further information from all available sources. My colleague Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who is with us in the Chamber today, will further address this matter. But I urge the Security Council, in accordance with its own mandate to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law, to, for God's sake, ensure that a mechanism is found to investigate these allegations and assign responsibility.Returning to the narrative of the events, at around midnight on 7 April, hours after the alleged chemical-weapons attack, Jaysh Al-Islam informed the United Nations that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Federation and the Syrian Government. The Russian Federation Ministry for Defence stated that the agreement encompasses a ceasefire and Jaysh Al-Islam fighters laying down their arms or evacuating Douma. The Russian Federation also reported that up to 8,000 Jaysh Al-Islam fighters and 40,000 of their family members were to evacuate.As I brief the Security Council now, we understand that additional evacuations from Douma are already under way. We have also received reports that some detainees — the ones we had heard about before — had begun to be released from Douma today. We note reports that the agreement provides for civilians who decide to stay to remain under Russian Federation guarantees, with the resumption of services in coordination with a local committee of civilians.I urge the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation to ensure the protection of those civilians so that as many civilians as possible can stay in their homes if they choose to, or leave to a place of their own choosing or return as per international law. I urge that there be, for there should be, an immediate refocusing for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). What we have see is basically an escalation before a de-escalation.Clearly, the dangers of further escalation arise from situations beyond Ghouta as well. We have received reports of missiles targeting the Syrian Government's Tiyas, or T-4, airbase early this morning. No State has claimed responsibility for that reported strike. The United States and France have explicitly denied any involvement. The Syrian Government, the Russian Federation and Iran have suggested that Israel could have carried out the attack, with Iranian State media reporting that over a dozen military personnel were killed or injured, including four Iranian military advisers. The Government of Israel has not commented. The United Nations is unable to independently verify or attribute responsibility for that attack, but we urge all parties to show their utmost restraint and avoid any further escalation or confrontation.We are also concerned about the dynamics in other areas of Syria. Syrians in Dar'a, northern rural Homs, eastern Qalamoun, Hamah and Idlib have all expressed to us their own fears that they may soon face escalations similar to what we have seen in eastern Ghouta. We therefore urge the Security Council and the Astana guarantors and those States involved in the Amman efforts to work towards reinstating de-escalation in those areas and elsewhere in Syria. The indications are the opposite at the moment.Meanwhile, following its operations in Afrin, the Turkish Government has indicated the potential for further operations in other areas of northern Syria if Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat and Kurdish People's Protection Units forces are not removed from those areas. Military operations in such areas have the potential of raising international tensions. We therefore urge all parties concerned to de-escalate, show restraint and find means to implement resolution 2401 (2018) through dialogue and fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Let me also highlight the fact that we have recently seen — and this is particularly tragic when we consider the efforts all of us, including all members of the Security Council, have made in the last year — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launch new operations within Syria, south of Damascus, in rural Damascus, in remote areas near the Iraqi border.I would like to conclude with some bottom lines, if I may.First, civilians are paying a very heavy price for the military escalation. We are not seeing de-escalation; we are seeing the contrary. Today our first priority must be to protect civilians from the war, from the conflict, from chemical weapons, from hunger. We call on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including humanitarian access across Syria to all people in need. We urge once S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 4/26 18-09955 more for concrete respect for resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, which is, after all, a resolution of the Security Council.Secondly, continued allegations of the use of chemical agents are of extremely grave concern. Those allegations must be independently and urgently investigated. Any use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited and constitutes a very serious violation of international law, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013). Preventing impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and upholding international law must be an utmost priority for all members of the Security Council.Thirdly, I have to say this very slowly because today is the first time, in over four years of briefing the Security Council in person, that I have reached a point in which I have to express a concern about international security, not just regional or national or Syrian security, but international security. Recent developments have more than ever before brought to the surface the dangers that the Secretary-General warned about recently at the Munich Security Conference, when he spoke of "different faultlines" in the Middle East that are interconnected and crossing each other, of conflicting interests of both global and regional Powers, and forms of escalation that can have absolutely devastating consequences that are difficult for us to even imagine. The Council cannot allow a situation of uncontrollable escalation to develop in Syria on any front. Instead, it must find unity and address the concrete threats to international peace and security in Syria today.I am sorry to have been this brief, but I wanted to focus on one specific concern, namely, the threat to international security related to what we are seeing now in Syria and the danger of the alleged chemical-weapons attacks being repeated. Next time I will brief the Council on humanitarian and other issues and on the political process, which I know we are all interested in focusing upon, but today is the day for talking about security — international security — and peace.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. De Mistura for his very informative briefing.I now give the floor to Mr. Markram.Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel.It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention.Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use of chemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations. Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 5/26 well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Markram for his informative briefing.I now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): If you imagine, Mr. President, that I derive pleasure from the subject of my statement today, or from speaking at great length, you are wrong. Unfortunately, however, the situation is such that I have a lot to say today. And you will have to listen to me.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.The Russian Federation asked that this meeting be convened under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security" because we are deeply alarmed about the fact that a number of capitals — Washington first and foremost, with London and Paris blindly following its lead — are purposely steering a course designed to supercharge international tensions. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France, with no grounds and no thought for the consequences, are taking a confrontational line on Russia and Syria and pushing others towards it too. They have a broad range of weapons in their arsenal — slander, insults, bellicose rhetoric, blackmail, sanctions and threats of the use of force against a sovereign State. Their threats against Russia are brazen, and the tone they take has gone beyond the limits of the permissible. Even during the Cold War their predecessors did not express themselves so crudely about my country. What next?I remember the rhetorical question that President Putin of Russia put to our Western partners, and especially the United States, from the rostrum of the General Assembly in 2015 (see A/70/PV.13), about their careless geopolitical experiments in the Middle East, when he asked them if they at least realized what they had done. At the time, the question went unanswered. But there is an answer, and it is that no, they do not realize what they have done. As they do not realize what they are doing now. It is not only we who are perplexed at their lack of any coherent strategy on any issue. It perplexes most of the people in this Chamber. They just do not want to ask them about it openly. Wherever they go, whatever they touch, they leave behind chaos in their wake in the murky water where they have gone fishing for some kind of fish. But the only fish they catch are mutants. I will ask them another rhetorical question. Do they understand the dangerous place they are dragging the world to?One of the areas where the hostility manifests itself most strongly is Syria. The terrorists and extremists supported by external sponsors are being defeated. Let me remind those responsible that these are the terrorists and extremists whom they equipped, financed and dumped into the country in order to overthrow the lawful Government. Now we can see why this is causing hysteria among those who have invested their political and material capital in such dark forces.In the past few weeks, thanks to Russia's efforts to implement the Security Council's resolutions, a massive operation has been carried out to unblock eastern Ghouta, whose residents have been forced to endure the humiliation of the rebel militias for several years. More than 150 thousand civilians were evacuated from this suburb of Damascus, completely voluntarily and under the necessary security conditions. Tens of thousands of them have already been able to return to liberated areas and many have been taken in by relatives. The changes in their demographic composition that the defenders of the Syrian opposition have been screaming about have not happened. That is a lie. Some extremely complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of the armed groups, as a result of which many left the neighbourhoods they were occupying, with full guarantees for their security. Incidentally, there were several attempted acts of terrorism during these transport operations when militias tried to bring suicide belts onto the buses and were prevented. Others preferred to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities. Thanks to the presidential amnesty, they will now be able to return to civilian life, and may even eventually be able to join Syria's security forces. That represents the implementation of the United Nations principle of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.However, not everyone is so keen on such positive dynamics. The outside sponsors — that is, the leading Western countries — were ready to grasp at any straw in order to hang on to any centre of terrorist resistance, however tiny, within striking distance of the Syrian capital, so that the militias could continue to terrorize ordinary residents, taking their food and begging humanitarian aid from the international community. Incidentally, they were not about to S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 6/26 18-09955 share medicines with those ordinary civilians, as an inspection of the strongholds left behind by the fighters revealed. As happened previously in eastern Aleppo, the improvised hospital facilities in basements were full of medicines that thanks to Western sanctions were not to be had for love or money in Damascus and other Government-controlled areas. Mass graves and bodies that showed evidence of torture were also discovered. The dimensions of the tunnels that the jihadists used were astonishing. Some of them could easily accommodate small trucks travelling in both directions. Those impressive underground facilities connected the positions of groups that some view as moderate to the strongholds of Jabhat Al-Nusra.On 6 April, at their sponsors' instructions, Jaysh Al-Islam's new ringleaders prevented the fourth group of militia fighters from evacuating Douma and resumed rocket and mortar fire on residential areas of Damascus, targeting Mezzeh, Mezzeh 86, Ish Al-Warwar, Abu Rummaneh and Umayyad Square. According to official data, eight civilians were killed and 37 were wounded. It is regrettable that we seen no statements from Western capitals condemning the shelling of a historic part of Damascus.The next day, 7 April, militias accused the Syrian authorities of dropping barrel bombs containing a toxic substance. However, they got their versions mixed up, referring to it sometimes as chlorine and sometimes as sarin or a mixture of poison gases. In a familiar pattern, the rumours were immediately seized on by non-governmental organizations financed by Western capitals and White Helmets operating in the guise of rescue workers. These so-called reports were also just as quickly disseminated through media outlets. I should once again point out that many of these dubious opposition entities have an accurate list of the email addresses of the representatives of Security Council members, which leads us to conclude that some of our colleagues, with a reckless attitude to their position, have been leaking sensitive information to those they sponsor. Incidentally, we all should remember the incident in which the White Helmets accidentally posted on the Internet a video showing the preparation stages for filming the next so-called victim of an attack allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian army. The chemical "series" that began in 2013 has continued to run, with each subsequent episode designed to top the impact of the previous one.In Washington, London and Paris, conclusions have immediately been reached as to the guilt of the Syrian authorities, or regime, as they call it. Has no one wondered why Damascus needs this? While the Syrian leadership has received its share of insults, the main burden of responsibility has been laid at the door of Russia and Iran, to no one's surprise, I believe. As is now customary, it has occurred at lightning speed and without any kind of investigation. On 8 April, Syrian troops searching the village of Al-Shifuniya, near Douma, discovered a small, makeshift Jaysh Al-Islam chemical-munitions factory, along with German-produced chlorine reagents and specialized equipment.The Istanbul-based opposition journalist Asaad Hanna posted a video on his Twitter feed that was allegedly from the area of the incident. In it, an unidentified individual in a gas mask, presumably from the White Helmets, is posing against a backdrop of a homemade chemical bomb that allegedly landed in a bedroom in a building in Douma. It is accompanied by commentary about what it calls another of the regime's attacks on civilians. There can be no doubt that this production was staged. The trajectory of the alleged bomb is entirely unnatural. It fell through the roof and landed gently on a wooden bed without damaging it in any way and was clearly placed there before the scene was shot.In an interesting coincidence, the chemical act of provocation in Douma on Saturday, 7 April, occurred immediately after the United States delegation in the Security Council was instructed to call for expert consultations for today, Monday, 9 April, on its draft resolution on a mechanism for investigating incidents involving chemical weapons. Today far-reaching changes were made to the initial text. In such murky circumstances, of course, we have to determine what happened. But we have to do it honestly, objectively and impartially, without sacrificing the principle of the presumption of innocence and certainly not by prejudging the process of an investigation.Despite this provocation, the Russian specialists have continued their efforts to resolve the situation in eastern Ghouta. On Sunday afternoon, 8 April, according to new agreements, the evacuation of Jaysh Al-Islam combatants was resumed. Following Douma's liberation from militants, Russian radiological, chemical and biological protection specialists were sent there to collect evidence. They took soil samples that showed no presence of nerve agents or substances 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 7/26 containing chlorine. Local residents and combatants who were no longer fighting were interviewed. Not one local confirmed the chemical attack. At the local hospital, no one with symptoms of sarin or chlorine poisoning had been admitted. There are no other active medical facilities in Douma. No bodies of people who had died from being poisoned were found, and the medical staff and residents had no information about where they might have been buried. Any use of sarin or chlorine in Douma is therefore unconfirmed. By the way, representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent refuted statements allegedly made on their behalf about providing assistance to victims of toxic gases. I call on those who plan to denounce the regime when they speak after me to assume that there was no chemical-weapon attack.Sweden has drafted a resolution calling for the incident to be investigated. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) does not need a resolution to investigate it, but we are willing to consider it. Today we propose to do what is envisaged in the draft resolution, which is to let the OPCW, which Mr. Üzümcü, Director-General of its Technical Secretariat, has announced is ready to deal with the situation, fly to Damascus immediately, if possible tomorrow. There the Syrian authorities and the Russian military will ensure the necessary conditions so that the OPCW experts can travel to the site of the alleged incident and familiarize themselves with the situation. That, by the way, is what President Trump and other Western leaders have been urging us to do.The Syrians have repeatedly warned that there might be chemical provocations. At the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic they are saying that the equipment needed to film the next purported chemical attack has already been brought in. We have also made statements to that effect in the Security Council. Everyone has heard those warnings, but has deliberately ignored them because they do not correspond to the doctrinal positions espoused by those who dream of seeing the legitimate Government of yet another Arab country destroyed.There has still been no attention given to the discovery in November and December 2017 of a significant quantity of chemical munitions on Syrian territory that had been liberated from militias. In terrorist warehouses in Az-Zahiriya and Al-Hafiya in Hama governorate, 20 one-ton containers and more than 50 pieces of ordnance containing toxic chemicals were discovered. In Tel Adel in Idlib governorate, 24 tons of toxic chemical, presumed to be chlorine, were discovered. At a storage site in Moadamiya, 30 kilometres to the north-east of Damascus, 240- and 160-millimetre-calibre munitions and plastic canisters of organo-phosphorous compounds were found. In the area around As-Suwayda in Idlib governorate, an manufacturing facility for synthesizing various toxic substances was found, along with 54 pieces of chemical ordnance and 44 containers of chemicals that could be used to manufacture toxic substances.Since the beginning of this year alone, four instances of militias using toxic chemicals against Government troop positions have been established in Suruj and Al-Mushairfeh districts, and more than 100 Syrian troops have been hospitalized. On 3 March, during the liberation of Khazram and Aftris in eastern Ghouta, soldiers from a sub-unit of Government troops discovered an auxiliary workshop for homemade chemical munitions. This far from exhaustive list is an indication of the misdeeds of the still unreconciled opposition. And yet we have seen no eagerness to send OPCW expert groups there to collect evidence of these events. We demand that the OPCW verify all of these areas. They are accessible. We are also seeing information that American instructors in the Al-Tanf camp have trained a number of groups of fighters to carry out provocations using chemical weapons in order to create a pretext for a rocket strikes and bombings.It has been clear to us that sooner or later there would be an attempt to bring the jihadists out of harm's way and at the same time to punish the regime that some Western capitals hate. The talking heads on television have thrown themselves into urging a repeat of last year's effort at a military attack on Syria. This morning there were missile strikes on the T-4 airfield in Homs governorate. We are deeply troubled by such actions.The provocations in Douma are reminiscent of last year's incident in Khan Shaykhun, with their shared element being the planned nature of the attacks. Analysis of the operations conducted by the United States in April 2017, on the eve of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and after it, shows that Washington prepared its operation in advance. From 4 to 7 April of last year — in other words, from the day that a toxic substance was used in Khan Shaykhun until the strike on the Al-Shayrat airbase — the USS Porter and Ross naval destroyers S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 8/26 18-09955 were already present in the Mediterranean Sea, where they were engaged in planned operations. They did not call into any ports where an exchange of munitions could have been effected as a way to increase their quantity of cruise missiles.Specifically, from 4 to 5 April, the USS Porter was located south-east of Sicily and the Ross was en route from the Rota naval base to an area south of Sardinia. Later, on 6 April, both ships were observed moving at accelerated speed towards the area of the firing positions to the south-west of Cyprus, from where they launched a massive strike on Al-Shayrat on 7 April. However, the 59 Tomahawk missiles that were launched would have exceeded the two destroyers' total munitions capacity if they had actually been engaged in the anti-missile defence operations that they were assigned to, which required only 48 units. That means, therefore, that even before the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun, these United States naval vessels undertook a military operation with a strike capability above the number of cruise missiles necessary for their anti-missile defence operations, which could be evidence of advance planning by Washington of an action against Damascus.Among other things, Saturday's fake news from Douma was aimed at diverting the public's attention from the circus that is the Skripal case, in which London has become terminally mired, hurling completely unproven accusations at Russia and accomplishing its basic purpose of extracting solidarity from its allies in order to construct an anti-Russian front. Now the British are shifting away from a transparent investigation and concrete responses to the questions they have been asked while simultaneously covering their tracks.At the Security Council meeting on 5 April on the Skripal case (see S/PV.8224), we warned the Council that the attempt to accuse us, without proof, of involvement in the Salisbury incident was linked to the Syrian chemical issue. There was an interesting new development regarding the issue yesterday. As Britain's Foreign Minister Boris Johnson was continuing his display of rapier wit "exposing" Russia, another gem emerged. The Times informed us that Royal Air Force experts in southern Cyprus had intercepted a message sent from outside Damascus to Moscow on the day of the Skripals' poisoning that contained the phrase "the package has been delivered" and said that two people had "successfully departed". Apparently this formed part of the intelligence that London provided to its allies before expelling our Russian diplomats. Is not it obvious to everyone that there is an irrefutable Syria-Russia-Salisbury connection? I will give the British intelligence services one more huge hint, for free. Why do they not assume that the Novichok they are so thrilled about reached Salisbury directly from Syria? In a package. To cover its tracks. How pathetic.Ambassador Haley recently stated that Russia will never be a friend of the United States. To that, I say that friendship is both reciprocal and voluntary. One cannot force a friendship and we are not begging the United States to be friends. What we want from it is very little — normal, civilized relations, which it arrogantly refuses, disregarding basic courtesy. However, the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it has friends. Its so-called friends are only those who cannot say no to it. And that is the only criterion for friendship that it understands.Russia has friends. And unlike the United States, we do not have adversaries. That is not the prism through which we view the world. It is international terrorism that is our enemy. However, we continue to propose cooperating with the United States. That cooperation should be respectful and mutual, and aimed at resolving genuine problems, not imaginary ones, and it should be just as much in the interests of the United States. Ultimately, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.Through the relevant channels, we already conveyed to the United States that military action conducted on false pretences against Syria, where Russian troops are deployed at the request of its legitimate Government, could have extremely serious repercussions. We urge Western politicians to temper their hawkish rhetoric, seriously consider the possible repercussions and cease their feeble, foolhardy efforts, which merely produce challenges to global security. We can see very good examples of what becomes of the military misadventures of the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. No one has invested Western leaders with the power to take on the roles of the world's policeman and its investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners as well. We urge them to return to the world of legality, comply with the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to address the problems that arise rather than attempting to realize its own selfish geopolitical dreams at every step. All our energy should be focused on supporting the political process in Syria, and for that, all stakeholders with influence must unite in a 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 9/26 constructive effort. Russia is always ready for that kind of cooperation.In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to request a briefing of the Security Council on the results of the United Nations assessment mission in Raqqa and on the situation in the Rukban camp. We can see how the coalition members are trying to complicate a resolution of the problems resulting from their actions in Syria, particularly the carpet-bombing operation designed to wipe out Raqqa. No chemical provocations will distract our attention from that issue.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Thomas Markram for their briefings.Only five days ago, here in this Chamber (see S/PV.8221), we mourned as we remembered the sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun that occurred a year ago. This weekend another devastating gas attack was carried out in the city of Douma, killing more than 45 civilians and injuring more than 500. It was another in a series of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. That is unacceptable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of nine Security Council members that requested today's emergency meeting because we all believed that it was critically important to address this horrific attack. We must reinstate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We must underscore the basic norms of the international legal order and stop the ongoing tragedy in eastern Ghouta and Douma.We almost met twice today because one permanent member of the Council seemed not to want a focused discussion on the issue at hand, the chemical attack in Douma. That begs the question of whether that particular member State would prefer the international community to stand by and watch like a spectator while it covers for the crimes of its ally, the Syrian regime, some of which amount to serious war crimes. The Council must not stand idly by. It is high time for us to act in three ways, condemning, protecting and holding to account. First, today we should condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons. International law has been trampled on. Silence and impunity are not an option. However, condemnation alone is not enough.Secondly, we must deliver on our responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians must remain an absolute priority. We call on the Astana guarantors to use their influence to prevent any further attacks. They must ensure a cessation of hostilities and a de-escalation of the violence, as per resolution 2401 (2018). An immediate ceasefire is needed in Douma so that humanitarian and medical aid can reach the victims of the attack and so that humanitarian personnel can continue their life-saving work. We owe it to the men, women and children of Douma and of Syria. We owe it to our own citizens.Furthermore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to point out that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations count on the permanent members of the Council not to use their veto in cases of mass atrocities. The international community should be able to count on the Council to uphold international humanitarian law and the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and to act when international law is trampled. Let me be clear. We support the humanitarian work of the White Helmets. They do extremely important humanitarian work for civilians in Syria in dire circumstances.Thirdly, all members of the Council regularly stress the importance of accountability for perpetrators who use chemical weapons. Yet the Council has not been able to move forward on that issue for months owing to one permanent member's use of the veto. We have been unable to tackle this crisis because one permanent member is a direct party to the conflict and has proved that it will defend the Syrian regime at all costs. We must intensify our efforts to establish a mechanism that can continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and investigate and identify perpetrators independently of the politics in the Council. The JIM has identified both the Syrian regime and a non-State actor as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As I said last week (see S/PV.8221), the discontinuation of the JIM mandate cannot be the end of the story — all the more so because since the JIM ceased to operate, we have received reports that the regime has carried out at least six more chemical-weapon attacks and perhaps even more. For those who claim that chemical-weapon attacks have not taken place or that such accounts have been fabricated, I have a clear message. The establishment of an effective, impartial and independent attribution and accountability mechanism must not be vetoed.Let us not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the helm of Organization and a powerful General S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 10/26 18-09955 Assembly. Both must consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The work should build on the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission and the JIM. We welcome the Fact-finding Mission's immediate investigation of the terrible incident in Douma this weekend. It should be given full access and cooperation by all parties. We reiterate our strong support for, first, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; secondly, the Commission of Inquiry; thirdly, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France; and fourthly, a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice.In conclusion, the Council must act. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission must complete an investigation as soon as possible, and there can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To do otherwise is tantamount to condoning such appalling attacks, failing in our responsibilities and undermining the international architecture that we have collectively designed to stop such attacks. It is time for the Council and the international community as a whole to act.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.Almost exactly one year ago, I stood on the floor of the Security Council and held up pictures of dead Syrian children (see S/PV.7915). After that day, I prayed that I would never have to do that again. I could; there are many truly gruesome pictures. Many of us have worked hard to ensure that one day we would not have to see images of babies gassed to death in Syria. However, the day we prayed would never come, has come again. Chemical weapons have once again been used on Syrian men, women and children. And once again, the Security Council is meeting in response.This time I am not going to hold up pictures of victims. I could; there are many, and they are gruesome. Worse are the videos imprinted in our minds that no one should ever have to see. I could hold up pictures of babies lying dead next to their mothers, brothers and sisters — even toddlers and infants still in diapers, all lying together dead. Their skin is the ashen blue that is now tragically familiar from chemical-weapon scenes. Their eyes are open and lifeless, with white foam bubbles at their mouths and noses. They are pictures of dead Syrians who are unarmed, not soldiers and fit the very definition of innocent and non-threatening. Rather, they are women and children who were hiding in basements from a renewed assault by Bashar Al-Assad. They are of families who were hiding underground to escape Al-Assad's conventional bombs and artillery, but the basements that Syrian families thought would shelter them from conventional bombs were the worst place to be when chemical weapons fell from the sky. Saturday evening, the basements of Douma became their tombs.It is impossible to know for certain how many have died, because access to Douma is cut off by Al-Assad's forces. Dozens are dead that we know of, and hundreds are wounded. I could hold up pictures of survivors — children with burning eyes and choking for breath. I could hold up pictures of first responders washing the chemicals off of the victims and putting respirators on children, or of first responders walking through room after room of families lying motionless with babies still in the arms of their mothers and fathers. I could show pictures of a hospital attacked with chemical weapons. I could show pictures of hospitals struck by barrel bombs following the chemical attack. Ambulances and rescue vehicles have been repeatedly attacked, maximizing the number of dead civilians. Civil defence centres have been attacked in order to paralyse the medical response so as to increase the suffering of the survivors. Who does that? Only a monster does that. Only a monster targets civilians, and then ensures that there are no ambulances to transfer the wounded, no hospitals to save their lives and no doctors or medicine to ease their pain.I could hold up pictures of all of that killing and suffering for the Council to see, but what would be the point? The monster who was responsible for those attacks has no conscience, not even to be shocked by pictures of dead children. The Russian regime, whose hands are all covered in the blood of Syrian children, cannot be ashamed by pictures of its victims. We have tried that before. We must not overlook Russia and Iran's roles in enabling the Al-Assad regime's murderous destruction. Russia and Iran have military advisers at Al-Assad's airfields and operation centres. Russian officials are on the ground helping direct the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 11/26 regime's starve-and-surrender campaign, and Iranian allied forces do much of the dirty work.When the Syrian military pummels civilians, they rely on the military hardware given by Russia. Russia could stop that senseless slaughter if it wanted, but it stands with the Al-Assad regime and supports without any hesitation. What is the point of trying to shame such people? After all, no civilized Government would have anything to do with Al-Assad's murderous regime. Pictures of dead children mean little to Governments like Russia, who expend their own resources to prop up Al-Assad.The Council, which saw the pictures last year, has failed to act because Russia has stood in its way every single time. For a year we have allowed Russia to hold the lives of innocent Syrians hostage to its alliance with the Al-Assad regime. That also allowed Russian to weaken the credibility of the United Nations. We are quick to condemn chemical weapons in the Security Council, but then Russia prevents any action. It vetoed five draft resolutions on this issue alone and used 11 vetoes all together to save Al-Assad. Our lives go on as usual.The Council created the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It found the Syrian regime responsible for the attack at Khan Shaykhun a year ago. Because Russia supported Al-Assad and his actions, Russia killed the Mechanism. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. We pushed for a ceasefire. The Council unanimously agreed, but it was immediately ignored by Russia and Al-Assad. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. Now here we are, confronted with the consequences of giving Russia a pass in the name of unity — a unity that Russia has shown many times before it does not want. Here we are, in a world where chemical-weapons use is becoming normalized — from an Indonesian airport to an English village to the homes and hospitals of Syria. Since the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun one year ago, chemical weapons have been reportedly used dozens of times, and the Council does nothing.What we are dealing with today is not about a spat between the United States and Russia. It is about the inhumane use of chemical agents on innocent civilians. Each and every one of the nations in the Council is on record opposing the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more rationalizations for our failure to act. We have already introduced and circulated to the Council a draft resolution demanding unrestricted humanitarian access to the people of Douma. Al-Assad is doing all he can to assure maximum suffering in Douma. Our priority must be to help the starving, the sick and the injured who have been left behind. We also call on the Council to immediately re-establish a truly professional and impartial mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, including the attack this weekend. We hope that our colleagues on the Council will join us, as they have before.That is a very minimum we can do in response to the attack we just witnessed. Russia's obstructionism will not continue to hold us hostage when we are confronted with an attack like that one. The United States is determined to see the monster who dropped chemical weapons on the Syrian people held to account. Those present have heard what the President of the United States has said about that. Meetings are ongoing. Important decisions are being weighed, even as we speak. We are on the edge of a dangerous precipice. The great evil of chemical-weapons use, which once unified the world in opposition, is on the verge of becoming the new normal. The international community must not let that happen. We are beyond showing pictures of dead babies. We are beyond appeals to conscience. We have reached the moment when the world must see justice done. History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Peruvian presidency for having convened this emergency Security Council meeting, at the request of France, together with eight other Council members. I also wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram, for their insightful briefings.There are times in the lives of nations where what is essential is at stake: life or death; peace or war; civilization or barbarism; the international order or chaos. That is the case today following the dreadful chemical carnage that once again pushed the boundaries of horror on Saturday in Douma. We are aware that two new and particularly serious chemical-weapons attacks took place in Douma on 7 April. The provisional toll of human life is appalling. There are nearly 50 dead, including a number of children, and 1,000 wounded. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 12/26 18-09955 That toll is likely to be even higher, as assistance cannot reach some areas. Once again, toxic substances have been dropped to asphyxiate, to kill and to terrorize civilians, reaching them even in the basements where they sought refuge. Chlorine gas has the particular characteristic of being a heavy gas, capable of entering basements. For that reason, it is used. That is the level of deadly cynicism that has been reached in Syria.There are no words to describe the horror of the images that surfaced on 7 April, nearly one year after the Khan Shaykhun attack, which killed nearly 80 people. What we see in the thousands of photos and videos that surfaced in the course of several hours after the 7 April attacks reminds us of the images we have seen far too often: children and adults suffocating due to exposure to concentrated chlorine gas. What we also see are people suffering from violent convulsions, excessive salivation and burning eyes, all of which are symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect. As I mentioned, in total more than 1,000 people were exposed to that deadly chemical compound.The experience and the successive reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism leave no room for doubt as to the perpetrators of this most recent attack. Only the Syrian armed forces and their agencies have the requisite knowledge to develop such sophisticated toxic substances with such a high degree of lethality. And only the Syrian armed forces and its agencies have a military interest in their use. This attack took place in Douma, an area that has been subjected to relentless shelling by the Syrian armed and air forces for several weeks. Unfortunately, the use of such weapons enables much swifter tactical progress than conventional weapons.We are all aware that the Syrian regime has already been identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as the party responsible for the use, on at least four occasions, of chlorine and sarin gas as a chemical weapon. There are no illusions as to the sincerity of the declaration delivered by Syria on the state of its chemical stockpiles in 2013. Unfortunately, we once again we have proof in the form of empirical evidence. This dovetails with the regime's strategy of terror against civilians. We have already experienced this. At the worst, this is bad faith or, even worse, complicity. The Damascus regime clearly seeks, by sowing terror, to accelerate the capture of other urban areas that it wishes to control. What could be more effective to prompt those who resist the regime to flee than sieges, a tactic worthy of the Middle Ages, in addition to chemical terror. Let us make no mistake: the children frozen in an agonizing death are not so-called collateral victims. They are deliberate targets of these chemical attacks, designed and planned for the purpose of waging terror. The Damascus regime is conducting State terrorism, with its litany of war crimes and even crimes against humanity.The offensive and the shelling conducted by the regime, as well as by its Russian and Iranian allies, over the past 48 hours prove the degree to which they have engaged in a military race without any consideration of the human cost. This latest escalation of violence, punctuated by a new instance of the use of chemical weapons, brings us face to face with the destructive madness of a diehard regime that seeks to destroy its people completely. And that regime's Russian and Iranian allies are either unable or unwilling to stop it. We are aware of the fact, and the Russian authorities have confirmed this on several occasions, that Russian military forces have a presence on the ground and in the air in eastern Ghouta. On 7 April, as the second chemical attack took place in Douma, Russian aircraft were also taking part in air operations in the Damascus region. Russian and Iranian military support is present on the ground and at all levels of the Syrian war machinery. No Syrian aircraft takes off without the Russian ally being informed. These attacks took place either with the tacit or explicit consent of Russia or despite its reluctance and military presence. I do not know which is more alarming when it comes to our collective security.The stakes revolving around this recent attack are extremely grave. This is the latest proof of the normalization of chemical weapons use, which we should attribute not only to a regime that has become uncontrollable and continues to gas civilians with complete impunity, but also to its supporters, including a permanent member of the Security Council. That member failed in its commitment to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which it, itself, co-sponsored. That member's responsibility in the endless tragedy that is the war in Syria is overwhelming.France therefore of course turns towards Russia today in order to put forward two demands. The first demand is a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire in Syria, in line with resolution 2401 (2018), adopted on 24 February, 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 13/26 which to date has never been upheld by the Damascus regime. France deeply deplores the fact that, although it was unanimously adopted, it was not possible to implement that resolution, which provides for a truce and emergency humanitarian access. The second demand is the establishment of a new international investigative mechanism that will be able to document all of the factors of the attack in Douma and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The end of the Joint Investigative Mechanism last November due to two successive Russian vetoes has stripped us of an essential tool of deterrence. For that reason, we support any initiative to bridge that gap. And in that spirit France has committed to a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons. In that same spirit, we endorse the draft resolution that has been put forward today by the United States.With this attack the Al-Assad regime is testing yet again the determination of the international community to ensure compliance with the prohibition against chemica-weapons use. Our response must be united, robust and implacable. That response must make it clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians will no longer be tolerated, and that those who flout that fundamental rule of our collective security will be held accountable and must face the consequences. The Al-Assad regime needs to hear an international response, and France stands ready to fully shoulder its role alongside its partners.Ultimately, we know that only an inclusive political solution will bring an end to the seven-year conflict, which has claimed the lives of 500,000 people and pushed millions to take the route of exile. That is why France will remain fully committed alongside the United Nations Special Envoy and in line with the Geneva process. However, in the light of this most recent carnage, we can no longer merely repeat words. Without being followed up by deeds, such words would be meaningless. I wish to reiterate here what President Macron has stressed on several occasions: France will assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. France's position is clear. It will uphold its commitments and keep its word.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and Mr. Markram for their briefings. I also thank all the United Nations teams on the ground for the important and incredibly difficult work they do.As Staffan de Mistura said, this is an important Security Council meeting. My Government shares the outrage that other colleagues have eloquently described today. It is truly horrific to think of victims and families sheltered underground when the chlorine found them.This is the third time in five days that the Council has convened to discuss chemical weapons. This is dreadful in the true sense of that word. The Council should dread what we risk happening — for chemical weapons to become a routine part of fighting. As one of the five permanent members of the Council (P-5), the United Kingdom believes that we have a particular responsibility to uphold the worldwide prohibition on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We agree with the Netherlands Ambassador that the P-5 has specific responsibilities. I believe that four members of the P-5 do believe that, but there is one that does not. The Russian Ambassador referred to a resurgence of the Cold War. This is not the Cold War. In the Cold War there was not this flagrant disregard for the prohibitions that are universal on the use of WMDs.The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also referred to the risks of escalation, and to international peace and security more broadly. We share his fears, but it is the Syrian Government and its backers, Iran and Russia, who are prolonging the fighting and risking regional and wider instability. There are real questions about what is happening in the T-4 airbase, with its foreign fighters and its mercenaries.We have been challenged today by our Russian colleague to say why we believe the attack was carried out by Syria and why we believe, further, that chemical weapons were used. The reasons are as follows. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism found six uses of chemical weapons between 2014 and 2017. Two it ascribed to Da'esh for the use of mustard gas, three it ascribed to the regime for the use of chlorine and one further use it ascribed to the Syrian regime for the use of sarin. That is the attacks that we talked about in the Council just last week at Khan Sheykhoun, which led to the United States strike — which we support — on Al-Shayrat. In addition, as the French Ambassador has said, we had reports of Russian and Syrian warnings before the chemical-weapon attack took place and of a pattern of Mi-8 Hip helicopters flying overhead. Those reports have come from the ground.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 14/26 18-09955 I listened carefully to the Russian Ambassador's argument. As I have just set out, we, as the United Kingdom believe that the Syrian regime is responsible for these latest attacks. But there is one way to settle this — to have an independent fact-finding mission followed by an independent investigation — as we all know that fact-finding missions are there to determine whether chemical weapons have been used and, if they have been used, what sort of chemical weapons. But only an investigation can determine who is responsible for their use, and therefore start the path to accountability.I was very interested to hear the Russian offer that an OPCW fact-finding mission could visit and would have the protection of Russian forces. I believe that this is an offer worth pursuing, but it would, of course, be necessary for the OPCW mission to have complete freedom of action and freedom of access. That still leaves us with the question of who committed these atrocities. That is why we support the United States text for a draft resolution and we believe that there is no legitimate reason not to support the call for the Council to set up an independent investigative mechanism. As I said before, we have nothing to hide, but it appears that Russia, Syria and their supporters, Iran, do have something to fear.The Russian Ambassador singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France for criticism. I would like, if I may, to turn to that. The responsibility for the cruelty in Syria belongs to Syria and its backers — Russia and Iran. The use of chemical weapons is an escalatory and diabolical act. It strikes me that what Russia is trying to do is to turn the debate in the Council away from the discussion of the use of chemical weapons into a dispute between East and West, presenting itself as the victim. It is far too important to play games with the politics between East and West in respect of chemical weapons. Russia's crocodile tears for the people of eastern Ghouta has an easy answer. It is to join us in the non-political attempt to get in humanitarian and protection workers from the United Nations to do their job of looking after and mitigating the risk to civilians. Russia's concern about attribution for the use of chemical weapons also has an easy answer. It is to join us in allowing the United Nations to set up an international investigative mechanism to pursue the responsible parties. I repeat here the two demands of my French colleague, and I hope we will be able to make progress.I had not intended to address the Skripal case in Salisbury, but since my Russian colleague has done so, I will address it today. He asked what the similarities were between Salisbury and Syria. I think it is important that I point out that the cases are different in the following respects. First, there is a thorough investigation under way in Salisbury. As we have heard, there is no investigation under way in Syria. The British Government in Salisbury is seeking to protect its people, as is its duty. The Syrian Government, on the contrary, as we have heard today, attacks and gasses its people. I am sorry to say that what the two do have in common though, is Russia's refusal to assume P-5 responsibilities to prevent the use of WMDs and its reckless support for the use of WMDs by its agents and by its allies.It is not we who want to alienate Russia. It alienates herself by not joining in the vast majority of the Council who wish to find a non-polemical way through and to address the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The Russian Ambassador mentioned friends of the United States. My Government and its people are proud to be a friend of the United States. We stand with everyone on the Council who wants to find a way through the chemical weapons problem, to have a proper fact-finding mission and to have a proper investigation as the first step to bringing this dreadful conflict to a close.Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Envoy de Mistura and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Markram, for their briefings. China takes note of the reports alleging that chemical weapons were once again used in Syria and caused civilian casualties. That is of great concern to China.China's position on chemical-weapons has been consistent and clear. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstances. Any use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever, must not be tolerated. China supports a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation of the incident concerned so that it can reach a conclusion based on substantiated evidence that can stand the test of history and facts so that the perpetrators and responsible parties can be brought to justice.The Syrian chemical-weapons issue is closely linked to to a political settlement of the Syrian situation. China 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 15/26 supports the ongoing important role of the Security Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the main channels for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapons issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take a constructive approach so as to seek a solution through consultations, establish the facts, prevent any further use of chemical weapons, preserve the unity of the Security Council and cooperate with the efforts by the parties concerned to advance the political process in Syria.The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and is inflicting tremendous suffering on the Syrian people. A political settlement is the only solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must remain committed to a political settlement of the question of Syria, while fully respecting its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.China has always opposed the use or threat of force in international affairs. We always advocate adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. All parties should increase their support for the United Nations mediation efforts and compel the parties in Syria to seek a political settlement under the principle of Syrian leadership and ownership in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).The fight against terrorism is an important and urgent issue in the political settlement of the Syrian question. The international community must strengthen its coordination, uphold uniform standards and combat all terrorist groups identified as such by the Security Council.At a recent Security Council meeting, China set out its principled position with regard to the Skripal incident (see S/PV.8224). China believes that the parties concerned should strictly comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention, carry out a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation and deal with the issues concerned within the framework of the OPCW. China hopes that the parties concerned will work in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and equality, engage in consultations, cooperate, avoid politicization and measures that might further exacerbate tensions and resolve their differences properly through dialogue.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings this afternoon. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for acceding to our request for an emergency meeting.We are dismayed by the general escalation of violence in Syria, as described today by Staffan de Mistura, in clear violation of the various resolutions, including resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I want to plea with the Syrian authorities represented in the Chamber and with the Astana guarantors to live up to the Security Council's resolutions.We asked for this meeting today because over the weekend we were yet again faced with horrifying allegations of chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, this time in Douma, just outside Damascus. There are worrying reports of a large number of civilian casualties, including women and children. The graphic material that has been shared is beyond repugnant. We are alarmed by those extremely serious allegations. There must now be an immediate, independent and thorough investigation.Let me reiterate that Sweden supports all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in armed conflict is always prohibited and amounts to a war crime. Those responsible must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria has become a central test of the credibility of the Council. How we respond to the most recent reports from Douma is therefore decisive. Despite the odds, we must put aside our differences and come together. Now is the time to show unity. In our view, the following needs to happen.First, we must condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria.Secondly, our immediate priority must be to investigate the worrying reports from Douma. In that context, we welcome the announcement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Fact-finding Mission for Syria — to which we reiterate our full support — is in the process of gathering information from all available sources. We express our hope that the Fact-finding Mission can be urgently deployed to Syria.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 16/26 18-09955 Thirdly, all States, as well as the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, must fully cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission. What is particularly needed is safe and unhindered access to the site in Douma, as well as any information and evidence deemed relevant by the Fact-finding Mission to conduct its independent investigation.Fourthly, we need to urgently redouble our efforts in the Council to agree on a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism to identify those responsible for chemical-weapons use.Finally, if the allegations of chemical-weapons use are indeed confirmed and those responsible are eventually identified, the perpetrators must be held to account.We are ready to work actively and constructively with other members for urgent Council action. To that end, we have circulated elements as input to our discussions. We must immediately engage in consultations in order to break the current deadlock and to shoulder our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. We owe that to the many victims of the crimes committed in this conflict.Mr. Radomski (Poland): Allow me to thank Special Envoy Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Mr. Thomas Markham for their important briefings.We are horrified by the news of another deadly attack in eastern Ghouta, which took place on Saturday evening. Dozens of people perished as a result of a vicious act of violence against civilians in Douma. The available information about the symptoms of the victims affirm that they are consistent with those caused by a chemical agent.Poland condemns that barbaric attack, and expects that it will be possible to hold the perpetrators accountable. No military or political goal can justify the extermination of innocent vulnerable people, especially those seeking help in medical facilities. That atrocious crime seems to be a cynical response to the debates in the Council last week, when we commemorated the first anniversary of the attack in Khan Shaykun (see S/PV.8221).We call on the actors affecting the situation in Syria, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take all the necessary actions to prevent any further use of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve the full cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Syria. We insist that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.As has been stated many times by members of the Council, as well as United Nations officials and European Union representatives, it is highly regrettable that the renewal of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was vetoed, thereby allowing those responsible for the subsequent chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Today we face the results of that impunity, witnessing further attacks against civilians with the use of chemicals as weapons.We urge all our partners in the Council to engage in a serious discussion in good faith in order to re-establish an accountability mechanism for chemical attacks in Syria. That is the minimum that we owe the victims of Ghouta, Khan Shaykun, Al-Lataminah and the numerous other places where chemical weapons have been used.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to thank Special Envoy De Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings.Reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on Saturday and the videos and pictures that we saw through media outlets are indeed very worrisome. It is also deeply disturbing that such reports of the use of chemical weapons have continued in the ongoing military activities in Syria. As we have repeatedly stated, we strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons by any actor under any circumstances. There is no justification whatsoever for the use of chemical weapons. Those responsible for these inhuman acts must be identified and held accountable. This is absolutely vital, not only for the sake of the victims of chemical weapons in Syria but also for maintaining international peace and security and for preserving the non-proliferation architecture.As the Secretary-General said in his 8 April statement, cited by the Special Envoy earlier, any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation. That includes the need to establish accountability — something on which the Council has yet to achieve consensus. In the meantime, we believe the reported use of chemical weapons in Douma, and in other parts of Syria, should be investigated by the Fact-finding Mission, and all parties should extend full cooperation in that 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 17/26 regard, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.While we all agree that accountability is indispensable for deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and beyond, there is currently, as has already be said, no independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify those individuals, entities, State or non-State actors that use chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Council should recover its unity and engage in a positive and constructive discussion that could address the existing institutional lacunae.We all know that the threats to international peace and security we face today are becoming increasingly more complex by the day. We are seeing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is posing a real danger and that the international norms on the use of chemical weapons are also being undermined. Since the end of the Cold War, the trust among major Powers has never been so low as it is currently, which has enormous implications not only for global peace and security but also for the transformative agenda that we have set for ourselves in the development sphere. We cannot think of making any meaningful headway towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals without creating the necessary global security environment. At the moment, we really cannot say that this is an environment conducive to making any progress on that account.The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, it has not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security that we are facing today. It has been all the more apparent that the lack of unity and cohesion among members is undermining the credibility of the Council. Perhaps we, the elected members, have to look for ways and means to have a greater impact, with a view to contributing to increasing the Council's effectiveness. Without dialogue among the major Powers to build the necessary trust and understanding, it will be extremely difficult to address some of the most difficult and complex security challenges we have ever seen, including the situation in Syria.Things are in fact bound to get even worse unless something is done. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand. The dangers are very palpable. That is why every opportunity should be seized. That is also why we consider the news about the upcoming summit-level meetings being planned to be encouraging. We can only hope that those meetings will help to defuse tensions and allow for serious discussions to take place with a view to finding a common approach to tackling current threats and challenges. The sooner those discussions happen, the better for preserving global peace and stability, which, as we speak, is becoming a source of extremely great concern. In fact, I am understating the magnitude of the potential danger we are facing.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The Ivorian delegation thanks Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their respective briefings on the latest developments in Syria, after the resumption of fighting in Douma and eastern Ghouta and the bombing of the city of Damascus, following the relative calm of recent weeks. My delegation would like to focus its statement on three main points.First, we remain deeply concerned about recent reports of chemical-weapons attacks against innocent civilian populations, which have reportedly resulted in numerous casualties who have shown symptoms of exposure to a chemical agent. While reaffirming its categorical rejection of any use or resort to chemical weapons, be it in times of peace or in times of war, Côte d'Ivoire strongly condemns such acts and calls for these events to be placed under an intense spotlight, with the contribution of all stakeholders.In the face of allegations of recurrent use of chemical weapons by the warring parties in the Syrian conflict, the Ivorian delegation stresses that it is more important than ever that the international community send a strong signal to show, beyond the usual principled condemnations, its determination to put a definitive end to this infernal cycle.The use of chemical weapons violates the most fundamental norms of international law and poses threats to our collective security. That is why we must engage in a unflagging fight against impunity in the use of chemical weapons and preserving the international chemical non-proliferation regime, which is one of the fundamental pillars of our common security.My second point concerns the need for the international community to put in place a mechanism for accountability and for the fight against impunity for those who use chemical weapons, in order to put an end to the repeated use of these weapons. In that regard, the Ivorian delegation expresses its readiness to work S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 18/26 18-09955 towards the establishment of such a mechanism and calls on the Council to return to the unity it had when it established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, whose mandate unfortunately could not be renewed despite our common efforts.Thirdly, Côte d'Ivoire notes with regret that resolution 2401 (2018), which remains the framework for our joint action, has not been implemented and that the humanitarian situation in Syria has further deteriorated. In the light of the distress of the civilian populations trapped in the fighting, the urgency for a cessation of hostilities remains more relevant than ever. In the face of the deteriorating situation, my country would like once again to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and to respect international humanitarian law, including unhindered humanitarian access to persons in distress, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018).In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that the solution to the crisis in Syria cannot be military. Only an inclusive political process can put a definitive end to this conflict. Such a political solution must be in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and imbued with the results of the Geneva negotiations. My country believes that the Geneva talks remain the right framework for achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram and their respective teams for their exhaustive briefings.The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its gratitude to the French Republic and to the other members of the Council that called for the convening of this afternoon's meeting. We also thank the President of the Security Council for having decided to hold this afternoon's meeting under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security: The situation in the Middle East". This is an appropriate topic, since recent events in the Middle East represent a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but at the international level as well. From the protests in the Gaza Strip, with their loss of human lives, to the missile attacks on Syria, as well as the horrendous chemical weapons attack in the Syrian town of Douma, those are all situations of deep concern for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.This past weekend we awoke to news that added a new low to the saddest and bloodiest episodes of the Syrian conflict. According to reports published in the international media, on 7 April, in the Syrian town of Douma in eastern Ghouta, more than 40 people, mostly women and girls, died from asphyxiation caused by inhaling a poison gas.As we heard in this Chamber on 4 April from the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram (see S/PV.8221), the conclusions and recommendations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are not binding and do not attribute responsibilities in the case of evidence of the use of chemical substances prohibited under the relevant international treaties. In the light of that fact, we take this opportunity to recall the obligation of all parties to take essential steps towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), and we underscore the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism of the United Nations whose task should be focused on preventing impunity, identifying those responsible and preventing future attacks to the best of its abilities.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, no use of chemical weapons should go uninvestigated or unpunished. As a result, the alarming information coming out of Syria, especially that pertaining to the use of chemical weapons targeting civilians, both the case of Douma, which we are discussing today, as well as similar events in the past, must be investigated exhaustively, fairly, objectively and independently by international bodies in accordance with OPCW standards. The results of such investigations must be made public and those responsible must answer for their crimes before the implacable face of justice.The fact that chemical substances continue to be used, especially against civilians, is cause for serious concern to the Government of Equatorial Guinea. During the general debate of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, condemned in the strongest terms the use, manufacture, possession and distribution of chemical weapons in armed conflicts (see A/72/PV.13). It is worth recalling that no member of the Council should be considered exempt from that obligation, which also reflects Chapter I of the Charter of the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 19/26 United Nations, which enshrines the determination of Member States to build a world of peace and ensure the well-being of humankind.The Security Council now finds itself at a crossroads with respect to its options. It can either strengthen the presence of international forces with a view to future military intervention, as some military Powers have been suggesting, or we can pursue international negotiations, be they in Geneva, Astana, Sochi or Ankara. However, history continues to teach us that military interventionism has never resolved conflicts; rather, it exacerbates and entrenches them, sowing desolation and ruin in its wake.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, the only solution to the Syrian conflict is to be found in the words spoken yesterday by Pope Francis in the traditional Sunday mass in Saint Peter's Square in the Vatican:"There is no such thing as a good war and a bad war. Nothing, but nothing, can justify the use of such instruments of extermination on defenseless people and populations . military and political leaders choose another path, that of negotiations, which is the only one that can bring about peace and not death and destruction."In conclusion, we reiterate the appeal made by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the countries and actors with influence in Syria, as well as in Israel and Palestine, to wield that influence in order to force all parties involved in those conflicts to mitigate the suffering of their people and to sit down to negotiate to put an end to that chronic threat to international peace and security which persists in the Middle East.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Thomas Markram, for their briefings. We express our gratitude to Council members for initiating this emergency meeting, which we hope will lead to the launching of a timely and objective investigation of the incident in Douma.We firmly believe that the Security Council remains the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the situation within the Council is becoming increasingly strained. In order to achieve an appropriate solution to these critical issues, it is of utmost importance that the Council act unanimously, in a balanced and pragmatic manner. To that end, we must demonstrate greater flexibility and negotiability, rising above our national interests in order to achieve peace and stability. Any controversy that involves prejudices and mutual accusations and lacks conclusive results and irrefutable evidence will have only a destructive effect and will not lead to the results that the world community expects from us.With regard to the chemical attacks in Syria, we mourn together with the families of those killed and express our solidarity with them in the face of such atrocities, by which innocent civilians become victims of the relentless confrontation of the opposing parties. Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stand, uncompromisingly condemning any use of chemical weapons as the most heinous action and an unacceptable war crime.With regard to the situation in Douma, we call for an investigation into this alleged incident to be carried out and for all the circumstances to be clarified as soon as possible. The Council has the great responsibility to act on verifiable facts, not only before the world community, but before ourselves. Furthermore, history itself will ultimately be the judge of our decisions. Therefore, we need to verify all the details of the incident. In that regard, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.First, are there any other reliable sources, in addition to White Helmets' claims, and who can verify the veracity of the assessments and testimonies of those sources? Some claim that the number of victims is 70, while others report that there were more than 150 victims and still others believe there were only 25 victims. Even one victim is too many. However, today, the Russian Federation denied the attack altogether. There are many allegations and assumptions regarding the very facts concerning the use of a toxic chemical substance.Secondly, we consider it important to take into account the fact that the Government of Syria has repeatedly notified us and requested that we check its reports that a number of terrorist groups on the side of the opposition were making attempts to transfer chemical weapons and prepare chemical attacks on the territory of eastern Ghouta. Actually, these allegations have not been given due attention and we have had no opportunity to verify all the facts. We are not advocating for any side in this conflict, but rather demanding a full S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 20/26 18-09955 and objective investigation on the basis of which we can make a thoughtful decision.Thirdly, we believe that it is imperative to conduct an independent investigation. We again recall the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, the establishment of which depends on the permanent members of the Council. They must make every possible effort to find common ground on the issue. We urgently need objective and verifiable information, as well as an immediate, independent, transparent and unbiased investigation before any decision or action, unilateral or otherwise, is taken.We fully support the proposal that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission be sent at the earliest. We are certain that the Syrian people are very interested in an objective investigation. Therefore, Damascus and opposing parties should provide all assistance and secure access for the speedy visit of the OPCW inspectors to the incident sites to collect facts on the ground.Finally, we again call for the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the Council to reach a consensus-based decision to preserve peace and stability in the world.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank you, Mr. President, for the prompt convening of today's meeting. We were one of the countries that requested it.We also thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.Since the beginning of this year, the State of Kuwait has occupied the Arab seat in the Security Council. One of our most important priorities, which we made clear before we joined it, is to defend and uphold Arab issues, voice the concerns about them and work to find peaceful solutions. We deeply deplore the lack of any real and genuine progress on any of these issues, in particular that of the Syrian crisis, which regrettably continues to deteriorate. Security Council resolutions on such issues are not implemented. The Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is unable to shoulder that responsibility. It is divided as it faces those dangers and threats. Therefore the crises continue, along with the suffering of the people in the region.The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest terms the heinous rocket and barrel bomb attacks against residential areas under siege in eastern Ghouta, including the latest attack on Douma, on 7 April. Five days ago we marked the first anniversary of the Khan Shaykhun incident (see S/PV.8221), in which chemical weapons were used, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also identified who used them.Two days ago, scores of civilians, including children and women, were killed or injured in attacks and air strikes against Douma. Many cases of asphyxiation were recorded. Several international reports confirmed that the crimes committed in both incidents were tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, which reminds us once again of the request we all made in the Chamber for the establishment of a new mechanism to determine whether or not and by whom chemical weapons had been used, and to hold the perpetrators in Syria accountable. The mechanism must guarantee impartial, transparent and professional investigations in all chemical attacks in Syria in order to end impunity. For the past five years — specifically, since August 2013 — the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria have enjoyed impunity. They have not been punished, even when we witnessed the very first crime of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta.We do not want to mark the first anniversary of the attack in Douma without a conviction. We call for the Council to establish an accountability mechanism that would determine the perpetrators of the chemical-weapons crimes anywhere in Syria — be they a Government, entity, group or individual — so that they can be held accountable in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013). The Council must shoulder its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in Syria is a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime. The continued attacks against civilians in medical facilities and residential areas, through air strikes or artillery, are all flagrant violations of the international community's will and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, at the very least, without delay.09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 21/26 The provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) are clear and definite. They call for accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, current events are a clear violation of the provisions of the resolution. As members of the Council, we cannot accept the status quo, which is the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is another disappointment for the Syrian people, whose suffering caused by the use of such weapons in different parts of Syria we have been unable to end.The Council has a collective responsibility. The suffering Syrian people are sick and tired of tuning into meetings of the Council without seeing tangible results on the ground. At several junctures throughout this bloody conflict the Council has been able to find common ground to end the crisis. However, we must overcome our political differences and establish a new accountability mechanism in Syria that is professional, credible and impartial. Such elements are available in the draft resolution under discussion, which has been put forward by the United States. It includes updates on the incident in Douma. We call on all members of the Council to build on that draft as a good basis for negotiations on a future mechanism.We continue to seek a political solution as the only means to end the crisis in all its dimensions. The political road map is clear and agreed, based on the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and on resolution 2254 (2015). It seeks to maintain the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria and meet the legitimate aspirations and ambitions of the Syrian people towards living a dignified life.Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma. Bolivia reiterates its condemnation of the use of chemical agents as weapons and considers it to be an unjustifiable criminal act. There can be no justification for their use, regardless of the circumstances or by whom they are used, as it constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to international peace and security.We believe that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, in line with its mandate, should verify in the most objective, methodological and technical manner the reported use of chemical weapons. Should their use be verified, it must be investigated in an effective and transparent manner in order to ensure that the perpetrators can be identified and tried by the appropriate bodies so as to prevent impunity. We therefore need an independent, impartial and representative entity that will conduct a comprehensive, credible and conclusive investigation. Our major challenge is to ensure that we do not politicize or exploit the Security Council for our own purposes. We regret that so far there have been obstacles to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on all the parties involved to make every effort to effectively implement it throughout Syrian territory. We emphatically reject the ongoing bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, especially those on civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, and we deplore all military activity in residential areas. Such actions only cause more displacements, injuries and deaths. We call on all the parties to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, including authorizing humanitarian access throughout Syria and to all persons in need, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that the only option is an inclusive, negotiated and coordinated political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, aimed at enabling sustainable peace to be achieved in the area without any foreign pressure, as provided for in resolution 2254 (2015). We also reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria.Bolivia wants to once again make clear its firm rejection of the use of force or the threat of use of force. We also reject unilateral actions, which are illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and undermine any effort to achieve a political solution.Lastly, with regard to the events in the city of Salisbury, we reiterate the importance of conducting an independent, transparent and depoliticized investigation in accordance with current rules and regulations of international law, especially as set forth by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 22/26 18-09955 We believe that cooperation among the relevant parties will be essential to making progress through the appropriate diplomatic channels in solving the crime and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings. Peru is deeply concerned about the new reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, including minors, in the town of Douma. In that regard, we note the urgent need for a thorough investigation. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons wherever it may take place. We want to point out that it is a heinous crime, a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and a violation both of the non-proliferation regime and international humanitarian law.In the short term, we believe that the Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict, including countries with influence on the ground, should abide by and implement the humanitarian ceasefire that the Council provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and to cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. To that end, we once again reiterate the importance of establishing an independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The investigations should result in the prosecution and punishment of those responsible. The members of the Council cannot permit impunity.We must also remember that any response to the conflict in Syria and the atrocities committed there must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Peru opposes any use or threat of use of force contrary to international law. We reiterate our deep concern about the serious consequences that the ongoing atrocities in the Syrian conflict may have for the stability of the Middle East and for an international order based on minimum standards of humanity and coexistence. In that regard, I would like to conclude by calling on the members of the Council to restore a sense of unity and the common good to our discharge of our high responsibilities. In the case of Syria, that means implementing the ceasefire and ensuring the effective protection of civilians, investigating and punishing atrocity crimes and resuming a serious process of political dialogue, based on resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), with a view to promoting the sustainable peace that the Syrian people so badly need.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like my Dutch colleague and friend, I too have three points to make.I would first like to respectfully request of my colleague Mrs. Nikki Haley, Permanent Representative of the United States, that from now on she refrain from labelling any legitimate Governments as "regimes". Right now I am referring specifically to Russia. I have made that request once before, but Ambassador Haley was not present, and I asked for it to be conveyed to her by her colleagues. Now I am requesting it personally. If it happens again, I will interrupt the meeting on a point of order.Secondly, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said that Syria is different from Salisbury in that there no investigation is being conducted in Syria, while one is under way in Salisbury. We would very much like to know more about the details of that investigation and would be grateful if she could communicate them to us. However, for the time being we know nothing other than that all of a sudden the alleged victims of a chemical warfare agent, thankfully, turn out to be alive and, apparently, almost completely well. However, nobody has seen them yet, and we fear for the condition of those important witnesses. At the moment, we have learned from newspaper reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has offered to shelter the Skripals in the United States under new identities. The CIA's participation in this is itself revealing. But it also means that we may never see these people, who are key witnesses to what happened, again.What else do we know? We know about the speedy euthanization of the Skripals' pets and the cremation of the cat and dead guinea pigs. We are also aware of the intention to demolish their house and the restaurant and pub they visited. We also know that Yulia Skripal's sister, Viktoria, who wanted to see her, was denied a British visa. Why? That is all we know. I repeat that we would very much like to learn more details about what is going on, and we would be grateful to our British 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 23/26 colleagues if they could keep us regularly informed during the investigation.Thirdly, and lastly, we did not meet here today to address the situation in Douma. The agenda item is entitled "Threats to international peace and security", although, needless to say, it was the situation regarding Douma and the so-called chemical attack that prompted the meeting. In today's meeting, as Mr. De Mistura mentioned and the Secretary-General has previously discussed, we are moving towards a dangerous area. Unfortunately, the people who are playing these dangerous games and spewing irresponsible threats do not understand that. Today we heard once again what we have already heard many times. None of our Western colleagues want to hear or listen to objective information. None of them has expressed any doubts about the one and only version that has been given of what transpired. So what is the point of an investigation? Why bother? They have accused Damascus of a chemical-weapon attack not just before any investigation has been carried out but before the incident was even known about.They are not convinced by the information that we have provided today. They simply do not want to listen. We have already said that there are no witnesses to the use of chemical weapons at all. There are no traces of chemicals, no bodies, no injuries, no poisoning victims. Nobody went to the hospital. The footage was all clearly staged by the White Helmets. We demand that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission immediately visit Douma and the area of the alleged chemical weapons attack, interview the residents and medical staff and and collect soil samples. My British colleague said that only an investigation can establish who is to blame. We agree, except that did not stop her from blaming the so-called Syrian regime. Those two things do not really jibe. We insist that the OPCW mission visit Douma immediately. The Syrian authorities and Russian troops are ready to provide the necessary conditions for this to take place.Lastly, we too wish there were an independent investigative mechanism. I would like to remind the Council that our draft resolution, which includes a proposal for establishing such a mechanism, is in blue, and we are ready to adopt it today, if necessary.The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I apologize for taking the floor again, but I want to clarify something. The Russian Ambassador's English is far too good for him not to have understood me when I spoke on 5 April (see S/PV.8224). The investigation of the Salisbury incident that is under way is an independent police investigation, and the United Kingdom will be very pleased to update the Council as and when we have something to say.If I may, I would like to add one more thing. The other difference between Salisbury and Syria is that the United Kingdom is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in good standing, and the Syrian Government has not complied with its obligations as certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The American representative said that Russia spends its resources to support what she calls the regime in Syria. My question to her is: What does the United States spend its resources on in Syria? Does it spend its resources providing milk and medicine to Syrian children, or on providing weapons and munitions to its terrorist groups, which have committed the most heinous crimes against the Syrian people? Or is it spending resources on the its alliance's aircraft, which have wreaked destruction in many places in Syria, particularly in the city of Raqqa? What about the continuous threats that are made against my country at nearly every meeting of the Security Council on this issue? Does she acknowledge that her Administration has no respect for the Security Council, this international Organization or the principles of international law?Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the United States Ambassador said. I ask members to note that I do not refer to the American Administration as the "American regime" because that would be legally shameful in this Chamber. Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the American Ambassador said when she asked the Security Council to act in order to achieve justice in Syria. Well, my test is to request that her Administration and her country allow the disclosure of the results of the United Nations Special Commission that investigated the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq for 18 years. The Commission was headed for some time by a Swede, Mr. Hans Blix.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 24/26 18-09955 As Council members know, after 18 years of investigation the Commission found no chemical weapons in Iraq. Nor did they find Coca-Cola or Pepsi Cola. Nevertheless, in a semi-confidential meeting towards the end of 2008, the Security Council decided to end the Commission's work and bury its archives in iron boxes. I repeat — it decided to bury its archives in iron boxes. Only the Secretary-General knows the code that opens those boxes. There was one condition, which was that the boxes could not be opened for 60 years. What is so shameful in those archives? Why did they have to be buried in boxes that cannot be opened for 60 years? That question is directed to the American Ambassador.The Government of my country condemns in the strongest terms the ruthless Israeli aggression that took place this morning on the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate, in which a number of civilians were killed and injured. It was a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and of various Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, and would not have occurred were it not for the American Administration's unlimited and consistent support for Israel. The American Administration guarantees Israel immunity so that it will not be held accountable in the Council. That allows Israel to continue to practice State terrorism and to threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. Of course, Western countries did not even mention the Israeli aggression in their statements today, which shows that the Governments of their countries are complicit in it and are covering for it. Unfortunately, my dear friend Mr. De Mistura did not hear Netanyahu say this morning that it was Israel that launched the attack. That is why I was surprised when he said that the United Nations has not been able to verify the identity of its perpetrators. If Netanyahu himself says that he launched this aggression, why does Mr. De Mistura not refer to Israel as the aggressor?This Israeli aggression is an indirect response to the successes of the Syrian Arab Army in expelling armed terrorist groups from the suburbs of Damascus, its rural area and other Syrian territory. Those groups have been killing the Syrian people, kidnapping civilians, detaining them and using them as human shields. They targeted Damascus alone with 3,000 missiles over the course of three months, killing 155 martyrs and injuring 865 civilians, most of them women and children. The Syrian Government underscores that the repeated Israeli aggression did not and will not protect Israeli agents operating within terrorist groups, nor will it divert the attention of the Syrian Army from its decisive military achievements in combating terrorism.The American anti-racism activist Martin Luther King Jr. said that "a lie is like a snowball: the further you roll it the bigger it becomes". It would seem that this wise saying holds true at any time and at any place. The Governments of some countries lie incessantly. Fortunately, though, they have not quite perfected the details of their web of lies, much like the famous Baron Munchausen of German literature. How many roosters truly believe that sunrise is the result of crowing?Some permanent members have become professional liars, and that in itself is a weapon of mass destruction. Through their lies, Palestine was stolen. The lies of these countries fuelled the war in the Korean peninsula. Through their lies, they invaded Viet Nam. Through their lies, they invaded Grenada. Through their lies, they destroyed Yugoslavia. Through their lies, they occupied Iraq. Through their lies, they destroyed Libya. Through their lies, they created takfiri terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam — and the list goes on and on. Through their lies, the same countries are trying to defeat Syria and prepare the ground for an assault today.It is worth noting that the today's negative statement of the United States representative is in absolute contradiction with a statement made by United States Secretary of Defence General Mattis in an interview with Newsweek two days ago with journalist Ian Wilkie. Mr. Wilkie used the following title for the interview: "Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People." That was said by the American Defence Secretary, not the Syrian Defence Minister. What a harmonious Administration!On 10 December 2012, some six years ago, we submitted a formal letter to the Council (S/2012/917), before the operators of terrorist groups claimed, for the first time, that sarin gas was used in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013. We informed the Council that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had launched a campaign of allegations claiming that the Syrian Government may have used chemical weapons. Back then, we warned that such allegations would encourage Governments that sponsor terrorists to provide chemical weapons to armed terrorist groups and then claim that the Syrian Government had used such weapons. What happened in the past few years 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 25/26 in Khan Al-Assal, Ghouta, Kafr Zita, Lataminah, Tal Minis, Khan Shaykhun and many other villages and towns in Syria confirms unequivocally what we had warned of five to six years ago, and during all these six years.The United States, the United Kingdom and France have been extremely eager to hold one meeting after another based on fabricated information. That is part of the deep crisis that we are witnessing. They want to involve other Council members in that crisis. Since 2013, those three countries have created a big elephant of lies and deceit in the Security Council. That elephant is living in the Chamber today and is stomping on the credibility of the Council with its huge feet. It seems that these countries called for the holding of today's meeting to support terrorists and to obstruct the agreement reached about Douma.However, those countries were a bit late because the terrorists had hoped this meeting would be held before they were forced to reach an agreement with the Syrian State to leave their strongholds and hand over their weapons. These countries were late in fulfilling their promises to the terrorists. It would have been better not to repeat their nasty story and not to rely on false reports from mercenaries — so-called White Helmets, founded by British intelligence officer James Le Mesurier. He is British, but his name is French. What proves that these countries were lying is that the residents of Douma left the city safely — 170,000 civilians left the city safely. Those terrorists chose to reach an agreement with the Syrian State as a last resort for them and their families. Many buses are transferring them and their families to the city of Jarabulus, after they refused to settle their affairs and chose to go there. However, the vast majority of residents chose to stay in their houses and resort to the Syrian State.It has been proven that the allegations of certain States, including some States members of the Council, on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta were lies, just as we saw in Aleppo and other places. As it turned out, terrorist group warehouses were full of medication and food, monopolized by their elements who sold some of those items to civilians at exorbitant prices. At this point, I must ask: Did the three countries call for this meeting in order to legitimize the Israeli aggression that occurred this morning or to impede the implementation of the agreement reached with their terrorist tools?In this context, I must thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for recognizing the true nature of what these countries were preparing for, and aptly called for the meeting to be held under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security". That is the correct agenda item.We have conveyed to the Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and what used to be called the Joint Investigative Mechanism 145 letters, the latest on 1 April 2018. I thank the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan for pointing out that the Council members do not read and that the Council does not respond to those letters. The letters contain accurate information. They indicate that armed terrorist groups possess toxic chemical substances, notably chlorine and sarin. We have warned time and again that those groups were preparing to commit crimes involving chemical weapons against innocent Syrians, and were working with the White Helmets to fabricate evidence, photograph locations and film Hollywood-like scenes with everything staged in order to blame the Syrian Government and influence public opinion against Syria and its allies. Those countries call for the holding of meetings such as this in order to create a pretext that would justify any military aggression against Syria.It seems that the directors of that terrorist scene failed to perfect their web of lies. We note that in each of those theatrical scenes on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government, the substances never seem to affect the armed elements, but only women and children. These chemical weapons seem to discriminate against women and children and do not affect armed men. It suffices to wash away these chemicals with water in front of the camera. Water appears to heal everything. Rescue workers never need to wear protective masks. The Syrian Arab Army does not use these substances because it does not possess them to begin with. The Americans destroyed them on the vessel MV Cape Ray in the Mediterranean. So, the Syrian Arab Army uses these substances, which it does not possess, only when it is making military progress. How strange that is!This vehement campaign lacks the minimum standards of credibility. It relies on fabricated information on social media by elements of armed terrorist groups and their operators. I announce from this table that the Syrian Government is fully prepared to facilitate an OPCW fact-finding mission to Douma, S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 26/26 18-09955 where the incident is alleged to have occurred, as soon as possible to investigate and verify these allegations. We endorse the Russian proposal to hear a briefing on the fact-finding mission's report after its visit to Al-Raqqa. We welcome this visit as soon as possible.I hope that this offer does not suffer the same fate as the first offer we made to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the Khan Al-Assal incident of chemical substance use in March 2013. At that time, we asked the Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Syrian Government in immediately investigating what happened in the town of Khan Al-Assal. It took the United Nations four months and 11 days to send Mr. Sellström, as Council members recall. Yes, it took the United Nations four months and 11 days. That is how the United Nations interpreted the term "immediately" — four months and 11 days. When Mr. Sellström arrived in Damascus to investigate what had happened in Khan Al-Assal, terrorists in Ghouta were instructed to use chemical substances again. Mr. Sellström therefore left Khan Al-Assal and moved to Ghouta. Council members should be aware that since March 2013, investigations into what happened in Khan Al-Assal have not taken place.Today, we directly accuse Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha and Ankara of providing Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and scores of other affiliated terrorist groups with toxic chemical substances to be used against Syrian civilians. We accuse them of inciting those massacres and of fabricating evidence to falsely blame the Syrian Government for the use of toxic chemical substances in order to prepare the ground for an aggression against my country, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did in Iraq in 2003.Yes, we say to the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in Syria and Iraq, we eliminated the vast majority of Da'esh elements within three years — not within 30 years, as President Obama has said. Those States have plans to justify undermining the stability of the region. Yes, we say to Saudi Arabia today that we cut off its terrorist tentacles — the gangs of Jaysh Al-Islam — in eastern Ghouta. Yes, we say to Qatar and Turkey that we cut off their terrorist tentacles — the gangs of the Al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman — in eastern Ghouta. I say to all those who sent moderate, armed, genetically modified opposition fighters to our land that we eliminated these toxic exports. We call on those exporters to bear the consequences of their actions, as some surviving elements will return to their original countries.The issue is very simple. Let me just say that on our borders with Turkey and in the separation zone in the Golan with Israel, there are tens of thousands of good, moderate terrorists with their light weapons, long beards, black banners and white helmets. Whoever wants to adopt them should submit an application to their operators. They are ready to go to Europe and the West as refugees.In conclusion, the Syrian Arab Republic stresses once again that it does not possess chemical weapons of any type, including chlorine. We condemn anew the use of chemical weapons at anytime, anywhere and in any circumstances. My country, Syria, reaffirms its readiness to cooperate fully with the OPCW in fulfilling its commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.The Russian Centre for Reconciliation in Syria announced today that Russian military experts have carried out investigations in Douma and confirmed that they have found no sign of the use of chemical weapons there. While treating the sick in the hospitals of Douma, Russian doctors have proven that these patients have not been subjected to any chemical substance. What we were seeing there was nothing but Hollywood-style scenes.The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.