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Climate change is now well recognized as a potentially significant factor in the human future, affecting ecological systems, agriculture, health, and settlement patterns. The scientific consensus, periodically assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, foresees a long‐term atmospheric warming of a few degrees over a century. The accumulating knowledge of the world's climate history, however, suggests that any implied stability of trend may be illusory. The evidence comes from ice and seabed cores and tree rings, which can yield year‐by‐year information on atmospheric conditions and time‐series of mean temperatures extending back for millennia. These data show many episodes of a sudden rise or fall in temperature in particular regions, sometimes of 10°C or more in ten years, with the new mean lasting for decades or centuries. There is thus the likelihood—even the inevitability—of comparably large and abrupt changes occurring in coming years, a very different prospect from the "greenhouse warming" scenario projected by current large‐scale climate models. Moreover, the two phenomena may be connected: a continued slow temperature rise may at some point trigger an abrupt shift in climate regime through mechanisms such as the effect on ocean circulation. In 2002 a committee set up by the US National Research Council reviewed what is known about this subject in a report, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises (Washington, DC: National Academy Press). The Council is the operating arm of the US National Academy of Sciences; the Committee on Abrupt Climate Change comprised mostly oceanographers and climate experts and was chaired by Richard B. Alley, Professor of Geosciences, Pennsylvania State University, a glaciologist and author of The Two‐Mile Time Machine: Ice Cores, Abrupt Climate Change, and Our Future (Princeton, 2000).A recent spate of media attention to the subject has been occasioned less by the NRC report itself than by a dramatic scenario exercise derived from it, prepared under US Defense Department auspices, and by release of a disaster film with an instant‐ice‐age theme. The Pentagon study, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security, authored by Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, was issued in October 2003. It explores the hypothetical geopolitical consequences of a repetition in the near future of an event experienced 8,200 years ago (as recorded in an ice core from central Greenland): a sudden cooling of some 2–3° C, lasting for a century, punctuating climatic conditions broadly similar to those of the present day. In the scenario, the collapse of ocean heat‐conveying currents causes rapid cooling in the northern hemisphere and warming in the southern hemisphere. Outcomes include resource wars, large population movements, and "a significant drop in the human carrying capacity of the Earth's environment."In February 2004 the NRC reasserted the more measured voices of its committee by issuing a four‐page summary of the 2002 report, under the same title as the full document. This "report in brief" is reproduced below.

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper explores the basic responsibilities of those who "govern" any kind of organization, whether these be non‐profits, widely held or closely held firms, cooperatives, or voluntary agencies. It adopts a perspective that is largely philosophical and sociological rather than legal or economic, and explores the basic functions of governors in relation to their organizations. It begins its inquiry by contrasting managing and governing. It argues that the practice of governing consists fundamentally in the exercise of reflective and authoritative judgment. The paper then reflects on the basic character of organizations, using what the author refers to as a revised stakeholder model. It argues that organizations are constituted and reconstituted by their ongoing, negotiated, asset‐creating interactions with diverse constituencies. With this enlarged view of organizations as a frame of reference, the paper then spells out in order of importance the fundamental responsibilities of governors. These consist of overviewing their organizations to promote the good of their organizations as a whole, reviewing and authorizing organizational strategies, monitoring organizational performances, supervising chief administrators, as well as other tasks. In order to assume these responsibilities effectively, governing boards need to be constituted so that they can deliberate well. While recognizing merit in the view that regards governors primarily as agents of stakeholders with proprietary claims, the paper argues instead that boards should be constituted to represent the interests of their organizations as whole.RésuméCet article examine les responsabilités fondamentales de ceux qui "gouvernent" les différent types d'organisa‐tions, qu'elles soient organisations sans but lucratif, à capital privé ou cotées en bourse, coopératives, ou organisations volontaires. Il adopte une perspective essentiellement philosophique et sociologique plutôt que légate ou économique, et explore les fonctions fondamentales des gouverneurs par rapport à leurs organisations. II commence par une discussion sur la différence entre gestion et gouvernance. Nous proposons que la gouver‐nance est avant tout un exercice de réflexion et implique un jugement d'autorité. Ensuite, nous réfléchissons sur le caractère fondamental des organisations en utilisant ce que nous appelons un modèle réSvisé des parties prenantes ("stakeholders"). Notre argument est que les organisations sont constituées et reconstituées par les interactions permanentes et négociées entre différent groupes, et que ce sont ces interactions qui créent les ac‐tifs de l'organisation. Avec comme cadre de référence cette vue élargie de l'organisation, cet article énonce par ordre d'importance les responsabilités fondamentales des gouverneurs. Celles‐ci consistent à exercer une vue générate sur Vorganisation pour le bien de leur organisation dans son ensemble, de revoir et d'autoriser les stratégies organisationnelles, de suivre les performances organisationnelles, de superviser les responsables, ainsi que d'autres tâches. Les comités de gouvernance doivent être constitués de telle sorte qu 'ils assument leurs responsabilités et puissent bien délibérer. Tout en reconnaissant le mérite du modèle des gouverneurs comme agents des parties prenantes, cet article met en avant que les comités de gouvemance devraient représenter les intérêts des organisations dans leur ensemble.

Humans are dependent on others for their livelihood for many years before they become economically productive and self‐supporting. In modern industrial societies productivity and the capacity to be self‐supporting also require costly investments in human capital. What is the proper division of responsibilities between parents and other members of society for rearing children and thus, collectively, reproducing the population? And how equitable is the sharing between husband and wife of the burdens that fall on the immediate family? To what extent should social responsibilities for childrearing be formalized in explicit institutional arrangements? While certainly long‐standing, these questions acquired a special urgency in industrial countries beginning with the second decade of the twentieth century as a result of the convulsive experience of the world war. (In subsequent decades, below‐replacement‐level fertility amplified such concerns.) Total mobilization for war resulted in the massive influx of female workers into industry, thus undercutting prevailing assumptions about the logic and equity of an industrial system characterized by sharp divisions of labor by sex, discrimination in hiring and remuneration in the job market, and routine reliance on unpaid female labor in childrearing.In the March 1917 issue of The Economic Journal, Eleanor F. Rathbone addressed these issues in an article titled "The remuneration of women's services." This article is reproduced below in full. "Perhaps the most important function which any State has to perform—more important even than guarding against its enemies—is to secure its own periodic renewal by providing for the rearing of fresh generations," asserted Rathbone. How is this burden paid for? She saw the existing system as iniquitous and haphazard—requiring a disproportionate and unremunerated contribution from the adult female population, a contribution supplemented only in a "hesitating and half‐hearted way" by the state. The modern state gradually accepted responsibilities to cover some of the costs of formal education and started to make minor provisions for child nurture and medical expenses. Still, she noted, "the great bulk of the main cost of [population] renewal [the state] still pays for… by the indirect and extraordinarily clumsy method of financing the male parent"—thus accomplishing the task "in a very defective and blundering way." Rathbone argued for a radical rethinking and revision of the existing system. She further elaborated her proposals in a book, The Disinherited Family, published in 1924. This book was republished posthumously in 1949 under the title Family Allowances. Lord Beveridge, father of the post–World War II British welfare state, in an Epilogue written for that book, attributes the intellectual preparation of the 1945 Family Allowances Act "first and foremost" to the author of The Disinherited Family.Eleanor Rathbone was born in 1872 to a prominent Liverpool family. Educated at Oxford in classics and philosophy, she played an active public role as a suffragist, feminist, and advocate of social reforms. She was a member of the British Parliament, as an Independent, from 1929 to her death in 1946.

Teatro Abierto ('Open Theatre') was launched in Argentina in 1981. It was the idea of a number of playwrights, directors and actors, many of whom had spent all or many of the years following the 1976 coup in exile abroad. They were determined to demonstrate that theatre was still a living art in Argentina in spite of repeated government censorship and outright repression by means of bannings, threats and blacklists. 'We reckoned that if we all appeared together, they couldn't possibly silence the whole thing,' one of the founding group commented. Their idea was to put on 21 short plays at the rate of three a day over a week, with repetitions of the plays over a month. However, halfway through the first week, just after the performance of a play which contained references to the thousands of 'disappeared' in Argentina (see Box), the theatre staging the plays was burnt out. Several people, never subsequently identified, broke into it and spread phosphorus bombs throughout the auditorium. The theatre was gutted, and since it was not insured, has remained empty ever since. The outcry against such a blatant attack on freedom of expression was so great that the season of plays was quickly offered a home in a larger theatre, where the remaining works were performed, arousing enormous public interest. Teatro Abierto 1981 was an important psychological turning point for cultural life in Argentina under the military. The fact that a group of artists had stood together and refused to allow any interference with their work greatly encouraged others. Their initiative was soon followed by similar events in dance, cinema and photography, all of them demonstrating the vitality of Argentine cultural expression despite six years of official censorship and neglect. The play which follows, Odd Man In, was one of the works presented in the 1981 series of Teatro Abierto. Its author, Eduardo Pavlovsky, returned recently to Argentina after spending several years in exile in Spain. He has described his escape from Argentina in the following fashion: 'In my play Telarañas ('Cobwebs') there is a scene in which two gas board officials force their way into a home. In fact, they are not from the gas board at all, but are torturers. Cobwebs was written in 1976 and put on at the Teatro Payró in 1977. It lasted two days. I received a letter from the Secretary of Culture of the City of Buenos Aires asking me to withdraw it. Possibly because I wasn't fully aware of the kind of situation we were really in, I took no notice, and forced them to issue a formal banning decree. Three months later, two 'gas board officials' came to my place asking for me. Luckily my secretary realised what was going on, and phoned to me upstairs. By this time, another eight 'gasmen' had appeared. If I'm here to tell the story, it's because by then I had climbed out of my window and escaped across the roofs.'

The present article is a summary of a quantitative Social History in three volumes (can be obtained directly from the author) treating of the 24 cathedral chapters of the Old German Empire in the 17th and 18th Century. The research on the cathedral chapters which were as well spiritual as secular corporations, until now is rather traditional in its methods, i.e. focusing on the constitutions and the biographies of the canons. Actually there are only a few monographies. Our study which comprehends all chapters examines 5 725 cases. The case-unit is not the person, but the prebend. The following variables are taken up: name (locality) of the chapter, dignitaries, degrees (for commoners), the ways of applying to and retiring from the chapters, social status (seven categories for the nobility, two for the commoners), advancements in rank, origin, cumulations. The completeness of the data is generally more than 90%, often towards 100%. All data is published in form of chronological lists of the canons in every chapter, besides an index of names is given. Therefore our work serves as a reference-book too. The data were processed with SPSS, crosstabulations and other statistics are published also. For regional inquiries the chapters were classified into three groups: Northern Germany, the chapters of the Knights of the Empire (i. e. Rhineland and Franconia), Southern Germany and Austria. To show the chronological development we divided the entire period (1601-1803) into four periods of about fifty years. The article presents some important results for every variable. Some general Statements are possible. From the viewpoint of social history the hypothesis of three regional types has been verified. Chapters at the border of the Empire form a particular group which shows more and more deviations to the Standard. On the other hand the chapters in the center assimilate. Spatial mobility decreases, local recruitment increases. There are tendencies to closeness and occasional provincialism. Cumulations increase in the second half of 18th Century. Canons from the middle and lower classes were almost completely eliminated during the two centuries. Thus the European feudal reaction can clearly be demonstrated using the example of the German cathedral chapters. Our research shows that the chapters get into a crisis in the late 18th Century. They could no more accomplish their functions as providing institutions for the German nobility. For many reasons the run to the prebends grew as well as the commoners' criticism influenced by the Enlightenment. They disapproved the loss of the chapters' spiritual functions, the prevalence of the nobility, the grewing exclusion of the commoners and the enormous cumulations. Proposals to a reform failed. The difficult Situation in the Empire during the Napoleonic Wars forced the secularization (1803) which brought the end to the old German cathedral chapters.

SUMMARYPeasants have frequently been observed to exhibit two patterns of political behavior which tend to inhibit the formation and consolidation of peasant economic and political organizations, namely political passivity and violence. Theories so far have usually concentrated on explaining either only one of these behavior patterns, or only one class context (either inter‐or intra‐class relations). Noting that Chinese peasants during land reform frequently adopted these behavior patterns both towards landlords and towards peasant leaders of their organizations, the author develops her own explanation based on the analysis of several case studies, one of which is presented here in detail as illustration. Her main hypothesis is that Chinese peasants make rational behavior‐choices based not only on the calculation of expected material benefits, but also on that of political risks. This latter calculation appears to rest on certain assumptions which are shared by the majority of Chinese peasants and which do not differ in content when considering the future political behavior of peasant rather than landlord power‐wielders.RÉSUMÉIl a souvent été considere que les paysans manifestent deux types de comportemcnt politique ‐ passivité d'une part et violence d'autre part ‐ ce qui tendrait à empêcher la formation et la consolidation d'organisations paysannes, tant politiques qu'économiques. Et jusqu'ici les théories se sont habituellement centrées sur l'explication soit d'un de ces types de comportement, soit sur un unique contexte de classe (relations entre classe ou internes à la classe).Observant que les paysans chinois ont, durant la réforme agraire, fréquemment adopté ces types de comportement tant à l'égard des propriétaires terriens que des leaders de leurs organisations, l'auteur développe son propre modèle explicatif à partir de plusieurs études de cas dont une sert ici d'illustration. Sa principale hypothèse est que les paysans ont en fait un comportement rationnel dans la mesure où celui‐ci n'est pas seulement basé sur un calcul économique mais aussi sur un calcul des risques politiques. Ce calcul politique sc révèle alors reposer sur certaines dispositions qui sont communes à la majorité des paysans chinois et qui ne changent pas de sens si on examine le comportement politique futur par rapport à l'exercice du pouvoir des propriétaires terriens.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGEs ist häufig beobachtet worden, daß Bauern zwei politische Verhal‐tensmuster aufweisen, welche die Bildung und Konsolidicrung von ökonomischen und politischen Bauernorganisationen tendenziell verhindern, nämlich politische Passivität und Gewalltätigkeit. Theorien haben sich bisher meist darauf konzentriert, entweder nur eins dieser Verhaltensmuster oder diese nur in einem Zusammenhang (entweder Inter‐ oder Intraklassenbeziehungen) zu erklären. Ausgehend von der Beobachtung, daß chinesische Bauern während der Bodenreformzeit häufig diese Verhaltensweisen sowohl gegenüber Großgrundbesitzern als auch gegenüber den Bauernführern ihrer eigenen Organisationen ergriffen, entwickelt die Autorin aufgrund einer Analyse mehrerer Fallstudien ‐ von dencn cine hier zu Illustration ausführlicher darge‐stellt wird ‐ ihre eigene Erklärung. Ihre Hauptthese ist, daß chinesische Bauern rationale Verhaltensentscheidungen treffen, die nicht nur auf der Berechnung von erwarteten materiellen Vorteilen, sondern auch von politischen Risiken beruhen. Dieser letzten Kalkulation scheinen einige Annahmen zugrundezuliegen, die von der Mehrheit der chinesischen Bauern geteilt werden, und die sich inhaltlich nicht un‐terscheiden, gleichviel ob es sich um das politische Verhalten von Bauern oder das von Großgrundbesitzern handelt.

SUMMARY This article criticizes the argument of Radorniro Tomić, (see 'Reflections on the Coup d'Etat in Chile', IDS Bulletin vol.7 no. 3, October 1975) according to which there was a possibility of an agreement between the Chilean Christian Democrats and the parties of Unidad Popular which would have saved Chile from the events of September 1973. The counter‐argument rests on the evidence that the Christian Democrats did all they could to prevent the UP government from fulfilling its programme, and even when partial agreements were in the air, ended up by defeating such efforts. Tomić represents a minority view in his party which is dominated by Frei, the President of Chile from 1964 to 1970, who has always rejected any deal with the Left. However, the author agrees with Tomić that an agreement would have saved the country from its present fate, even if it would have involved some sacrifice of ultimate goals.RESUME La Démocratie Chrétienne et la Gauche au Chile: Le Bilan Selon TomićL'article qui suit remet en question la thèse de Radomiro Tomić, (voir 'Réflexions au sujet du Coup d'Etat du Chile', Bulletin de 1'IDS, Vol. 7, No. 3, Octobre 1975) selon laquelle il est question de la possibilité d'un accord entre Démocrates Chrétiens Chiliens et partis de L'Union Populaire qui aurait pu éviter au Chile les evenements de September 1973. Le contre‐argument repose sur le fait que les Démocrates Chrétiens ont fait tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour empêcher le Gouvernement d'UP de remplir son programme, et même lorsque des accords partiaux étaient dans l'air, ont fini par mettre de tels efforts en échec. Tomić représente les vues d'une minorité au sein de son parti, dominé par Frei, Président du Chile de 1964 à 1970. qui a toujours refusé de traiter avec un parti de gauche. Cependant l'auteur pense comme Tomić qu'un accord aurait sauvé le pays de son destin actuel, même si cela avait impliqué le sacrifice d'objectifs ultérieurs.RESUMEN Tomić y la Relación entre la Democracia Cristiana y la Izquierda en Chile: Un ComentarioEste articulo critica la tesis de Radomiro Tomić (ver, 'Reflexiones sobre el Golpe de Estado en Chile', Boletín IDS Vol. 7, No. 3, octubre 1975) según la cual los partidos de la Unidad Popular hubieran podido llegar a un acuerdo sin transacciones ideológicas con la Democracia Cristiana y evitar asi la tragedia de septiembre de 1973. Tomić representa una tendencia minoritaria dentro su partido, el que está dominado por el ‐ex‐Presidente de Chile Eduardo Frei, quien nunca quiso llegar a un acuerdo. El autor concuerda con Tomić que un entendimiento con la izquierda hubiera salvado al país de su destino actual, pero cree que su ausencia se debió a que nadie apreció con claridad los riesgos que se corrían al no buscar seriamente un acuerdo.

Those phenomena that are called revolutions, in the conventional sense of the word, are essentially moments of turbulent acceleration following periods of retardation; and such are the phenomena of the révolution tranquille in Québec, which are confused by some with the inclusive events of long duration. In this perspective, and as a prelude to the analysis of current conceptions of the so-called quiet revolution in Québec, the author offers a study of the economic and social history of the United States from 1920 to 1940. He sees no sharp break between the fabulous twenties and the depression decade; nor does he see a gap between the interwar period and the preceding so-called progressive period. This can be seen through the unfolding of social, political, and economic events, provided that care is taken to adopt the mental set of transcending the conflictual in order to assent to the cumulative aspects of the historical process. Seen from this angle, the issues appear more complex, and contemporaries may easily be pardoned for failing to grasp the fundamental questions or for seeing revolutions where there are none. In the freedom of dancing, smoking, and drinking with women or, again, in the freedom of teaching the theory of evolution in schools (freedoms conquered in the twenties and the early thirties), some have seen a revolution. In a like manner, the New Deal has been described as revolutionary, as has the economic theory of J.M. Keynes. But if capitalism really has undergone such trials, how then can it still carry on so vigorously? In fact, it has learned to adapt itself to the changing conditions of its survival without altering its basic character. New regimes arise and the system carries on. The New Deal created a new regime to which capitalism acclimatized itself; and in the new regime capitalism managed so well that it could take advantage of the change in mentality in order to save the system. Under the New Deal, however, capitalism reached an important stage of its politicization, as it did somewhat later, under the new fiscal policies derived from Keynes' general theory. Yet, despite all revolutionary appearances, it continued to operate on the basis of usury, and while taking hold of the new media of information it mobilized resources with a view to profit and in so doing it organized things and men with equal indifference and efficiency. The system has continued to operate on the same basis of usury and, in order to sidetrack violent protest, it has adopted the issue of social justice; it has been willing to substitute assistance for employment, destructive idleness for creative leisure. Those benefits that are labeled social security and are now distributed without much regard for human creativity have the properties of a tranquillizing pill. And so we are reminded of the panem and circenses politics of a declining Empire. Are we really prepared to swallow the tranquillizing pill?

For an introduction to this article see SA 0206/E9423. The article is a reprint from Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 1944, 25, 2, 100-117. Res is presented which inquired into the readjustments that have taken place in Negro fam life as 'a result of war emergency (WWII), & to what entent these readjustments may have been conditioned by the factor of minority group status. 1, 000 Tex Negro fam's were selected from various towns & cities in East Tex according to the proportional representation of the Negro pop in these areas. 50 Negro fam heads were asked to write letters giving an account of how the present war has affected their fam's. The following aspects are dealt with: (1) changes in fam formation; (2) changes in place of residence; (3) changes in econ functions of fam members; (4) relation of fam readjustment & minority group status. Data show that under the influence of WWII Amer fam's come into existence more rapidly & become dissolved more rapidly than in peace time. Negro fam's are no exception. Fam's had an abnormally high rate of mobility during the 3-yr period immediately following 1941, & their reasons for moving were based upon attempted adjustment to the labor demands of the US war economy. Responding to the expanded labor demand in specific industries, members of these fam's shifted from a group of agri'al & domestic service workers to a mass of factory labor. Although this shift intensified racial friction, it resulted in a change of the position of these fam's & the establishment of a new pattern of life which they defined as better than the old. The att's of white & Negro Coll students revealed a willingness of whites to tolerate this change in ES as long as the traditional SR of the races are maintained. 4 Tables, 5 Charts. Henry A. Bullock, SOME READJUSTMENTS OF THE NEGRO FAMILY IN 1944 AND 1970-offers an explanation of how the author viewed Negro fam readjustment in the first instance & how he views it now. In 1944 the concern was with the degree & manner in which an instit accommodates to new circumstances imposed upon it by the external environment in which it is enmeshed. Then the quality of black fam's was judged in terms of how they deviated from WASP norms. Now the Amer assimilation ideal is being abandoned. Blacks want to be black. Negro fam's could now be observed in terms of the efficiency with which they are org'ed to meet needs generated by conditions under which black people have to live. In a ghetto, a WASP style of fam org would be a poor tool for fam survival. Today's res'er should probe beyond the structural horizon & into the dynamics of fam org itself. This will lead to a further & beneficial fading of the demarcation line between pure & applied res. M. Maxfield.

O contexto amazônico tem como marca sua biodiversidade e a diversidade sociocultural com significativo potencial produtivo local de recursos mobilizáveis e mobilizadores. O presente trabalho busca integrar os estudos em cadeia produtivos de recursos Amazônicos com as áreas de tecnologias prioritárias por organizações cooperativas na Região Central no estado de Rondônia. Os dados serão coletados utilizando roteiros de entrevistas semi-estruturados. Inicialmente o estudo foi desenvolvido através de revisão bibliográfica, buscando entender os conceitos de cadeia produtiva e as abordagens sobre tecnologia de produção de produtos extrativistas. Neste artigo apresenta-se esta revisão bibliográfica utilizada. Dentro dos resultados o presente trabalho buscou abordar discussões teóricas acerca da temática: produtos florestais não madeiráveis, cadeias produtivas e tecnologia e informação. Para Pedrozo et al. (2011), os Produtos florestais não madeiráveis – PFNMs são recursos provenientes de florestas nativas, sistemas agroflorestais e plantações incluindo também plantas medicinais e de uso alimentício, frutas, castanhas, resinas, látex, óleos essenciais, fibras, forragem, fungos, fauna e madeira para a fabricação de artesanato, sendo a floresta amazônica a maior fonte de fornecimento desses produtos. No âmbito das cadeias produtivas, segundo Labone (1987) esta é definida como uma sequência de atividades físicas desempenhadas para a produção de um bem. Além disso, podemos associar este termo ao vocábulo agroflorestais, nas quais há uma abertura para discutir a extração de Produtos Florestais Não Madeiráveis (PFNMs). Por fim tecnologia é amplamente utilizada em diferentes áreas da humanidade. Para Klinge (2000), a mentalidade tecnologista é uma forma de se aproximar da realidade que surgiu na modernidade. Os resultados obtidos por coleta de dados não se fez possível por razões do cenário pandemico. O presente trabalho buscou abordar no âmbito teórico, pois por razões da pademia não se pode contemplar os questionários e análises qualitativas, o que fica como possibilidade futura para trabalho complementar.

Refências
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AbstractIn the 15‐year period since the Syrian military entry into Lebanon on June 1, 1976, allegedly to put an end to the civil war that broke out there a year earlier, Syria firmly solidified its control of the country, as evidenced by the signing of the "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon," on May 22, 1991, which granted Syria a special status. Yet, 14 years later, on April 24, 2005, the Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. This article seeks to explain this relatively rapid decline in Syria's standing in Lebanon by examining the strategies of the two Syrian rulers who indirectly controlled this country during those years. It examines what was right in Hafiz al‐Asad's strategy in Lebanon, and what did not work in Bashar's policy.In 2000, the year of Hafiz al‐Asad's death, Syria's status in Lebanon seemed unshakable: 1) Lebanon's president (Emile Lahoud) acted as Damascus's puppet; 2) Hezbollah, the Shi'a militia Hezbollah largely accepted Syria's authority while it simultaneously tightened its control over southern Lebanon and also began gaining popularity in the rest of the country; and 3) finally the politics of the noble families, which had characterized Lebanon since its establishment, began to gradually give way to a politics where a political figure is measured by the level of his connections to the country's power base in Damascus. Yet, merely five years later, Syria was under immense pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. This suggests that we must look at the difference between the strategies of Hafiz al‐Asad and his son Bashar for controlling Lebanon to better understand the rapid deterioration in Syria's standing in the country.We argue that the difference in the degree of anti‐Syrian pressures from Lebanon's society and political elements between the two tenures is largely rooted in the different strategies that the two Syrian presidents adopted for informally ruling Lebanon. We identify three main areas where Bashar al‐Asad made mistakes due to his failure to continue his father's methods. First, Bashar put all his cards on Hezbollah, thus antagonizing all the other groups which resented that Shi'a dominance. Second, in stark contrast to his father, Bashar distanced himself from the regular management of Lebanon's ethnic politics. Hafiz al‐Asad made sure that all the leaders of the different ethnic groups would visit Damascus and update him on their inter‐ethnic conflicts, and then he would be the one who would either arbitrate between them or, for expediency reasons, exacerbate these feuds. Once the ethnic leaders had to manage without Damascus, they learned to get along, making him far less indispensable for the running of the country. Finally, Bashar, unlike his father, did not make a real effort to gain international and regional legitimacy (or at least de‐facto acceptance) for Syria's continued control over Lebanon. Most conspicuously, while Hafiz participated in the First Gulf War against Iraq, his son supported Sunni rebels who fought against the United States‐led coalition forces there. This foreign acquiescence was significant since the Lebanese felt they had a backing when they demanded Syria's withdrawal in 2005.These different strategic approaches of the two rulers meant that the father's policies wisely laid the ground for some of the most controversial measures which were needed as part of any attempt to monopolize control over another country, such as Lebanon (assassinating popular but too independent‐minded Lebanese presidents/prime ministers or extending tenures of loyalist ones), whereas the son's policies myopically failed to do so properly. Indeed, the article will show that while both the father and the son took these same controversial measures, the responses of the Lebanese were completely different.Admittedly, some historical developments increased the Lebanese propensity to rise up against Syria, and these meant that Bashar did in fact face a harder task than his father in maintaining Syria's informal occupation. The Israeli withdrawal from its so‐called "security zone" in south Lebanon meant that one justification for the Syrian presence was gone. More importantly, the risk of renewed eruption of the civil war (which in turn had meant for many years a greater willingness by the locals to tolerate the Syrian presence which prevented the war's resumption) declined significantly due to a variety of processes that could not have been halted even with better "management" of the interethnic strife from Damascus (i.e., making sure that the ethnic groups remained in deep conflict with each other). Nevertheless, as we will show, Bashar's mistakes played a crucial role in bringing the rival ethnic groups together by making Damascus their joint enemy.

Le désir de convertir en une autre monnaie les données soviétiques en roubles a fait l'objet de nombreuses controverses et a toujours forcé l'attention des économistes soviétiques et occidentaux. L'intérêt académique accordé à la formule de conversion a été renforcé par des préoccupations pratiques : comparer le budget soviétique de défense nationale, les efforts d'investissements dans la recherche et le développement. L'intérêt récent des Soviétiques pour la technologie occidentale et la coopération économique avec les pays hautement développés, donne une nouvelle dimension au problème de la convertibilité, à savoir la conversion des données soviétiques concernant les coûts et les profits, la fixation du prix des innovations technologiques et des produits nouveaux.
Cette étude entend résumer et passer en revue la situation actuelle de l'art de calculer des taux de conversion rouble/dollar, résultant de comparaisons binaires effectuées en termes de quantité et de prix entre l'Union Soviétique et les Etats- Unis. L'auteur a plus précisément voulu réaliser une analyse comparative des 22 taux rouble/dollar dont il examine le caractère rationnel, la méthode de calcul et la crédibilité. Il présente à la fin de l'article neuf observations générales concernant les taux examinés. Etant donné que les taux d'origine occidentale, analysés ici, ne tiennent pas compte des modifications de prix effectués en U.R.S.S. en 1967 et des changements institutionnels récents, issus des réformes économiques, deux problèmes sont posés : (1) les modifications qui se sont produites après 1955 dans les systèmes américain et soviétique supposent-elles un ajustement en hausse ou en baisse des taux fondés sur les prix de 1955 ? (2) l'applicabilité des déflateurs de prix soviétiques officiels à l'ajustement des taux fondés sur les rapports de prix soviéto-américains de 1955.
En tant que cas particulier des indices de prix, un taux rouble/dollar est sujet à toutes les mises en garde usuelles en ce qui concerne ce type d'instrument de l'analyse économique. Malheureusement, les conclusions afférant aux capacités de production, qui peuvent être tirées des indices quantitatifs résultant de comparaisons binaires entre deux pays, sont limitées par la situation de l'équilibre concurrentiel. L'article débute par un examen des aspects méthodologiques essentiels des comparaisons binaires entre pays et par l'énumération des caractéristiques et des limites des taux de prix. Ensuite, l'auteur procède à l'analyse comparée d'une sélection de taux de conversion rouble/dollar qui se présente en deux parties. Premièrement, il prend en considération et examine vingt taux de conversion (15 d'origine occidentale et 5 d'origine soviétique), estimés de manière explicite. Ces vingt taux sont comparés dans le Tableau I et s'accompagnent de commentaires critiques. En outre, il propose deux taux de conversion implicites, concernant les biens de production durables et estimés sur la base de données soviétiques. Dans la seconde partie, l'auteur évalue ces vingt taux (voir Tableau II) en fonction de six critères : connaissance de la manière dont on les a calculés, objectifs, type et caractère adéquat de la méthode utilisée, détermination des prix, déterminations des pondérations, pondérations utilisées.
L'étude se termine par les principales conclusions suivantes : 1) Sauf rares exceptions, les méthodes employées par les divers auteurs n'étaient pas suffisamment connues pour permettre d'adopter la série requise de taux de conversion rouble/dollar pour la comparaison des économies soviétique et américaine en général ou en termes d'un effort spécifique (budget de la défense, investissements dans la recherche...) ; 2) Pratiquement tous les taux de conversion occidentaux, présentés dans le Tableau I, sont fondés ou utilisent les résultats d'une étude de Becker, effectuée sur un échantillon de prix soviétiques de 1955 pour les biens de production durables. Cependant, les rapports de prix de 1955 n'ont plus qu'un intérêt historique depuis les révisions de 1967 et les transformations institutionnelles, accompagnant en U.R.S.S. les réformes économiques. De toute évidence, les temps sont mûrs pour une étude détaillée, fondée sur les prix soviétiques actuels et les données concernant la production afin de calculer une nouvelle série de rapports de prix pour les biens de production durables, qui servira à étayer des taux de conversion rouble/dollar acceptables ; 3) Pour huit raisons au moins, y compris des données fragmentaires découvertes dans la littérature soviétique, on peut supposer que les taux réels ont pu être supérieurs à ceux de 1955 ; 4) Dans les sources occidentales aussi bien que soviétiques, on s'est sérieusement interrogé sur la validité de l'utilisation des indices de prix soviétiques officiels, notamment ceux qui concernent les industries de construction de machines et de travail des métaux, pour ajuster à d'autres années les taux rouble/dollar de 1955. Les principales réserves à l'égard des indices de prix soviétiques se rapportent aux méthodes utilisées pour leur calcul et au caractère limité de l'échantillonnage.