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Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), French philosopher, followed a period of ruptures, that is, of conceptual and methodological changes in contemporary physics. He is one of several thinkers who presented important reflections for the understanding of contemporary atomistics. This article highlights the main philosophical reflections of Gaston Bachelard about the foundations of quantum mechanics. For that, it uses important concepts of its epistemology without which its ideas become incomprehensible. Thus, this work highlights how this science breaks with traditional scientific and philosophical ideas in the first half of the 20th century by presenting a new object of knowledge, namely, the quantum corpuscles. Furthermore, in order to characterize the philosophy of bachelardian quantum physics, according to the author, the nature of atomic particles stands out, as the scientific activity of this science in the creation of new phenomena is emphasized and its rationalism applied as philosophy is emphasized best suited to the new physics. Finally, it is emphasized in this work that Bachelard's ideas are different from other interpretations of quantum mechanics.

This article aims at comparing the similarities contained in criticism of liberal democracy present in some selected works of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) and Robert Kurz (1943-2012). In spite of the close association of the first author with the Nazi regime after 1933 and of the second being normally characterized as a Marxist thinker (although very critical to "orthodox" Marxism), numerous similarities between the two are verified when they attempt to analyze the characteristics of parliamentarian liberalism in twentieth-century democracies. One hypothesis that might explain such similarities would be the influence exercised by Schmitt on Frankfurt School theoreticians, from whom Kurz often draws inspiration in his writings - in particular, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, although Schmitt also influenced Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Karl Korsch and Herbert Marcuse. Another interpretation addressed here refers to the possibility that Schmitt found, in his theories about the State and about law, the epistemological limits of modern liberalism, which constitutes Kurz's main research subject and was a recurring theme in the writings of the Frankfurt theorists.

First of all, the article analyzes, in panorama, Spinoza's ontology. Secondly, it shows how, from the concepts present in the ontology, the author derives others, as man, desire, joy and sorrow, hope and fear, security and despair, action and passion. From the relationship between ontology, men and desire - as well as from the other affects -, are extracted, in brief considerations, some Spinoza ́s political thesis. In this argumentative movement, the hypothesis is that many Spinoza's political thesis a rise from its ontology and its conception of man as desire and potency variation. The concept of desire is analyzed in the light of the variation of potency and the theme of natural right, which in Spinoza is identical to potency. When the subject is the brief derivations to politics, some hobbesian thesis - related to the following subjects, namely, the multitude, the people, the representation, the natural right, the civil state, etc. - are brought to show, by contrast, the importance of Spinoza's innovations.

In this article we intend to establish the bases that Martín de Azpilcueta demonstrates his foundation of political authority to reflect on how this thinker articulates his argument to present the people as the original holder of the civil power by natural right. To achieve this objective it will be present how the author relates and distinguishes the ecclesiastical power from secular or civil power. So, it will be shown how the Spanish thinker establishes his foundation of popular civil authority by claiming that civil power legitimizes itself by having its origin in God because it is your natural order and it is given immediately to the community of mortals. According to the thought of Martín de Azpilcueta, it is possible to consider that the secular political authority has the people as its legitimate depository and results in the original equality of all men in public life. In order to accomplish the objective presented in this paper, we will specifically study Notabile tertium present in the work Martín de Azpilcueta called Relectio C. Novit de Iudiciis first published in Coimbra in the year 1548.

Epistemology is the science related to the practice of knowledge, for which the method is fundamental to scientific knowledge. This article focuses on the problematic of the epistemology of space production theory and its philosophical importance in Social Sciences. Objectively, we seek to draw notes on the epistemology of Henri Lefebvre's space production theory with emphasis on its significance to Geography. To do so, we will turn to the reading of his work of the same name La producción del espacio, as well as a review of relevant literature and information already published and available in print or electronic media about episteme, the concept of space and its capitalist production, of the urban and of Lefebvre's own theory. In short, the theory discussed it is part of a production about the city,the space and the urban that carries with it the marks of observation and interpretation of its time. Its author sought, through his method and methods of procedure, to construct a simultaneously descriptive, analytical and global knowledge project that would result in a theory about an urban space production.

Recognition is a normative concept. By recognizing someone as having certain characteristics or capabilities, we recognize their normative status and we are taking responsibility for treating them in a certain way. Non-recognition, in this case, can mean deprivation of rights and marginalization; in a democracy may preclude individuals or groups from enjoying the democratic egalitarian ideal, for example. Over the past three decades, reflection on this category has deepened and taken on greater importance in the debate between liberalism and communitarianism parallel to the demands, sometimes for the achievements, of groups and minorities (LGBTQIA, people with special needs, feminist, indigenous, ethnic, etc.) who feel unrecognized and engage in political movements through struggles for recognition. We will return here to the development of Axel Honneth's concept of "ethical life" in 'Struggle for Recognition' (1992), a fundamental work for reflection on the theme. The author places his theory in the middle between Kantian morality and communitarian ethics: his conception is formal for he understands that universal norms are conditions of some possibilities, but they are substantive for they are guided by the end of human self-realization.

In the present articles we will analyze the way in which Dieter Henrich interprets the aesthetic conception of Hegel. As we shall see, the author considers that, during the last years of his life, Hegel revised his position contrary to modern art and developed a favorable interpretation of it. Henrich discovers in Hegel's intuitions about objective humor an appropriate starting point for thinking about a non-sovereign conception of subjectivity and for developing an affirmative aesthetic of truth. To do this, however, he not only departs from the assumptions of Hegelian aesthetics but also projects traditional categories on modern art and contemporary art. For this reason, after reviewing Henrich's critiques of reflexive theories of consciousness and reconstructing the way in which he understands the relation between art and subjectivity, we will delineate some considerations concerning the difficulties that are contained in his tendency to ignore the radical autonomy of modern art. As we will argue, Henrich denies the critical moments of modernity by neutralizing his possible excesses and constructs a theory of modern art that can no longer be faithful to its constitutive ambiguity.

An evaluation of Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean cooperation on security policies over the last decade demonstrates that high levels of trust have been sustained. This article proposes a heuristic model for the analysis of cooperation between states on matters of security policy. The model that is suggested is based on three levels of analysis that condition the security policies of the countries under consideration: 1) State and society; 2) inter-state relations and 3) international systems. Next, it is argued that common rules shared by different countries are more easily established when this involves small groups of states at a regional level, and not at a world scale, in which it is much more difficult to achieve unanimous or consensual acceptance of rules. Following a macro-theoretical debate on states' motivation to cooperate in an international system, the author introduces Karl W. Deutsch's concept of "security community" and questions whether such a community can be found in southern Latin America. The heuristic model that is introduced should permit answering the questions posed and determine the phase of integration.

The relationship between nature and history is of paramount importance in the development of Heidegger's thought. The philosopher reserved a different way of interrogating nature in relation to the way of interrogating the historical being-there. In fact, the author of Being and Time captured a fundamental aspect with regard to the consequences of the way nature is considered in our time. Considering that Heidegger affirmed that "nature is an entity that meets within the world and that can be discovered, following different paths and degrees", his indication that the current (hegemonic) conception of nature is characterized by being "undifferentiated" proves to be extremely relevant to the understanding of the topic in focus. In this sense, the present work aims to discuss the Heideggerian critique of the undifferentiated conception of nature from the concept of unterschied and the dialogue with its critics, seeking to explain the philosopher's intention of no longer thinking about the relationship between nature and history separately, but in its unity in the ontological understanding, which would occur each time according to the modalities from which the historical being-there appropriates its having-been, its traditionally inherited possibility-of-existence.

In this text, we intend to develop the elements that make up the criticism that Hannah Arendt presents at the end of the interview granted to the German writer Adelbert Reif in the summer of 1970 to the concept of state and modern government, and that are not developed by Arendt at that moment. To this end, we will initially expose Arendt's criticism of the emptying of public space and the attempt to reduce political participation to the electoral process. To counteract these problems inherent to the modern concept of state and government, Hannah Arendt mentions, even slightly, the possibility of a council-state. However, in this text Arendt does not explore these concepts and experiences, but only relates them to the need for transformation of the modern concept of state and government, i.e., it allows the perception of the actuality of her previous reflection. In view of this, the hypothesis explored in this text is that this 1970 interview serves as a reading key to understand the relevance and actuality of the parallel between parties x council developed by the author in On Revolution in 1963 and adds a new element, namely, the theme of the need to institutionalize a forgotten experience: the councils.

This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we'll start on some observations of political liberalism, where in the first moment, we'll explore the book "Two Concepts of Liberty" by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - "being free of" and, not the positive liberty - "being free to", should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin's bet and the liberal tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.

In this article I try to bring to light the convergences and divergences between the German reformer Marthin Luther and the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard. For this purpose, the text was subdivided into four chapters so that it could be possible to bring the main ideas of the authors. The dialogue between Luther and Kierkegaard, where the author defends freedom of conscience as being a freedom from, as Luther does, since our freedom is only found when we love Christ, with a passion so distinct that we are willing to risk everything for him and at the same time sacrifice everything for him. According to Kierkegaard (1978) the subject who is able to be alone in the world, consulting only his conscience is a hero. Kierkegaard appeals to Luther, the solitary monk who faced the Emperor and the Pope, leading first to the creation and strengthening of consciousness in silence and solitude. Thus, only the lonely subject before God, willing to make all sacrifices for God can be free, while the second Luther led to a vision that leads subjects to the abolition of conscience, seeking the forgiveness of sins in Christ so that it is possible to have fun in life. The love of God, which for Luther leads us to freedom for Kierkegaard, keeps us imprisoned and anguished, because the subject will be aware that he will never be able to reciprocate such love. In order to be able to appease such anxiety, you must have a life totally surrendered to Him.

Eminent critical evaluations on Machiavelli's thought discuss the Fortuna-Virtù pair. Even though such terms share well-known origins and traditions throughout Latin literary historiography, especially ancient and medieval receptions during civic humanism, their elusive features persist in Machiavelli´s arguments, enabling numerous academic debates. While the idea of Virtù maintain its ambivalence and ambiguity throughout these relevant and varied textual evidences, continual pursuits for clarification are made throughout the Florentine secretary's corpus, associating the term with other important and central concepts, e.g., desiderio, stato, forza. Political instabilities, forces beyond human control, unpredictability of civil actions are recurring themes in Machiavelli's conceptions of Fortune. In open dialogue with civic humanists who emphasize a crescent political and social participation, blending rational reflections, moral consideration, as well as discussions about different forms of regimes, this author exposes a historiographical conception, reinvigorating ancient traditions, in the creation of a civil order. This demands Virtù, a personal and public commitment in the exaltation of human potentialities and limits. Reinserting the relevance of a parity between Fortuna and Virtù in Machiavelli is a relevant step for avoiding anachronistic readings. Thus, the most significant examples of civic founders and maintainers of civic order are investigated, e.g., Romulo, Numa, Moses, Cesare Borgia, Castruccio Castracani. By studying the images of Fortune, in face of Machiavelli´s political and anthropological conceptions, the argumentative development of some main ideas of this famous political thinker sustains the centrality of the Virtù-Fortuna dyad.