Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Chapter 1. School Health in Asia and Africa (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, Karl Peltzer, PhD, and Joav Merrick, MD, DMSc, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Section One: School Health in Asia and Africa -- Chapter 2. Alcohol Use and Misuse among School-Going Adolescents in Laos: Investigating Socio-Ecological Factors (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhonpathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 3. High Carbonated Soft Drink Consumption Is Associated with Externalizing and Internalizing Behaviour among In-School Adolescents in the Seychelles (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhonpathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 4. Physical Attacks and Physical Fighting among In-School Adolescents in Bangladesh: Prevalence and Associated Factors (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 5. Prevalence and Associated Factors of Oral and Hand Hygiene Behaviour among Adolescents in Afghanistan (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 6. Prevalence and Associated Factors of Physical Attacks and Physical Fighting among In-School Adolescents from Five ASEAN Countries (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 7. Prevalence and Correlates of Behavioural Risk Factors of Non-Communicable Diseases among Adolescents in Thailand: Results of a National School Survey in 2015 (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 8. Underweight and Overweight or Obesity and Associated Factors among School-Going Adolescents in Oman, 2015 (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 9. Prevalence and Associated Factors of Child Abuse and Child Labour among Children in Iraq: Results of the 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for High prevalence of unintentional injuries Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhonpathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 10. Past 12-Month Suicide Attempt and Associated Factors among In-School Adolescents in Afghanistan (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhonpathom, Thailand, and others) -- Chapter 11. Unintentional Non-Fatal Injuries among In-School Adolescents in Bahrain: Prevalence and Socio-Psychological Correlates (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa, and others) -- Chapter 12. Unintentional Non-Fatal Injuries among In-School Adolescents in Benin: Prevalence and Correlates from a National Cross-Sectional Survey (Karl Peltzer, PhD, and Supa Pengpid, DrPH, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa, and others) -- Chapter 13. Physical Violence (Attacks and Physical Fighting) among In-School Adolescents in Nepal: Prevalence and Associated Factors (Karl Peltzer, PhD, and Supa Pengpid, DrPH, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa, and others) -- Chapter 14. Overweight and Obesity and Associated Factors among Adolescents in Wallis and Futuna and Cook Islands (Karl Peltzer, PhD, and Supa Pengpid, DrPH, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa, and others) -- Chapter 15. High Prevalence of Unintentional Injuries and SocioPsychological Correlates among In-School Adolescents in Nepal (Supa Pengpid, DrPH, and Karl Peltzer, PhD, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa, and others) -- Chapter 16. Interpersonal Violence among In-School Adolescents in Bahrain: Prevalence and Associated Factors (Karl Peltzer, PhD, and Supa Pengpid, DrPH, Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa) -- Section Two: Acknowledgements -- Chapter 17. About the Editors -- Chapter 18. About the ASEAN Institute for Health Development, Mahidol University, Salaya, Phutthamonthon, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand -- Chapter 19. About the Department of Research Administration and Development, University of Limpopo, Turfloop, South Africa -- Chapter 20. About the National Institute of Child Health and Human -- Development in Israel -- Section Three: Index.

US officials will have to get used to operating in a world in which they can take less for granted. The 2016 presidential campaign, and its ultimate outcome, raised sharper questions about the fundamental nature and purpose of the United States' grand strategy than at any time in a generation. In doing so, the campaign also served as a reminder of the critical role of assumptions in shaping US statecraft. In the grand-strategic context, assumptions are the ingrained, overarching ideas that US officials have about how the world works, and about America's role within the global arena. Simply put, such assumptions represent the intellectual foundation upon which American statecraft rests. If the foundation is solid, then American strategy has a decent chance of success. If the foundation is shaky, American strategy is likely in for a world of trouble. Yet because assumptions are, by their very nature, often implicit rather than explicit, and because the most fundamental assumptions underlying American grand strategy do not frequently surface in the course of day-today policy debates, these assumptions are rarely scrutinised or even made explicit to the degree they ought to be. This is dangerous. If assumptions are not identified and stress-tested, how will policymakers know, other than by pure intuition, when those assumptions are no longer valid and the conceptual foundation of strategy has begun to crack? Today, the need to critically examine the core assumptions of American grand strategy is becoming ever more pressing. Since the Cold War's end, the United States has pursued a grand strategy centred on maintaining America's global primacy, deepening and extending the liberal international order, and heading off major threats to the generally happy state of the post-Cold War world. That grand strategy has rested upon a set of bedrock assumptions that have also stayed largely constant over time - assumptions about the nature and sustainability of American dominance, the direction in which the world is moving geopolitically and ideologically, the ways in which Washington can best prevent or address emerging threats, and so on. Assumptions about specific policy issues have evolved over time, of course, but the core intellectual premises of American strategy have not been extensively revised for nearly a quarter-century. Collectively, those assumptions have added up to a broadly optimistic view of global affairs - a view that the United States enjoys essentially uncontested supremacy in most key aspects of international relations; that the dominant ideological, geopolitical and economic currents are running Washington's way; and that, with properly vigilant and enlightened American policy, this comparatively benign situation need not be fundamentally disrupted by resurgent great-power conflict or other throwbacks to an earlier and less hopeful age. Yet today, roughly 25 years into the post-Cold War period, some of the essential assumptions of American grand strategy are either coming under real strain, or are increasingly likely to do so in the next 10-20 years. This is not to say that all of these core assumptions have been fully or even largely invalidated, because their residual strength does vary, and because their erosion has not yet, for the most part, reached a critical stage. Moreover, we should remember that critics have prematurely proclaimed the inevitable demise of America's post-Cold War 'unipolar moment' before. Yet these disclaimers aside, there is little question that the validity of these core assumptions is more contested now than at any other time during the postCold War era, and that this validity will only become more contested over the next decade or two if current trends hold. As this happens, look out: American officials will have to get used to operating in a world in which they can take less for granted, in which the international environment is significantly more contested and challenging, and in which it will become steadily harder to sustain the grand strategy - and international order - that the country has pursued since the end of the Cold War. (Survival / SWP)

Partisan activity has been the main and the most important mode of institutionalized political participation (in addition to electoral participation) in the modern democracy. Even though mass party membership is a distinct feature of modern political system (although not necessarily democratic), since 1960-ies the decline of party membership is observed in many democratic countries. Lithuania is a typical example of post-communist region, where party membership is regarded as a specific elitist activity rather than an ordinary practice of political involvement. In the article, the attitudes of Lithuanians towards party membership are analyzed to answer the question if and why people are not keen to join political parties. Public attitudes are explored using the data of a representative public opinion survey carried out in 2005 and qualitative data of in-depth interviews with ordinary people collected in 2008. Using a mixed method research strategy, the article analyses the image of political parties in Lithuania, determines the potential of party membership and investigates the dominant reasons of avoiding partisan activity. In the first part of the article, the theories explaining partisan activity are presented. In addition to Civic voluntarism model and General incentives theory used by Paul Whiteley and Patrick Seyd to explain partisan activity, the broader theories explaining changes of political culture and transformation of party models are discussed. Moreover, the theoretical arguments for the exceptionalism of post-communist societies are presented. In the second part of the article, the analysis of the qualitative data is presented. The exploration of public attitudes reveals that partisan activity can be perceived in several different ways: as a specific occupation, as a civic self-expression, as belonging to power elite, as a privilege, as dependence, and as partiality. These images of parties held by people are related to their attitudes towards party membership. The reasons provided by the people of not joining political parties can be grouped into three groups: 1) the lack of necessary resources or personal characteristics (e.g. old age, low education, etc.); 2) critical attitudes towards political parties; 3) dislike of partisan activity because of indifference towards politics or individualism and appreciation of personal independence. In the third part, the quantitative data drawn from the public opinion survey is analysed. The data shows a surprisingly high potential of party membership in Lithuania: about 11 percent of all respondents and about 20 percent of respondents in the age group of 18-39 have an inclination to join a political party. However, 87 percent of individuals admit that they were not invited to join a political party during the last 5 years. This proves that Lithuanian political parties are not active in expanding their membership. The quantitative data approve the trends observed from the qualitative research. The two most popular reasons of not joining a party are the lack of resources or necessary characteristics (surprisingly, young age seems to be one of the most important of them) and an indifference towards politics. These two motives fit well into the Civic voluntarism model. Disappointment with politics or a negative attitude towards political parties in general, contrary to expectations, proved to be of secondary importance. The importance of individualist attitudes, i.e. the avoidance of commitment and appreciation of independence, unfortunately, could not be evaluated due to the lack of data. Summing up, the analysis of Lithuanian case suggests that low party membership in post-communist countries might be explained by low demand rather than low supply. In other words, we should look for the explanation of low enrolment in the process of recruitment of party members rather than in the attitudes of people. The research do not provide any evidence for a popular theory of "communist legacy" claiming that a "bad" image of parties inherited from communist regime accounts for the low party membership in post-communist societies. On the contrary, the data demonstrate rather positive attitudes towards partisan activity among Lithuanian population. Adapted from the source document.

The election of Kennedy serves to mark nothing less than the end of a neo-conservative decade & the beginning of a neo-liberal one, not only in the US but throughout the Western World. Wars often undermine existing soc structures which create a situation favorable to radical & liberal parties. Immediately after WWII, liberal gov's were formed in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, & GB. In the US, to the surprise of many, the Democrats, with the victory of Truman in 1948, held on to the presidency. During the 40's & 50's the pol'al tide began to flow to the right. Soc Democrats & Labor Parties started losing & in 1952 the US had its first Republican President in 20 yrs. While the Soc Democrats in Sweden, Norway & Israel managed to retain power during this period, the right-wing groups in all of these countries gained support at each election during the decade from the late 40's to the late 50's. A number of forces reversed the postwar upsurge of liberalism: (1) the econ forces - the economy of the West helped by a universal growth in pop, the Marshall Plan, & finally the Korean War produced prosperity. Under the impact of Khrushchev's revelations about the Stalinist Regime, & of the Hungarian Revolution, an endless number of intellectuals abandoned the Communist & left-Socialist Parties all over the Western World. Factor (2) undermining the left was the 'liberalization' of traditionally conservative Parties - in England the Tories preserved most of the soc security & nationalization measures introduced by the Labor Party; in the US, Eisenhower, rather than Taft was chosen to represent the Republicans. It was only in the late 50's that the new liberal wave first began to reveal itself. Perhaps the earliest sign was the Labor Party's return to office in New Zealand in 1957. In the US, the Democrats increased their control of the House & the Senate & also elected a large number of governors, senators & congressmen in traditionally Republican States such as Maine, Vermont, & Connecticut. The liberal trend continued to manifest itself in the `New Nixon,' & finally in the victory of Kennedy. Why is this shift to the left taking place? A series of small recessions have helped to undermine the post-WWII feeling of prosperity. In Europe, with the end of econ reconstruction, unions in Germany, the Netherlands & Austria are resuming their traditional role of pressing for a larger share of industrial income for their members. In the intellectual sphere, the ideological warfare against Communism has subsided. In the US, the declining pressure for conformity has led many ex-radicals & liberals to become vocal once more & pol'ly active. A new set of soc problems is working to make the 60's a decade of neo-liberalism. (a) The prime econ issue is no longer the redistribution of national income among the various SC's; the question now is the proportion in which national income will be parcelled out between public & private expenditure. It seems that leftwing Parties are more likely to come to grips with this issue than those of the right, since the former have traditionally recognized & articulated the need for public control of the economy. The Democrats in the US have gained votes because of their stress on federal aid to educ, res, & public health. (b) Another issue in 1960 was international relations. The left is more likely than the right to respond to the widespread desire for an international settlement of the cold war. Problem (c) concerns the complex issue of upward SM. As soon as newer members of the Mc realize that their econ gains have not been matched by a commensurate gain in SS, they seem to rebel against the parties that speak for the higher echelons of power & prestige. In the US, the Democrats won in part because they were led by a man who could be identified with the more covert desires for increased SM & opportunities felt by labor & the new Mc; in the ambitions & handicaps of a Catholic candidate these groups saw something of their own situation. V. D. Sanua.