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Using the results of the poll on the eve of the 2003 parliamentary elections, the author analyzes the determinants of their ideological cleavages. The analysis shows that the most significant determinants are the attitudes concerning the role of tradition & the Catholic Church in the society, the role of women in the society, the attitude towards the minority groups & the attitude to the Croatian history, primarily regarding World War Two & the post-war period. Of all the attitudes-measuring variables the most significant ones for the ideological left-right self-identification are those concerning the role of the Church & tradition & the attitude towards the history. The most important determinants of concrete ideological orientations in Croatia are those variables that measure the attitudes to traditional values & the role of the Church in the society, the attitude to the minorities & the position of women & the attitude to the history. While the attitudes to tradition & the role of the Catholic Church, & to a somewhat smaller extent to the minorities & the position of women in the society distinguish the liberals & social-democrats from the Christian-democrats, the attitude to the history distinguishes primarily the liberals from the social-democrats. The analysis has also shown that the variables measuring the attitude to the parties undoubtedly have the biggest influence on ideological self-identification, whether this is the left-right self-identification, or the identification with a concrete ideological orientation. However, in interpreting these results one should bear in mind that the causal link among these variables can be established both ways. Nevertheless, regarding the level of political sophistication of the public it might be said that the respondents will more easily identify with a party than an ideology, which for most voters is an abstract category. Party identification (preference) may be a consequence of a variety of factors ranging from the early political socialization in the family to the ideological affinity concerning certain issues or trust in party leadership etc. Hence we can conclude that regarding their ideological self-identification the respondents use their party identification as an information shortcut in order to get their bearing in, for most voters, the abstract world of ideologies. Tables, Graphs, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

As an expression of China's eagerness to modernize its foreign policy in line with the modified global conditions at the start of the 21st century, a new official Chinese foreign policy doctrine has emerged -- the theory of "peaceful rise." After the top echelon of the Chinese leadership have adopted this doctrine, now it is being peddled to the international public. The fundamental tenet of the theory of "peaceful rise" is that a vigorous long-term growth of Chinese economy & China's affirmation in the arena of international relations does not represent a regional or global threat; on the contrary, China's rise may be good for its neighbors (by bringing economic opportunity & strengthening their security) & the global community in general. After the successful resolution in the 1990s of the border disputes with Russia, Kazakhstan & Tajikistan, & the settlement of the issue of the land border with Vietnam, China has directed its efforts to the resolution of the remaining territorial disputes with Japan & India. China joined the ASEAN in October 2003, a sign of the continued improvement of China's relations with the countries in this region. China has also been very keen on improving its -- primarily economic -- relations with Russia & Japan that will bring economic benefits to all the parties. It is interesting that most China's neighbors, unlike the countries of the EU & the US, have a trade surplus with China. China's most important bilateral relation, that with the US, has been marked with the strategic rapprochement of those two great powers after "September 11" concerning the fight against international terrorism, but is nevertheless still burdened with an array of troublesome issues: Taiwan, criticisms of China due to its violation of human rights & intellectual property, the huge American trade deficit with China. The main challenges to the process of China's "peaceful rise" are the following: the imbalance of its economic growth, particularly its overdependence on exports, the deteriorated relationships with Taiwan after President Chen Shui-bian, a strong advocate of Taiwan's independence, won the 2000 elections. The author concludes that the Chinese foreign policy doctrine of "peaceful rise" is a welcome effort to allay the fears that have been fueled by China's prominence & to explain its new role in international relations. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the impact of globalization on social security & social exclusion in Lithuania for the first time in Lithuanian social sciences literature. The article consists of 5 parts: in the first part "globalization risk" & related non-traditional methodology is examined, in the second part the relation between globalization & glocalization is analyzed, in the third part of the article the changes of Lithuanian macrosocial indicators are examined, in the fourth part the role of libertarian ideology & practice for social exclusion development is shown & the fifth part reveals the positive & negative shifts in Lithuanian state social security. The author relies on Lithuanian macrosocial data & tries to prove that parallelly with globalization its antipode -- glocalization -- is thriving in the social processes. Globalization impact on social exclusion may be understood not only in its narrow sense -- as marginalization of different "traditional" social risk groups but also in the wider meaning because globalization is raising risks for many life spheres & even for entire society. Globalization often positively influences the social position of the "winners" & enables their better self-realization. But globalization often negatively influences the situation of the "losers" when they are imprisoned in glocalization for the longer or shorter time without any clear perspectives to rise. Among social security backwardness & the reasons of social exclusion formation were: a) the lack of financial resources, b) accelerating globalization & transformation rates -- when the system could not "develop into deepness" but was forced to chase headlong perfunctory all the time accelerating processes. The strife was followed not against the reasons but against the separate negative social consequences. The preventive activities were very limited, c) the lack of new progressive administrative theories & decisions, d) insufficient development of social policy, social security & social exclusion research, e) frequent confinement of social administration agents on barely theoretical solutions & solving problems "on paper," f) unfavorable international & native influence of ideology & practice of extreme liberalism. The article shows that globalization had influenced the distinctive administrative reforms & measures in Lithuania, which have given controversial results (New Public Management, private pensions funds reform, development of social services). The conclusion is possible to make that characteristic contradiction in Lithuanian social security is between organizational maturity & scarcity of real results after implementation of social security measures. Adapted from the source document.

The article discusses the problem that was recently raised in Lithuanian historical literature and public discourse by G. Beresnevicius, A. Bumblauskas, S.C. Rowell: was the medieval Lithuanian state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL) an empire? Traditional historiography did not use concepts of "empire" and "imperialism" in the work on GDL. For Non-Marxist Russian historians, GDL was simply another Russian state, so there could not be Russian imperialism against Russians. For Marxist historians, imperialism was a phase in the "capitalist formation," immediately preceding the socialist revolution and bound to the specific period of world history, so the research on precapitalist empires and imperialism was suspect of anachronism. For the opposite reason, deriving from the hermeneutic methodology, the talk about how the medieval Lithuanian empire and imperialism was an anachronism for Non-Marxist Polish and German historians too, because they considered as Empires only polities that claimed to be successors to Roman Empire. However, the Lithuanian political elite never raised such claims, although theory of the Lithuanian descent from Romans (Legend of Palemon) could be used for this goal. Using the recent work in comparative historical sociology of empires by S.N. Eisenstadt, I. Wallerstein, A. Motyl, B. Buzan, R. Little, A. Watson, M. Beissinger, Ch. Tilly, Th.J. Barfield and M. Doyle, the author argues that GDL was an empire because it was (1) the greatest state in Europe in the late 14-early 15th century, (2) militarily expansive in all directions if not held in check by superior military power, (3) displayed the territorial structure characteristic for empires, consisting of metropole and periphery, (4) had an informal empire and sphere of hegemony, (5) established imperial "Pax Lituanica" on broad territories securing long-distance trade roads. Typologically, it was a patrimonial empire, typologically distinct from the "barbarian kingdoms" created by ancient Germans and Vikings. After the internal crisis in 1432-1440 that is interpreted as "Augustan threshold" (in M. Doyle's sense), the Lithuanian empire evolved into a federal state by the early 16th century. Drawing on the distinction between "primary empires" and "shadow empires" proposed by Th.J. Barfield, GDL is classified as subtype of "shadow empires," called "vulture empires." GDL started as a "vulture empire," using for its expansion a geopolitical situation created by the decline of the Mongol empire and aspiring to unite under its power all lands of the former Kiev Russia. The most important outcome of the failure of the Lithuanian imperial project is the emergence of the three different Eastern Slave peoples (Belorussian, Ukrainian, Great Russian), while the probable outcome of its success would be the continuation of the undivided old Russian ethnicity. Adapted from the source document.

Although the Iraq crisis and the flood disaster largely determined the political agenda at the end of the 2002 federal election campaign, the economic situation was, once again, one of the most important themes in the context of the election itself. This article examines for the period of 1994 to 2002 whether, and in what measure, the electorate's perception of economic conditions played a role in voters' decisions. Empirical results show that judgements of the economic situation in 2002 were noticeably worse than prior to the last two national elections. Few East-West differences are recognisable in perceptions of current general and individual economic conditions. Differences in retrospective or prospective assessments of the economic situation have also fallen. Regarding the attribution of economic problem solving ability, considerable gains are noted for the CDU/CSU, while the trust in the economic competence of the SPD has decreased. Multivariate analyses show that in 2002 the influence of economic variables on individual voting behaviour was not very strong. Significant effects only occurred in West Germany. Besides the evaluation of the general economic situation, perceived economic competence had the most clearly visible electoral impact. (German Politics / FUB)

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into Habermas' theory of deliberative democracy in the context of the present-day debates on the theory of morals & politics. The starting point of Habermas' theory is his idea of discourse ethics. This is cognitivist ethics in the tradition of Kant, Rawis, Tugendhat & Apel that is built around the concept of normative correctness analogous to the descriptive notion of truth. This idea is best expressed by Kant's categorical imperative, according to which the validity of norms depends on their generalizability. Habermas, in line with Kant, is aware of the impossibility to rationally found universalist ethics. Instead of the final (deductive) foundations he offers the reflexion about the assumptions of a meaningful discourse i.e. the argumentation rules that must be respected if language communication is to be meaningful. Habermas' outline of the theory of law in his book Between Facts and Norms (Faktizirat und Geltung) builds on this moral-theoretical position. In modern society the function of law is to facilitate social communication: law is the legitimate framework of social communication on which the actors can rely. Habermas considers the specific link between human rights & popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy. Human rights & popular sovereignty mutually condition each other & at the same time there is tension between them. The absolutization of individual rights makes democracy impossible since decision-making is obstructed; absolutization of popular sovereignty leads to the tyranny of the majority & the loss of rights. Habermas thinks that law can be legitimized by communicational mediation between the individual rights & popular sovereignty, in line with the principle that the claim to validity can only be laid by those norms that are approved of by all potentially affected individuals as rational discourse participants. Popular sovereignty is consistently procedurally interpreted. On the one hand, it is practised by means of public discourses & on the other through decision-making processes within democratically structured political institutions. The two dimensions of legitimizing law are different yet complementary: public discourses take place in civil society, political decisions are made in democratic institutions of the state. This is also an outline of the specific position of Habermas' political theory of deliberative democracy. It is equally distant from the model of liberal democracy which emphasizes possessive individualism & the protection of citizens' private interests, & from the republican democratic model that emphasizes political participation of active citizens. The theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of civil society: It is a sort of a practical verification of discourse ethics. Civil society is a sphere of autonomous public communication that is complementary to state administration but cannot substitute it. Communication power is exercised in the "siege mode" i.e. multiple discourses of civil society should contribute to the rationality & legitimacy of the decisions made by the political system, but do not have to replace them nor expose them to populist pressures. 2 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.