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AbstractIt is well-recognised that cognitive irrationalities can be exploited to influence behaviour. 'Hypernudging' was coined by Karen Yeung to describe a powerful version of this phenomenon seen in digital systems that use large quantities of user data and machine learning to guide decision-making in highly personalised ways. Authors have worried about the societal impacts of the use of these capabilities at scale in commercial systems but have only begun to articulate them concretely. In this paper I look to elucidate one concern of this sort by focusing specifically on the employment of these techniques within social media and considering how it threatens our autonomy in forming moral judgments. By moral judgments I mean our judgments of someone's actions or character as good versus bad. A threat to our autonomy in forming these is of real concern because moral judgments and their associated beliefs provide a critical backdrop for what is deemed acceptable in society, both individually and collectively and therefore what futures are possible and probable.In the first two sections I introduce a psychological model that describes how humans reach moral judgments and the conditions under which it can and cannot be considered autonomous. In the third section I describe how hypernudging within a social media context creates the relevant problematic conditions so as to constitute a threat to our autonomy in forming moral judgments. In the fourth section I explore some practical measures that could be taken to protect moral autonomy. I conclude with some indicative evidence that this threat is not experienced uniformly across all societies, pointing to interesting future areas of research.

Thus, if the Turner‐​Himes amendment were to become law, its digital reach and lack of any kind of FISC review could put at surveillance risk the data of literally millions of Americans—including any current political office holder or candidate, as well as their staff, constituents, or donors.

4/22/1992: Planned Parenthood v. Casey argued.

3/22/1957: Justice Charles Whittaker takes oath.

1/22/1890: Hans v. State of Louisiana argued.

2/22/2005: Kelo v. City of New London argued

In May 1944, at the age of 33, the lawyer and writer Ottó Kornis was crammed into a cattle car in his native Transylvanian town, Kolozsvár (in Romanian: Cluj; after 1974: Cluj-Napoca) with 72 of his fellow Jewish citizens, his parents included. They were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau. His parents were murdered upon arrival. Out of all the passengers in that cattle car, only he and four other Jews survived the hell of the death and forced labour camps. As soon as he returned home, he wrote a book about his experience titled Smoke ( Füst), which was published in November 1945 in Cluj by the Minerva Literary and Printing Institute and was one of the very first books about the Nazi camps. The present study deals with Kornis' career and fate from the early years of his youth until his death at the age of 38, only four years after the end of the war. It is a microhistory that explores the career and work of a celebrated and award-winning, then completely forgotten author. His life story reveals the central problems that preoccupied most of the survivors who returned from the Nazi camps to multi-ethnic Transylvania; it also helps to document the literary memorialisation of the Holocaust during the early post-war period.

"This book argues that moral rights provisions in copyright law rest on a misunderstanding, or romanticization, of the role of the author. The romantic conception of authorship, as a lone genius, creating from nothing, sensitive and vulnerable, has helped publishers push for strong copyright reform. But is this conception borne out in practice - especially in a world of meme culture, of artificial intelligence generated art and poetry, and of open source and fan fiction? This book probes the romantic vignette of the author through its legal adoption. Moral rights are rights that attach to the non-economic - for example, intellectual or emotional - interests of an author in their work. Much like defamation, moral rights see the right of reputation as superior to the right of freedom of expression. However, unlike defamation, moral rights are not protecting against defamatory actions against a person. In most jurisdictions, they are provisions set within copyright regimes; regimes whose purpose is to incentivize innovation. Challenging the way we think about authorship and how it should be protected by law, the book draws on a wide range of historical and contemporary examples to demonstrate how moral rights can constitute a barrier to transformative creativity. While authors and artists require strong rights to protect their ability to earn an income and incentivise creativity, moral rights, the book argues, may in turn actually harm their ability to do so. This timely criticism of moral rights will appeal to researchers, students, policy makers and lawyers working in the area of intellectual property law, as well as legal theorists, sociolegal scholars and legal historians with relevant interests"--