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SUMMARY: Taking as its point of departure the 2015 "decommunization" legislation in Ukraine, this article looks at the transformation of historical memory in that republic from the late 1980s to the present. The author argues that the new canon of national heroes developed through the gradual transformation rather than the radical rejection of Soviet historical narratives, with the Cossacks being the most successful example of a historical symbol supporting a uniting, civic identity for a new Ukraine. Two case studies are used to demonstrate the challenges of merging the nationalist mythologies preserved in the Ukrainian diaspora with the models inherited from Soviet times: that of diaspora-funded films about the Ukrainian insurgents of the 1940s and the cult of the otamans developed by a network of regional historical clubs in central Ukraine. Both projects produced highly divisive historical mythologies that often employed incongruent cultural models reusing the Soviet clichés. Both also constructed an ethnically exclusive vision of Ukraine's past, as opposed to an inclusive, civic one. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent war in the Donbas gave a powerful impetus to the process of memory work in Ukraine, while at the same time furnishing the inclusive, multinational canon of the "Heavenly Hundred," who died for a democratic Ukraine. However, there exists a very real danger that the process of constructing a new Ukrainian historical memory can be hijacked by radical nationalists or discredited by Soviet-style administrative feats. Отталкиваясь от сюжета с принятием весной 2015 г. в Украине "исторических" законов, направленных на десоветизацию общества, статья обращается к проблеме трансформации исторической памяти в республике, начиная с конца 1980-х гг. и до настоящего времени. Согласно автору, новый канон национальных героев сформировался в результате постепенной трансформации, а не радикального оттор-жения советских исторических нарративов. Казаки служат наиболее удачным примером исторического символа, приспособленного для обоснования единой гражданской идентичности новой Украины. Труд-ности совмещения националистических мифов, культивировавшихся в украинской диаспоре, с советским историческим наследием иллю-стрируются двумя историями: о производстве на средства диаспоры художественных фильмов об украинских повстанцах 1940-х гг. и культе "отаманов", продвигаемом сетью региональных исторических клубов в Центральной Украине. Оба проекта предлагают крайне поляризующие исторические мифологии, зачастую использующие несовместимые культурные модели, эксплуатирующие советские клише. Оба формули-руют этнически эксклюзивное видение прошлого Украины в противо-положность инклюзивному, гражданскому. Революция Евромайдана и последующая война на Донбассе дали новый важный толчок процессу работы над исторической памятью в Украине. Они способствовали оформлению нового инклюзивного, многонационального канона Не-бесной сотни, погибшей за демократическую Украину. Тем не менее, сохраняется весьма реальная угроза того, что процесс конструирования новой украинской исторической памяти будет захвачен радикальными националистами или дискредитирован административными усилиями в советском стиле.

The article tells the story of a series of attempts by Russian imperial authorities to codify the customary law of the Kazakh nomads, from the 1780s to the 1850s. Similar projects were undertaken by other colonial powers of the time seeking to integrate local legal regimes into the imperial legal system, thus strengthening control over the colonies. Unlike more successful Russian experiments with standardizing and codifying customary law ( adat ) in the Caucasus, in the Kazakh steppe no officially recognized collection of adats was produced. The main reason for this failure should be sought in the very success of the fieldwork produced by Russian Orientalists, assigned the task of studying Kazakh customary law, and the progress of Russian legal expertise. After the 1830s, Russian jurists began differentiating between tribal customs ( adat s) and Muslim Sharia law as two main sources of local customary law in Asian regions of the empire. The increasingly nationalizing worldview of the regime and the educated society advanced the political agenda of codifying the "national" customs of the Kazakhs while muting the influence of the Sharia as a universalizing ideology – the chief rival to the empire's own universalizing and assimilating policy. At the same time, scholars working on codification projects had realized that in practice Sharia was inseparable from adats and the entire system of traditional administration of justice in the steppe. This brought them repeatedly into conflict with the authorities. The most spectacular instance of such a conflict discussed in the article in details was one between the author of the most comprehensive collection of the Kazakh customary law, Efim (Iosif) Osmolovskii and his supervisor, a renowned Orientalist himself, Vasilii Grigoriev. Aware not only of the intrinsic interconnectedness of adat and Sharia but also of the futility of attempts to distill some universal single "common law" shared by all the tribal and regional groups of Kazakhs, Osmolovskii produced a complex and nuanced compendium of Kazakh legal norms, sensitive to local variations. Grigoriev had his own highly ideological vision of the prospects of eventual Kazakh Russification, and therefore deemed the work of Osmolovskii extremely subversive for the plans of Kazakh assimilation and de-Islamization. When transferred to St. Petersburg, he purloined the collection – the official document commissioned by the government – and all the preparatory materials, making sure that they would never become available to administrators or scholars. The purely theoretical distinction between the Sharia and adat, and the nationalizing and anti-Islamic drive of the Russian authorities resulted in a peculiar politics of reconstructing the pure legal traditions of the Kazakh people as the foundation of their Russified future.

AbstractIn July 2011 what is commonly known as the Wai 262 Report was released. After a protracted series of hearings, dating back to 1997, the New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal has at last reported on the some of the wide range of issues canvassed in those hearings. Three beautifully illustrated volumes contain a large number of recommendations in what is described as a whole-of-government report. This article notes earlier comments on Wai 262 in this journal and reframes what is often known as the 'Maori renaissance' from which this claim emerged in 1991. The Tribunal decided not to discuss historical aspects of the evidence presented, except for the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, as this was not 'an orthodox territorial claim' allowing the Crown to negotiate with iwi for a Treaty Settlement. Of great significance for this readership, the Tribunal staunchly refused to entertain any discussion of 'ownership' claims to Maori cultural property. Rather, the Tribunal focussed on 'perfecting the Treaty partnership' between the two founding peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand. Its report is concerned with the future and with the Treaty of Waitangi when the nation has moved beyond the grievance mode that has dominated the last quarter century. The partnership principles are pragmatic and flexible. Very seldom indeed can Maori expect to regain full authority over their treasured properties and resources. The eight major topics of the chapters on intellectual property, genetic and biological resources, the environment, the conservation estate, the Maori language, Maori knowledge systems, Maori medicines and international instruments are briefly summarised. The author is critical of this Tribunal panel's timidity in refusing to make strong findings of Treaty breach as the basis for practical recommendations—the approach usually adopted in previous Tribunal reports on contemporary issues. The article then notes that the Wai 262 report featured significantly in 2012 hearings on Maori claims to proprietary rights in freshwater resources. It featured not to assist the freshwater claimants, however, but as a shield wielded by the Crown to try to deny Maori any remedy.The low bar of partnership consultations encouraged by the Wai 262 report was congenial for Crown counsel seeking to undermine Maori claims to customary rights akin to 'ownership' of water. The 2012 Tribunal panel, under a new Chief Judge, restrictively distinguished the Wai 262 report and found in favour of Maori rights to water. In conclusion, the article notes the irony of a government following neo-liberal policies in pursuing a privatisation strategy and yet relying on 'commons' rhetoric to deny Maori any enforceable rights to water; and of indigenous people arguing for ownership property rights to frustrate that government's policies.

PurposeThis study aims to statistically investigate the place of the eurozone countries in the framework of the international economy and particularly within the most advanced non Euro‐currency countries; second it attempts to explain the eventual discrepancies in the performing of the eurozone from the most advanced non‐eurozone countries by the weaknesses of some eurozone members. The discriminant analysis as an investigation tool has been chosen as an as unbiased as possible investigation technique. Of course, every discriminant analysis requires classification criteria. The criteria adopted in this study result to more or less the same conclusions.Design/methodology/approachMost econometric studies prefer the popular econometric techniques employing classical regression techniques, while methods of multivariate statistics and non‐linear regressions occupy a minor place as statistical tools. Numerous and multivariate data call for multivariate techniques, which at the cost of losing information and details allow for better a perception of the data structure. Therefore, a great part of the statistical analysis focuses on multivariate techniques and non‐linear regression.FindingsThe study concludes that despite the present budget and debt crisis hitting some major and minor eurozone members the "real" economy of the eurozone posseses a first class place in the World economy – both in relative and absolute terms. During the course of the study effort was paid to balancing the tools of investigation and the fertility of the results, in particular to approach questions such as: what is present condition of the eurozone? How solid are the predictions for a hanging collapse of the euro currency and the eurozone? At the end of the study is given an apercu on the transition of the member countries to the eurozone and their economic status by the end of 2011 tries to soften the fears for the eurozone future.Originality/valueThis study tries to analyze the position of the eurozone countries from an arithmetic/objective perspective, ignoring as much as possible the (geo) political and national interests of the principal countries involved as an effort to check the solidity of the fears. Not all parameters of the economy can enter the study. The author has chosen a few variables, which to their opinion reflect the overall performance of an economy. Parameters relating to financial aspects have nowadays in great degree become autonomous and call for special inquiry. The study seeks to add to econometric studies carried out by national and international institutions and Universities. It mainly concerns the statistical techniques and to treat eurozone as a whole entity vs the rest of the developed non‐eurozone world. Indeed, the study tries to defend the eurozone using objective data against a multitude of gloomy predictions, raised by several world partners, for the performance and the future of the eurozone.

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to put into focus and explain distinctive features of the political developments in Lithuania during second post-communist decade, comparing them with other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and those Central European countries with political systems which resembled most closely Lithuania (Poland and Hungary) by the end of the first post-communist decade. In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice Party has to be classified together with the Kaczynski twins Law and Justice Party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and Gábor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše's New Era in Latvia. They all were right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of new politics. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in Estonia and Latvia, its outcome in Hungary and Poland was the breakup of the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact which was the foundation of the political stability during first post-communist decade. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Orban used the two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated thanks to the collaboration of all, by this time, established and left-of-center populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the European Union and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. Preventing the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the impeachment as stress test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favor of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the left-of-centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.

Our age has confronted no greater ethical, political and institutional challenge than ensuring the protection of civilians, as victims of both war and of mass atrocity crimes. Awareness of the problem of civilian protection is growing and has been accompanied by a much greater evident willingness -- at least in principle -- to do something about it. New paradigms for a new century Two normative advances in this area are, first, the dramatically upgraded attention given since 1999 to the law and practice relating to the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict; and, second, the emergence in 2001, and far-reaching global embrace since 2005, of the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P). There is now more or less universal acceptance of the principles that state sovereignty is not a licence to kill but entails a responsibility not to do or allow grievous harm to one's own people. The international community also bears a responsibility to assist those states that need and want help in meeting that obligation, and a responsibility to take timely and decisive collective action in accordance with the UN Charter. Libya and its aftermath UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing military intervention in Libya to halt what was seen as an imminent massacre, was a resounding demonstration of these principles at work, and seemed to set a new benchmark against which all future arguments for such intervention might be measured. However, the subsequent implementation of that mandate led to the reappearance of significant geopolitical divisions. The Security Council's paralysis over Syria during the course of 2011, culminating in the veto by Russia and China of a cautiously drafted condemnatory resolution, has raised the question, in relation to the sharp-end implementation of R2P, of whether Resolution 1973 would prove to be the high-water mark from which the tide will now retreat. The future for civilian protection The crucial question is whether the new geopolitics of intervention that appeared to have emerged with Resolution 1973 is in fact sustainable, or whether, as suggested by the subsequent response to the situation in Syria, a more familiar, and more cynical, geopolitics will in fact reassert itself. This author takes the optimistic view that the new normative commitment to civilian protection is alive and well, and that, in the aftermath of the intervention in Libya, the world has been witnessing not so much a major setback for a new cooperative approach as the inevitable teething troubles associated with the evolution of any major new international norm. The Brazilian 'responsibility while protecting' initiative, focusing on clearer criteria for and more effective monitoring of the use of force, offers a constructive way forward. Adapted from the source document.

The paper starts by questioning the theory of second demographic transition
(SDT) and its universal relevance in the field of marriage behavior and
family organization in low fertility context, arguing for more differentiated
approaches. With an aim to illustrate the contextual specifics of
post-socialist countries in general and of Serbia in particular, the author
claims that analyzed changes have not just been delayed or incomplete in
comparison to more developed European countries, but shaped by specific
modernization processes, which led to rationally developed strategies in
overcoming structural risks, although, without ideational changes typical to
the theory of SDT. Slow changes in marital behavior and family organization
in Serbia are illustrated in recent sociological (empirical) research
findings. The perceived changes are linked to specific structural risks (war,
slow transformation and enduring economic hardships, weak state and low trust
in institutions, etc) and value characteristics (persistence of materialism
and traditionalism, but with increasing ambivalence). The connection between
structural and ideational changes is considered through social stratification
variable by relying on Coale's model on necessary preconditions for
behavioral changes as well as on social deprivation concept. Having in mind
upper social strata (more educated and better off), the value changes precede
the behavioral that are adapted to economic uncertainty, which still force
more traditional marital and family patterns. Therefore, there is a rank of
different options, from extended family (for a short period at the beginning
of marriage or after divorce) to separated leaving (of married partners) in
parental households (due to refusing the extended family option thus creating
quite specific "living apart together" form), combined with dominant strategy
of prolonging the marriage. Hence, for upper social strata, marriage is still
a universal but negotiable institution since more alternative options
(although attractive and in accordance to changing values) are deemed
irrational (have no obvious benefit). As regards the lower social strata
(less educated and worse off), marriage is more in accordance with their
higher inclination to traditional values, but general value liberalization
legitimizes possible failures (divorces, extra marital births), which, even
if not desired or economically rational, happen due to lower capacity to
command life. For that reason, cohabitations and extra marital births are
more common among actors at the lower end of the stratification ladder. The
paper concludes that adaptive strategies related to traditional patterns of
family organization dominate in Serbia, which might be illustrated by the
fact that every third of one parent families lives in extended families. Even
with significant structural changes (and economic improvements) in Serbia in
the near future it is realistic to expect familism as an influential context,
which suggests the spreading of cohabitation primarily as a pre- marital
option (but more desired than forced).

PurposeWhen coping with complex, but also possibly disruptive and open‐ended social dynamics, the anticipatory system idea, which was developed by Rosen in the realm of physical and biological system observation, remains a reference framework, but one that may need to be reinforced by other theoretical considerations. This paper aims at using a debate that took place in a specific foresight discussion arena on early detection and weak signal analysis, as a constructive epistemic detour to eventually contribute to such a reinforcement of Rosen's anticipatory system proposal.Design/methodology/approachThe author aims at revisiting Rosen's framework with stimulating inputs drawing upon the early detection debates, by first assessing the original concepts brought up by Ansoff in the 1970s and 1980s and its further enhancements by contemporary scholars. A rather constructivist approach is then developed to weak signal analysis, aiming at emphasising the need, in analytical situations involving social system features, for reflexive stages and capacities. Bearing this requirement in mind, the productive value of the "framing" and "meta‐framing" notions is explored, in order to apply them to Rosen's anticipatory systems and possibly contribute to enriching his original concept.FindingsHow effective the framing and meta‐framing couple can be for a series of anticipatory issues is described in a detailed manner and, then more specifically, Rosen's anticipatory system concept is revisited in the light of those inputs, aiming at putting into perspective new options for research and anticipation activities in general.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper is essentially conceptual and based on a rich but disputable detour by early detection and weak analysis issues so as to emphasise key reflexive references and method. However, most of this material is taken from domains rather untypical of Rosennean debates and in addition would need to be completed by a series of supportive cases, but that is beyond the scope and scale of this paper.Practical implicationsThe paper sets clear distinctions and boundaries for when and when not to apply reflexive steps in a foresight exercise, including in the context of rolling out a Rosen type of approach. Research decision making both in the corporate and policy‐making contexts can benefit from such clues and supportive framework conditions.Social implicationsSocial systems are typically complex and involve multiple perspectives and viewpoints; they concern a series of major challenges to be coped with locally or more globally, at environmental, political, cultural or technological level, and in that category of anticipatory endeavor, the framing/meta‐framing epistemic couple may be of great usefulness.Originality/valueAlthough rather conceptual, the detour proposed by the paper aims at creating a reflexive distance and enriched capability to evaluate one's potential biases and blind spots in anticipatory modelling activities.

JPS has always sought to provide a forum for discussion and productive debate on emerging trends in thought regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and its peaceful resolution. It is in this light that JPS offers the following two pieces, without comment or endorsement, in the hope that they might inspire serious academic discussion, perhaps even within the pages of JPS. The editors welcome responses (they may be sent to jps@palestine-studies. org), although for space reasons we cannot guarantee that all of them will be published.
In recent years, faced with a stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Israel's continued creation of facts on the ground, many have started to question whether it is still possible to implement a viable two-state solution, which is the peace process's stated goal. A number of alternative ways forward in the conflict have therefore been suggested that go beyond the usual one-state solution. As part of an exercise of "thinking outside the box," JPS is running two essays that suggest unconventional frameworks for dealing with the conflict.
The first essay, by Swedish diplomat Mathias Mossberg, places the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of a discussion of the concept of sovereignty and its erosion and outlines the basic elements of a "parallel states" structure as a possible vision for the Israeli-Palestinian future. This scenario is currently being studied in the Swedish government-funded "Parallel States Project" at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University. The project, launched in 2008, gathers Israeli and Palestinian academics and thinkers along with international experts to explore the implications of a parallel states structure involving two distinct states, Israel and Palestine, and distinct institutions sharing sovereignty over the entire area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. The project does not pretend to provide solutions or build a model, but to explore the issues and develop the questions that would arise from such a scenario. The project intends to present a first report at a conference in Lund in September 2010.
The second essay, by Israeli scholar Lev Grinberg, starts from a critique of the one- and two-state solutions to suggest an alternative vision including elements of both. The proposed formula is an Israeli-Palestinian Union with different layers of state institutions: a shared administration based on parity representation located in the unified capital of Jerusalem, two separate democratic nation-states, and seven provinces (or federal states) belonging to one of the two nation-states. The author sees this "1––2––7 states" vision of the future as a way of containing the conflict in the absence of an ideal solution.

AbstractThe mechanism of subnational regional and urban economic development has been studied extensively by economists, geographers, town planners and other academics. The existing widely varying theories of regional economic development are insufficient on their own in explaining how a region can develop and prosper. Each theory has evaluated a few facets of regional economic development. Research from these different perspectives is narrow and prevents any cross‐fertilization of research from these diverse theories. Recognition of multiple factors affecting the development process has led the author to create an integrated model of regional and urban economic development. The essay first sets out to describe and explain this integrated model. Each of the components of this new model draws heavily upon seminal work in the field. This model proposes three rings. Each ring is at a different level of abstraction. The determinants of development described in each ring can influence each and every other determinant of development shown in the three‐ring structure. This model recognizes that development in any centre, be it regional or urban, nascent or established, is a composite end result of the complex interplay of all the determinants. The essay then goes on to show how this model can provide a broad holistic approach to regional economic development that can assist researchers in their attempts to understand and link its various theories.Résumé Économistes, géographes, urbanistes et autres spécialistes ont largement étudié le mécanisme de développement économique urbain et régional infranational. Les très nombreuses théories existantes sur le développement économique régional sont insuffisantes à elles seules pour expliquer comment une région peut se développer et prospérer. Chaque théorie a évalué quelques facettes de cette évolution. Les études résultant de ces différentes perspectives ont un champ étroit et empêchent tout enrichissement mutuel des recherches émanant de ces diverses théories. Prenant en compte les facteurs multiples qui affectent le processus de développement, l'auteur a pu créer un modèle intégréde développement économique urbain et régional. Le texte commence par décrire et expliciter ce modèle intégré. Chacune de ses composantes repose en grande partie sur les travaux majeurs dans le domaine. Le modèle propose trois cercles. Chaque cercle se situe à un niveau d'abstraction différent. Les déterminants du développement présentés dans chaque cercle peuvent influencer tout ou partie des autres déterminants du développement appartenant à la structure d'ensemble. Le modèle admet que le développement dans un centre quelconque, qu'il soit régional ou urbain, naissant ou établi, est un aboutissement composite des interactions complexes de tous les déterminants du développement. Est ensuite montré comment ce modèle peut apporter une approche holistique élargie du développement économique régional, capable d'aider les chercheurs à comprendre et relier les diverses théories sur cette évolution.

SUMMARY:
In his essay, Sergei Abashin shares reflections on the volume Central Asia within the Russian Empire . He compares this volume with other volumes published in the series Borderlands of the Russian Empire . Abashin observes that the task of writing histories of different regions of the Russian Empire according to a single plan has failed. The author contends that attempts made in the series to overcome the influence of national narratives were unsuccessful. Proof that national narratives have crept into a new analytical framework is found in the fact that the volume was eventually titled Central Asia , despite the fact that the region had never constituted geographic or administrative unit prior to the twentieth century. Moreover, Abashin contends that putting all the borderlands of the Russian Empire into a single analytical framework conceals imperial diversity and inequitable relations between different borderlands and the imperial center. Though Central Asia briefly fascinated Dostoevsky and other champions of mission civilisatrice , it never occupied a place in governance and symbolic geography of imperial mindscape similar to that of the Caucasus. At the same time, the efforts undertaken in the series to overcome the inertia of past imperial narratives, with their concomitant focus on the imperial center, led to a paradoxical situation in which the center did not merit a separate volume. Still, study of the history of diverse borderlands evokes the image of the center and judging by the various volumes of the series, the imperial center was perceived differently in different borderlands. Reflecting on the volume dedicated to Central Asia, Abashin observes that the period of entry (conquest and incorporation) of new territories into the Empire receives more scholarly attention than periods of ruling routine. This creates an imbalance in the historical analysis of colonialism and pushes historians to rely on the visionary designs of a short heroic period, thus missing the importance of the dissipation of these visions during the longer period of imperial routine. Abashin also describes other imbalances apparent in historical reconstructions of the steppe region and Turkestan, both of which (contrary to historical evidence) are usually taken together and thought of as homogenous colonial peripheries. In conclusion, Abashin defends the view of the steppe region and Turkestan as a peculiar borderland in the Russian Empire, based on a number of historical factors. More to the point, Abashin reminds the reader that the region of Central Asia appears to be a peculiar part of the Russian Empire because its study is contested between two hardly compatible traditions: historiography (or studies of Russian history) and Oriental Studies.

Abstract:On the occasion of the ECJ Decision on preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 16 (1) (a) of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, made in the course of proceeding brought for repayment of sums paid on the conclusion of a contract to acquire a right to use an apartment in Greece on a timeshare basis, the court entertained no doubts as to the obligational nature of the claim. This decision comes at a time when the European Commission is promoting follow-up consultations on the use of immovable property on a timeshare basis, pointing out that the lack of a unified concept as to what is the nature of the product has given way to a constant introduction of new contractual forms designed to evade the guarantees laid down by the Community. Against this background the author finds it appropriate to outline a personal approach to these issues. It is sustained that what lies in the centre of this and a vast number of similar disputes on the subject is insufficient recognition of the actual problems, for which, so far, there are still no satisfactory answers.
Résumé:À l' óccasion de la décision à titre préjudiciel de la CJCE en interprétation de l'article 16 (1) de la Convention de Bruxelles de 1968 concernant, la compétence judiciaire et l'exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, soulevée dans une affaire pendante sur le remboursement des payments fait pour l'achat d?un droit d'utilisation à temps partiel (timeshare) d'un appartement en Grèce, la Cour n'a pas douté de statuer sur la nature obligationelle de cette question. Cette décision arrive au moment où la Commission lance une consultation sur l'utilisation à temps partiel des biens immobiliers parce que par défaut d'un concept uniforme de la nature du produit, des nouveaux contracts similaires au timesharing sont arrivés sur le marché pour exploiter des failles dans la réglementation communautaire. Sur la base de cette donnée, l'auteur fait ici une valoration personnelle de la question abordée. Cette opinion soutient que le motif de ces controverses et d'autres similaires se trouve dans une évaluation souvent erronée des vrais problèmes, auxquels in n'a pas été donné des réponses satisfaisantes.
Zusammenffassung:Der vorliegende Beitrag bezieht seinen Anstoß aus einer jüngsten EuGH- Entscheidung sowie aus Aktivitäten der EG-Kommission im Bereich des Timesharing. Der EuGH hat in der hier besprochenen Entscheidung zu Artikel 16 (1) (a) EuGVÜ den vertraglichen Charakter der Ansprüche aus Timesharing-Verträgen betont. Das Verfahren betraf die Klage eines Käufers eines in Griechenland gelegenen Timesharingobjekts auf Rückzahlung der von ihm bei Vertragsschluss geleisteten Zahlungen. Die EG-Kommission initiiert zur Zeit Untersuchungen zu den Ausgestaltung von Timesharingverträgen in der europäischen Praxis, weil sie davon ausgeht, dass das Fehlen eines einheitlichen Timesharing-Begriffs in Europa den Gebrauch neuer Vertragsformen begünstigt hat, die europarechtliche Garantien umgehen könnten. Der vorliegende Beitrag will darlegen, dass der Ausgangspunkt für den der EuGHEntscheidung zugrunde liegenden Rechtsstreit und viele weitere im mangelnden Bewusstsein um die eigentlichen Probleme des Timesharing liegt, für die nach wie vor keine befriedigenden Lösungen gefunden wurden.

The article discusses the problem that was recently raised in Lithuanian historical literature and public discourse by G. Beresnevicius, A. Bumblauskas, S.C. Rowell: was the medieval Lithuanian state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL) an empire? Traditional historiography did not use concepts of "empire" and "imperialism" in the work on GDL. For Non-Marxist Russian historians, GDL was simply another Russian state, so there could not be Russian imperialism against Russians. For Marxist historians, imperialism was a phase in the "capitalist formation," immediately preceding the socialist revolution and bound to the specific period of world history, so the research on precapitalist empires and imperialism was suspect of anachronism. For the opposite reason, deriving from the hermeneutic methodology, the talk about how the medieval Lithuanian empire and imperialism was an anachronism for Non-Marxist Polish and German historians too, because they considered as Empires only polities that claimed to be successors to Roman Empire. However, the Lithuanian political elite never raised such claims, although theory of the Lithuanian descent from Romans (Legend of Palemon) could be used for this goal. Using the recent work in comparative historical sociology of empires by S.N. Eisenstadt, I. Wallerstein, A. Motyl, B. Buzan, R. Little, A. Watson, M. Beissinger, Ch. Tilly, Th.J. Barfield and M. Doyle, the author argues that GDL was an empire because it was (1) the greatest state in Europe in the late 14-early 15th century, (2) militarily expansive in all directions if not held in check by superior military power, (3) displayed the territorial structure characteristic for empires, consisting of metropole and periphery, (4) had an informal empire and sphere of hegemony, (5) established imperial "Pax Lituanica" on broad territories securing long-distance trade roads. Typologically, it was a patrimonial empire, typologically distinct from the "barbarian kingdoms" created by ancient Germans and Vikings. After the internal crisis in 1432-1440 that is interpreted as "Augustan threshold" (in M. Doyle's sense), the Lithuanian empire evolved into a federal state by the early 16th century. Drawing on the distinction between "primary empires" and "shadow empires" proposed by Th.J. Barfield, GDL is classified as subtype of "shadow empires," called "vulture empires." GDL started as a "vulture empire," using for its expansion a geopolitical situation created by the decline of the Mongol empire and aspiring to unite under its power all lands of the former Kiev Russia. The most important outcome of the failure of the Lithuanian imperial project is the emergence of the three different Eastern Slave peoples (Belorussian, Ukrainian, Great Russian), while the probable outcome of its success would be the continuation of the undivided old Russian ethnicity. Adapted from the source document.