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Representatives of the Polish punk-rock scene were careful observers of political, social and economic unrest in the world since the late 1970s and in the 1980s. A large part of the texts, written at that time, aptly commented on the tragic events in the world. Unfortunately, some of them haven't lost their validity, like the song by KSU entitled 'Liban' ['Lebanon'], or by the band 'Brak' ['The Lack'] entitled 'Na Bliskim Wschodzie wszystko w porządku' ['In the Middle East Everything's All Right']. After 1989, more songs, referring to various old or new threats in the world, were written. Songs, produced within the punk scene, describe the problems of political, economic and social nature, which remain unresolved. Authors, such as Maciej Augustyn, Krzysztof Grabowski, Kazik Staszewski not only point to the genesis of security problems in the world, but sometimes predict the consequences of such events in a broader perspective. Surprisingly, anticipations of some authors who are not political scientists or sociologists, come true more frequently than scientific analyses made by security experts. Suffice it to say that almost at the same time when Fukuyma guaranteed that happiness of humanity would be manifested in liberal democracy, Staszewski and Grabowski warned people of imminent wars, crises, a new division of the world and exploitation. ; Representatives of the Polish punk-rock scene were careful observers of political, social and economic unrest in the world since the late 1970s and in the 1980s. A large part of the texts, written at that time, aptly commented on the tragic events in the world. Unfortunately, some of them haven't lost their validity, like the song by KSU entitled 'Liban' ['Lebanon'], or by the band 'Brak' ['The Lack'] entitled 'Na Bliskim Wschodzie wszystko w porządku' ['In the Middle East Everything's All Right']. After 1989, more songs, referring to various old or new threats in the world, were written. Songs, produced within the punk scene, describe the problems of political, economic and social nature, which remain unresolved. Authors, such as Maciej Augustyn, Krzysztof Grabowski, Kazik Staszewski not only point to the genesis of security problems in the world, but sometimes predict the consequences of such events in a broader perspective. Surprisingly, anticipations of some authors who are not political scientists or sociologists, come true more frequently than scientific analyses made by security experts. Suffice it to say that almost at the same time when Fukuyma guaranteed that happiness of humanity would be manifested in liberal democracy, Staszewski and Grabowski warned people of imminent wars, crises, a new division of the world and exploitation.

".OUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SPOILED, IT REQUIRES IMPROVEMENT AND NOT ALTERATION." JÓZEF ANDRZEJ ZAŁUSKI'S CONCEPT OF THE FUNCTIONING OF CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE NOBILIARY REPUBLIC Józef Andrzej Załuski, bishop of Kiev and the alleged author of Opisanie krótkie niektórych interessów wewnętrznych Najjaśniejszej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w roku 1762 (Brief description of some internal interests of the Eminent Polish Nobiliary Republic in 1762), tried to survey a series of opinions and reflections on the constitutional system of Poland at the decline of the reign of August III of Vettin dynasty and the beginning of reign of Stanisław August Poniatowski. The major element of Załuski's analysis is his attitude toward liberum veto which was one of the most crucial elements of the Polish constitutional system. While perceiving the negative aspect of the abuse arising from the liberum veto, Załuski considered the latter to be the immanent part of the Polish constitution. He therefore regarded the liberum veto as something unavoidable and as something what produced a counterbalance vis-à-vis the voting by majority, the latter being applied in England, Sweden and Denmark. It is easy to observe that Załuski was a firm opponent of the majority vote system. What – in his opinion - was detrimental to the Polish Republic was the absence of the effective implementation of good laws. As a result he did not see any need for the introduction of new constitutional devices. The volume published by the bishop of Kiev assumed, to a large extent, also the shape of polemics conducted by him with Stanisław Konarski and with the treaty of the latter On the Effective Advice.

Following the coup d'état of December 1926, Lithuania found itself governed by the leaders of the Lithuanian Nationalists, Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona. The article discusses Voldemaras' foreign policy during the important for Lithuania years of 1927 and 1928. It was the period of attempted reconstruction of Polish-Lithuanian relations, mainly in the context of Vilnius region, secret negotiations with the Germans to secure additional financial support for the young Lithuanian state, and policy of détente with the USSR which made it possible for Lithuania to gain a powerful ally in the argument with Poland. ; Po zamachu stanu w grudniu 1926 r. na czele Litwy stanęli liderzy partii narodowców: Augustinas Voldemaras i Antanas Smetona. W artykule omówiono politykę zagraniczną Voldemarasa w kluczowych dla Litwy latach 1927–1928. Był to okres próby przebudowy stosunków relacji polsko-litewskich, głównie w kontekście Wileńszczyzny, tajnych negocjacji z Niemcami, mających na celu pozyskanie dodatkowego wsparcia finansowego dla młodego państwa litewskiego oraz polityki zbliżenia z ZSRR, dzięki której Litwa zyskała potężnego sojusznika w sporze z Polską.

Following the coup d'état of December 1926, Lithuania found itself governed by the leaders of the Lithuanian Nationalists, Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona. The article discusses Voldemaras' foreign policy during the important for Lithuania years of 1927 and 1928. It was the period of attempted reconstruction of Polish-Lithuanian relations, mainly in the context of Vilnius region, secret negotiations with the Germans to secure additional financial support for the young Lithuanian state, and policy of détente with the USSR which made it possible for Lithuania to gain a powerful ally in the argument with Poland. ; Po zamachu stanu w grudniu 1926 r. na czele Litwy stanęli liderzy partii narodowców: Augustinas Voldemaras i Antanas Smetona. W artykule omówiono politykę zagraniczną Voldemarasa w kluczowych dla Litwy latach 1927–1928. Był to okres próby przebudowy stosunków relacji polsko-litewskich, głównie w kontekście Wileńszczyzny, tajnych negocjacji z Niemcami, mających na celu pozyskanie dodatkowego wsparcia finansowego dla młodego państwa litewskiego oraz polityki zbliżenia z ZSRR, dzięki której Litwa zyskała potężnego sojusznika w sporze z Polską.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest odpowiedzialność polityczna Rady Ministrów w Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. Zgodnie z konstytucją z 22 lipca 1952 r. rząd odpowiadał przed Sejmem, a na wniosek premiera zmiany w jego składzie mogły być również dokonywane przez Radę Państwa. Autor dokonał analizy wszystkich przypadków odwołania premiera oraz rządu przez Sejm PRL, poszukując odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy w jakimkolwiek stopniu wydarzenia te były podobne do wotum nieufności funkcjonującego w państwach demokratycznych. W Polsce Ludowej zmiany w składzie rządu – co do zasady – dokonywane były przez Sejm, a jedynie wyjątkowo przez Radę Państwa. Głosowanie w parlamencie miało znaczenie jedynie formalne, a rzeczywiste decyzje personalne podejmowane były przez kierownictwo PZPR. Pozycja Sejmu stała się silniejsza w ostatnich latach PRL. Dymisja rządu Zbigniewa Messnera w 1988 r. nastąpiła w wyniku parlamentarnej krytyki, może być więc uznana za typowe wotum nieufności. Autor omawia także obowiązujący w PRL zwyczaj konstytucyjny, zgodnie z którym, mimo że nie nakazywała tego konstytucja, na pierwszym po wyborach posiedzeniu Sejmu premier zgłaszał dymisję rządu. Zazwyczaj nie dochodziło wówczas do istotnych zmian w składzie Rady Ministrów, którą powoływano pod kierownictwem tego samego polityka. ; The article treats about the political responsibility of the Council of Ministers in Polish People's Republic. Due to the constitution of July 22nd, 1952 the government was responsible to the Sejm. Changes of ministers could be done also by Council of the State, but only at the request of the prime minister. The vote of parliament had only formal importance, because the real personal decisions were made by the leaders of Th e Polish United Workers' Party. Th e constitutional position of Sejm became stronger in the last years of PRL. Th e dismissal of Zbigniew Messner's government took place as the result of the parliamentary opposition to this government, so it can be considered as the real vote of no confi dence. The author describes also the constitutional custom, not based on the norms of the constitution, which ordered to the prime minister to declare the dismissal of his government aft er the parliamentary elections, during the fi rst session of new-elected Sejm. Usually it didn't mean important changes in the Coucil of Ministers, which was still led by the same person as the prime minister.