Suchergebnisse

In this paper an attempt is made by the author to assess whether the Self-management Industrial Relations System defined institutionally as a non-conflict pattern has the potentiality to regulate the industrial conflict undoubtedly existing in Yugoslav enterprises; and whether it is in its potentiality for conflict management matched to the American system of industrial relations based on the collective bargaining. Comparative theoretical analysis of the two systems on a number of major dimensions leads to the conclusion that the self-management system is inferior in regard to the potentialities for conflict management than Collective bargaining. This conclusion is even more valid if the great discrepancies between the real self-management organizations and the self-management pattern are taken into consideration. But, the available evidence on strikes in Yugoslavia during the last decade lends no support to such theoretical expectations. It is evident that some forms of conflict management do exist, although the institutional pattern has no built-in mechanisms of regulations at the level of manifest functions. In an attempt to explain the variance between the real course of the industrial conflicts and the theoretical expectations, the author formulates the main hypothesis: the self-management institutional pattern regulates the conflict on the level of latent functions. This central hypothesis is further elaborated into six particular hypotheses issuing form the specific properties of the self-management institutional pattern. These properties are: lack of legitimacy of managerial power and insecurity of managers' status, »political management«, insufficient revindicative orientation of syndicate, co-option of the potential worker leaders into management and the horizontal principle of organization. Examining the efficiency of conflict management at the level of latent functions the author points out some important qualifications: (1) possibility of the omission of catharsis effects after the strike, (2) such a "type of regulation does not lead to the systematic resolving of problems which are at the root of the conflict, (3) conflict management at the level of latent functions does not involve conflict resolving directly at the Working places. In accordance with these qualifications the author does not perceive such a type of regulation of conflict as a possible alternative to the institutionalization of conflict in modern industrial society. Nevertheless it has a great significance for the stability and survival of the global social system such as the one existing in Yugoslavia.

The basic feature and specificity of Yugoslav pluralism are the institutional interest groups. These groups are the elements of the structure of the political system itself, and therefore directly included — institutionally and legislatively in the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. As the enterprise is given a special status in the constitutional political system of Yugoslavia in which it is legally recognized as a political category par excellence, the consideration is here primarily given to the enterprise. Analyzing the results of the interviews with the presidents of Communal Assemblies in Socialist Republic of Croatia and directors of some bigger enterprises in the same republic, the author investigates whether and to what extent the enterprise uses its power and influence in the political process — in what degree it is a policy making factor. The research results show considerable differences between the formal authority and factual power of the enterprises. Although all the enterprises have the same status constitutionally, the real differences are so great, that some enterprises make the policy of communes and even larger regions, and the influence of others is meager. The factor is the economic power. Besides the differences between the enterprises in power and influence, the research results give the evidence to the author's thesis that the enterprises significantly influence the process of political decision making. The actual possibility of the enterprise to act as an interest group is determined by many conditions — some of political and legislative, some of factual nature, primarily: a) by political and legal status in the total system, b) unstable normative structure which is subject to many influences and constant change, c) lack of the more stable criteria that would provide an evaluation of organizations and individuals according to their results, and last but not least; d) democratization of the system itself which is becoming more open to the expression of different interests and actions of interest groups. Finally, author examines some relevant theoretical and political aspects of the strike as a mean of the political pressure in the self-management system in Yugoslavia.

There are varied institutional forms (formal and informal) in which electoral (political) subjects take part in elections. Elections for assemblies show that the actions of such subjects are differently motivated, and also that their approach during conflict or cooperation in the realization of their wishes is different. Thus conflict situations, »election scandals«, occur sporadically. Such conflicts are an expression and a result of contradictory desires and actions of the participants. The significance and effect of an electoral conflict is conditioned and determined by the (political) significance of the elections themselves, not only in the sense that they are formally one of the basic constitutive elements of the political system, but first and foremost because they are the form in which citizens are active in politics. Following the procedure in election the author has tried to reveal the basic actors in electoral conflicts, the content of their conflict and the form it takes. In the author's opinion it is wrong to pass an a priori judgement of the character and value of electoral »cases« (negative judgements have usually been passed), the foundation of the conflict and the character and orientation of the persons involved, who do not seek for affirmation of their political value in the strength of arguments and objective achievement. We can understand and solve the ambivalent character of such conflicts, and the political behavior of their participants, only after studying the case. There will be a smaller number of »cases« and electoral conflicts, and they will be less complicated, the more consistently we free ourselves from varied formal-legal and political restraints, and the more society takes on the characteristics of self-managing and democratic socialism. Conflicts of this type are not the result of democracy. They are the result of its insufficient development or presence, thus making it subject to misunderstanding, searching and abuse.

Using primary sources, the author has described Maček's meeting with Prince Paul and the Prime Minister Stojadinović. The meeting with the Prince was held on November 8, 1936. This meeting paved the way for Maček's later meeting with Stojadinović on Januar 16, 1937 in Brežice (Slovenia). At the meetings various question of external and internal policy were discussed. The Croatian question was the Central problem. The Prince and Stojadinović were of the opinion that it was impossible to change the September 3, 1931 Constitution, and that any agreement about the Croatian question could only be arrived at within the frame of that Constitution. This, in fact, meant retaining the unsatisfactory unitary establishment. Maček's opinion was that the solution of the Croatian question was possible only if the Constitution was abrogated and there was a new constitutional situation, based on a federal state. He proposed a procedure for attaining this new constitution. Although the views of the government and the Croatian opposition for the solution of the Croatian question were different, both sides were interested in maintaining contact, making concessions and pursuing a policy of compromise. Stojadinović's government had enemies on several sides. In such a situation it did not want to make relations with the Croatian opposition worse. That is why this opposition's activity was to a certain extent tolerated. These tactics were a result of the Prince's and Stojadinović's wishes for the government to show itself as following a new political course after the assassination of King Alexander. Maček, on the other hand, wished Stojadinović's government to remain in power because there was a danger of it being pushed aside by forces which upheld the earlier absolutist policy of King Alexander. The relatively tolerant policy of the government made the process of the renewal of the Croatian Peasant Party, and organizations under its influence, easier. Among the Contributiones is the report of the Ban of the Sava banovina on reactions to Maček's meeting with Stojadinović, and also two reports from which are seen Maček's secret contacts (through the Chief of Stojadinović's Cabinet) after the meeting in Brežice. In these reports their mutual wish to continue the policy of reciprocal concessions and compromise is affirmed.

The lndependent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka) was one of the many political parties of pre-war Yugoslavia. Although it was not a large party as far as number o members was concerned, its role, and especially that of its leader Svetozar Pribićević, in the political life of the Yugoslav stace was very important. ln this paper the author deals with the party's foundation, development and activities, shows the characteristics of its programme, and its social and nacional basis. He restricts his exposition to the period of the Vidovdan Constitution, accunting for this by the fact that ater the institution of the dictatorship the organizational work of the party (and of all other political parties) and its activities in further political development had a special quality. The Independent Democratic Party was formed after a group of 14 delegates, with Svetozar Pribićević at their head had withdrawn from the Democratic Party in March 1924. The leaders of the new party stressed from the beginning that the basis of their policy was unitarism and centralism. Since the ideal of unitarism was expressed most strongly in the Vidovdan Constitution, the Independant Democrats emphasized the importance of the full application of that Constitution. This was the foundacion of their coalition with the Radicals and of the formation of the government of the National Block. When the Radicals saw that their agrement with the Independent Democratic Party and the enforcement of the Obznana against the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka) did nat affect Radić's position, they broke off the alliance with Svetozar Pribićević and came to an understanding with Stjepan Radić. The Independent Democratic Party then became part of the opposition. Svetozar Pribićević started forming a large, general Yugoslav party, whose nucleus was to be the Independent Democratic Party. Thes did nat succeed. A struggle for unitarism and centralism remained the basic substance and prime aim of his political activities. Being in the opposition, however, he became more and more aware of manifestations of great-Serbian predominence. Realizing that centralism was not creating Yugoslav unity, but, on the contrary, was strengthening great-Serbian hegernony and bringing the country to a serious crisis, Svetozar Pribićević approached Stjepan Radić. Thus a political alliance between the Independent Democratic Party and the Croacian Peasant Party was formed, named the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija). The transformation of the Independent Democratic Party's programme started after the formation of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition. At the beginning a consistent enforcement of the Vidovdan Constitution and a respect for the law were demanded, but soon a demand was made for a revision of the Constitution and even its abolishion. This was expressed in particular after the assassinations in the Nacional Assembly. Before the proclamation of the Dictatorship formulations concerning the reorganization of the state had not been concrete enough, and left possibilities for various different interpretations. But after the manifest of January 6, 1929, the Independent Democratic Party explicitly proclaimed itself for federalism. Svetozar Pribićević himself, after emigrating from the country, even worked for a republican state.