Suchergebnisse

Lorenzo is an intern at the Adam Smith Institute.Some argue that the current UK welfare state discourages people to work, rather than specifically targeting low-income individuals.An example of such policies are the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) and the Income Support (IS) (Niemietz, 2010). As a matter of fact, these welfare-enhancing policies impose elevated implicit marginal tax rates on the most vulnerable segments of the labour market (Blundell et al., 1998; Meghir and Phillips, 2008), essentially functioning as an additional income tax for individuals receiving transfers who strive to go back to the labour market. Consequently, they give rise to detrimental effects on labour dynamics, as clearly highlighted in Table 1. Adam et al. (2006) find indeed that, as the ratio of benefit income without work to disposable income in a low-paid occupation increases, the share of working adults strongly decreases. Despite recognising that there might not be a causal link between the two, the authors conclude that UK benefits might discourage job-seeking and return to work.












































































These policies extend economic support to a significant portion of the population including those who do not necessarily require it, rather than providing incentives for individuals with the lowest incomes to work and escape poverty. As Table 2 shows, government transfers have evolved into a regular source of income across various income levels, as opposed to being limited to those with the lowest earnings (Office for National Statistics, 2020). In 2019-2020, the 5th, 6th and 7th income decile groups, namely the middle and upper-middle class, received a higher percentage of benefits than the lowest decile group. This is mainly because the coverage of a spending programme, as opposed to its net distributional impact, is a much better predictor of its popularity (Niemietz, 2010).












































































The advantages of a Negative Income TaxA negative income tax (NIT) supplements the incomes of the poor by achieving systematic structure of marginal rates, without poverty trap problems or cliff-edges. According to Friedman (1962)'s proposed scheme, at a "break-even" level of income, households pay no income tax (Figure 1). Above this level, households pay tax at constant rate on each additional pound while, below this level, they receive a payment of such rate for each pound by which income falls short of the breakeven level tax. This net benefit can therefore be considered a "negative" income tax as it makes the income tax symmetrical. Under such a proposal, some households would now pay no taxes, others would pay less taxes than before while other households with relatively high incomes would be unaffected (Tobin et al., 1967). NIT's main advantages are therefore claimed to be reducing poverty, supplementing the incomes of low-income earners, reducing expenditure on social security, welfare and administrative costs as well as contributing to the development of social capital (Humphreys, 2001).












































































Empirical EvidenceFrom 1968 to 1980, the U.S. Government conducted four experiments on the NIT, while the Canadian government conducted one, aiming to evaluate the policy's effectiveness and economic viability. Some scholars argued in favour of the policy's success as the experiments did not find any evidence suggesting that a NIT would cause a portion of the population to withdraw from the labour force (Robins, 1985; Burtless, 1986; Keeley, 1981). On the other hand, some scholars declared the failure of the policy based on two main arguments. First, there was a statistically significant work disincentive effect for some subgroups such as primary earners in two-parent families, allowing scholars to conclude that a NIT discourages certain people to work. Second, the work disincentive would increase the cost of the program of about 10 to 200% over what it would have been if work hours were unaffected by the NIT (Rees and Watts, 1975; Ashenfelter, 1978; Burtless, 1986; Betson et al., 1980; Betson and Greenberg, 1983). Despite its theoretical economic advantages - reducing poverty by supplementing the incomes of low-income earners until they reach better paid work as well as lowering expenditure on benefits payments, welfare and administrative costs - further field research is required to assess NIT overall efficiency and economic feasibility.BibliographyAdam, S., Brewer, M. and Shephard, A. (2006) 'Financial work incentives in Britain: Comparisons over time and between family types', Working Paper 06/2006, Institute for Fiscal Studies.Ashenfelter, O., 1978. The labor supply response of wage earners. In: Palmer, J.L., Pechman, J.A. (Eds.), Welfare in Rural Areas. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.Betson, D., Greenberg, D., (1983). Uses of microsimulation in applied poverty research. In: Goldstein, R., Sacks, S.M. (Eds.), Applied Policy Research. Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ.Betson, D., Greenburg, D., Kasten, R., (1980). A microsimulation model for analyzing alternative welfare reform proposals: an application to the program for better jobs and income. In: Haveman, R., Hollenbeck, K. (Eds.), Microeonomic Simulation Models for Public Policy Analysis, vol. 1. Academic Press, New York.Blundell, R.; Duncan A., Meghir, A., (1998) 'Estimating labor supply responses using tax reforms', Econometrica, 66, 4, 827-861.Burtless, G., (1986). The work response to a guaranteed income. A survey of experimental evidence. In: Munnell, A.H. (Ed.), Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, BostonFriedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Humphreys, J. (2001). Reforming wages and welfare policy: six advantages of a negative income tax. Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas, 17(1), 19-22.Keeley, M.C., (1981). Labor Supply and Public Policy: A Critical Review. Academic Press, New York.Meghir, C. and Phillips, D. (2008), 'Labour supply and taxes', Working Paper 08/04, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.Niemietz, K. (2010). Transforming welfare: incentives, localisation and non-discrimination. Institute of Economic Affairs.Office for National Statistics (2020) "Working and workless households in the UK: April to June 2020"Rees, A.,Watts,H.W., (1975). An overview of the labor supply results. In: Pechman, J.A.,Timpane, P.M. (Eds.),Work Incentives and Income Guarantees: The New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment. Brookings institution, Washington, DC.Robins, P.K., (1985). A comparison of the labor supply findings from the four negative income tax experiments. Journal of Human Resources 20 (4), 567–582.Robins, P.K., Brandon, N., Yeager, K.E., (1980). Effects of SIME/DIME on changes in employment status. The Journal of Human Resources 15 (4), 545–573.Widerquist, K. (2005). A failure to communicate: What (if anything) can we learn from the negative income tax experiments? The journal of socioeconomics, 34(1), 49-81.

Global gains in girls' secondary education correspond with declines in early marriage and early childbearing, but this is not transferring to women's employment and leadership. Data from India offer a glimpse into what is holding girls back from the benefits of education.Anita Raj, Tata Chancellor, Professor of Society and Health, and Director of the Center on Gender Equity and Health at UC San Diego, shares results on parental aspirations for children in India. This study was supported by the National Institute of Child Health and Development and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and conducted by UC San Diego, in partnership with India's National Institute of Research on Reproductive Health and Population Council India.A young wife in Junnar Taluka, Maharashtra, India. Photo credit: Charm2 projectTen years ago this week, the International Day of the Girl was established by the UN to prioritize adolescent girls' development, with the initial theme dedicated to ending girl child marriage. At that time, India had the largest number of girls marrying as minors in the world. Girl child marriage prevalence in the country has since been reduced by half — from 45 percent to 22 percent, based on 2005–2006 and 2019–2021 estimates. That's remarkable progress.Keeping girls in secondary school is viewed as a key driver of this reduction. Today, rates of secondary school attendance for Indian girls are high and most recent data indicates the gender gap is closing. In their 2022 Global Gender Gap report, the World Economic Forum ranked India first in terms of women's enrollment in tertiary (higher) education. Nonetheless, the same report showed a national decline in women's equality, largely because of low rates of labor force participation, wage equality, and leadership positioning.The gender gap is worst for adolescent girls and young women in rural areas. Recent data suggests that adolescent boys are five to six times more likely than girls to be employed. This differential is greater for married young people. Young married women also have less control over household earnings than their husbands. Similarly, these young women are less likely than their older peers to report freedom of movement — to go to the market, a health facility, or locations outside of the local community — and less likely than men their age to hold assets such as land or mobile phones, particularly in rural areas.New researchWhat is limiting adolescent girls' transition from secondary education to employment and on to leadership? Data is limited, but traditional gender norms, established early in a girl's development, are likely responsible for the unequal participation and positioning of women in the workplace. The UC San Diego Center on Gender Equity and Health conducted a recent study with couples in a rural district of India that offers some insight into parental expectations on these issues. As part of EMERGE — an open access gender empowerment measurement platform funded by the National Institute of Child Health and Development and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation — the study deployed newly-developed survey measures on parental aspirations for children. The research site reflected a rural, middle class, and largely agricultural population of parents, where education participation for girls and boys is normative but women's employment beyond agriculture is rare.What we foundA gender gap in education aspirations exists at the tertiary education level. While almost all parents aspired for their children to complete secondary education, regardless of the child's gender, parents were more likely to desire a higher education for boy children than girls (54 percent to 46 percent). This gender gap in educational aspirations was more likely to be reported by fathers than mothers.Parents gender the importance of good-paying jobs for their children's futures. Parents largely reported aspirations of college and a good-paying job for their children. However, when asked what is most important to support the happiness and success of a child, separately for girls and boys, parents focused more on good-paying jobs for boys compared to girls (36 percent to 19 percent).No gender gaps in parental aspirations to start families. We found that the majority of parents believed their child should have two children by age 25, regardless of gender. Given strong expectations, in this context, that children should be born in marriage, these aspirations point to a greater chance of young marriages with early childbearing and, consequently, little birth spacing. Interestingly, 18 percent of parents desired no grandchildren from their girl children by age 25, while 20 percent did so for their boy children.What does this mean for girl's leadership?Despite holding more gender equal ideologies and goals regarding the education of their children, parental aspirations for this generation of children are reinforcing traditional norms and gendered expectations. Retention of girls in secondary school may support delayed marriage and first birth, but is not helping girls transition from school to vocation to leadership in a climate of norms that still centralize marriage and family as the follow-up to education.In this context, success for adolescents transitioning to young adults is defined by marriage, and marriage remains an immediate precursor to family creation, mothers' increasing domestic responsibilities, and fathers' increasing pressures for income generation. Would these children choose these lives without the normative expectations and pressures from family and community to marry and procreate? Could there be more space for girls to lead and women to use their education for employment, and for boys to take more space as caregivers for their children, if these norms were reshaped to allow for these choices?To answer these questions, the EMERGE platform has placed more gender norms measures into multinational surveys — in partnership with Afrobarometer, the Violence Against Children Surveys, World Values Surveys, and others — to start assessing and tracking these gendered expectations. We want to determine if in fact transformative change at scale can improve gender empowerment for women and girls. Hopefully, the next decade of progress for the International Day of the Girl will reach beyond indicator advancements to achieve comprehensive, global change for women and girls' full participation and contribution.The value of education for girls' employment and leadership was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Zuerst waren sie plötzlich überall in den größten polnischen Städten zu sehen: junge Leute fuhren mit schneller Geschwindigkeit zwischen den Passanten, sie lagen auf der Mitte der Bürgersteige und piepsten abends im Busch. E-Scooter waren 2019 in Polen vor allem unter jungen Menschen sehr beliebt, verursachten aber auch heftige Diskussionen darüber, wie ihre Benutzung geregelt werden soll. Jetzt, in der Coronazeit, können sie wegen der niedrigen Ansteckungsgefahr eigentlich als eines der sichersten Transportmittel angesehen werden. Lässt sich das auch an den Zahlen erkennen? Wie sieht der Markt in Polen aus und wo liegen die größten Unterschiede zwischen dem polnischen und dem deutschen E-Scooter Markt?Seit 2018 auf dem polnischen MarktDie ersten E-Scooter zum Ausleihen kamen im Oktober 2018 nach Polen, wo das kalifornische Startup-Unternehmen Lime, das unter anderem mit Google und Uber zusammenarbeitet, in einer ersten Testphase in Wrocław seine E-Scooter zur Verfügung stellte, ehe sie auch in anderen Städten aufgestellt wurden[1] (in Deutschland wurden sie im Mai 2019 zum Folgemonat zugelassen[2]). Nachdem Lime die ersten Monate der einzige Anbieter war, kam im März 2019 mit Hive ein zweiter Anbieter hinzu, bevor in den folgenden Monaten immer mehr Anbieter den polnischen Markt "fluteten", denn schon im April kündigte sich mit CityBee bereits der vierte Anbieter alleine für Warschau an. Bereits zu diesem Zeitpunkt stellten sich die ersten Fragen nach der Rentabilität. Allerdings muss man hier in Betracht ziehen, dass sich der Markt gerade erst neu öffnete und die Investoren noch nicht mit Gewinnen rechneten.[3] Ganz ähnlich waren die ersten Entwicklungen in Deutschland. Zwar mussten die Unternehmen länger auf eine Zulassung warten als in Polen, doch auch hier war Lime einer der frühesten Anbieter und der Markt wurde hier zu Beginn ebenso förmlich überflutet. So fuhren auf den Straßen und Bürgersteigen Hamburgs im August 2019 bereits die Roller von 4 Herstellern, während ein fünfter sich gerade ankündigte, ähnliches lässt sich auch für andere Großstädte wie Köln oder Stuttgart sagen.[4] Rechtliches ChaosDoch nicht nur die vollgestellten Bürgersteige sorgten für Diskussionen, die bis heute anhalten. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, wo die E-Scooter eigentlich hingehören, auf die Straße oder auf den Bürgersteig? Diese Fragestellung gibt es zwar auch in Deutschland, dennoch lassen sich im Umgang mit ihr Unterschiede zwischen Polen und Deutschland erkennen. Der grundlegende Unterschied ist, dass in Deutschland die Regulierung schon einsetzte, bevor die E-Scooter auf die Straßen kamen, während sie in Polen unter Regeln fahren durften, die noch vom Ende der 1990er-Jahre stammen. In Deutschland stimmte die Länderkammer am 17. Mai 2019 einer neuen Verordnung über Elektrokleinfahrzeuge zu. Diese Fahrzeugkategorie wurde speziell für die E-Scooter eingeführt und legt die Geschwindigkeit für die Scooter auf 12 bis 20 Km/h fest. Gleichzeitig wurden die Fahrbereiche festgelegt, wonach Fußgängerzonen und Gehwege nicht befahren werden dürfen.[5]In Polen zieht sich die Diskussion um die E-Scooter etwas in die Länge und wird von Kommentatoren als Beispiel dafür gehandelt, "wie langsam die polnische Legislative sein kann". Zwar wurden im Juni 2019 neue Gesetze für die Benutzung von E-Scootern angekündigt, allerdings kamen für den Gesetzesvorschlag nicht weniger als 111 Änderungsvorschläge zusammen. Auch im Jahr 2020 verzögerte sich die Neuregelung, sodass immer noch eine Verordnung aus dem Jahr 1997 in Kraft ist, der zu Folge Benutzer elektrisch betriebener Fahrzeuge so behandelt werden müssen wie Fußgänger.[6]Mitte Juni 2020 wurde zwar von der geplanten Änderung berichtet, es folgten aber keine rechtlichen Schritte. Angeblich sollten die E-Scooter in Zukunft auf den Radwegen fahren, und nur falls solche nicht vorhanden sind, sollten sie die Gehwege mitbenutzen dürfen. Sollte die Höchstgeschwindigkeit auf der Straße aber 30 km/h oder weniger sein und ein Fahrradweg fehlen, sollen die E-Scooter die Straße. Wann diese Regelungen in Kraft treten, ist aber noch offen.Doch nicht nur die Fragen der Verkehrsregelung mussten diskutiert werden. Den anderen großen Streitpunkt stellte die bereits erwähnte "Überflutung" der Bürgersteige dar. Damit ist gemeint, dass zum einen sehr viele E-Scooter im Einsatz sind, die dazu noch häufig unbedacht stehen gelassen wurden und so Gehwege versperrten. Das führte dazu, dass einige Städte auch die Abstellpraxis für die E-Scooter konkreter regelten. Beispielhaft dafür ist Kattowitz, wo die Stadt in Absprache mit den beiden dort operierenden Anbietern 40 Parkzonen eingerichtet hat, wo in Zukunft die E-Scooter abgestellt werden sollten. Dazu wurde an einigen Orten noch zusätzlich die Geschwindigkeit reguliert.[7] Auch Danzig hat in eine ähnliche Lösung mit speziellen Parkzonen gewählt.[8]In Deutschland ist die Abstellpraxis ebenfalls Thema von Diskussionen. So beschwert sich die Herforder CDU-Ratspolitikerin Marion Maw, man müsse "Slalom gehen, um den Elektro-Rollern auszuweichen". Entsprechend werden auch in Herford 88 Stellplätze für Elektro-Scooter eingerichtet.[9] Andernorts setzt man lieber auf großflächige Verbote, wie in Spandau, wo die E-Scooter in der gesamten Altstadt nicht abgestellt werden dürfen.[10]Bei den meisten Anbietern handelt es sich um international agierende Unternehmen. Doch auch polnische Unternehmen sind auf dem Markt aktiv. Ein Beispiel stellt Quick dar, ein Unternehmen, das aus Danzig stammt und in seiner Anfangsphase auch ausschließlich dort vorzufinden war, ehe es als sechster Anbieter seine E-Scooter in Warschau aufstellte.[11] Mittlerweile ist Quick nicht mehr in Warschau aktiv, dafür aber neben der Heimatregion des Unternehmens, also Danzig, Gdynia und Zoppot, noch zusätzlich in Stettin. Ein weiterer polnischer Anbieter, der sich im Jahr 2020 sogar als neuer Marktführer etablieren konnte, ist Blinkee.City. Als einziger Anbieter hat er in der Coronapandemie seine Scooter aktiv gelassen.CoronazeitDie Coronazeit müsste eigentlich die Nutzung von E-Scootern fördern. Als Transportmittel, das Kontakte mit Mitmenschen vermeiden lässt, hätten die E-Roller große Chancen, um noch populärer zu werden. Doch schon im März 2020 zogen sich zwei der größten Anbieter vom polnischen Markt zurück – der Marktführer Lime und auch einer derer wichtigsten Konkurrenten, Bird. Lime stellte vorübergehend in 22 Ländern, darunter neben Polen auch in Deutschland[12], keine Scooter mehr auf, während Bird den europäischen Markt komplett verließ.[13] Die die E-Scooter-Branche wurde zuerst als einer der größten Verlierer der Krise betrachtet.[14] Allerdings konnte sie letztlich doch davon profitieren, dass in Polen im April ein Verbot für die Benutzung von Leih-Fahrrädern in Kraft getreten ist, dieses Gesetz allerdings die E-Scooter nicht erwähnte, sodass diese Lücke von den ersten Anbietern genutzt werden konnte, die dann früher als die Leihradanbieter nach dem ersten Lockdown wieder zurückkehren konnten.[15]In Deutschland sah die Situation gar nicht so anders aus, auch hier zogen sich die meisten Anbieter zurück.[16] Doch wie in Polen auch, hat sich das Geschäft mit dem Abflachen der ersten Welle etwas erholt, sodass in beiden Ländern die Anbieter am Ende des Frühjahrs wieder zurückkehrten. Hier lässt sich feststellen, dass neben Anbietern wie Bird und Lime, die schon vor der Krise präsent waren, auch neue Konkurrenten auf den Markt kommen. Und so weist einigen Berichten zufolge der E-Roller Markt trotz der Coronakrise vielversprechende Perspektiven auf.[17]Dabei ist zu bedenken, dass der Markt noch immer sehr dynamisch ist, sodass auch exakte Zahlen schwierig zu nennen sind. Allerdings lassen sich allgemeine Trends erkennen. So war der polnische Markt 2019 noch stark von ausländischen Unternehmen dominiert. Von 7000 E-Scootern, die im Juli 2019 auf den Straßen zu finden waren, stammten 6000 von Unternehmen aus dem Ausland. Die Coronapandemie hat dazu beigetragen, dass der Markt, zumindest Mitte 2020, zu fast 80% von polnischen Unternehmen bedient wurde, wobei mit dem Markteintritt des französisch-niederländischen Unternehmens Dott, das 1500 neue E-Scooter aufstellte, sich diese Zahlen veränderten. Insgesamt wird davon ausgegangen, dass etwa 15.000-20.000 E-Scooter auf den polnischen Straßen unterwegs sind, also 80% mehr als 2019.[18] In Deutschland standen 2019 insgesamt 30.000 E-Scooter zur Verfügung. Im Jahr 2020 wird diese Zahl alleine von den Städten Berlin, Hamburg und Köln übertroffen, sodass hier auch eine deutliche Tendenz zu erkennen ist.[19]
[1] https://www.rp.pl/Transport/310169923-Rewolucja-w-transporcie-Elektryczne-hulajnogi-wjezdzaja-do-Wroclawia.html


[2] https://www.berlin.de/special/auto-und-motor/nachrichten/5560401-2301467-e-scooter-elektro-tretroller-verleih.html


[3] https://biznes.wprost.pl/technologie/10212442/elektryczne-hulajnogi-problematyczny-rynek-przynoszacy-straty.html


[4] https://www.mopo.de/hamburg/braucht-hamburg-das--noch-ein-e-scooter-anbieter-draengt-auf-die-strassen-33053506; https://www.ksta.de/ratgeber/verbraucher/stiftung-warentest-e-scooter-im-test---hohe-mietpreise--unsicheres-fahrgefuehl-33111000; https://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.verleiher-voi-jetzt-auch-in-stuttgart-zweite-e-scooter-welle-rollt-an.1d870320-191c-40ef-9507-633883ffd5d7.html


[5] https://www.berlin.de/special/auto-und-motor/nachrichten/5560401-2301467-e-scooter-elektro-tretroller-verleih.html


[6] https://moto.pl/MotoPL/7,88389,26353118,hulajnogi-elektryczne-maja-dzielic-jezdnie-z-samochodami-nowe.html


[7] https://motoryzacja.interia.pl/wiadomosci/news-polskie-miasto-chce-zrobic-porzadek-z-elektrycznymi-hulajnog,nId,4807202


[8] https://www.gdansk.pl/wiadomosci/gdansk-reguluje-zasady-poruszania-sie-na-hulajnogach-miejsca-postojowe-i-ograniczenie-predkosci,a,179565


[9] https://www.westfalen-blatt.de/OWL/Kreis-Herford/Herford/4228603-Anbieter-will-weitere-Roller-aufstellen-CDU-Ratsfrau-kritisiert-Abstell-Praxis-Debatte-um-E-Scooter


[10] https://www.morgenpost.de/bezirke/spandau/article230572298/Parkverbot-In-der-Spandauer-Altstadt-sind-E-Scooter-unerwuenscht.html


[11] https://warszawa.naszemiasto.pl/hulajnogi-elektryczne-warszawa-nowy-operator-hulajnog-na/ar/c1-7403982


[12] https://t3n.de/news/e-scooter-e-bikes-lime-bird-1263471/


[13] https://www.komputerswiat.pl/aktualnosci/sprzet/lime-i-bird-zawieszaja-uslugi-w-polsce-elektryczne-hulajnogi-pokonal-koronawirus/p9zy7yl


[14] https://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/artykuly/6464490,koronawirus-taksowki-hulajnogi-rowery-spadek-zawieszenie.html


[15] https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,25838297,koronawirus-rowery-miejskie-zakazane-ale-hulajnogi-wracaja.html


[16] https://www.ksta.de/wirtschaft/corona-raeumt-die-e-scooter-branche-auf-36672580


[17] https://cyfrowa.rp.pl/globalne-interesy/48026-odzyly-elektryczne-hulajnogi-czas-na-nowych-graczy


[18] Ebenda.


[19] https://www.spiegel.de/auto/fahrkultur/was-vom-e-scooter-hype-geblieben-ist-a-b416e889-1151-43c5-b0f1-007d8a3487f8; https://www.businessinsider.de/wirtschaft/es-gibt-30000-e-scooter-in-deutschland-erste-staedte-uebersaettigt-2019-10/

Deutschlands Neuntklässler erreichen bei der neuen PISA-Studie historisch niedrige Testwerte. Was das bedeutet – und warum ein neuer PISA-Schock vermutlich trotzdem ausbleiben wird.






Illustration: Venita Oberholster / Pixabay.






ERINNERT SICH noch jemand an die Aufregung nach der Veröffentlichung der ersten PISA-Studie 2000? Sie war so außerordentlich und so nachhaltig, dass das Narrativ vom "PISA-Schock" prägend
wurde für die deutsche Bildungsdebatte der Nullerjahre. Und einen ungeahnten Bildungsaufbruch markierte. 



 



22 Jahre später ist es passiert. Nach einem langsamen, mühsamen, aber bemerkenswerten Aufstieg bei den Schülerleistungen bis Mitte der Zehnerjahre folgte der umso rasantere Abstieg. Und
jetzt, bei den am Dienstagvormittag veröffentlichten Ergebnissen der achten Pisa-Studie, haben Deutschlands Neuntklässler in zwei von drei getesteten Kompetenzbereichen mit
der historisch schlechtesten Punktzahlen abgeschnitten, schlechter noch als bei PISA 2000, und im dritten nur knapp über den damaligen Werten.



 



Das bedeutet, dass die heute 15-Jährigen im Schnitt maximal so lesen, rechnen und naturwissenschaftliche Probleme bearbeiten können wie ihre Altersgenossen vor zwei Jahrzehnten. Was damals, siehe
oben, einen enormen bildungspolitischen Veränderungsdruck erzeugte. Und heute? Dazu später mehr. Zunächst die wichtigsten Ergebnisse von PISA 2022 im Überblick



 



o In Mathematik erreichten Deutschlands 15-Jährige 475 PISA-Punkte, satte 25 weniger als vor vier Jahren. 30 Punkte entsprechen Bildungsforschern zufolge etwa dem Lernstoff
eines Schuljahres. Damit liegt Deutschland nur noch drei Punkte über dem OECD-Schnitt, was im Gegensatz zu 2018 statistisch nicht mehr bedeutsam ist. Von den erreichten Höchstwerten Mitte
der Zehnerjahre haben sich die Schüler inzwischen rund 40 PISA-Punkte entfernt. Jungen schneiden im Mittel etwas besser ab als Mädchen. Mit Ausnahme von Japan verschlechterte sich die
überwiegende Mehrheit der OECD-Staaten gegenüber 2018. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Japan (536), Korea (527), Estland (510), Schweiz (508), Kanada (497).


Wer hat mitgemacht? Wer hat getestet?


In Deutschland haben 6116 Schüler:innen an 257 Schulen aller Schularten an dem "Programme for International Student Assessment", kurz PISA, teilgenommen, womit die
ermittelten Kompetenzniveaus für die Bundesrepublik insgesamt statistisch repräsentativ sind. Wegen der Corona-Pandemie wurde die turunusmäßige Erhebung um ein Jahr nach hinten geschoben, und es
waren nur halb so viele Schüler bei den Tests dabei wie 2018.



 



Gleichzeitig wurden die Jugendlichen zu ihren Lernbedingungen und Einstellungen sowie ihrer sozialen Herkunft befragt, auch Schulleiter, Lehrkräfte und Eltern
wurden einbezogen.



 



Jede PISA-Runde leuchtet einen Kompetenzbereich besonders intensiv aus, diesmal, im achten Durchgang seit 2000, war wieder die Mathematik
dran. 



 



Weltweit nahmen rund 690.000 Schüler:innen an der Studie teil, sie stammen aus 81 Ländern und Volkswirtschaften. Anders als in den ersten
PISA-




Runden werden die Testaufgaben und Fragebögen seit 2015 am Computer bearbeitet.



 



Der Wert von 500 PISA-Punkten entspricht dem durchschnittlichen Kompetenzniveau aller Teilnehmerstaaten bei der ersten PISA-Runde 2000. Damals erreichte Deutschland
in Mathematik 490, im Lesen 484 und in den Naturwissenschaften 487 Punkte.



 



Verantwortlich für den deutschen Teil der Studie ist das Zentrum für internationale Vergleichsstudien (ZIB), ein An-Institut der TU München (TUM), an dem
außerdem das Leibniz-Institut für Bildungsforschung und Bildungsinformation (DIPF) und das Leibniz-Institut für die Pädagogik der Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik (IPN) beteiligt sind. Als
nationale PISA-Leiterin fungiert  die TUM-Bildungsforscherin und ZIB-Vorstandsvorsitzende Doris Lewalter. Auftraggeber sind Kultusministerkonferenz und Bundesministeriums für Bildung
und Forschung.








o 30 Prozent der deutschen Neuntklässler sind nicht in der Lage, vollständig beschriebene mathematische Aufgaben zu lösen, sie liegen damit unterhalb der sogenannten Kompetenzstufe II . Im
Schnitt aller OECD-Länder gilt das für 31 Prozent. Gegenüber 2018 ist die Gruppe der leistungsschwachen Schüler in Deutschland mit acht Prozentpunkten sehr stark gewachsen, gegenüber 2012 beträgt
die Zunahme sogar zwölf Prozentpunkte. Ihr Anteil ist durch alle Schulformen hindurch gestiegen, auch an Gymnasien, dort von 0,7 Prozent (2012) auf allerdings immer noch niedrige vier
Prozent. Zum Vergleich der Anstieg bei den nichtgymnasialen Schulformen: von 25 auf 40 Prozent. Am anderen Ende der Leistungsskala sind nach PISA-Maßstäben nur noch neun Prozent aller
deutschen Schüler leistungsstark (Kompetenzstufen V und VI) – eine Halbierung gegenüber 2012 (17 Prozent).



 



o Im Fragebogen äußerten die deutschen Neuntklässler 2022 deutlich mehr Ängstlichkeit in Bezug auf die Mathematik als 2012, während umgekehrt die Freude und das Interesse an der Mathematik
sowie die Motivation und die sogenannte Selbstwirksamkeitserwartung bei klassischen Matheaufgaben stark nach unten gegangen sind. Am häufigsten empfinden die deutschen Schüler während des
Mathematikunterrichts Müdigkeit und Langeweile.


"Wir brauchen einen fast schon revolutionären Neuanfang"



Was Deutschlands Politiker, Bildungsexperten und Verbände zu den historisch schlechten PISA-Ergebnissen sagen. (05. Dezember 2023) >>>


o Bei den naturwissenschaftlichen Kompetenzen erreichten die Neuntklässler in der Bundesrepublik bei PISA 2022 noch 492 Punkte, was nur sieben Punkte, aber immerhin noch
statistisch signifikant über dem OECD-Mittel von 485 liegt. 2018 wurden 503 Punkte erreicht. Gegenüber 2012 summiert sich der Rückgang inzwischen auf über 30 Punkte. Jungen und Mädchen schneiden
in etwa gleich gut ab. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Japan (547), Korea (527), Estland (526), Kanada (515), Finnland (511). 



 



o Der Anteil leistungsschwacher Schüler ist in Deutschland auch in den Naturwissenschaften signifikant gestiegen, um drei Prozentpunkte auf 22,9 Prozent, was etwas unterhalb des OECD-Schnitts
liegt. Besonders häufig sind sie mit 31,9 Prozent an den nichtgymnasialen Schulformen anzutreffen (+4,4 Prozentpunkte gegenüber 2018), an Gymnasien befinden sich 2,9 Prozent der Schüler unterhalb
von Kompetenzstufe II, was indes fast einer Verdopplung gegenüber 2018 (1,6 Prozent) gleichkommt. 9,7 Prozent der deutschen Schüler erreichen die Kompetenzstufen V und VI und sind daher als
leistungsstark anzusehen, ähnlich viele wie 2018 (10,0 Prozent) und deutlich mehr als im OECD-Mittel (7,5 Prozent).



 



o Beim Lesen schafften die deutschen Neuntklässler diesmal 480 PISA-Punkte, 18 weniger als 2018 und knapp 30 unterhalb von 2012 – womit Deutschland von der
statistischen Signifikanz her auf den OECD-Durchschnitt zurückfällt. Mädchen erreichen deutlich bessere Ergebnisse als Jungen. Außer Deutschland haben sich 18 weitere OECD-Staaten in den
vergangenen vier Jahren deutlich verschlechtert. International auf den vorderen Plätzen: Irland (516), Japan (516), Korea (515), Estland (511), Kanada (507). 



 



o 25,5 Prozent der deutschen Schüler erreichten beim Lesen nur Kompetenzstufe I und gelten damit als leistungsschwach (+5 Prozentpunkte im Vergleich zu 2018). An den Gymnasien hat sich ihr
Anteil von einem niedrigen Niveau kommend auf 3,8 Prozent der Schülerschaft mehr als verdoppelt. An den übrigen Schulformen liegt er allerdings mit 35 Prozent neunmal so hoch, nochmal
sechs Prozentpunkte mehr als 2018. Das bedeutet laut nationalem PISA-Bericht: "Diese Jugendlichen verfügen nur über sehr eingeschränkte Lesekompetenzen und sind kaum in der Lage,
sinnentnehmend Texte zu lesen, was mit Problemen der gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe einhergehen kann." Die Gruppe der besonders lesestarken Neuntklässler verringerte sich seit 2018 um drei
Prozentpunkte auf 8,2 Prozent – wobei der Rückgang an Gymnasien von 27,3 auf 19,2 Prozent ebenfalls rasant ausfiel. 



 



o Die soziale Herkunft spielte bei den Leistungen in Deutschland, gemessen an den Mathematikkompetenzen, erneut eine größere Rolle als im OECD-Durchschnitt, zumindest bezogen auf
die Berufe der Erziehungsberechtigten und deren sozioökonomischen Status. Allerdings: Werden weitere Faktoren wie Bildungsdauer der Erziehungsberechtigten, das Vorhandensein von Büchern oder die
Anzahl der Computer im Haushalt einberechnet, verschwindet der Unterschied. Die Stärke des statistischen Zusammenhangs (gemeint ist hier der Anteil der aufgeklärten Varianz) zwischen
sozialer Herkunft und Pisa-Leistungen bleibt aber trotzdem über den OECD-Mittel.



 



o Die deutschen Schülerleistungen sind in der Pandemie stärker gesunken sind als in vielen anderen Ländern, vor allem deutlich stärker als im OECD-Schnitt. 71 Prozent der
deutschen 15-Jährigen gaben an, dass in ihrem Schulgebäude wegen der Corona-Krise mehr als drei Monate lang kein Unterricht stattgefunden habe (im OECD-Durchschnitt sagten das 51 Prozent).
Die Auswertung der internationalen Daten zeige allerdings, dass es keinen systematischen Zusammenhang zwischen der Dauer der Schulschließungen und Leistungsrückgängen zwischen 2018 und 2022
gegeben habe, betont die deutsche PISA-Studienleiterin Doris Lewalter. Weiter ergab die PISA-Befragung, dass der Distanzunterricht in Deutschland signifikant seltener mithilfe digitaler
Geräte und viel häufiger mithilfe versendeter Materialien zum selbständigen Lernen ablief. Dass deutsche Schüler gleichzeitig seltener Tipps zum eigenständigen Lernen erhielten und seltener
gefragt wurden, wie es ihnen ging. Und dass Gymnasiasten nach Angaben von Schulleitungen weitaus besser erreicht wurden durch den Distanzunterricht als Schüler nichtgymnasialer Schulen.
"Deutschland war im internationalen Vergleich nicht gut auf den Distanzunterricht vorbereitet, was die Ausstattung mit Digitalgeräten angeht – hat dann aber aufgeholt“, sagt PISA-Studienleiterin
Lewalter.



 



o Jugendliche aus Einwandererfamilien (bis einschließlich zweite Generation) schneiden in fast allen europäischen Staaten schlechter ab. Auffällig ist zudem, dass unter den vier Staaten, die in
wechselnder Reihenfolge die PISA-Spitze unter sich ausmachen, drei sind fast ohne Einwanderung: Japan und Korea, die meist vorn liegen, außerdem Estland, das mit Abstand beste europäische Land.
Dann folgen allerdings mit Kanada schon ein klassisches Einwanderungsland und nicht weit dahinter weitere Staaten mit viel Zuwanderung: die Schweiz, Australien, das Vereinigte
Königreich. 



 



o In Deutschland indes ist der Effekt des Zuwanderungshintergrunds auf die Schulleistungen laut PISA-Forschern überdurchschnittlich stark ausgeprägt. Ihr Rückstand zu
Nicht-Einwanderern erkläre sich zu erheblichem Anteil durch die soziale Herkunft und ihren häuslichen Sprachgebrauch. Gegenüber 2012 hat sich der Anteil der Einwandererkinder auf 38,6
Prozent veranderthalbfacht. Knapp über die Hälfte von ihnen spricht zu Hause Deutsch, von Jugendlichen der ersten Einwanderergeneration tun dies lediglich zwölf Prozent. 16 Prozent der ersten
Einwanderergeneration besucht ein Gymnasium – im Vergleich zu 44 Prozent der Neuntklässler aus Nicht-Einwandererfamilien. Die Ergebnisse der ersten Generation nennen die deutschen PISA-Forscher
"alarmierend": "Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Integration der Jugendlichen der ersten Generation in das deutsche Bildungssystem nicht gelingt. Die pandemiebedingten Schulschließungen der Jahre
2020 und 2021 dürften hier zusätzliche negative Effekte gehabt haben."



 



Wohlgemerkt: zusätzliche negative Effekte. Diese Betonung ist den Forschern offenbar besonders wichtig, und das aus gutem Grund. Denn keinesfalls darf über den vermutlichen Folgen der
Schulschließungen und anderer Corona-Einschränkungen aus dem Blick geraten, dass der PISA-Abwärtstrend teilweise seit einem Jahrzehnt läuft. Die Pandemie habe insofern "eher als Verstärker
bereits bestehender Probleme gewirkt", so formulieren das die Forscher.



 



Womit wir bei der Frage sind, was die Ergebnisse bedeuten – und was aus ihnen folgten sollte. Dazu drei Thesen:



 



1. Die deutschen PISA-Ergebnisse sind so schlecht wie nie, trotzdem droht ein zweiter PISA-Schock auszubleiben



 



Die Zahlen sind – nüchtern betrachtet – dramatisch: In allen drei Kompetenzbereichen fallen die deutschen Neunklässler auf oder unter die niedrigsten Werte zurück, die jemals im Rahmen von
PISA gemessen wurden. Die Anteile der leistungsschwachen und damit besonders gefährdeten Schüler sind seit 2018 durch die Bank gestiegen, teilweise sehr stark. Folgt jetzt ein öffentlicher
Aufschrei, der den des PISA-Schocks nach 2000 noch in den Schatten stellt?



 



Leider unwahrscheinlich. Denn unsere Gesellschaft ist, was schlechte Schülerleistungen angeht, inzwischen abgestumpft. Das hat viel mit den Folgen der Corona-Krise zu tun. Nach einer ganzen
Batterie mieser Studienergebnisse von IGLU
bis zum IQB-Bildungstrend haben Medien und Öffentlichkeit den enormen Lernschaden durch die Pandemie-Maßnahmen bereits "eingepreist", schon auf die letzten Studien reagierten sie nur noch mit
einem Zucken, nach dem Motto: Schade, war aber ja erwartbar und ist nicht zu ändern. Was zwar nicht stimmt, aber scheinbar seine Rechtfertigung dadurch erhält, dass es anderswo kaum besser lief
zwischen 2018 und 2022, Deutschland also quasi im OECD-Geleitzug nach unten gerauscht ist.



 



Paradoxerweise leiden die heute 15-Jährigen, vor allem aber auch die noch jüngeren Schüler, auf diese Weise ein zweites Mal unter der Pandemie – weil sich der Handlungsdruck auf die
Bildungspolitik verringert. Forderungen nach einem grundsätzlichen Ruck könnten mit dem Narrativ von historisch einmaligen Umständen wegmoderiert werden, deretwegen man – ebenfalls anders
als nach PISA 2000 – jetzt nicht gleich bildungspolitisch alles in Frage stellen oder die große Krise ausrufen dürfe.



 



Gegen einen PISA-Schock wirkt zudem, dass die gemessenen Werte zwar niedrig sind wie nie, aber Deutschland mit ihnen noch etwas über dem OECD-Mittel liegt. Das war vor 22 Jahren
anders: Damals befand sich Deutschland mit ähnlichen PISA-Ergebnissen international unter dem Durchschnitt. Was so gar nicht dem damaligen Anspruch entsprach, eine führende Bildungsnation
mit fairen Chancen für alle zu sein. Heute reicht das gleiche Niveau für ein (leicht) überdurchschnittliche internationale Mittelmaß. Indes: Macht es das irgendwie besser? Haben wir noch den
bildungspolitischen Anspruch von einst? Oder haben wir auch diesen längst wegmoderiert? Sind wir zu müde, um noch einmal erschüttert zu sein? Nicht die kurzfristigen Reaktionen auf PISA
2022, die betroffenen Sprüche werden es zeigen, sondern die mittelfristigen, die bildungs- und finanzpolitischen Weichenstellungen der nächsten Monate und Jahre. Und zwar schonungslos.



 



2. Die Zuwanderung nicht als Ausrede nutzen, sondern als Gelegenheit



 



Es ist ein gefährlicher Satz – gefährlich, weil er zu falschen Schlussfolgerungen einlädt: Deutschlands Einwandererkinder ziehen die PISA-Ergebnisse merklich runter. Sie erreichen in Mathe 59
Kompetenzpunkte weniger als Gleichaltrige ohne Zuwanderungsgeschichte, das entspricht zwei Schuljahren. In Lesen ist der Abstand mit 67 Punkten noch größer. Wer das allerdings den
Einwandererkindern und ihren Familien vorwirft, sie womöglich sogar bei den nationalen Ergebnissen rausrechnet, um zu zeigen, wo die Bundesrepublik ohne sie stehen würde, hat nichts verstanden.
Die Wahrheit ist: Deutschland hat sich für Millionen Menschen geöffnet, viele davon Geflüchtete ohne ausreichende Schul- oder Berufsbildung, nun muss Deutschland sich aber auch auf sie und ihre
Bedürfnisse einstellen. Hinzu kommt etwas, was PISA-Studienleiterin Lewalter betont: "Die mathematischen Kompetenzen der Jugendlichen ohne Zuwanderungshintergrund sind im Vergleich zu 2012
ebenfalls geringer geworden – sogar deutlicher als bei den Jugendlichen, deren Eltern zugewandert, die aber selbst in Deutschland geboren sind."



 



Und doch bleibt es eine der wichtigsten PISA-Botschaften: dass es gerade auch in den Schulen bisher nicht ausreichend gelingt, sich auf die Realitäten einer Einwanderergesellschaft
einzustellen. Da nützt kein Lamentieren über die mangelnde Unterstützung durch die Eltern, die nicht vorhandenen Sprachkenntnisse der Jugendlichen – oder gar der Hinweis, dass erfolgreiche
PISA-Länder wie Kanada oder Großbritannien fast ausschließlich hochqualifizierte Einwanderer ins Land lassen. Es sind jetzt alles unsere Kinder, und wir brauchen sie alle: weil die Gesellschaft
dramatisch altert, weil schon jetzt hunderttausende Fachkräfte fehlen – und weil eine vielfältige Gesellschaft besser auf künftige Veränderungen wird reagieren können. Wie groß das Potenzial der
Einwandererkinder ist, auch das hat neulich eine Studie gezeigt: Beim IQB-Bildungstrend standen neben alarmierend schlechten Deutsch-Ergebnissen starke Englisch-Werte –
und gerade eingewanderte Jugendliche schnitten gut ab.



 



3. Deutschland hat Handlungsoptionen, es muss sie nur nutzen



 



Die deutschen PISA-Forscher mahnen in ihrem nationalen Bericht, die 2022er Ergebnisse seien "besorgniserregend und zeigen, dass großer Handlungsbedarf für das Bildungssystem in Deutschland
besteht. Es bedarf entschiedener gemeinsamer Anstrengungen von Bildungspolitik, Bildungsforschung, Bildungspraxis und Zivilgesellschaft, um flächendeckende Maßnahmen auf den Weg zu bringen." Eine
gemeinsame, man könnte auch sagen: eine nationale Kraftanstrengung. Doch schafft die Politik die auch ohne zweiten PISA-Schock?



 



Immerhin haben schon die  IQB-Englischergebnisse gezeigt: Der Unterricht kann so gestaltet werden, dass Schüler mit unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen mitgenommen werden. Deshalb wird die
Unterrichtsgestaltung im Fokus der Bildungspolitik stehen müssen, das umfasst Lehreraus- und Fortbildung genauso wie die Schulentwicklung. Es geht ums Hinschauen, Abgucken und
Weiterentwickeln. 



 



Und da schulischer Erfolg stark mit Sprache verknüpft ist, muss Deutschland dessen Förderung noch absoluter setzen als bislang. Das bedeutet: Ähnlich wie etwa in Hamburg sollte es überall in
Deutschland eine Vorschulpflicht schon für Fünfjährige geben, die in Deutschtests Defizite aufweisen. Denn die Pflicht geht dann in beide Richtung: Die Gesellschaft wird damit
verantwortlich, die Kinder auf einen Sprachstand zu bringen, der ihnen die Bildungsteilhabe erst eröffnet. Also: systematisch diagnostizieren und systematisch fördern.   



 



Richtig ist darüber hinaus, dass mit dem geplanten Startchancen-Programm ein Anfang gemacht werden soll, besonders jene Schulen zu fördern, an denen viele sozial benachteiligte Kinder lernen.
Doch ist das vorgesehene Volumen mit zwei Milliarden pro Jahr und zehn Prozent der deutschen Schulen viel zu klein. Es muss mehr Geld fließen, und es muss noch deutlicher umgesteuert werden
dorthin, wo es gebraucht wird. Nicht zu den Gymnasien und statt dessen besonders in den Kita- und Grundschulbereich. In die Bundesländer, Regionen und Stadtviertel, wo die sozialen
Herausforderungen am größten sind. Das Gegenteil von Gießkanne. Wenn Bildung die soziale Frage des 21. Jahrhunderts ist, dann ist das der entscheidende Teil der Antwort. PISA 2022
akzentuiert sie einmal mehr. 




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Mehr lesen...

This is a special guest post by Kal Munis, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Virginia. Kal is a lifelong Montanan, and is an alum of both Montana State and the University of Montana. I expect to feature his work often here.



With the 2018
midterm elections just a little over seven months away, candidates have begun
to ramp up efforts to distinguish themselves from one another. In addition to
the various typical dimensions on which we might expect those aspiring to
represent us to stress their unique qualifications—such as prior political
experience, policy positions and past accomplishments—there is another
conspicuous characteristic upon which political candidates in Montana attempt
to out-maneuver one another: successfully conveying that they possess an
authentic Montanan identity.

 Typically, candidates try to signal to voters that
they share with them various attachments to the customs, values, and lived
experiences particular to their geographical constituency. They do so in
numerous ways including in video advertisements, mailers, press releases,
emails, social media postings and other campaign media. It should be noted that
these activities don't stop at election day—indeed, many politicians will
continue to cultivate their image of place-based authenticity as a component of
what political scientists refer to as their "home-style."

Candidates in
Montana and elsewhere clearly engage in this behavior cycle after cycle due a
belief in the campaign community that it is an effective practice. In a content
analysis of all video based advertisements that were paid for by campaigns
during the 2012 and 2014 U.S. Senate elections, I found that these types of ads
are widespread throughout the country, with the highest level of usage being
clustered in Western states such as Montana. Despite their seeming ubiquitousness,
it remains unknown whether campaigns' decisions to deploy these appeals are
evidence based or the product of folk-wisdom based inertia.

 Irrespective of their effectiveness, however,
some pundits (and voters—see
the comments on this
ad)
have remarked that excessive hand-wringing over which candidate is the most Montanan borders on xenophobic,
particularly when such concerns are tied to place of birth. At the same time,
however, it seems widely accepted that the success of many candidates in
Montana, particularly Democrats Senator Jon Tester and Governor Steve Bullock
(as well as former Governor Brian Schweitzer), has been largely predicated on
their ability to connect with voters on the basis of place.

In large part, the
mechanism through which this connection has been fostered in Montana, as well
as that upon which many campaign appeals based on place identity are made, is the
candidate's birthplace. For successful Democratic candidates in Montana, it
seems that part of the litmus test has been whether they're a native of the
state. For a recent example, look no further than Governor Bullock's successful
2016 reelection bid against then Republican gubernatorial candidate and current
U.S. Representative Greg Gianforte. In that race, the Bullock campaign was able
to successfully paint Gianforte as an outsider with deep connections to
California and New Jersey. So out of touch with Montana was Gianforte,
according to Bullock's campaign, that he was willing to try to run roughshod
over that which many Montanans hold to be most sacred: public lands. The
narrative was simple: Bullock, a native Montanan, respects and maintains
Montana values, whereas Gianforte—a Californian multi-millionaire by way of New
Jersey—does not. The result, meanwhile, was shocking, as returns revealed that
Bullock defeated Gianforte by 4 points, all while Gianforte's co-partisan in
the presidential race, Donald Trump, crushed his Democratic foe by a staggering
22 points.

As part of the
2018 midterm elections, Tester will defend his Senate seat and multiple
Republicans are competing in their party's primary to challenge him. Currently,
most observers regard Matt Rosendale as being the front runner among these
challengers. And, if recent advertisements are any indication, it would seem
that several left-aligned groups, including the Montana Democratic Party, consider
him to be the front-runner as well.

In a recent
advertisement,
the MTDP makes an overtly place identity charged indictment of "Maryland Matt" Rosendale,
namely that he is an outsider who "doesn't share our Montana values." In the
ad, the MTDP takes a 'don't just take our word for it' strategy by relying
mostly upon statements made by (or on behalf of) prominent Montana Republicans,
as well as upon a compilation of footage of Rosendale himself butchering the
pronunciation of the state he is running to represent in Washington. The statements
(which are attributed variously to current U.S. Senate primary opponent Russ
Fagg, former U.S. House primary opponent and current Secretary of State Cory
Stapleton, and to a PAC that supported Ryan Zinke in the 2014 Republican
primary for the U.S. House of Representatives) all suggest that Rosendale's
non-native born status should be viewed as a deficiency in the eyes of voters. Of
these statements, Stapleton's makes the case against Rosendale's non-native status
most powerfully, stating "we don't need that East Coast value here in Montana,
we don't need somebody from the East Coast representing us in Montana, we need a
Montanan representing us on the East Coast."

This theme, though
in decidedly less antagonistic tone, was on display yet again a few weeks ago in
Bozeman at the Republican U.S. Senate candidate
forum
(not a debate!) put on by the College Republicans at Montana State University.
The forum, which featured Rosendale and his three opponents, Troy Downing (a
fellow non-native from California), Albert Olszewski, and Russel Fagg, saw all
candidates take pains to stress their connections to Montana and demonstrate
their embrace of Montana values. Rosendale and Downing (the non-native
candidates) did so in decidedly apologetic fashion, with the following
statement by Downing being emblematic of the tone: "I've always been a
Montanan, it just took me 31 years to get here." Fagg and Olszewski (the native
candidates), meanwhile made their born and raised Montanan bonafides front and
center from the outset, with Fagg, for example, noting that he "has the Montana
roots, the Montana endorsements, (and) the Montana donations."

It was a portion
of Fagg's closing statement as well as Rosendale's that followed, however, that
really drew my attention. In his last appeal to the crowd in Bozeman that
night, Fagg made his case that his native Montana roots would be critical to
defeating native Jon Tester in 2018. "I'm a fourth generation Montanan…and (my
family) has live and loved Montana since before Montana was a state," he said "[…]
and the reason that's important, I appreciate everyone that has moved to
Montana because they love Montana, but the Democrats are going to unmercifully
beat up two of my opponents because they moved here nine years ago (Downing)
and fifteen years ago (Rosendale). It may not be fair, but it's the truth. If
you put me on that ticket, that takes that argument away from Senator Tester." Fagg
then went on to note that he has to date collected the lion's share of
endorsements from prominent Montana Republicans from well-known names such as
Marc Racicot and Denny Rehberg (Rosendale, meanwhile, has the support of
prominent national Republicans such U.S. Senators Rand Paul and Mike Lee)
before passing the mic to Rosendale.

Fagg's point was
brought into stark relief just moments later when Rosendale mispronounced
"Montana" so badly that even I, a social scientist who studies the role of
place-based identities in politics, couldn't help but to find it grating. In my
defense, it was the contrast of Rosendale's mispronunciation and Fagg's ominous
message regarding the importance of Montana roots in eyes of Montana voters
that made the moment so powerful. And, apparently I wasn't the only one to
notice—the MTDP released the "Maryland Matt" ad just a few days later and
appeared to indirectly reference the forum in a short blurb accompanying the
ad's posting.

Do voters care
about where candidates were born? To begin to investigate this question, I draw
upon data from three different surveys that I have fielded (one in Autumn 2015,
one in Spring 2017, and another in early fall 2017) utilizing Mechanical Turk
samples. All respondents in these surveys reside in the United States. Within
each survey, I included a question asking whether and how important respondents
thought it was that candidates running for Congress in their state had been
born there. In the most recent two surveys, an additional question was asked
regarding whether respondents felt that candidates born in their state were
more likely to understand the values and needs of people in their state.



Table 1: How important do you think it is
for candidates running for Congress

in your state to have been born in your
state?













Fall 2015



Spring 2017



Fall 2017





Extremely Important



25

(5%)





200

(11%)





130

(11%)





Very Important



117

(25%)





368

(20%)





255

(22%)





Moderately Important



136

(29%)





496

(28%)





300

(26%)





Slightly Important



87

(18%)





320

(18%)





232

(18%)





Not at all important



111

(23%)



423

(23%)



229

(23%)





N



476



1,807



1,146







Results for the
first question are remarkably stable across all three samples, as can be seen
in Table 1. In the most recent sample, one third of respondents indicated that
they felt candidate place of birth to be highly important (including both the
"extremely important" and "highly important" categories). A little over a
quarter of respondents indicated candidate place of birth to be moderately important.
Meanwhile, a minority of respondents (41%) indicated that candidate place of
birth is only slightly important or not important at all to them.



Table 1: In general, do you think that
candidates born in your state are better

at understanding the values and needs of
people in your state?











Spring 2017



Fall 2017





Yes



853

(47%)





554

(48%)





No



287

(16%)





144

(13%)





Unsure



667

(37%)





450

(39%)





N



1,807



1,146







            As
for respondents' perceptions regarding whether native born candidates are more
likely to better understand the values and needs of their constituency, a large
plurality in both samples (an average of 47.5%) indicated that they felt this
was the case, with a small minority (an average of 14%) of respondents saying
this wasn't likely to be the case. A large number of respondents in both
samples indicated that they were unsure regarding this question (38%). These
results are presented in Table 2.

            To
further explore responses to these questions, I use various methods (including
ANOVA, OLS, and logistic regression) to model the relationship between
responses to these questions and respondents' partisanship.[1] First, I estimate the
association between how important respondents rated candidate birthplace and respondents'
partisanship while controlling for the influence of other background
characteristics. Results show that, on average, the place of birth of political
candidates is significantly more important to Republicans (by about 25%) than
it is for Democrats even after controlling for the influence of respondents'
level of educational attainment, gender, self-reported recent voting history,
and whether the respondent lived in a rural area. Moreover, further analysis
reveals that Republicans' average importance rating of candidate place of birth
is significantly higher than that of independents as well, though Democrats and
independents do not differ significantly from one another in this respect. Finally,
I model the association between partisanship and perceptions of whether being
born in state imparts upon candidates a special constituency related knowledge
(all while again controlling for a number of other related factors). Results
indicate that Republicans are 4.5 times more likely on average to indicate that
candidates born in their state typically better understand the values and
problems associated with that state.

            Taken
together, these results suggest that many Americans see candidate place of
birth as being an important attribute of political candidates. More
specifically, a majority of people in my sample indicated that it is at least
moderately important that candidates be born in the state that they seek to
represent in Congress, with a full third indicating that they feel it is highly
important. Moreover, a plurality of respondents indicated that they believe
that candidates born in the state they are running in are more likely to
understand the needs and values of their constituency. Results also indicate a
significant association between these considerations and partisanship, with
Republicans endorsing both to a greater extent than non-Republicans on average.
All of this is especially noteworthy considering that these results are derived
from a sample comprising survey respondents from all across the United States.
And, in terms of demographic characteristics, the sample skews slightly younger,
more liberal, and more educated than the American population as a whole—as well
as Montana. So, if anything, I would expect the patterns and statistical
associations described above to increase in magnitude if the sample were one
perfectly representative of Montana.

            Finally,
in relating all of this back to Montana politics, the results presented here
seem to lend some credence to Republican
candidate Russ Fagg's (as well as many others) warning to Republican primary
voters that (in)congruence between where candidates are born and the district
they hope to represent is important to voters—and, at least in this sample,
especially amongst self-identified Republicans. And, since Tester will almost
certainly have to win over a considerable percentage of voters who recently
voted for our Republican president, these results suggest that one fruitful
path for him to do so would be to continue to appeal to voters on the basis of shared
Montana values and identity (as Bullock did in his successful 2016 reelection
bid). Whether and to what degree he is able to do so could very well be
moderated by whether a native-born Republican, such as Fagg or Olszewski, is at
the top of the Republican ticket.

B.
Kal Munis is, amongst other things, a 6th generation Montana native
and alumnus of both Montana State University and the University of Montana. He
is currently a PhD candidate in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at
the University of Virginia. You can follow him on Twitter @KalMunis.










[1] If you want more specifics on the
data and my analyses, please send me an email or leave a comment below.

This guide accompanies the following article: Nikki Khanna, 'Multiracial Americans: Racial Identity Choices and Implications for the Collection of Race Data', Sociology Compass 6/4 (2012): 316–331, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2011.00454.x.Author's introductionIn 2010, approximately nine million Americans self‐identified with two or more races on the United States Census – a 32 percent increase in the last decade. President Barack Obama, the son of a white Kansas‐born mother and Kenyan father, was not one of these self‐identified multiracial Americans. In fact, Obama chose only to check the 'black' box, illustrating that multiracial ancestry does not always translate to multiracial identity. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing body of research examining the multiracial population and key questions have included: How do multiracial Americans identify themselves? And why? This paper reviews this research, with a focus on the factors shaping racial identity and the implications regarding the collection of race data in the US Census.Author recommendsKhanna, Nikki. 2011. Biracial in America: Forming and Performing Race. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.Looking at black‐white biracial Americans, this book examines the influencing factors and underlying social psychological processes shaping their multidimensional racial identities. This book also investigates the ways in which biracial Americans perform race in their day‐to‐day lives.Korgen, Kathleen. 1998. From Black to Biracial: Transforming Racial Identity among Biracial Americans. New York: Praeger.This book looks at the transformation in racial identity among black‐white biracial Americans over the last several decades. She finds that those born before the Civil Rights Era are likely to identify as black, while those born in the post‐Civil Rights Era identify as biracial, black, and sometimes white. She describes the declining influence of the one drop rule on shaping black identities, and the increasing importance of other factors, such as physical appearance.Perlmann, Joel and Mary Waters (eds). 2005. The New Race Question: How the Census Counts Multiracial Individuals. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.This edited volume examines how changes to the race question in the US Census affect how people are counted and the implications for public policy, enforcement of anti‐discrimination laws, and reporting of health, education, and income statistics.Rockquemore, Kerry Ann and David Brunsma. 2008. Beyond Black: Biracial Identity in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Drawing on interview and survey data, this groundbreaking book examines racial identity among black‐white biracial adults. The authors describe a myriad of ways in which biracial Americans understand themselves racially, while also examining why people identify the way they do.Online materialsRace: Are We So Different?http://understandingrace.org/This website explores the common misconceptions about race through several interactive activities.Race: The Power of an Illusionhttp://www.pbs.org/race/000_General/000_00‐Home.htmThis website explores the question 'What is Race?' through several interactive activities.Mixed‐Race Studieshttp://www.mixedracestudies.org/This website is a useful resource for anyone interested in mixed‐race studies. Included here is information about articles, books, dissertations, videos, multimedia, and other resources related to multiracial people.Mixed Folks.comhttp://www.mixedfolks.comThis site provides information about multiracial historical figures and celebrities, as well as links to books, websites, and comics featuring biracial characters.Mixed Chicks Chathttp://www.mixedchickschat.com/This site features an award‐winning weekly podcast about the multiracial experience. Included are approximately 200 episodes of interviews with scholars, activists, journalists, celebrities, and artists.Sample syllabusPart I: IntroductionWeek 1: Defining conceptsRace & Multiraciality as Social Constructs.Spickard, Paul R. 1992. 'The Illogic of American Racial Categories.' Pp. 12–23 in Racially Mixed People in America, edited by Maria P. P. Root. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.Khanna, Nikki. 2011. 'A Note on Terminology.' Pp. ix–xiii in Biracial in America: Forming and Performing Racial Identity. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.Angier, Natalie. 2000. 'Does Race Differ? Not Really, Genes Show.'New York Times, August 22. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/22/science/do‐races‐differ‐not‐really‐genes‐show.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.American Anthropological Association's Statement on Race (1998): http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm.Part II: Historical backgroundWeek 2: Curbing 'Miscegenation' (Part 1)Interracial Mixing in Early America.Anti‐Miscegenation Laws.Zabel, William D. 2000. 'Interracial Marriage and the Law.' Pp. 54–61 in Interracialism: Black‐White Intermarriage in American History, Literature, and Law, edited by Werner Sollors. Oxford University Press.Kennedy, Randall. 2000. 'The Enforcement of Anti‐Miscegenation Laws.' Pp. 140–160 in Interracialism: Black‐White Intermarriage in American History, Literature, and Law, edited by Werner Sollors. Oxford University Press.Kennedy, Stetson. 1990. 'Who May Marry Whom.' Pp. 58–71 in Jim Crow Guide: The Way It Was. Boca Raton, FL: Florida Atlantic University Press.Week 3: Curbing 'Miscegenation' (Part 2)Biological, Religious, Social Arguments.The Role of Eugenics.Tucker, William H. 'Inharmoniously Adapted to Each Other: Science and Racial Crosses.' Pp. 109–33 in Defining Difference: Race and Racism in the History of Psychology, edited by Andrew S. Winston. American Psychological Association.Nakashima, Cynthia L. 1992. 'An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed‐Race People in America.' Pp. 162–72 in Racially Mixed People in America, edited by Maria P. P. Root. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.Visit the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia & read about the 'Tragic Mulatto Myth': http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/mulatto/.Week 4: The politics of racial definitionCounting 'Mixed‐Bloods' and 'Mulattoes'.Williams, Gregory Howard. 1995. Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black. New York: Plume.Morning, Ann. 2003. 'New Faces, Old Faces: Counting the Multiracial Population Past and Present.' Pp. 41–67 in New Faces in a Changing America: Multiracial Identity in the 21st Century, edited by Loretta I. Winters and Herman L. DeBose. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.Davis, F. James. 1991. Who is Black? One Nation's Definition. (Excerpt). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jefferson/mixed/onedrop.html.Week 5: Resistance and subversion to the American binaryIndividual & Collective Strategies.Daniel, G. Reginald. 1992. 'Passers and Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide.' Pp. 91–107 in Racially Mixed People in America, edited by Maria P. P. Root. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.Valdez, Norberto and Janice Valdez. 1998. 'The Pot that Called the Kettle White: Changing Racial Identities and US Social Construction of Race.'Identities 5: 379–413.Maillard, Kevin. 2000. 'We are Black Indians.' Pp. 81–86 in What Are You? Voices of Mixed‐Race Young People, edited by Pearl Fuyo Gaskins. New York: Henry Holt and Company.Read first‐hand narratives of people who 'passed' as white during the Jim Crow Era: http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/resources/lessonplans/hs_es_passing_narratives.htm.Week 6: The 'Biracial Baby Boom'Explanations.The Loving Myth?LISTEN: 'Loving Decision: 40 Years of Interracial Unions.' National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10889047.Spencer, Rainier. 2006. 'White Mothers, the Loving Legend, and Manufacturing of a Biracial Baby Boom' in Challenging Multiracial Identity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Week 7: The multiracial movementPlayers and Agendas.Public Policy Issues.White, Jack E. 1997. 'I'm Just Who I Am.'Time.http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,986278,00.html.Graham, Susan. 1995. 'Grassroots Advocacy.' Pp. 185–9 in American Mixed Race: The Culture of Microdiversity, edited by Naomi Zack. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Spencer, Rainier. 1999. 'The Multiracial Category Initiative.' Pp. 125–60 in Spurious Issues: Race and Multiracial Identity Politics in the United States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Wright, Lawrence. 1999. 'One Drop of Blood.'The New Yorker, July 24, 1994. http://www.afn.org/~dks/race/wright.html.Week 8: Critiquing multiracialitySpencer, Rainier. 1999. 'Thinking About Transcending Race.' Pp. 192–9 in Spurious Issues: Race and Multiracial Identity Politics in the United States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Spencer, Rainier. 2006. Challenging Multiracial Identity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Week 9: Mixed‐race people abroadConceptualizations & Status of Multiracial People.South Africa, Brazil, Australia, Vietnam, Japan, India.Davis, F. James. 2006. 'Defining Race: Comparative Perspectives.' Pp. 15–31 in Mixed Messages: Multiracial Identities in the 'Color‐Blind' Era, edited by David L. Brunsma. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Daniel, G. Reginald. 2003. 'Multiracial Identity in Global Perspective: The United States, Brazil, and South Africa.' Pp. 247–86 in New Faces in a Changing America: Multiracial Identity in the 21st Century, edited by Loretta I. Winters and Herman L. DeBose. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.Murphy‐Shigematsu, Stephen. 2001. 'Multiethnic Lives and Monoethnic Myths: American‐Japanese Amerasians in Japan.' Pp. 207–16 in The Sum of Our Parts: Mixed‐Heritage Asian Americans, edited by Teresa Williams‐Leon and Cynthia L. Nakashima. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Week 10: Intermarriage, multiracial people, and the future of race relations in the USCensus Trends.Future of Race in America?Humes, Karen R., Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. Ramirez. (2011). 'Overview of race and Hispanic origin: 2010.' 2010 Census Briefs. http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br‐02.pdf.Bonilla‐Silva, Eduardo and David G. Embrick. 2006. 'Black, Honorary White, White: The Future of Race in the United States?' Pp. 33–48 in Mixed Messages: Multiracial Identities in the 'Color‐Blind' Era, edited by David L. Brunsma. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Lind, Michael. 1998. 'The Beige and the Black.'New York Times.http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/16/magazine/the‐beige‐and‐the‐black.html?pagewanted=all.Part III: Scholarly researchWeek 11: Identities (Part 1)Methodological Issues in Research.Typology of Identities.Racial Fluidity.Root, Maria P. P. 1992. 'Back to the Drawing Board: Methodological Issues in Research on Multiracial People.' Pp. 181–9 in Racially Mixed People in America. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.Tashiro, Cathy J. 2002. 'Considering the Significance of Ancestry through the Prism of Mixed Race Identity.'Journal of Advanced Nursing Science 25: 1–21.Harris, David R. and Jeremiah Joseph Sim. 2002. 'Who is Multiracial? Assessing the Complexity of Lived Race.'American Sociological Review 67: 614–27.Week 12: Identities (Part 2)Factors Shaping Identity.Implications for Census Statistics.Morning, Ann. 2000. 'Who is Multiracial? Definitions and Decisions'. Sociological Imagination 37: 209–29.Khanna, Nikki. 2004. 'The Role of Reflected Appraisals in Racial Identity: The Case of Asian‐White Adults.'Social Psychology Quarterly 67: 115–31.*Khanna, Nikki. 2012. 'Multiracial Americans: Racial Identity Choices and Implications for the Collection of Race Data.'Sociology Compass 6(4): 316–31.Week 13: Psychological and social well‐beingThe 'Tragic Mulatto' & Other Stereotypes (revisited).Campbell, Mary E. & Jennifer Eggerling‐Boeck. 2006. 'What about the Children? The Psychological and Social Well‐Being of Multiracial Adolescents'. The Sociological Quarterly 47: 147–73.Suzuki‐Crumly, J. and L. L. Hyers. 2004. 'The Relationship among Ethnic Identity, Psychological Well‐being, and Intergroup Competence: An Investigation of Two Biracial Groups'. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 10: 137–50.Phillips, Layli. 2004. 'Fitting in and Feeling Good: Patterns of Self‐evaluation and Psychological Stress among Biracial Adolescent Girls.'Women & Therapy 27: 217–36.Seminar/Project ideasCensus Exercise and Discussion: Have students visit the webpage: http://racebox.org/, which shows what the race question looked like in the U.S. Census from 1790 to 2010. Next, they should visit http://understandingrace.org/lived/global_census.html to see how different countries collect census information about race. After students view both sites, they should answer the following questions: In what years in the US were multiracial Americans counted as multiracial? What types of categories were used? What other countries use multiracial categories and what categories are used? Finally, after reading Lawrence Wright's 'One Drop of Blood' and Rainier Spencer's 'The Multiracial Category Initiative' (see above), pose the following question for class discussion: What are the pros and cons of including a multiracial category in the Census (or allowing Americans to check multiple boxes)? Then ask: Should we even ask Americans their race in the US Census? While some students will emphatically answer 'no!' because they believe the Census categories only serve to reify racial categories and racial divisions, this question should open up an informed debate about the function of the Census and race question.Examining the Politics of Race in Comic Strips: To provide context for this assignment, student should first read the following on‐line excerpt from F. James Davis'Who Is Black: One Nation's Definition: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jefferson/mixed/onedrop.html. Next, have students visit the site: http://www.mixedfolks.com/comics.htm, which features The Boondocks comic strip with a biracial character (Jazmine). Have students read and analyze the 17 posted comic strips and answer the following questions (via class discussion or an out‐of‐class assignment): How is Jazmine's character portrayed? How is blackness portrayed? What message does the artist convey in these comic strips regarding biraciality and internal and external perceptions of Jazmine's race and racial identity?Film and Discussion: Show students the movie, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner– a 1967 film starring Spencer Tracy, Sidney Poitier and Katharine Hepburn, which looks at the controversy surrounding interracial marriage. In the year that the film was released, 16 states still prohibited interracial marriage in the US (although the Supreme Court would abolish these laws in the same year with their landmark ruling in Loving v. Virginia). This film is useful to discuss the controversy surrounding interracial marriage, and how the same scenario might play out in the present‐day.Small Group Activity: Analyzing Anti‐Miscegenation Laws: Before coming to class, have students listen to the following NPR story: 'Loving Decision: 40 Years of Interracial Unions' (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10889047) – it describes the case Loving v. Virginia (1967). Next, using an interactive map of the United States (see http://www.lovingday.org/legal‐map), have students, in small groups, examine and analyze anti‐miscegenation laws in the US prior to the Loving decision. Some questions to have them consider: Which states were the first to make interracial marriage illegal? Which racial groups were targeted in those early laws? By 1913, how many of the then 48 states had anti‐miscegenation laws? Which states made interracial marriage legal? How many states had anti‐miscegenation laws in the year preceding Loving? Students can also click on individual states to see an example of its laws. Looking at the laws, ask students: What was criminalized (e.g. interracial marriage, sex, performing the wedding, cohabitation)? What types of punishments did those who violated the law receive? What racial groups are targeted in these laws? How are racial categories (e.g. black, white) defined in these laws? What do these laws reveal about the social construction of race?

 I spent roughly 48 hours in Vienna, as Erin Jenne, a friend and co-author, invited me to Central European University to give a talk about my ongoing research and to help her grade her class's poster presentations.  It was not my first time to Austria, as I did visit Salzburg during my Eurailpass summer long ago, but it was my first time to Vienna.  Indeed, I am pretty sure Vienna was the only European capital on this side of the former Iron Curtain that I had not visited other than Athens.  And I am pretty sure we will do Greece next year.I am most grateful for the chance to present our work on both legislative and defense agency oversight over democratic armed forces, as I received a bunch of really good questions from both the audience in the room and those watching online that has already caused me to add a paragraph to our essentially complete book.  The ethnic conflict class was a blast to the past as Erin had teams of students compare pairs of situations, mostly across space but some over time, applying theories of ethnic conflict to understand the variation.  It exercised old brain muscles, as I have mostly left that stuff behind when I moved onto civil-military relations. Speaking of ethnic conflict, CEU is in Vienna because it was kicked out of Budapest, Hungary.  George Soros, bogeyman of the far right, essentially pays for CEU, so Orban objected to the school and pushed it out.  It has only been a few years, but enough time has passed that the students of today don't really know the history of the prior situation.  Oh, and the place we ate at after my talk had the most unusual lamp: Since both events were in the evening and my flight got pushed to the
mid-afternoon on Friday, I had time to see the city.  On my first day of
tourism, I hit the two museums near my hotel, both based in a prince's
former set of palaces.  So, it was a two-for--seeing some great art and
walking around a big palace or two.  And, yes, not only is Vienna chock
full of massive buildings but a heap of palaces.  I aimed to walk around
much of the historical center and accomplished that.  Klimt's Kiss was the featuredpiece at the first Belvedere palaceThe second Belvedere palacehad Ukrainian art exhibited  Oh and I found the restaurant that was recommended to me.  I was looking for strudel and found it.I had plenty of time before my flight to go to two more museums--one about the history of Vienna and a modern art museum.  I learned a lot about Vienna in a short period of time.  That there were huge divides between the left wing city and the countryside in the early 1900s that created much tension, for example.  I was surprised at how much anti-semitism was discussed, even going so far as to mention how Austrians tried to duck responsibility by considering themselves the first victims of the Nazis.The wire cutters and wire here are from when Austria and Hungary cut the fences separating the two countries in 1989 which ultimately led to the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of communism and autocracy in Eastern Europe.My timing was good as one of my fave artists had a special exhibit that started on this day I had to do some tourism.  I am not an expert on art, but, yes, I know what I like. Roy Lichtenstein's art has always resonated with me, partly because of my old hobby of collecting comic books, partly because I like art when it is colorful and dynamic, and partly because he had a great sense of humor.  I learned a bit more about him and that he had some sculptures.This trip to Austria was the first of two this month as I am going to spend the end of the month skiing in the Austrian Alps, my first time skiing in Europe.  So, I predict more schnitzel and strudel in my near future.    

Nuclear weapons aren't just a threat to human survival, they're a multi-billion-dollar business supported by some of the biggest institutional investors in the U.S. according to new data released today by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and PAX, the largest peace organization in the Netherlands. For the third year in a row, globally, the number of investors in nuclear weapons producers has fallen but the overall amount invested in these companies has increased, largely thanks to some of the biggest investment banks and funds in the U.S."As for the U.S., while there is, like past years, indeed a dominance, and total financing from U.S.-based institutions has increased, the total number of U.S. investors has dropped for the third year in a row (similar to our global findings), and we hope to see this number will continue to fall in the coming years," Alejandar Munoz, the report's primary author, told Responsible Statecraft.In 2023, the top 10 share and bondholders of nuclear weapons producing companies are all American firms. The firms — Vanguard, Capital Group, State Street, BlackRock, Wellington Management, Fidelity Investments, Newport Group, Geode Capital Holdings, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley — held $327 billion in investments in nuclear weapons producing companies in 2023, an $18 billion increase from 2022.These companies are also profiting from the enormous government contracts they receive for developing and modernizing nuclear weapons. "All nuclear-armed states are currently modernizing their nuclear weapon systems," says the annual "Don't Bank on the Bomb" report from PAX and ICAN. "In 2022, the nine nuclear-armed states together spent $82.9 billion on their nuclear weapons arsenals, an increase of $2.5 billion compared to the previous year, and with the United States spending more than all other nuclear powers combined."American weapons companies are some of the biggest recipients of contracts for nuclear weapons. Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics are "the biggest nuclear weapons profiteers," according to the report. Combined, the two American weapons manufacturers have outstanding nuclear weapons related contracts with a combined potential value of at least $44.9 billion.Those enormous government contracts for nuclear weapons, alongside contracts for conventional weapons, have helped make nuclear weapons producers an attractive investment for American investment banks and funds. "Altogether, 287 financial institutions were identified for having substantial financing or investment relations with 24 companies involved in nuclear weapon production," says the report. "$477 billion was held in bonds and shares, and $343 billion was provided in loans and underwriting."The report notes that while the total amount invested in nuclear weapons has increased, the number of investors has fallen and trends toward firms in countries with nuclear weapons.ICAN and PAX suggest that concentration may be a result of prohibitions on nuclear weapons development for signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a 93 signatory treaty committing to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The report says:The TPNW comprehensively prohibits the development, manufacturing, testing, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance with those acts. For companies that build the key components needed to maintain and expand countries' nuclear arsenals, access to private funding is crucial. As such, the banks, pension funds, asset managers and other financiers that continue to invest in or grant credit to these companies allow for the production of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons to proceed. By divesting from their business relationships with these companies, financial institutions can reduce available capital for nuclear weapon related activities and thereby be instrumental in supporting the fulfilment of the TPNW's objectives.Susi Snyder, managing director of the Don't Bank on the Bomb Project, told Responsible Statecraft that even U.S. banks, like Pittsburgh based PNC Bank, are facing shareholder pressure to divest from nuclear weapons and that the tide may be shifting as shareholders in U.S. companies grow increasingly sensitive to investments in nuclear weapons. "For three years shareholder resolutions have been put forward at PNC bank raising concerns that their investments in nuclear weapon producers are a violation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and that they are not in line with the bank's overall human rights policy guidelines," she said.

  As I wait for my flight across Asia to Germany and then Denmark (civ-mil conference in Copenhagen), I thought I would look back at what I observed and learned from my second trip to South Korea.  The big lesson is that I enjoyed it more the second time.  Sure, the first time I got to check out the DMZ, and I think I had more, clearer interviews, but I wandered a bit further this time, got to see more neighborhoods, and then, went to the other end of the peninsula to very pretty Busan.  I don't know how I missed the night food markets last time or why it took me 1.5 weeks to find them this time.  So, I ended up going out to one with the threat of rain, which then became way more than a threat, last night.  It was great and fun, but wet.  So, next time, if there is one, I will get out to these places earlier and oftener.  What else did I learn this time?What have I learned?With the same kind of plugs as they use in the EU, my Spanish investment in cute plugs has paid off.the cabs are really cheapGoogle maps didn't work well since South Korea has a dispute with google.  So, I downloaded a bunch of Korean apps, which were usable but tricky since, well, some of the text was in Korean.The history of the Korean War underplays that the UN intervention was possible because the Russians were boycotting the Security Council.  I saw only one reference to it in my entire trip at the massive war museum/memorialKoreans are less ambivalent about MacArthur than Americans.  Talking to one retired general, he mentioned Incheon and that gets a lot of play, deservedly so.  That Mac led the forces into a trap and disaster when the Chinese intervened gets much less attention.Speaking of massive war museums, I am pretty sure the Korean one is bigger than any other I have visited.  An old lesson that was repeated: of the various cuisines, I have to say that Korean is not at the top of the list.  I like some of it, but kimchi does nothing for me, and the bbq is just fine.  The chicken is great.  I found myself looking for Indonesian and Japanese food, which is a bit of a clue.I don't know if fall is the season of love, but I saw far more affectionate couples all over the place here than I remember from last time and definitely more than in Japan.   What has changed?Lots more touchscreens to order foodNo BBQ for singles? The Dokdo island dispute with Japan now gets more attention on the train to the airport than at the War Memorial.  It got some there as well, but less than last time.Parties!  When I was here last, the Progressives were in power, and now the Conservatives are.  The politics here seems more polarized now--lots of upset about the 2019 deal with North Korea which reduced South Korean defenses and .... didn't really change North Korean behavior.  I crammed this trip in between a CDSN conference in Ottawa and a civ-mil conference in Copenhagen.  The timing was not great as some of the folks I wanted to talk to were busy with audits.  I also started figuring out what I should be asking my last couple of days.  So, I may have to come back or send a co-author to come here to pick up a few more interviews.  I am glad I came--I enjoyed the trip, the interviews did push me to think more clearly about the project, we definitely are on to something.  And as always, I depend on the kindness of strangers willing to talk to me, and everything is awesome when you are part of a teamThese sharp folks arranged my interviews and served asexcellent interpreters.  Much thanks to all but especiallyto Soyeon Kim (bottom left) for doing all of the heavy lifting and organizing!

It probably won't surprise you to learn that the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal is not composed of a bunch of peaceniks who decry the crimes of the military-industrial complex at every opportunity. But a pro-industry op-ed it ran Thursday — entitled simply, "In Defense of the Defense Industry" — might as well have been written by the public affairs department of Raytheon. If anything, the Journal should be embarrassed for running it.It's a strange piece. Two-thirds of it describes efforts to protest or at least establish distance from the big weapons firms by everyone from protesting students at Harvard to officials of the Heritage Foundation to executives of major investment firms. The author, Ira Stoll, the editor of FutureofCapitalism.com, protests too much, lumping student activists demonstrating against Raytheon with a conservative think tank that has stopped taking arms industry money to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest with firms like Black Rock that offer investment funds free of stocks in major weapons makers. This is not exactly a unified front bent on dismantling the military-industrial complex, although any action that curbs the power and influence of the Raytheons and Lockheed Martins of the world is a welcome step.When Stoll finally gets around to defending the weapons companies, he cherry picks cases where their systems have been used by U.S. allies like Israel and Ukraine. He conveniently forgets to mention how U.S.-supplied weapons have been used repeatedly to bomb and kill Palestinians, much less the role of U.S.-built bombs in attacking hospitals, water treatment plants, ports — even a school bus — in Yemen. The truth is that arms executives — many of whom rake in tens of millions in compensation each year — are not so much immoral as amoral. If there's business to be had, regardless of the character of the client, they're there to sell their wares, no questions asked. Perhaps the greatest irony of the article is that the head of an organization devoted to touting the blessings of capitalism is praising the least capitalist industry in America. The top five weapons contractors — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — split well over $100 billion per year in Pentagon contracts, many of which were awarded without significant competition or basic standards of accountability.In all, over half of the department's $800-plus billion budget goes to private companies. These vast sums are secured in part through the work of the more than 800 lobbyists employed by the weapons industry, many of whom came from top jobs at the Pentagon. The industry may have its problems with cost overruns and performance issues with systems like the F-35 combat aircraft and the Littoral Combat Ship, but its ability to exert its influence to secure taxpayer money is unmatched.The big weapons firms are better at making money than they are at producing affordable, effective systems. As a 60 Minutes investigation revealed earlier this year, price gouging is rampant in the arms sector. In one of the most stunning examples, a former Pentagon procurement official held up an oil pressure switch that cost NASA $328. The Pentagon paid $10,000 for the same item. And it's not just parts. As 60 Minutes noted, "[t]he Pentagon, he told us, overpays for almost everything – for radar and missiles … helicopters … planes … submarines… down to the nuts and bolts."Meanwhile, even as they posture as members in good standing of the "arsenal of democracy," companies like Lockheed Martin are spending tens of billions of dollars buying back their own stock, a practice that has been repeatedly criticized by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.). These financial maneuvers have everything to do with enriching shareholders and top executives, and nothing to do with providing defense capabilities.Yes, America needs the ability to defend itself. But it would be able to do so far more effectively and for far less money if we reined in the power and influence of the military-industrial complex. It's time to put the public interest above special interests when it comes to Pentagon spending and strategy. Eventually, maybe even the Wall Street Journal will come around to recognize that reality. But don't hold your breath.

The men gathered in a graveyard in the dead of night. They wore body armor, boots and carried semi-automatic weapons. Their target lay a mile away, the official residence of the president of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh — a U.S.-trained military officer who seized power in 1994. Those in the cemetery planned to oust him, but within hours, they were either dead or on the run.


One of those killed, the ring-leader and former head of Gambia's Presidential Guard, Lamin Sanneh, had previously earned a master's degree at the Pentagon's National Defense University in Washington, D.C.


Some of the plotters were eventually convicted in the United States "for their roles in planning and executing an unsuccessful coup attempt to overthrow the government of The Gambia on December 30, 2014." Four pled guilty on counts related to the Neutrality Act — a federal law that prohibits Americans from waging war against friendly nations. A fifth was sentenced in March 2017 for buying and exporting weapons used in the failed coup, which pitted two generations of U.S.-trained mutineers against each other.


The State Department doesn't know about any of this — or doesn't want to. A simple Google search reveals this information, but when Responsible Statecraft asked if Yahya Jammeh or Lamin Sanneh had received U.S. training, a State Department spokesperson responded: "We do not have the ability to provide records for these historical cases at this time." When asked about other trainees in other nations that have experienced military uprisings, the response was the same.


Responsible Statecraft has found that at least 15 U.S.-supported officers have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes military personnel from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of the most recent coup in Niger, received U.S. training, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as governors, according to the State Department.


The total number of U.S.-trained mutineers across Africa since 9/11 may be far higher than is known, but the State Department, which tracks data on U.S. trainees, is either unwilling or unable to provide it. Responsible Statecraft identified more than 20 other African military personnel involved in coups who may have received U.S. training or assistance, but when asked, the State Department said it lacks the "ability" to provide information that it possesses.


"If we are training individuals who are executing undemocratic coups, we need to be asking more questions about how and why that happens," said Elizabeth Shackelford, a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and lead author of the newly-released report, "Less is More: A New Strategy for U.S. Security Assistance to Africa." "If we aren't even trying to get to the bottom of that, we are part of the problem. This shouldn't just be on our radar — it should be something we intentionally track."


Shackleford and her colleagues say that the U.S. penchant for pouring money into abusive African militaries instead of making long-term investments in bolstering democratic institutions, good governance, and the rule of law, has undermined wider American aims.


In addition to training military mutineers in Africa, other U.S. security assistance efforts during the war on terror have also foundered and failed. Ukrainian troops trained by the U.S. and its allies stumbled during a long-awaited counteroffensive against Russian forces, raising questions about the utility of the instruction.


In 2021, an Afghan army created, trained, and armed by the United States over 20 years dissolved in the face of a Taliban offensive. In 2015, a $500 million Pentagon effort to train and equip Syrian rebels, slated to produce 15,000 troops, yielded just a few dozen before being scrapped. A year earlier, an Iraqi army built, trained, and funded — to the tune of at least $25 billion — by the U.S. was routed by the rag-tag forces of the Islamic State.


"U.S. policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance," Shackelford writes in the new Chicago Council report. "Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces."

On this day in 1790, the great economist, moral philosopher and social psychologist AdamSmith died. The story is that he was entertaining friends at his home, Panmure House offEdinburgh's Canongate, when he felt unwell, rose and said: "Friends, we will have tocontinue this conversation in another place." He died soon after.It's a nice story, though greatly exaggerated for effect. Adam Smith's religious beliefs are amatter of debate, and it unlikely he believed in an afterlife anyway. Indeed, though he diedseventy years before Darwin's Origin of Species, he was grasping towards an evolutionaryexplanation of why human life, in economics, morality and other areas, seems to serve us ingenerally beneficial ways, without the need for any conscious direction from governmentsor anyone else. As if directed by an Invisible Hand, he wrote, though he knew there was noconscious entity moving that hand. Or Providence, he suggested. How it generated theharmony that F A Hayek would later call spontaneous order was a mystery to Smith, and tohis friend David Hume and other scholars of the age.Smith ordered that, on his death, all his papers should be burned, apart from one essay onThe History of Astronomy. It was not such an uncommon request at the time: people did notwant to be judged on the basis of their random notes and half-though-out jottings. But wewere lucky he spared The History of Astronomy, which is a remarkable essay in thephilosophy of science, advancing a trial-and-error thesis that would not be lost on thetwentieth-century author of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Sir Karl Popper.The fact that Smith wrote on scientific method demonstrates how wide his interestsand his expertise were. As well as the economics for which he is most remembered today, he alsowrote and lectured on the use of language, on the arts, on justice, on politics and on moralphilosophy. In fact it was his first book on ethics, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that in1759 made him internationally famous — and guaranteed him a generous income for lifethat would give him the freedom to think about economics and write his 1776 masterpieceAn Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, which he referred to as hisInquiry, but to us is known as simply The Wealth of Nations.In this, Smith offers an explanation of why, in economics, the spontaneous order ideaworks. For centuries, people imagined that the only gainers in any economic transactionwere those who ended up with the money. But Smith noted that their customers benefitedtoo, by getting goods or services that they valued more than the cash. Indeed, the tradewould not happen unless both sides thought they were getting value from it. To maximisethe creation and distribution of value, he concluded, we need to be facilitating freeexchange — not thwarting it with protectionist measures against foreign imports ordomestic regulations on what and how people are allowed to trade.This simple 'system of natural liberty', explained Smith, was what allowed the spontaneoussociety to flourish and raised nations from poverty to prosperity. It enabled individuals tostrive to 'better their condition', and that of their families. By contrast, regulations and lawswere too often laid down by politicians and their business cronies: to promote their owninterests, most generally in opposition to the interests of the working poor.Smith would have regarded a government that controls nearly half the economy, spendingnearly half the nation's GDP — a concept that he introduced to the world on the very firstpage of The Wealth of Nations — as the greatest tyranny. Taxes, he thought, were anotherway in which established interests skew things in their favour and block potentialcompetition. Taxes, he argued, should be as low as possible, should encourage rather thanrestrict free trade and innovation, and should be simple, understandable and convenient topay. One can imagine what he might have thought of a tax code like the UK's, which islonger than The Wealth of Nations itself, and a regulatory rule book that is even longer.When economic freedom, tempered by Smith's moral virtues of prudence, justice,beneficence and self-control, has been allowed to flourish, it has led to the greatestincrease, and spread, of human prosperity. The free trade era of the nineteenth centuryenriched much of the world and brought humanity cheap food and manufactures. Theglobalisation of the twentieth and twenty-first brought nearly all nations into the worldtrading system and thereby pulled a billion people out of dollar-a-day poverty.Adam Smith's intellectual and practical legacy is plain enough. The issue is whether theworld's governments will ever stop frittering it away.

Статья посвящена рассмотрению дискуссии между А.Я. Гуревичем и Л.М. Баткиным, которая внесла значительный вклад в становление «несоветской» медиевистики. Цель исследования состоит в определении характерных черт полемики между А.Я. Гуревичем и Л.М. Баткиным, ее значения в процессе трансформации эпистемологического поля отечественной исторической науки. Теоретической основой статьи стали принципы интеллектуальной истории. Исследование осуществлено на основе сравнительно-исторического и историко-генетического методов. В настоящей работе проанализированы взгляды А.Я. Гуревича и Л.М. Баткина на ряд методологических вопросов, которые оказались в центре прений между учеными. В публикации делается вывод о том, что рассматриваемый диспут затрагивал вопросы о культурной и социальной сущности личности, о реализации личностью функций внутри общественных структур, о причинах и механизмах изменения культурных ценностей и доминант. Трактовка понятия «личность» определяла выбор подхода к изучению общества. Если для А.Я. Гуревича личность является порождением социально-культурной системы конкретной эпохи, а особенность личности заключается в оригинальном соединении общих черт культуры, то для Л.М. Баткина личностью является индивид, который, руководствуясь общими нормами и установлениями, пропускает их через свое сознание и словно вновь порождает нормы и ценности. Согласно Л.М. Баткину, «осознающая личность» – начало преодоления стереотипов и матриц общественного сознания. В этой связи подход А.Я. Гуревича был нацелен на реконструкцию общественных стереотипов и матриц, определявших поведение людей. Л.М. Баткин анализировал выдающиеся литературные произведения, которые, по мысли ученого, открывают в исследуемой культуре ее изменение и трансформацию. Ряд тезисов, высказанных Л.М. Баткиным в ходе полемики, был воспринят и интерпретирован Ю.Л. Бессмертным, А.Л. Юргановым, А.В. Каравашкиным, И.Н. Данилевским и оказал влияние на формирование их научно-исследовательских программ. Ученые сошлись во мнении, что средневековую культуру необходимо изучать исходя из особенностей развития самой культуры, следует уделять внимание пониманию специфики культурного языка, особенностей мышления и самовыражения исследуемой эпохи, надлежит учитывать уникальные черты культуры и использовать принципы герменевтики в качестве методологической основы интерпретации письменных источников.
he article is devoted to the discussion between A. Gurevich and L. Batkin, who made a significant contribution to the development of "non-Soviet" medieval studies. The purpose of the study is to determine the characteristic features of the controversy between A. Gurevich and L. Batkin and its significance in the process of transformation of the epistemological field of Russian historical science. The principles of intellectual history constitute the theoretical foundation of the article. The study was carried out on the basis of comparative historical and historical genetic methods. The present work analyzes the views of A. Gurevich and L. Batkin on a number of methodological issues that were at the center of the debate between the scholars. The author concludes that the dispute under consideration raised questions about the cultural and social essence of the individual, about the implementation by the individual of his functions within social structures, and about the causes and mechanisms for changing cultural values and dominants. The interpretation of the concept of personality determined the choice of approach to the study of society. While for A. Gurevich, the personality is a product of the socio-cultural system of a particular era and the peculiarity of the personality lies in the original combination of common features of culture, L. Batkin views the personality as an individual who, being guided by general norms and regulations, lets them go through his consciousness and as if generates norms and values again. According to L. Batkin, "the conscious personality" is the beginning of overcoming stereotypes and matrices of social consciousness. In this regard, the approach of A. Gurevich was aimed at reconstructing social stereotypes and matrices that determined people's behavior. L. Batkin analyzed outstanding literary works, which, according to the scholar, reveal change and transformation in the culture under study. A number of points made by L. Batkin during the polemic were perceived and interpreted by Yu. Bessmertnyi, A. Yurganov, A. Karavashkin, and I. Danilevskii and influenced the formation of their research agenda. The scholars agreed that medieval culture should be studied proceeding from the peculiarities of the development of the culture itself; attention should be paid to understanding the specifics of the language of culture, features of thinking and self-expression of the era under study; unique features of culture should be taken into account; it is required to use the principles of hermeneutics as a methodological basis for the interpretation of written sources.

We are probably near the end of the most disruptive phase of the Digital Revolution. The economic and social changes accumulated during the last few decades are comparable, for their relative magnitude, to those of the Neolithic Agriculture Revolution and the modern Industrial Revolution. But they are slowing down. A possible new landscape with more widely distributed prosperity appears on the horizon.The biggest signal for the end of
a period with Big Tech's huge profits is the wave of layoffs in the last few weeks.
Tens of thousands have been fired from Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Twitter,
Facebook, and other companies. Last year's revenues were much smaller than before.
Distracting world-change projects, such as moonshots, delivery drones, the
metaverse, or self-driving cars are discreetly put aside. The golden years are
past.

Meanwhile, the labor market seems
to be self-restructuring and employment rates go up. Do these troubles announce
the end of an "Engels' pause" with stagnated standards of life? If so, it would
mean that improved labor conditions, and higher average and better-distributed
levels of economic well-being might emerge in a foreseeable future.

The Digital Revolution of computers,
the internet, and the World Wide Web have produced fantastic advantages, such
as making possible instant communication via email, smartphones and social networks,
easily available information via digitalized media and TV streams, or dynamic
economic activities by means of e-commerce and professional and business
services.

On the other hand, the new
technologies have fostered the concentration of capital in a few big firms and a
surge of new billionaires. Many jobs became obsolete and unemployment increased
temporarily. The purchasing power of most employees was frozen, or even
diminished. Indirectly, those technological and economic changes have also fostered
territorial cleavages and unparalleled migrations.

It is common knowledge that in
periods of technological innovation, the first who buys a new gadget whose
production has required a huge initial investment pays more. It has happened
for a few decades to eager early consumers of new versions of computers,
smartphones, and any chic novelty. As the industry develops, it can reduce the
costs of production, which permits lower consumer prices and increased sales
and profits. Yet, at some moment, only new technological inventions could
sustain further growth. We may be already in this phase.

These basic mechanisms and stages mimic
the ones of the Industrial Revolution two hundred years ago. For the firstcomers,
a "primitive accumulation" of capital was akin to the colonial system,
including pervasive and highly profitable slavery. Then, a technological
upheaval that was mostly labor-replacing generated huge corporate profits, the
emergence of wealthy tycoons, and a surge in economic inequality.

In Britain, in the first half of
the nineteenth century, productivity or output per worker expanded and the
profit rate doubled, while many people lived in abjection and poverty.
Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx's co-author, described how the British workers' real
wages stagnated and their living conditions worsened in his book The
Condition of the Working Class in England, initially published in German in
1845. However, when Engels' book was published in English, more than forty
years later, the conditions had already changed for the better. The
overexploitation period was over. Between 1840 and 1890, real wages multiplied
by nearly two and a half, in line with productivity. This led economic
historian Robert C. Allen to call the previous period "Engels' pause".

Some economic historians have
suggested parallels with the most recent period of technological innovation and
wage stagnation. The Great Recession initiated in 2008 can be seen as the
beginning of another "pause" in which the condition of workers has
lowered, there has been an extensive redistribution of wealth, and traditional
ways of economic and social development have failed. Yet, the Big Techs'
slowing down and their humble self-revision of unbridled projects may indicate
that the Digital Pause may be over soon.

Like the social benefits derived
from the diffusion of the steam engine, railroads, electricity, and
mechanization, also the dissemination of the digital revolution benefits takes
different times and rhythms in different parts of the world. But, globally, a
new, less unfair and asphyxiating stage seems to be in view.In Spanish in El Pais - click

At the center of this work is the analysis of the consequences of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as - the Iran nuclear deal) on divergent foreign policy approaches as the main indicators of the mismatch in relations between the United States and the European Union during the administration of the 45th US President Donald Trump. While the US unilaterally withdrew from this agreement, EU member states remained in it. The United States and the European Union, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, had completely different definitions of their own national security, insisting on their unilateral security, while failing to redefine the problem in the direction of mutual security. However, in addition, the US and EU member states, although both concerned about their own security due to the possible emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of a complementary approach to the issue had a mutually competing one. Using the case study method, as well as the analytical-deductive method and the content analysis method, the author explains the difference in this approach through the concept of the strategic culture of the US and the EU and concludes that they are a consequence of the different understanding of international relations, but also due to the different identity characters of these two actors. The main thesis of the paper is that the US administration of Donald Trump, with its more realistic and Hobbesian view of international relations, and a different understanding of the US national interest in the Middle East, adopted a different approach to curbing Iran's nuclear armament ambitions compared to the approach of the European Union, which is conditioned by a more liberal and Kantian nature of its view on international relations. With unilateral foreign policy actions, Trump's administration risked causing damage and shaking its own credibility in relations with the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union remains committed to multilateralism and the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal. The subject of this research is the direction of the foreign policy actions of the United States and the European Union, in the period from the unilateral withdrawal of Trump's cabinet from the Iran nuclear agreement on May 8th, 2018, until the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a general of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on January 3rd, 2020 in the Republic of Iraq. The current state and perspective of contemporary transatlantic political relations in the context of unilateral withdrawal will be taken into consideration. In accordance with its new foreign policy agenda and strategy, and more inclined to a realistic view of international relations, the Trump administration risked deeper conflicts and divergence with the European Union over regional security issues. Thus, there was a threat to limit the further deepening and strengthening of the transatlantic partnership with the leading member states of the European Union, especially with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the Republic of France. Additionally, the subject of research will be the patterns of behavior, embodied in speeches and foreign policy actions, which are consistent with the different approaches of the US and the EU to the problem of preventing the theocratic regime in Iran from developing its nuclear program. Accordingly, the focus will be on the period of the Trump administration, which, with its political will to break off with the legacy of the Obama administration, began to perceive Iran as a factor causing instability in the Middle East region. The Trump administration did not ratify the Iran nuclear agreement and continued to act under its obligations, solely because of the unfavorable benefits and a large number of shortcomings for the US. Thus, the paper will analyze whether the US administration of Donald Trump had a concrete foreign policy strategy in relations with the European Union and Iran. Also, the paper will try to answer the question of whether a unilateral or multilateral approach to regional security problems is more fruitful, taking into consideration the question of whether the unilateral approach of the only superpower in the world is more effective or, on the other hand, an international coalition of states is needed to suppress the Tehran's nuclear ambitions.