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Deviant behaviour is one of the most precise barometers of the social, economic, political and moral climate in a society. In this article the author analyses different forms of deviant behaviour in St Petersburg including violent crime, property crime, suicide and drug and alcohol addiction. Two stages in the dynamics of social deviation are identified during the transition period from 'socialist totalitarianism' to democracy. The first stage — from mid‐1985 to the end of 1987 — can be characterized by the spiritual and psychological elevation of the population, a sense of liberation and release and the expectation of improvement in standards of living. During this period the level of the main forms of deviant behaviour receded. The second stage begins with the deceleration of economic and political reforms in Russia. This process has been accompanied by an impoverishment in the level and the quality of life and in the basic components of socio‐demographic development and, as a result, by increasing levels of deviant behaviour. The advent of a third stage of economic, social and political stability is difficult to forecast. Our analysis of the official statistics and interviews with the people of St Petersburg leads to the following observation: the absolute and relative quantitative components of the basic forms of deviant behaviour have risen intensely and are near to critical. In addition, organized criminality has reached the level of criminal communities which control not only the great number of criminal organizations and groups but also the economic structures. On the one side, a process of criminalization of business is taking place, on the other, the politicization of organized criminality. In the author's opinion, this tendency of the social, political and economic processes militates against any optimistic prognosis for the immediate future.Le comportement déviant est un des baromètres les plus précis du climat social, économique, politique et moral d'une société. Dans cet article l'auteur analyse les différentes formes de comportement déviant à Saint Petersbourg, y compris les crimes violents, le crime contre la propriété, le suicide et la dependance à la drogue et l'alcool. Deux étapes dans les dynamiques des déviances sociales sont identifiées durant la période de transition du 'totalitarisme socialiste'à la démocratie. La première phase — du milieu de 1985 à la fin de 1987 — peut être caractérisée par l'élévation spirituelle et psychologique de la population, un sentiment de libéation et de relâchement et l'espoir d'une amélioration du niveau de vie. Durant cette période le niveau des formes principales de déviance baissa. La seconde phase commence avec le ralentissement des réformes politiques et sociales en Russie. Ce processus a été accompagné par un apprauvissement du niveau et de la qualité de la vie et des éléments de base du développement socio‐démographique, et, conséquemment, par un accroîssement des comportements déviants. La venue d'une troisième phase de stabilitééconomique, sociale et politique est difficile à prévoir. Notre analyse des statistiques officielles et des interviews avec les gens de Saint Petesbourg conduit à l'observation suivante: les éléments quantitatifs absolus et relatifs des formes déviantes de base sont beaucoup augmenté et approchent un niveau crucial. De plus, l'organisation criminelle a atteint le niveau de communautés criminelles qui contrôlent non seulement un grand nombre d'organisations et groupes criminels mais aussi les structures économiques. D'un côté, il y a un processus de criminalisation des entreprises et, de l'autre, la politisation des crimes organisés. L'auteur pense que cette tendance des processus sociaux, politicaux et économiques va à l'encontre de tous pronostics optimistes pour le futur immédiat.

AbstractWeak theoretical skills on the part of rural sociologists are hardly ever blamed as possible causes for the lack of fertility of the sub‐discipline. Reasons are advanced only at paradigmatic and/or methodological levels. This article is intended, however, to illustrate the following points. First, the higher the quality of conceptualization, the less the conceptualization can be applied in an indiscriminate way; second, perception of analysable topics depends upon the theoretical potential of the scientist. This is illustrated by re‐analyzing Germani's theory of modernization. Following a synthesis of Germani's views, the study focuses on three items which have an impact on rural sociology, irrespective of the field of research, namely development as selectively monitored possibilities, the impossibility of unilinear evolution, and the ubiquity of power and the birth of meta‐power in modern society. Within each item there appears to be more than ample scope for prolific rural sociological reflection and research. In concluding, the author refers to the sociology of agriculture. If modern farming is to be seen as the activity both of capable participants in the social dialogue (Giddens) and of deliberate actors (Germani), then the deterioration of their socio‐economic position is a puzzle requiring a sociologically specific explanation. The author's thesis is that the type of knowledge used as a resource by farmers in their professional "negotiations" with the agencies constituting today's farm business environment, is a major cause of this deterioration.RésuméLe peu de fécondité dont fait preuve la sociologie rurale est il dûà des raisons théoriques ou méthodologiques comme on ľ avance toujours, ou plutôt aux faibles competences théoriques des sociologues ruraux? Cet article propose ? illustrer cette possibility a partir de deux constats. Le premier est que les efforts de conceptualisation conduisent à des concepts qui ne sont pas univoques; le second est que la perception de thèmes de recherche dépend des capacités théoriques du chercheur. Ľauteur le montre à propos de la théorie de la modernisation de Germani. Ľ auteur synthétise cette théorie en mettant ľ accent sur trois thèmes cruciaux pour la sociologie rurale dans son ensemble: le développement en tint que possibilityés sélectivement pilotées, ľ impossibilité? une évolution linéaire, ľ ubiquityé du pouvoir et la naissance ? un méta‐pouvoir dans la société moderne. Ce sont là trois thèmes qui pourraient ouvrir de vastes champs de recherches aux sociologues ruraux. Pour conclure, ľ auteur renvoie à la sociologie de ľ agriculture et défend la thèse suivante: si ľ agriculture est vue comme une activité qui implique à la fois des acteurs engageés dans une interaction sociale et des acteurs sociaux doués ? intentionnalité, le déclin de la position socio‐économique des agriculteurs requiert une explication sociologique spécifique que ľ auteur propose de chercher dans le type de connaissance que les agriculteurs mobilisent dans les "négociations" professionnelles qu'ils mènent avec les institutions qui encadrent quotidiennement leur activité agricole.KurzfassungGeringe theoretische Fähigkeiten seitens der Landsoziologen sind kaum jemals als mogliche Ursachen verantwortlich gemacht worden für die mangelnde Fruchcbarkeit der Teildisziplin. Gründe dafür werden immer nur auf der Ebene der Paradigmata und/oder der Methodologie vorgebracht. Mit diesem Artikel ist dagegen beabsichtigt, die folgenden Punkte zu illustrieren. Erstens, je höher die Qualität der Konzeptualisierung, desto weniger kann die Konzeptualisierung auf eine kriciklose Art und Weise angewandt werden; zweitens, die Wahrnehmung analysierbarer Gegenstände hängt vom theoretischen Können des Wissenschaftlers ab. Dies wird durch eine Analyse der Modernisierungstheorie von Germani deutlich gemacht. Einer Darstellung der Sichrweise Germanis folgend, zielt die Studie auf drei Punkte, die unabhängig vom Forschungsgebiet für die ländliche Soziologie von Bedeutung sind, nämlich, EnrwickJung als selektiv wahrgenommene Möglichkeiten, die Unmöglichkeit linearer Entwicklungsverläufe und die Allgegenwart von Macht sowie das Entstehen von "Meta‐Macht" in der modemen Gesellschaft. In jedem dieser Punkte scheint mehr als ein ausgedehntes Betätigungsfeld für fruchtbare landsoziologische Reflektion und Forschung zu liegen. In seinen Schlußfolgerungen bezieht sich der Autor auf die Soziologie der Landwirtschaft. Wenn moderne Landwirtschaft als die Tätigkeit von fähigen Teilnehmern an einem sozialen Dialog und von bewußt Handelnden gesehen wird, dann ist der Zerfall ihrer sozioökonomischen Position ein Problem, das einer spezifischen soziologischen Erklärung bedarf. Die These des Autors ist, daß die Art des Wissens, das Landwirte als Ressource bei ihren beruflichen "Verhandlungen" mit den Agenturen einsetzen, die heute die Umwelt des landwirtschaftlichen Gewerbes darstellen, Hauptursache für diesen Verfall ist.

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering "what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population." In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than 'spiritual' measures, is reproduced below.An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. 'We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.' He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to 'talk up' fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a 'spiritual aufklärung.'Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about 'race decline' and 'a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.'In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, 'since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.' Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4.Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959.The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.

Après avoir connu un regain d'activité du printemps 1985 à l'été 1986 l'économie française est, depuis lors, revenue vers un rythme de croissance nettement inférieur à 2 % en taux annueL Le retournement de la consommation des ménages, qui était attendu, la quasi-stagnation de l'investissement et la langueur des exportations expliquent cette inflexion. L'ajustement des stocks, accumulés involontairement au second semestre 1986, devrait encore déprimer l'activité au début de cette année, malgré la reprise de la demande hors stocks. Il faudrait donc attendre le second trimestre pour qu'une reprise modérée de la croissance intervienne sous l'impulsion de l'investissement et des exportations. La consommation des ménages devrait en revanche être peu dynamique compte tenu des faibles gains de pouvoir d'achat. Le ralentissement de la demande mondiale, supposé intervenir en fin d'année, pèserait à nouveau sur la croissance en 1988. Au total le PIB marchand croîtrait de 1,7 % en 1987 et 1,3 % en 1988. Dans ce contexte la considérable amélioration des profits constatée en 1985-1986 ne serait que partiellement utilisée pour accroître l'investissement productif. Les risques d'une reprise de l'inflation en France au cours des trimestres qui suivent nous paraissent très limités. La politique de rigueur salariale dans la fonction publique, conjuguée à la montée du chômage, devrait en effet conduire à une progression modérée des salaires : le taux de salaire horaire, hors primes, augmenterait de 2,8 % en glissement en 1987 et 2,4 % en 1988. Les prix de production cesseraient de croître plus vite que les coûts unitaires, sauf dans le secteur tertiaire qui n 'a pas encore retrouvé un taux de marge comparable à celui observé au cours des années soixante-dix. Dans l'hypothèse où le prix du baril de pétrole se stabiliserait autour de 16 dollars à partir du second trimestre la hausse des prix à la consommation serait de 2,7% en 1987 et 2,4 % en 1988. Dans l'hypothèse où il remonterait progressivement à 20 dollars d'ici la fin de 1988 l'inflation pourrait avoisiner 3 % cette année et l'an prochain. Dans les deux cas la désinflation, mesurée par l'évolution du prix du PIB, ne serait pas remise en cause, puisque la hausse de celui-ci passerait, en moyenne annuelle, de 5 % en 1986 à 3 % en 1987 et 2,5 % en 1988. En dépit de la croissance modeste de la demande intérieure et de la faible hausse des prix l'excédent du solde des biens et services constaté en 1986 (environ 21 milliards) se réduirait cette année en raison d'un nouveau recul d'une quinzaine de milliards de francs du solde industriel. La détérioration de la compétitivité externe, due à la baisse du dollar depuis 1985, serait la principale cause de nos pertes de part de marché. Celles-ci seraient toutefois plus limitées : 1,5 point en 1987 et 1 point en 1988, contre 3 points au cours des deux dernières années. La légère augmentation des effectifs du secteur marchand constatée au cours de l'année 1986 risque de s'interrompre du fait de la croissance modérée de la production et des effets pervers du plan « Emploi des jeunes ». Il est en effet à craindre que certaines embauches « anticipées » aient été effectuées en 1986 pour bénéficier des exonérations de charges sociales. Malgré les nouvelles mesures concernant les chômeurs de longue durée prises récemment, le chômage continuerait donc à croître sensiblement. Le nombre de chômeurs pourrait atteindre 2,8 millions au, printemps 1988. La reprise de l'investissement amorcée dans l'industrie en 1984-1985 se poursuivrait au cours des deux prochaines années (6,5 % en 1987 et 5,4 % en 1988 aux prix de l'année 1970 pour l'ensemble des entreprises non financières). Cette reprise est- elle suffisante ? Sans doute si on compare l'investissement à la croissance de la demande intérieure et extérieure, mais certainement pas si l'on tient compte des capacités d'autofinancement qui sont aujourd'hui considérables et qu'il serait pertinent d'utiliser pour augmenter la capacité concurrentielle du secteur productif. L'étude développée dans la dernière partie de l'article montre que la baisse de l'impôt sur les sociétés n'est pas une mesure susceptible, dans la conjoncture actuelle, de relancer de façon significative l'investissement. A coût budgétaire équivalent une aide fiscale directe à l'investissement sous la forme d'un crédit d'impôt aurait sur l'investissement productif un impact dix fois plus élevé. Mais les bénéfices d'une telle mesure n 'apparaîtraient qu'à moyen terme.

SUMMARY:
Mark von Hagen's article offers an interpretation of the changes that occurred in the study of Russian and Soviet history, and suggests the concept of "Eurasia" as an anti-paradigm facilitating the description of the region that combines the legacies of multinational empires and of Soviet-style socialism. At the same time, "Eurasia" is an anti -paradigm because it points to a variety of ways to revise many assumptions about Russian, Soviet, and Eurasian histories.

For von Hagen, three separate processes heralded the arrival of new historiographical approaches. First, there is the increasingly prominence of works interpreting the history of Russia and the USSR not as that of a national state, but rather stressing its multinational and imperial character. Second, historians are constantly paying a greater attention to borderlands in the context of the prevailing view of boundaries as porous and fluctuating. Third, diasporas – including émigrés and exiles – have been "rediscovered" and their works are now returning to their countries of origin.

Von Hagen also analyzes what he considers as "two paradigms" of the historical perception of Russia and the USSR. The first, "Russia as Orient", attempted to present the Russian-Soviet historical experience as essentially rooted in centuries long Oriental and despotic traditions of Russia. Using Edward Said's concept of Orientalism, von Hagen argues that this perception of Russia as Orient helped sustain a Western "occidental" identity. It often walked hand in hand with a belief in the unique experience of Russian history, a belief that von Hagen terms "neo-Slavophile".

The second paradigm is that equates the Soviet Union with modernization. According to von Hagen, this paradigm was partly rooted in the liberal tradition of the Russian "state school" of historiography, which saw the privileged role of the state led by an enlightened bureaucracy as the driving force of Russia's path to modernization. Opposed to attempts to "essentialize" Russian history within the "Russia as Orient" paradigm, the modernization paradigm attempted to "normalize" the Soviet experience. Assumptions of the inevitable ethnic and national homogenization of the Soviet Union became prevalent in the modernization paradigm.

Von Hagen then explores the legacy of Eurasianist thinkers, a group of Russian émigrés who offered their vision of Eurasia as a space of interaction between the Russians and the Turkic and Finnish peoples. Their vision of Eurasia also implied a positive evaluation of the Mongol presence in Russian history and a critical approach to Eurocentric assumptions. Von Hagen asserts that, in his view, the new Eurasian anti-paradigm avoids problematic apects of the Eurasianist legacy, such as the political views of the Eurasianist thinkers and their geopolitical views. The new Eurasian anti-paradigm retains their critique of "essentializing" approaches to such concepts as Europe and Asia in order to offer an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the complex pasts of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Asia.

For von Hagen, the Eurasian anti-paradigm has been profoundly impacted by the current "decentralization" of historical narratives, which is the result of interaction between historians and linguists, anthropologists, sociologists, etc. Eurasia allows one to part with the dominance of national narratives while accepting the importance of modern nationalism in historical processes. According to von Hagen, Eurasia does not coincide with the former Russian Empire or the former Soviet Union or with any other particular state. Its chronological boundaries are also not rigidly determined. In the age of globalization, von Hagen argues, it is important to remember that the great continental empires constituted an important element of global history.

In the last part of his article, von Hagen surveys literature that he believes attests to the emergence of the Eurasian anti-paradigm in Russian-Soviet history. According to the author, the Eurasian anti-paradigm does not preclude any specific approaches to the past; even less is it meant as a judgment about the likelihood of one or another country of joining the European Union, NATO, or for that matter any of the Asian organizations. It is meant as a concept that opens up new horizons in the study of history and signifies a return of the Eurasian space into global history after almost a century of isolation.

Book Reviews in this titleAUSTRALIA'S AGE OF IRON: History and Archaeology By R. Ian Jack and Aedeen Cremin. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press and Sydney University Press, 1994, pp. xiv+175, Illustrated. Thirteen maps. $39.95.BRISBANE: The Aboriginal Presence 1824–1860 Edited by Rod Fisher. Kelvin Grove: Brisbane History Group Papers No 11, 1992, pp. 106. Illustrated. Two maps. $20.AUSTRALIA'S FIRST LADY By Lennard Bickel. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991, pp. xii +219. $34.95IRISH CONVICT LIVES Edited by Bob Reece. Sydney: Crossing Press, 1993, pp. x+266, illustrated. No price given.WAR ON THE HOMEFRONT: State Intervention in Queensland 1938–1948 By Kay Saunders. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993. pp. ix + 190. $29.95.CROWN OR COUNTRY: The Traditions of Australian Republicanism Ediled by David Headon, James Warden and Bill Gammage. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994, pp. xiv + 197. Illustrated. $24.95.VIETNAM: The Australian Dilemma By Terry Burstall. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993, pp. xxv + 329. Illustrated. Sixteen maps. $19.95.FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE The Federal Coalition Edited by Brian Costar. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994, pp. xii + 163. $24.95.EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS: Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management in Australia By Margaret Gardner and Gill Palmer. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1992, pp. xii+ 522. $39.95.I WAS A TEENAGE FASCIST By David Greason. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble/penguin, 1994. $16.95.THE OXFORD HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND Edited by Geoffrey W. Rice. Second revised edition. Auckland: Ogord University Press, 1993, pp. xviii i 755. Eleven tables. Four maps. Eight graphs $39.95STUDYING NEW ZEALAND HISTORY By G. A Wood. Second edition Revised by Simon Cauchi and G. A. Wood. Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1992. pp. viii ‐+ 145. No price given.EUROPE JUSTINIAN By John Moorhead. London and New York: Longman, 1994, pp. ix + 202. Np price givenMIRACLES AND THE PULP PRESS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION: The Battle of the Frogs and Fairford's Flies By Jerome Friedman. London: University College London Press, 1993, pp. xv+304. Illustrated. $39.95.THE COMMODITY CULTURE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND: Advertising and Spectacle 1851–1914 By Thomas Richards. London: Verso, 1991, pp. 306. $37.9Spb.CLASS AND ETHNICITY: Irish Catholics in England 1880–1939 By Steven Fielding. Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 1993, pp. mi + 180. No price given.THE POLlTICS OF IMMIGRATION AND "RACE" RELATIONS IN POST‐WAR BRITAIN By Zig Luyton‐Henry. Ogord: Blackwell, 1992, pp. xvii + 266. $34.95 pb.GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY By Peter Barberis and Timothy May. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, pp. viii+ 260. $45.00.SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN Edited by Nicholas Abercrombie and Alan Warde. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp xi + 189. $32.9Spb.EUROPE IN OUR TIME A History 1945–1992 By Walter L. uqueur. New York: Penguin Books, 1992, pp. xrii + 617. US$14.CONTEMPORARY FRANCE By Hilary P. M. Winchester. Longman Group UK Limited, 1993, pp. xiii + 273, illustrated with photographs, maps, tables, $16.IMPERIAL GERMANY 1871–1914: Economy, Society, Culture and Politics By Volker Berghahn Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1993, pp. xvii + 362. NO price givenTHE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SINCE 1969 A Party in Power and Opposition Gerard Braunthal. Second revised edition. BoulderBart Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press, 1994. pp. xiii + 402. Tables and charts. $54.95.WHAT ABOUT THE WORKERS? Workers and the Transition to Capitalism in Russia By Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov. London: Verso, 1993, pp. 241. No price given.REST OF WORLD THE GUERRILLA WARS OF CENTRAL AMERICA: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala By Saul Landau. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993, pp. xiii + 222. Four maps. $49.45.A CRITICAL STUDY OF BINI AND YORUBA VALUE SYSTEMS OF NIGERIA IN CHANGE: Culture, Religion and the Self By Emmanuel D. Babatunde. Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales: me Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, pp. 283. No price given.IMPERIAL AFFINITIES: Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges Between India and Ireland By S. B. Cook. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 162, Rs 195 (approx $9.00).DENG XIAOPING AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CHINA By Richard Evans. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993, pp. xi + 339:$39.95.TENNOZAN: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb By George Feifer. New York: Ticknor & Field 1992, pp. xvii + 622. Illustrated. $25.IDEAS DARWINISM, WAR AND HISTORY: The Debate Over the Biology of War From the "Origin of Species" to the First World War By Paul Crook. Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. xii + 306. $49.95.PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY: North, South, East, West Edited by David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, pp. xi + 412. $45 cloth; $14 pb.RACE, NATION, CLASS: Ambiguous Identities By Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein London, New York: Verso, 1991, pp. vii+232. $32.95.CULTURAL HISTORY By Roger Chartier. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, pp. 209. $39.95pb.CULTURES IN CONFLICT By Urs Bitterli, translated by Ritchie Robertson. Oqord: Polity Press, 1993, pp. 215. pb. $39.95.MARC BLOCH: A Life in History By Carole Fink Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 324. $17.95.

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity.The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called "the American Keynes"—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, "a drastic decline in population growth." This "stagnation thesis" is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.)Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the "older Malthusian view." In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible.The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization.Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a "drastic decline in population growth" based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.

Books reviewed in this article:García Canclini, Nestor (trans. Christopher L. Chiappari and Silvina L. López (1995), Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving ModernityBeverley, John, Oviedo, José and Aronna, Michael (eds) (1995), The Postmodernism Debate in Latin AmericaStuempfle, Stephen (1996), The Steelband Movement: the Forging of a National Art in Trinidad and TobagoBrowning, Barbara (1995) Samba: Resistance in MotionVargas, Lucila (1995), Social Uses and Radio Practices: the Use of Participatory Radio by Ethnic Minorities in MexicoParanagua, Paulo Anntonio (ed.) (1995), Mexican CinemaValderrama Fernández, Ricardo and Escalante Gutierrez, Carmen (original eds), Gelles, Paul H. and Martinez Escobar, Gabriela (translation, annotations and revised glossary) (1996) Andean Lives: Gregorio Condori Mamani and Asunta Quispe HuamPnHendrickson, Carol (1995) Weaving Identities: Construction of Dress and Self in a Highland Guatemala TownMorales, Edmundo (1995) The Guinea Pig: Healing, Food, and Ritual in the AndesBrandon, George. (1993), Santeria from Africa to the New World: the Dead Sell MemoriesPeña, Milagros (1995) Theologies and Liberation in Peru: the Role of Ideas in Social MovementsLovell, W. George (1995) A Beauty that Hurts: Life and Death in GuatemalaStarn, Orin, Degregori, Carlos Ivan and Kirk, Robin (eds) (1995), The Peru Reader: History, Culture, PoliticsBethell, Leslie (ed.) (1996) Cambridge History of Latin America. Vol. 10. Latin America since 1930: Ideas, Culture and SocietyHelg, Aline (1995) Our Rightful Share: the Afro‐Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912Brunk, S. (1995), Emiliano Zapata: Revolution and Betrayal in MexicoDi Tella, Torcuato S. (1996) National Popular Politics in Early Independent Mexico, 1820–1847Mallon, Florencia E. (1995), Peasant and Nation: the Making of Postcolonial Mexico and PeruPosada‐Garbó, Eduardo (1996) The Colombian Caribbean: a Regional History, 187&1950Joseph, Gilbert M. and Szuchman, Mark D. (eds) (1996), I Saw a City Invincible: Urban Portraits of Latin AmericaWalter, Richard J. (1994), Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires: 191&1942Kleinpenning, Jan M. G. (1995), Peopling the Purple Land: a Historical Geography of Rural Uruguay, 1500–1915Avellaneda, José Ignacio (1995), The Conquerors of the New Kingdom of GranadaCraig, Alan K. and West, Robert C. (eds) (1994), In Quest of Mineral Wealth. Aboriginal and Colonial Mining and Metallurgy in Spanish AmericaVelázquez, Primo Feliciano (1995, 3rd edition), Codex ChimalpopocaBierhorst, John (1992) History and Mythology of the Aztecs: the Codex ChimalpopocaNickson, R. Andrew (1995), Local Government in Latin AmericaSmith, Hazel (1995), European Union Foreign Policy and Central AmericaBresser Pereira, Luiz C. (1996), Economic Crisis and State Reform in Brazil: Toward a New Interpretation of Latin AmericaCamp, Roderic Ai (1993), Political Recruitment Across Two Centuries: Mexico, 1884–1991Mainwaring, Scott and Scully, Timothy R. (eds) (1995), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin AmericaHaggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R. (1995), The Political Economy of Democratic TransitionsRyan, David (1995), US‐Sandinista Diplomatic Relations: Voice of IntoleranceHall, Linda B. (1995), Oil, Banks and Politics: the United States and Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1917–1924Philip, George (1994), Political Economy of International OilJones, Richard C. (1995), Ambivalent Journey: US Migration and Economic Mobility in North Central MexicoDosal, Paul J. (1993), Doing Business with the Dictators: a Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899–1944Jenkins, Rhys (1995), Trade Liberaiisation and Manufacturing in BoliviaFrenkel, Roberto (ed.) (1994), Strengthening the Financial Sector in the Adjustment ProcessMorley, Samuel A. (1995) Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: the Impact of Adjustment and RecoveryLustig, Nora (ed.) (1995) Coping with Austerity: Poverty and Inequality in Latin AmericaPattullo, Polly (1996) Last Resorts: the Cost of Tourism in the CaribbeanMurray, Douglas L. (1995) Cultivating Crisis: the Human Cost of Pesticides in Latin AmericaChevalier, Jacques M. and Buckles, Daniel (1995) A Land Without Gods: Process Theory, Maldevelopment and the Mexican NahuasPeritore, N. Patrick and Galve‐Peritore, Ana Karina (eds) (1995), Biotechnology in Latin America: Politics, Impacts and RisksStewart, Douglas I. (1994), After the Trees: Living on the Transamazon HighwaySimonian, Lane (1995), Defending the Land of the Jaguar: a History of Conservation in MexicoBose, Christine E. and Acosta‐Belén, B. Edna (eds) (1995), Women in the Latin American Development ProcessAlatorre, Javier, Careaga Gloria, Jusidman, Clara, Salles, Vania, Talamante, Cecilia and Townsend, John (1994), Las mujeres en la pobreza, El Colegio de Mexico and Grupo Interdisciplinario sobre MujerJohnston, Francis E. and Low, Setha M. (1995), Children of the Urban Poor: the Sociocultural Environment of Growth, Development, and Malnutrition in GuatemalaSchneider, Cathy Lisa (1995), Shantytown Protest in Pinochet's ChileFiddian, Robin (ed.) (1995), Garcia MárquezMarzan, Julio (1995), The Numinous Site: the Poetry of Luis Palés MatosO'Connell, Joanna (1995), Prospero's Daughter: the Prose of Rosario CastellanosBergman, Emilie L. and Smith, Paul Julian (eds) (1995), ¿Entiendes?: Queer Readings, Hispanic WritingsAgosín, Marjorie (ed.) (1995) A Dream of Light and Shadow: Portraits of Latin American Women WritersHalperin Donghi, Tulio, Jaksié, Iván, Kirkpatrick, Gwen, and Masiello, Francine (eds) (1994), Sarmiento, Author of a Nation

Confiscated Growth Département des diagnostics de l'OFCE In 1986 both the price of oil and the exchange rate of the dollar have come back to levels more in line with market equilibrium. But these have not had the expected stimulating effects. The improvements in the terms of trade — particularly large in Europe and Japan -- have slowed down the growth of general government and corporate net debt at a time when many developing countries have been forced to adopt severe financial measures. The flow of capital to the OECD countries has been balanced by a sharp reduction of the demand from the rest of the world, while important losses of market shares were conceded to the newly-industrialising countries. The recovery of private consumption has been significant, but not enough to stimulate investment. An important portion of corporate resources has continued to flow to the financial markets, contributing to keeping real interest rates high. In 1987 and early 1988 the slackening of demand in the United States and then its contraction, will dominate the international environment. In such a context the persistence of the American external deficit will aggravate monetary, trade and financial tensions. Faced with increased external competition and weak world demand, Japan and above all Europe will suffer seriously from any additional drop of the dollar. In France the likelihood of significant growth appears limited. Household consumption growth will slow down because of low wage increases, not fully compensated by a strong growth in non-wage income. The recovery of private investment will accelerate but its pace will remain slower than the improvement in profits. The growth of final domestic demand will tend to benefit foreign more than French suppliers, who are facing hightened competition in domestic and world markets from the South-East Asian countries. The trade balance could turn negative. A 1.7 per cent GDP growth in 1987 will not be enough to stop unemployment from rising. A more expansionist economic policy could curb this upward trend, but there is a continuing risk of any surge in demand being captured largely by foreign competitors. expected slowdown of household consumption, the near-stagnation of investment, and the weakness of exports. Destocking following involuntary stockbuilding in the second quarter of 1986 is expected to depress activity in the first part of this year, notwithstanding some strengthening of final demand. A modest pick-up is therefore not likely until the second quarter, led by investment and exports. Household consumption is likely to recover only moderately, given the weak growth of real incomes. The slowdown in the growth of world demand, projected for around the end of this year, will again limit growth in 1988. Overall, GNP seems likely to grow by 1.7 per cent in 1987 and 1.3 per cent in 1988. As a result only part of the considerable increase in profits in 1985-86 seems likely to be used for productive investment. The risk of an upturn in inflation in France in the coming quarters seems small. The policy of strict control of public sector salaries, combined with rising unemployment, seems likely to lead to moderation in the overall growth of incomes : hourly wage rates are likely to increase by a modest 2.8 per cent in 1987 and 2.4 per cent in 1988. Output prices seem likely to stop growing faster than unit costs, except in the tertiary sector, which has not yet restored its margins to the levels of the 1970s. On the assumption that the price of oil will stabilize around $ 16 per barrel at the end of the second quarter, the growth of the consumer price index will be around 2.7 per cent in 1987 and 2.4 per cent in 1988. Under the assumption of a progressive increase in the oil price to $20 by the end of 1988, inflation could be around 3 per cent both this year and next. In either case disinflation, as measured by the GNP deflator, will continue, with inflation falling from 5 per cent in 1986 to 3 per cent in 1987 and 2.5 per cent in 1988. Despite the modest growth of domestic demand and inflation, the external surplus of goods and services recorded in 1986 (around FF 21 billion) seems likely to be smaller this year because of a reduction in the manufactures balance of FF 15 billion. The decline in international competitiveness, due to the fall of the dollar since 1985, could be expected to result in some loss of market share. Nevertheless this is likely to be limited to 1.5 points in 1987 and 1 point in 1988, compared with 3 points over the course of the last two years. The slow growth of employment in the market sector seen in 1986 risks being interrupted because of modest growth of production and the perverse effect of the youth employment scheme "Emploi des Jeunes". It seems that a number of people were taken into employment in 1986 in anticipation of an exemption from social charges. Despite the recent new measures in respect of long-term unemployed, unemployment will continue to grow significantly. The number of unemployed could reach 2.8 million in the spring of 1988. The pick-up of investment in industry in 1984-1985 seems likely to continue in the next two years (6.5 per cent in 1987 and 5.4 per cent in 1988 in 1970 prices for the total of non-financial enterprises). Is this likely to be sufficient ? It would seem to be so if compared with the likely growth of internal and external demand, but not if considered in relation to the now considerable capacity to finance productive investment out of retained earnings. The study reported in the last part of this article suggests that the reduction of corporation tax would probably not be effective in sparking off a significant increase in investment. For given budgetary cost a direct subsidy to productive investment in the form of a tax credit would be ten times as effective. But the benefits would be realised only over the medium term.

The Labour government is formally committed to tackling poverty, unemployment and social exclusion and sees a major role for area‐based policies in dealing with some of these problems. The government's flagship New Deals are primarily aimed at groups of individuals with high rates of joblessness. However, the New Deal for Communities is aimed at areas suffering from high concentrations of poverty and unemployment. In addition different government departments have launched their own zone initiatives in often‐overlapping local areas.Much political discussion has focussed on the problem of coordinating all of this activity. However, behind these initiatives lies a decades‐long debate over how effective area‐based polices can actually be and it is this debate which is reflected in this issue of New Economy.We also look at the argument that the big hole in the Government's armoury is the lack of any policies to actually create jobs in areas of the country with high unemployment.When at the Treasury, Daniel Hulls helped design the New Deal for Communities, which makes him well placed to explain the analytical basis for the government's area‐based policies as well as to explore where those policies might go next. Their underlying rationale is that concentrationsof deprivation give rise to problems greater than the sum of its parts. So individuals with characteristics likely to put them at high risk of social exclusion are further disadvantaged if they live in neighbourhoods where there is a high concentration of people with similar characteristics. Mark Kleinman takes issue precisely with this justification, arguing that the empirical evidence suggests that family and individual characteristics are more important than neighbourhood effects and that families and individuals should therefore be the primary target of policy intervention. There may still be a case for locally‐based service delivery and for area based programmes to supplement mainstream resources for the most hard‐pressed areas. Soit is not a case of targeting either individuals or areas – rather it is the balance between these two approaches which is under discussion.In practice the area regeneration budget, at ??1.35 billion in 1999‐00, is only a fraction of the resources spent on families and individuals through social transfers and other mainstream public spending. Moreover, spending on regeneration at the end of this Parliament will be 11 per cent less in real terms than the Conservatives were spending in 1993‐94.The Government, or more accurately the Treasury, points to the vacancy statistics to 'prove' that there is no shortage of employment opportunity anywhere in the UK. Few people living in the real world would agree with this view. David Webster presents the directly opposite argument that the New Deals cannot work unless more jobs are directly created in narrowly‐defined areas, especially in the cities, which have witnessed a significant loss of blue collar jobs.While agreeing that the Treasury line is unsustainable, Ian Gordon agues that narrowly‐targeted job creation programmes will not work. Fundamentally, the case for such policies is that labour market imperfections prevent aggregate demand and employment in the economy as a whole growing fast enough without generating serious inflationary pressures. The problems of demand‐deficiency within 'northern' urban areas are essentially issues of regional policy, not urban regeneration, while the reduction of concentrations of high unemployment in London and most other 'southern' urban areas relies on sustaining employment growth at the national level. Peter Tyler asks whether the policy recommendations of the Urban Task Force chaired by Lord Rogers ?žt with the perceived needs of urban regeneration. The general answer is yes, though we need to be wary of who really benefits from tax incentives. However, if all that Rogers aspires to is to be achieved it will require far more resources than have currently been planned for. Stephen Hall and John Mawson trace the evolution of regeneration policies and ask critical questions about how joined up the Government's policies really are. It is only at the local level that programmes can really be made cohesive and they point to the importance of the New Commitment to Regeneration directly involving local authorities and other local partners.Housing policy plays an important role in generating concentrations of deprivation. Sue Regan argues that it is increasingly difficult to generalise about social housing, with abandoned estates in the 'North' set alongside some well‐run, popular estates with vibrant tenant participation. There is a growing consensus about the benefits of mixed communities, which sits uneasily with the current composition of social housing.The IPPR indicators section points out that the funds which have come from HM Treasury to promote regional policy are very unfairly skewed, with Scotland and Wales doing much better than equivalent English regions. The North East really does have something to complain about. With some irony the funds that have emanated from Brussels are much more evenly distributed according to need. There is precious little correlation between how a local authorityscores on the Index of Local Deprivation and GDP per head. According to the data used by the EU, 14 out of the 20 most deprived local authorities in England have GDP per head at or above the EU average. This might suggest that GDP per head is a poor measure to use for targeting resources at anything below regional level. Andrea Westall and Marc Cowling question whether the proposed model for the Small Business Service will be appropriate and argue that the 'one‐stop shop' approach to offering business advice fails to recognise the differences between small ?žrms, especially across sectors.The article by Brendan Walsh is entitled 'The Irish Economic Miracle'. Whether intended or not the irony of the title is that miracles defy rational explanation. The problem is timing: all the factors put forward to explain the recent excellent performance of the Irish economy have been around for many years and sometimes even decades. Why were these factors for so long associated with lacklustre economic performance, with the Irish economy only taking off in the early 1990s? Graham Bird and Ramkishen Rajan revisit proposals for a Tobin tax in the light of the international financial crises of the late 1990s. They suggest that such a tax on currency transactions would work best in preventing crises from occurring by countering excessive inflows of capital in the first place. They also suggest that even if the tax had limited effects in this respect it could still raise a lot of revenue which could perhaps be used to finance a new international lender of last resort or to augment the resources of the IMF. Eamon O'Shea questions the emphasis on education as the route to material well‐being and argues for a less narrow conception of human welfare. Education can play an important role in developing social as well as human capital and in so‐doing help underpin the micro‐institutional foundations upon which macroeconomic success is based. Peter Robinson Editor