This article introduces a special issue that takes a close look at the outcome of the October 2018 Quebec election where a newly created party (the Coalition Avenir Quebec) took power with a majority of seats. The special issue's five articles collectively examine different factors having played a role in shaping Quebec citizens' voting behavior in 2018. The extent to which citizens decide to turn out at the district level and their vote choice calculus are both investigated. The latter is analyzed through the lens of long-term factors such as language, attitudes toward Quebec independence, and party identification, as well as more short-term factors such as policy preferences on emerging issues like immigration and the environment. While several contributions point toward an important, perhaps long-lasting, realignment of the Quebec party system, others also highlight some elements of continuity, bringing nuance to an overall explanation of the election's outcome.
In November of 2008, Quebec Premier Jean Charest decided to call a snap election. His obvious goal was to regain a majority of seats in the National Assembly by taking advantage of the Action Démocratique du Québec's steady decline in the polls and of the breaking financial crisis. The campaign's central theme was the management of the upcoming "economic storm." Based on the overall outcome, it is clear that Charest won his gamble, but this came at the price of an extremely low turnout. Also, it is unclear if the Liberal government will be able to win a fourth consecutive election down the road. The current controversy surrounding the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement's debacle may well hurt the PLQ in the long term. The Parti Québécois, having regained its place as the official opposition, now appears well positioned to become the alternative to the government next time.
The 2007 provincial election in Quebec may be considered a milestone in recent Quebec politics. For the first time since 1878, voters elected a minority government in the province (Jean Charest's Liberals), a third party (ADQ) replaced the Parti Québécois (PQ) as Official Opposition, and the PQ had its worst showing in 37 years. The pre-campaign was marked by the "reasonable accommodations" debate, which gave the ADQ the boost it needed to rival the two main parties. The incumbent Charest government suffered from its low popularity, due to what was largely perceived as a disappointing record. The PQ's loss of support was mostly attributable to its new leader André Boisclair's lack of appeal and to the party's insistence on holding another referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Quebec's new three-party system may last for some time, due to each party having strong and relatively well-defined regional support bases.
The effect of antiparty sentiment on voting behavior is examined comparatively using recent individual-level electoral survey data from Canada, Britain, and Australia. The author distinguishes two dimensions of antipartyism: the rejection of traditional major-party alternatives (specific antiparty sentiment) and of political parties per se (generalized antiparty sentiment). He argues that disaffected voters in these countries are attracted to third or minor parties and support them to voice antiparty sentiments. The results show that in general, third parties benefit from specific antiparty sentiment at the mass level. The rejection of party politics per se, in contrast, brings citizens to abstain, unless some third parties—antiparty parties such as the Reform Party in Canada and One Nation in Australia—electorally mobilize generalized antiparty feelings. The results also indicate that compulsory voting in Australia affects disaffected voters' behavior; in particular, those who reject all party alternatives would be more likely to abstain if they had the choice.
Abstract.This study proposes a new test of Maurice Pinard's theory on the rise of third parties applied to the case of the 1993 Canadian federal election. We assess the effect at the individual level of Pinard's factors (one-party dominance and grievances) on support for the Reform party and the Bloc Québécois using data from the Canadian Election Study. Logistic regression analyses of vote choice indicate that the extent to which the second major party was perceived to be electorally weak at the constituency level was a significant factor in leading some Western voters to support Reform. In Quebec, however, perceptions of predominance did not matter to a vote for the Bloc because the latter is a "radical" third party attracting support mostly on the basis of communal values and interests. The results further show that political grievances, but not economic ones, were a significant predictor of support for both third parties in that election.Résumé.Cette étude propose un nouveau test empirique de la théorie de Maurice Pinard concernant la percée électorale des tiers partis. L'impact des facteurs de Pinard (prédominance d'un parti et présence de griefs) sur l'appui au Parti réformiste et au Bloc québécois à l'élection fédérale canadienne de 1993 est vérifié au niveau micro-sociologique à l'aide des données de l'Étude sur l'élection canadienne. Les analyses de régression logistique du vote indiquent que la perception que certains électeurs de l'Ouest avaient de la faible compétitivité du second parti traditionnel dans leur circonscription les a encouragés à appuyer le Parti réformiste. Au Québec, les perceptions de prédominance n'ont cependant pas eu d'effet significatif sur le vote en faveur du Bloc en raison du fait que ce dernier est un tiers parti " radical " dont l'appui repose principalement sur des valeurs et des intérêts de groupe. Les résultats indiquent enfin que, contrairement aux griefs de nature économique, les griefs politiques régionaux ont significativement contribué au succès électoral des deux partis.
Issue ownership refers to political parties' recognized capacity or reputation to deal competently with a number of issues and problems. Canadian perceptions of party competence in five issue areas are examined: unemployment, inflation, national unity, public finance management and international affairs. Using aggregate-level Gallup poll data from a 50-year period, the study shows not only that Canadians distinguish between federal parties based on their issue-handling capabilities, but also that party images are not impervious to change. Two particular moments of realignment in party images are identified: the beginning of the 1960s, and the early 1990s. The image of the federal Liberal party clearly benefited from both periods. Beyond the expected projection effect of party popularity, two factors are shown to account at least partially for these variations over time in issue ownership. The parties' performance while in office and the arrival of new competitors within the party system in the 1993 election are both found to significantly affect perceptions of party competence in Canada.
