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Not all crises have the same impact. In this article the argument is made that we should make a distinction between a "homemade" and an "externally" caused crisis when analyzing the implications of an economic downturn. The case is Sweden and the analyses include both citizens' and MPs' attitudes towards democracy before and after the economic crisis of 2008. The article also makes an effort to compare the economic crisis of 2008 to a previous economic crisis that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Both crises were related to international turmoil, and they had a clearly negative impact on the Swedish economy. Yet, the crises were also very different. In the crisis of the 1990s, Sweden was seen as one of the countries that suffered the most, while in the aftermath of the economic crisis 2008, Sweden was seen as one of the most successful countries in handling the crisis. By comparing the two crises, we can get a better understanding of the extent to which attribution of responsibility depends on the context of the crisis.

Not all crises have the same impact. In this article the argument is made that we should make a distinction between a "homemade" and an "externally" caused crisis when analyzing the implications of an economic downturn. The case is Sweden and the analyses include both citizens' and MPs' attitudes towards democracy before and after the economic crisis of 2008. The article also makes an effort to compare the economic crisis of 2008 to a previous economic crisis that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Both crises were related to international turmoil, and they had a clearly negative impact on the Swedish economy. Yet, the crises were also very different. In the crisis of the 1990s, Sweden was seen as one of the countries that suffered the most, while in the aftermath of the economic crisis 2008, Sweden was seen as one of the most successful countries in handling the crisis. By comparing the two crises, we can get a better understanding of the extent to which attribution of responsibility depends on the context of the crisis

AbstractIn a representative democracy, politicians should either implement policies that voters want or policies that politicians believe are in voters long‐term interest, even if voters currently oppose them. The exact balance between these goals is debatable and politicians' policy engagement can tempt them to dismiss voters' preferences and resist information counter to their own policy position. In this paper, we discuss Sweden's generous migration policy and how it can serve as an example where politicians' policy engagement led them to a overly optimistic view of the implications of welcoming a large influx of refugees. Using detailed, repeated, survey data on members of parliament, we show that Swedish politicians favored a much more generous policy toward accepting refugees than voters for a long period of time. Neither observable factors nor expert knowledge can explain this difference between voters and politicians. A more likely explanations is wishful thinking and policy engagement from politicians that continued until political competition increased.

AbstractDo politicians get emotional during an election campaign? We examine the existence of changes in partisan in‐group favoritism and partisan out‐group hostility among political elites by evaluating the degree to which they fluctuate before, during and after election campaigns. The lack of elite level panel data has prevented scholars from studying the dynamics of politicians' emotions around the most emotionally intense political event in democracies: elections. We focus on Sweden around the 2014 election and follow more than 700 Swedish politicians before, during and after a national election campaign using a unique three‐wave panel survey. The results reveal that politicians' emotions towards other parties are affected during the election, but less so for their own party. Our study adds to the body of recent evidence that campaigns mobilize partisan identities and increase partisan animus.

Do politicians demand change if party support is slipping in opinion polls? If so, should a party change its program or just the way it communicates with voters? To investigate this, we conducted a survey experiment with 1236 Swedish politicians. We exposed them to a frame in which their party was losing in the polls, or a frame in which their party was gaining in the polls without using deception. Our results demonstrate that losing politicians seek change, both in terms of program and communication. However, the effects of the most recent polls are typically stronger than our experimental treatment. Along those lines we also find that politicians who are losing in recent polls, but not in our experimental treatment, favor ideological radicalization more than moderation or staying put. With these results our study paper speaks to the discussion on how representation is achieved and whether opinion polls are good or bad for democracy.

AbstractAre politicians more rational decision makers than citizens? This article contributes to the ongoing debate by examining how politicians and citizens assess the fairness of the process leading to a controversial policy decision. It contains theories as to why it is tempting to match the favourability of policy decision with a fairness assessment of the preceding process, and how politicians and citizens differ in their approach to the task. Having derived three hypotheses, parallel scenario experiments are run in large samples of Swedish politicians and citizens, in which the outcome and fairness of a policy decision process are manipulated. As predicted, it is found that both politicians and citizens match the favourability of the decision with the assessment of the process, that these self‐serving biases are stronger among politicians, and that policy engagement accounts for the group‐level difference.

When responding to citizens who make direct contact, politicians perform an act that matters not only to themselves and the contacting citizen, but also to colleagues within the party. This article studies whether some types of responsive behaviour are more accepted within the party than others. It also studies the circumstances that increase and decrease acceptability for party colleagues' responsiveness. In a survey experiment, 1,660 Swedish politicians were asked to approve of different communicative and adaptive responses given by a fictive colleague. Results show that responses that aim at changing the party from within are well regarded, but that open and external responses, which are more visible to voters, are considerably less liked by the politician's colleagues. The implication is that norms surrounding dyadic responsiveness are strong within parties and that they are likely to influence when and how citizens get responses from individual politicians.

How do individual party representatives respond to direct policy requests from citizens when the requests go against the party's position? In a survey experiment, 2,547 Swedish politicians are randomly assigned to scenarios in which citizens make contact to influence a political decision. Their willingness to respond to citizens' policy requests is measured using six indicators that capture adaptive as well as communicative responsiveness. The results show a lower willingness to adaptandto communicate when the request disagrees with the party's position. The effect is mitigated when politicians agree with the proposal and when likely voters make contact, but only forlisteningandadaptiveresponses, not forexplainingresponses (which have the opposite relationship). Important findings for future research are that the party matters for politicians' responsiveness and that their willingness to give explaining responses follows a different logic than for listening and adaptive responses.

How can one explain the transformation of elected assemblies like national parliaments? In this study it is argued that much can be gained from taking the assumption of political generations more seriously when trying to explain transformations of the political agenda – for example, of themes and topics brought up in the parliamentary process. More specifically, the article expands on previous research in three ways: first, it launches the concept of 'parliamentary political generation' where the core element is the combination of an influx of large numbers of newcomers into the elected assembly and an electoral context that is formative – that is, that exhibits characteristics that distinguish the election from other elections. Second, an empirical test is conducted where other factors such as party affiliation and social background characteristics are controlled for. Finally, the test on the impact of parliamentary political generations is conducted in a context – the Swedish Riksdag – where parliamentary party groups are strong. The data used is the Parliamentary Surveys 1985–2010 conducted at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The political generation in focus is the 'Class of 94'. The results show that the Class of 94 distinguish themselves by being more feminist than their senior colleagues and other groups of newcomers in Swedish elections. This is the feminist generation in Swedish politics.