Bargaining power in repeated games
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 101-110
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 101-110
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 53-64
ISSN: 1090-9451
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 256-281
ISSN: 1545-8504
Policy studies often evaluate health for an individual or for a population by using measurement scales that are ordinal scales or expected-utility scales. This paper develops scales of a different type, commonly called cardinal scales, that measure changes in health. Also, we argue that cardinal scales provide a meaningful and useful means of evaluating health policies. Thus, we develop a means of using the perspective of early neoclassical welfare economics as an alternative to ordinalist and expected-utility perspectives.
In: Measuring Poverty and Wellbeing in Developing Countries, S. 24-39
In: Platz , T T & Østerdal , L P R 2010 ' Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen .
A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players, is called partnership formation-proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution-proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well known allocation rules.
BASE
In: Review of Income and Wealth, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 559-573
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In: Hougaard , J L , Østerdal , L P & Yu , Y 2008 ' The Chinese Health Care System : Structure, Problems and Challenges ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen .
In the present paper we describe the structure of the Chinese health care system and sketch its future development. We analyse issues of provider incentives and the actual burden sharing between government, enterprises and people. We further aim to identify a number of current problems and link these to a discussion of future challenges in the form of an aging population, increased privatization and increased inequity
BASE
In: Social indicators research: an international and interdisciplinary journal for quality-of-life measurement, Band 129, Heft 2, S. 739-759
ISSN: 1573-0921
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 95, S. 1-8
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 90, S. 93-99
In: Journal of international development: the journal of the Development Studies Association, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 3-21
ISSN: 1099-1328
AbstractWe explore a novel first‐order dominance (FOD) approach to poverty mapping and compare its properties to small‐area estimation. The FOD approach uses census data directly, is straightforward to implement, is multidimensional allowing for a broad conception of welfare and accounts rigorously for welfare distributions in both levels and trends. An application to Mozambique highlights the value of the approach, including its advantages in the monitoring and evaluation of public expenditures. We conclude that the FOD approach to poverty mapping constitutes a useful addition to the toolkit of policy analysts. © 2015 UNU‐WIDER. Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In: Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 2/2015
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Working paper
In: Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 11-13
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Working paper
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 40, Heft 11, S. 2290-2301