Życie na Kresach: województwa wschodnie II Rzeczypospolitej (1918-1939)
In: Seria wydawnicza Muzeum Pamięci Sybiru: Sybir tom 2 (Y)
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In: Seria wydawnicza Muzeum Pamięci Sybiru: Sybir tom 2 (Y)
In: Seria wschodnia
In: Prace Białostockiego Towarzystwa Naukowego 53
In: Prace Białostockiego Towarzystwa Naukowego 46
In Search of a New (National) Historical Record – the Republic of Belarus of 1991–1994AbstractThe final stage of the Soviet Union and the creation in 1991 of a new Belarusian state were characterised by big political whirls. There was the need in a new, post-Soviet reality, for a different look at the nation's own history. Increasingly strong was national narrative, emphasising the importance of political and national independence. Those milieux demanded that Belarusian sciences should be made independent of the party, for thus far they were treated as the ideological resource base for the communist party.A large part of Belarusians, however, and numerous groups of historians did not see the necessity to break up with Soviet heritage. The majority of citizens of the Belarusian Republic opted for the existence of the Soviet Union as the political entity. A new interpretation of history met neither with any special resistance, nor enthusiasm. It was regarded is as yet another action imposed by the authorities, the only difference being that this time it was possible to criticise it much more easily without the fear of severe reprisals as in the Soviet times.There was a general feeling of nostalgia for the good, Soviet times. The fight for the construction of a new interpretation of history intensified after 1994, when the presidential campaign entered its final stage. Both the national circles and those appealing to the Soviet version of history understood that historical topics made an important element of the campaign which made it possible for electors to better identify with their candidate.An attempt to build a new community based on national banners suffered defeat in the elections of 1994. The society was not ready to reject the Soviet-class system of values and replace it with a new national-Belarusian offered after 1991. Neither a symbiosis was created that could combine these two systems. The "West Russian" idea, developed in the nineteenth century, but modified and Sovieticized during the period of Belarusian Soviet Republic, became a strong element of the Belarusian identity, and national circles proved to be unable to weaken it in the years of 1991–1994. В поисках нового (национального) исторического повествования – Республика Беларусь 1991–1994 Аннотация Заключительный этап существования Советского Союза и формирование в 1991 году новой Белоруссии характеризовались большими политическими проблемами. В новой, намечающейся постсоветской действительности надо было по-другому посмотреть на собственную историю. Укреплялось национальное повествование, подчеркивающее значение государственной и национальной независимости. Национальные круги выступали за партийную нейтрализацию белорусской науки, которая до сих пор была идеологической базой коммунистической партии.Однако подавляющая часть общества и большие группы историков не видели необходимости порвать с советским наследством, выступая за оставление Советского Союза как государственного учреждения. Новая интерпретация истории не встретилась с решительным сопротивлением, но и не вызвала особого восторга. Большинство граждан относилось к ней как к очередной акции, навязанной сверху властями, однако с той разницей, что теперь ее можно было гораздо легче раскритиковать, чем в советские времена, не подвергая себя репрессиям.Ностальгия за хорошими, советскими временами была всеобщей. Борьба за создание исторического повествования усилилась в 1994 году, когда в окончательную фазу спора вступила президентская кампания. Как национальные круги, так и те, обращающиеся к советской картине истории, понимали, что исторические темы являются важным элементом кампании, позволяющим избирателю лучше отождествить себя с конкретным кандидатом.Попытка создать новое сообщество, опираясь на национальные лозунги, потерпела поражение в выборах 1994 года. Общество не было готово отбросить советско-классовую систему ценностей и поменять ее на национально-белорусскую, предложенную после 1991 года. Не был разработан и своего рода симбиоз, который смог бы совместить обе эти системы ценностей. Образовавшаяся в XIX веке «западнорусская» идея, модифицированная и советизированная в период БССР, стала мощной частью белорусской идентичности, которую не смогли перестроить национальные круги в 1991–1994 гг.
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In: Studia z dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 143
ISSN: 2353-6403
In Search of a New (National) Historical Record – the Republic of Belarus of 1991–1994AbstractThe final stage of the Soviet Union and the creation in 1991 of a new Belarusian state were characterised by big political whirls. There was the need in a new, post-Soviet reality, for a different look at the nation's own history. Increasingly strong was national narrative, emphasising the importance of political and national independence. Those milieux demanded that Belarusian sciences should be made independent of the party, for thus far they were treated as the ideological resource base for the communist party.A large part of Belarusians, however, and numerous groups of historians did not see the necessity to break up with Soviet heritage. The majority of citizens of the Belarusian Republic opted for the existence of the Soviet Union as the political entity. A new interpretation of history met neither with any special resistance, nor enthusiasm. It was regarded is as yet another action imposed by the authorities, the only difference being that this time it was possible to criticise it much more easily without the fear of severe reprisals as in the Soviet times.There was a general feeling of nostalgia for the good, Soviet times. The fight for the construction of a new interpretation of history intensified after 1994, when the presidential campaign entered its final stage. Both the national circles and those appealing to the Soviet version of history understood that historical topics made an important element of the campaign which made it possible for electors to better identify with their candidate.An attempt to build a new community based on national banners suffered defeat in the elections of 1994. The society was not ready to reject the Soviet-class system of values and replace it with a new national-Belarusian offered after 1991. Neither a symbiosis was created that could combine these two systems. The "West Russian" idea, developed in the nineteenth century, but modified and Sovieticized during the period of Belarusian Soviet Republic, became a strong element of the Belarusian identity, and national circles proved to be unable to weaken it in the years of 1991–1994. В поисках нового (национального) исторического повествования – Республика Беларусь 1991–1994 Аннотация Заключительный этап существования Советского Союза и формирование в 1991 году новой Белоруссии характеризовались большими политическими проблемами. В новой, намечающейся постсоветской действительности надо было по-другому посмотреть на собственную историю. Укреплялось национальное повествование, подчеркивающее значение государственной и национальной независимости. Национальные круги выступали за партийную нейтрализацию белорусской науки, которая до сих пор была идеологической базой коммунистической партии.Однако подавляющая часть общества и большие группы историков не видели необходимости порвать с советским наследством, выступая за оставление Советского Союза как государственного учреждения. Новая интерпретация истории не встретилась с решительным сопротивлением, но и не вызвала особого восторга. Большинство граждан относилось к ней как к очередной акции, навязанной сверху властями, однако с той разницей, что теперь ее можно было гораздо легче раскритиковать, чем в советские времена, не подвергая себя репрессиям.Ностальгия за хорошими, советскими временами была всеобщей. Борьба за создание исторического повествования усилилась в 1994 году, когда в окончательную фазу спора вступила президентская кампания. Как национальные круги, так и те, обращающиеся к советской картине истории, понимали, что исторические темы являются важным элементом кампании, позволяющим избирателю лучше отождествить себя с конкретным кандидатом.Попытка создать новое сообщество, опираясь на национальные лозунги, потерпела поражение в выборах 1994 года. Общество не было готово отбросить советско-классовую систему ценностей и поменять ее на национально-белорусскую, предложенную после 1991 года. Не был разработан и своего рода симбиоз, который смог бы совместить обе эти системы ценностей. Образовавшаяся в XIX веке «западнорусская» идея, модифицированная и советизированная в период БССР, стала мощной частью белорусской идентичности, которую не смогли перестроить национальные круги в 1991–1994 гг.
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In: Studia z dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 161
ISSN: 2353-6403
In: Studia z historii społeczno-gospodarczej XIX i XX wieku, Band 17, S. 103-111
ISSN: 2450-6796
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In: Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, Heft 2, S. 121
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
BASE
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
BASE
After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.
BASE
The final stage of the Soviet Union and the creation in 1991 of a new Belarusian state were characterised by big political whirls. There was the need in a new, post-Soviet reality, for a different look at the nation's own history. Increasingly strong was national narrative, emphasising the importance of political and national independence. Those milieux demanded that Belarusian sciences should be made independent of the party, for thus far they were treated as the ideological resource base for the communist party.A large part of Belarusians, however, and numerous groups of historians did not see the necessity to break up with Soviet heritage. The majority of citizens of the Belarusian Republic opted for the existence of the Soviet Union as the political entity. A new interpretation of history met neither with any special resistance, nor enthusiasm. It was regarded is as yet another action imposed by the authorities, the only difference being that this time it was possible to criticise it much more easily without the fear of severe reprisals as in the Soviet times.There was a general feeling of nostalgia for the good, Soviet times. The fight for the construction of a new interpretation of history intensified after 1994, when the presidential campaign entered its final stage. Both the national circles and those appealing to the Soviet version of history understood that historical topics made an important element of the campaign which made it possible for electors to better identify with their candidate.An attempt to build a new community based on national banners suffered defeat in the elections of 1994. The society was not ready to reject the Soviet-class system of values and replace it with a new national-Belarusian offered after 1991. Neither a symbiosis was created that could combine these two systems. The "West Russian" idea, developed in the nineteenth century, but modified and Sovieticized during the period of Belarusian Soviet Republic, became a strong element of the Belarusian identity, and national circles proved to be unable to weaken it in the years of 1991–1994. ; p. 143-173 ; Summary in English and Russian. ; Continues: Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej ; The final stage of the Soviet Union and the creation in 1991 of a new Belarusian state were characterised by big political whirls. There was the need in a new, post-Soviet reality, for a different look at the nation's own history. Increasingly strong was national narrative, emphasising the importance of political and national independence. Those milieux demanded that Belarusian sciences should be made independent of the party, for thus far they were treated as the ideological resource base for the communist party.A large part of Belarusians, however, and numerous groups of historians did not see the necessity to break up with Soviet heritage. The majority of citizens of the Belarusian Republic opted for the existence of the Soviet Union as the political entity. A new interpretation of history met neither with any special resistance, nor enthusiasm. It was regarded is as yet another action imposed by the authorities, the only difference being that this time it was possible to criticise it much more easily without the fear of severe reprisals as in the Soviet times.There was a general feeling of nostalgia for the good, Soviet times. The fight for the construction of a new interpretation of history intensified after 1994, when the presidential campaign entered its final stage. Both the national circles and those appealing to the Soviet version of history understood that historical topics made an important element of the campaign which made it possible for electors to better identify with their candidate.An attempt to build a new community based on national banners suffered defeat in the elections of 1994. The society was not ready to reject the Soviet-class system of values and replace it with a new national-Belarusian offered after 1991. Neither a symbiosis was created that could combine these two systems. The "West Russian" idea, developed in the nineteenth century, but modified and Sovieticized during the period of Belarusian Soviet Republic, became a strong element of the Belarusian identity, and national circles proved to be unable to weaken it in the years of 1991–1994. ; s. 143-173 ; Streszcz. ang., ros. ; Czasop. kontynuuje numerację wydaw. pt.: Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej
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