Suchergebnisse

The author analysed the scale of betrayal among the officers and officials of the Ukrainian state during the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The main research problem was an attempt to explain the anomaly in the activities of the special services in the form of recruiting 1,400 officers of the Ukrainian SBU to the Russian FSB. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon in the practice of secret services, the author used the theory of offensive intelligence and counter-intelligence created and developed in the USSR from the early 1920s, as well as the findings of cognitive psychology regarding the phenomenon of projection as the main mechanism for explaining the behavior of other people. Thanks to the synthesis of psychology and the analysis of the theoretical achievements of the Soviet secret services, the author put forward a hypothesis about the mass recruitment of the SBU officers in the Crimea long before the annexation. According to the author, the main mechanisms of mass recruitment of agents in order to control the opponent's organisation were broadly understood corruption and cronyism characteristic to the post-Soviet area.

The author analysed the scale of betrayal among the officers and officials of the Ukrainian state during the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The main research problem was an attempt to explain the anomaly in the activities of the special services in the form of recruiting 1,400 officers of the Ukrainian SBU to the Russian FSB. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon in the practice of secret services, the author used the theory of offensive intelligence and counter-intelligence created and developed in the USSR from the early 1920s, as well as the findings of cognitive psychology regarding the phenomenon of projection as the main mechanism for explaining the behavior of other people. Thanks to the synthesis of psychology and the analysis of the theoretical achievements of the Soviet secret services, the author put forward a hypothesis about the mass recruitment of the SBU officers in the Crimea long before the annexation. According to the author, the main mechanisms of mass recruitment of agents in order to control the opponent's organisation were broadly understood corruption and cronyism characteristic to the post-Soviet area.

Autor dokonuje analizy przypadku zatrzymania oficera Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy Olega Kulinicza pod zarzutem szpiegostwa na rzecz Federalnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej. Na podstawie analizy zadań stawianych temu rosyjskiemu agentowi dochodzi do wniosku, że sposób działania rosyjskiego kontrwywiadu diametralnie różni się od metod zachodnich służb. Główną różnicą jest przeniesienie środka ciężkości działań operacyjnych z pracy rozpoznawczo-informacyjnej na próby agenturalnego przejęcia kontroli nad instytucjami przeciwnika, głównie cywilnymi i wojskowymi służbami specjalnymi, oraz na realizację infiltracji wywiadowczej przez ludzi dysponujących tym samym habitusem co kandydaci do werbunku. Korzystając z dorobku psychologii po-znawczej oraz badań z zakresu historii najnowszej, autor udowadnia, że od ponad 100 lat rosyjskie służby wykorzystują i udoskonalają te metody.

Working methods of the Russian secret services in the light of the Oleg Kulinich case: The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.

The author analyses the case of the detention of Ukrainian Security Service officer Oleg Kulinich on suspicion of espionage for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. On the basis of the analysis of the tasks posed to this Russian agent, he concludes that the modus operandi of Russian counterintelligence is diametrically opposed to the methods of Western services. The main difference is the shifting of the centre of gravity of operational activities from reconnaissance-information work to attempts at agentic seizure of control over enemy institutions, mainly civilian and military special services, and the realisation of intelligence infiltration by people with the same habitus as recruitment candidates. Drawing on the achievements of cognitive psychology and research in recent history, the author demonstrates that the Russian services have been using and refining these methods for more than 100 years.

Autor analizuje zajęcie siedziby Służby Bezpieczeństwa Ukrainy (SBU) w Ługańsku w 2014 r. przez prorosyjskich manifestantów. Przedstawia także dobrze udokumentowane poszlaki wskazujące na to, że ługańska SBU została wybrana przez rosyjskie służby specjalne, aby odegrać rolę "wyzwalacza" wystąpień separatystycznych w Donbasie. Temu miało służyć między innymi zgromadzenie w magazynach tej jednostki ogromnych ilości amunicji, broni i materiałów wybuchowych, aby natychmiast po szturmie separatyści mogli przystąpić do tworzenia struktur militarnych. Zdaniem autora infiltracja ukraińskiego SBU i Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych była łatwiejsza wskutek istnienia w nich rozgałęzionych sieci klientelistycznych. To umożliwiało politykom wrogim nowej władzy sterowanie instytucjami państwowymi w imię interesów strategicznych Federacji Rosyjskiej.

2014 takeover of the SBU headquarters in Lugansk as an example of the operation of the Russian special services
The author analyzes the seizure of the SBU headquarters in Lugansk in 2014 by pro-Russian demonstrators. The author presents well-documented evidence that the Luhansk SBU was selected by the Russian secret services as a "trigger" of the uprising in the Donbas, due to the accumulation of a huge amount of ammunition, weapons and explosives, thanks to which the separatists could immediately start creating military structures after the attack. In the author's opinion, the infiltration of the Ukrainian SBU and the Ministry of the Interior was facilitated by the existence of branched clientelist networks within them, enabling politicians hostile to the new prowestern government to steer state institutions in the name of the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.

The author analyzes the seizure of the SBU headquarters in Lugansk in 2014 by pro-Russian demonstrators. The author presents well-documented evidence that the Luhansk SBU was selected by the Russian secret services as a "trigger" of the uprising in the Donbas, due to the accumulation of a huge amount of ammunition, weapons and explosives, thanks to which the separatists could immediately start creating military structures after the attack. In the author's opinion, the infiltration of the Ukrainian SBU and the Ministry of the Interior was facilitated by the existence of branched clientelist networks within them, enabling politicians hostile to the new prowestern government to steer state institutions in the name of the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.

The author analyzes the course of the elections in Belarus in 2020 and the socio-political protests caused by election fraud. On the basis of the anomalies noted in the activities of the security service of the Republic of Belarus the author puts forward a hypothesis about the possible involvement of the Russian secret services in provoking the post-election crisis in order to reduce the margin of political maneuver for the Lukashenka regime.

Autor analizuje przebieg wyborów na Białorusi w 2020 r. oraz protesty społeczne wywołane fałszerstwami wyborczymi. Na podstawie anomalii zaobserwowanych w działaniach sektora siłowego Republiki Białoruś wysuwa hipotezę o możliwym udziale rosyjskich służb specjalnych w wywołaniu kryzysu powyborczego w celu zmniejszenia marginesu manewru politycznego dla reżimu Aleksandra Łukaszenki.

ABSTRACT
Post-election protests in Belarus as a tool of political technology. Working hypothes

The author analyzes the course of the elections in Belarus in 2020 and the socio-political protests caused by election fraud. On the basis of the anomalies noted in the activities of the security service of the Republic of Belarus the author puts forward a hypothesis about the possible involvement of the Russian secret services in provoking the post-election crisis in order to reduce the margin of political maneuver for the Lukashenka regime.

Autor analizuje działania białoruskich władz w sytuacji społecznego buntu wywołanego sfałszowanymi wyborami w 2020 r. Wysuwa hipotezę, że istotną rolę w wygaszaniu potencjału protestacyjnego odegrały agenturalne gry decepcyjne prowadzone przez białoruskie KGB oraz realizowane równolegle działania represyjne i ofensywa informacyjna reżimu, w której doszło do synergii działań propagandowych i dezinformacyjno-agenturalnych.

The author analyzes the actions of the Belarusian authorities in the situation of the social rebellion triggered by the rigged elections in 2020. He puts forward a hypothesis that a significant role in extinguishing the protest potential was played by agent deception games conducted by the Belarusian KGB, as well as parallel repressive actions and the regime's information offensive, which resulted in a synergy of propaganda and disinformation-agent activities.