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Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π
In: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After, S. 573-592
Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 94-101
Average weights and power in weighted voting games
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 108, S. 90-99
The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise
This Note contains the recommendation for a mathematical basis for the apportionment of the seats in the European Parliament between the Member States of the European Union. This is the unanimous recommendation of the Participants in the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting, held at the instigation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge, on 28-29 January 2011.
BASE
The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise
This Note contains the recommendation for a mathematical basis for the apportionment of the seats in the European Parliament between the Member States of the European Union. This is the unanimous recommendation of the Participants in the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting, held at the instigation of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs at the Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge, on 28-29 January 2011.
BASE