Suchergebnisse

This article deals with the most noticeable aspects of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. Without doubt, the constitutional mission of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania is to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and, by the same token, the rule of law. According to an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the effective implementation of the Constitutional Court's mission of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is only possible if no compromises are made at the expense of the Constitution and the rule of law. For this purpose, in interpreting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court reveals its own implied powers (aspects thereof). Thus, in order to effectively handle the challenges faced by the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the Constitution, possesses all the necessary powers, including those that are not explicitly laid down in the text of the Constitution, but can be justified by the mission of the Constitutional Court to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, while simultaneously interpreting the Constitution in the context of its other provisions and principles (the limits of these powers are determined by the explicit provisions of the Constitution. For example, those that pertain to setting out the entities that have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court and the law-making entities whose acts may be challenged before to the Constitutional Court). The development of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court can be described by three principles that follow from the necessity to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. First, no legal act may have immunity from constitutional review. Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the objects of constitutional review exercised by the Constitutional Court are, for example, amendments to the Constitution, legal acts adopted by a referendum, individual legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as legal acts of a non-normative (programme or conceptual) nature that are passed by the Seimas or the Government. If the Constitutional Court were precluded form verifying the legal acts not explicitly mentioned as objects of constitutional review carried out by it, it would be impossible to effectively ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, as this would create preconditions for "circumventing" the Constitution by adopting such legal acts whose constitutionality could not be verified by anyone (since, according to the Constitution, no other court, but only the Constitutional Court, may verify the constitutionality of legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as those adopted by a referendum of the Nation). In other words, preconditions would be created for denying the hierarchy of values entrenched in, and protected by, the Constitution, for amending the Constitution in violation of the procedure established therein, including the carrying out of individual anticonstitutional actions or adopting programme acts of any content, and laying down guidelines for the actions of state institutions that would not necessarily conform with the Constitution.

Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama 1991 m. liepos 29 d. Lietuvos Respublikos sutartis dėl tarpvalstybinių santykių pagrindų su Rusijos Federacija. Svarbiausios jos nuostatos yra susijusios su atkūrusios nepriklausomybę Lietuvos Respublikos tarptautinio teisinio statuso pripažinimu pagal 1990 m. kovo 11 d. aktus ir Lietuvos Respublikos saugumo garantijų įtvirtinimu. Sutartimi Rusijos Federacija pripažino SSRS įvykdytos agresijos (įskaitant aneksiją) prieš Lietuvos Respubliką faktą, Lietuvos Respublikos tęstinumą ir tapatumą 1918 m. vasario 16 d. Nepriklausomybės aktu įsteigtai Lietuvos valstybei. Taip pat pripažinta Lietuvos Respublikos teisė laisvai pasirinkti saugumo garantijas, tarp jų ir narystę NATO. Šiais aspektais Lietuvos tarpvalstybinių santykių pagrindų sutartis su Rusija yra unikali: tokios sutarties su Rusija neturi nei Latvija ir Estija, nei juo labiau buvusios sovietinės respublikos. Apskritai Lietuvos ir Rusijos tarpvalstybinių santykių sutartis daug prisidėjo prie tarptautinės teisės viršenybės tarptautiniuose santykiuose įtvirtinimo, tebeišlaiko didžiulį potencialą plėtojant draugiškus šalių santykius remiantis tarptautine teise ir teisingumu.

This article deals with the most noticeable aspects of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. Without doubt, the constitutional mission of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania is to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and, by the same token, the rule of law. According to an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the effective implementation of the Constitutional Court's mission of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is only possible if no compromises are made at the expense of the Constitution and the rule of law. For this purpose, in interpreting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court reveals its own implied powers (aspects thereof). Thus, in order to effectively handle the challenges faced by the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the Constitution, possesses all the necessary powers, including those that are not explicitly laid down in the text of the Constitution, but can be justified by the mission of the Constitutional Court to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, while simultaneously interpreting the Constitution in the context of its other provisions and principles (the limits of these powers are determined by the explicit provisions of the Constitution. For example, those that pertain to setting out the entities that have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court and the law-making entities whose acts may be challenged before to the Constitutional Court). The development of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court can be described by three principles that follow from the necessity to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. First, no legal act may have immunity from constitutional review. Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the objects of constitutional review exercised by the Constitutional Court are, for example, amendments to the Constitution, legal acts adopted by a referendum, individual legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as legal acts of a non-normative (programme or conceptual) nature that are passed by the Seimas or the Government. If the Constitutional Court were precluded form verifying the legal acts not explicitly mentioned as objects of constitutional review carried out by it, it would be impossible to effectively ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, as this would create preconditions for "circumventing" the Constitution by adopting such legal acts whose constitutionality could not be verified by anyone (since, according to the Constitution, no other court, but only the Constitutional Court, may verify the constitutionality of legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as those adopted by a referendum of the Nation). In other words, preconditions would be created for denying the hierarchy of values entrenched in, and protected by, the Constitution, for amending the Constitution in violation of the procedure established therein, including the carrying out of individual anticonstitutional actions or adopting programme acts of any content, and laying down guidelines for the actions of state institutions that would not necessarily conform with the Constitution.

This article deals with the most noticeable aspects of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. Without doubt, the constitutional mission of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania is to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and, by the same token, the rule of law. According to an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the effective implementation of the Constitutional Court's mission of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is only possible if no compromises are made at the expense of the Constitution and the rule of law. For this purpose, in interpreting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court reveals its own implied powers (aspects thereof). Thus, in order to effectively handle the challenges faced by the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the Constitution, possesses all the necessary powers, including those that are not explicitly laid down in the text of the Constitution, but can be justified by the mission of the Constitutional Court to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, while simultaneously interpreting the Constitution in the context of its other provisions and principles (the limits of these powers are determined by the explicit provisions of the Constitution. For example, those that pertain to setting out the entities that have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court and the law-making entities whose acts may be challenged before to the Constitutional Court). The development of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court can be described by three principles that follow from the necessity to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. First, no legal act may have immunity from constitutional review. Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the objects of constitutional review exercised by the Constitutional Court are, for example, amendments to the Constitution, legal acts adopted by a referendum, individual legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as legal acts of a non-normative (programme or conceptual) nature that are passed by the Seimas or the Government. If the Constitutional Court were precluded form verifying the legal acts not explicitly mentioned as objects of constitutional review carried out by it, it would be impossible to effectively ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, as this would create preconditions for "circumventing" the Constitution by adopting such legal acts whose constitutionality could not be verified by anyone (since, according to the Constitution, no other court, but only the Constitutional Court, may verify the constitutionality of legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as those adopted by a referendum of the Nation). In other words, preconditions would be created for denying the hierarchy of values entrenched in, and protected by, the Constitution, for amending the Constitution in violation of the procedure established therein, including the carrying out of individual anticonstitutional actions or adopting programme acts of any content, and laying down guidelines for the actions of state institutions that would not necessarily conform with the Constitution.

This article deals with the most noticeable aspects of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution. Without doubt, the constitutional mission of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania is to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and, by the same token, the rule of law. According to an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the effective implementation of the Constitutional Court's mission of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is only possible if no compromises are made at the expense of the Constitution and the rule of law. For this purpose, in interpreting the Constitution, the Constitutional Court reveals its own implied powers (aspects thereof). Thus, in order to effectively handle the challenges faced by the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the Constitution, possesses all the necessary powers, including those that are not explicitly laid down in the text of the Constitution, but can be justified by the mission of the Constitutional Court to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, while simultaneously interpreting the Constitution in the context of its other provisions and principles (the limits of these powers are determined by the explicit provisions of the Constitution. For example, those that pertain to setting out the entities that have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court and the law-making entities whose acts may be challenged before to the Constitutional Court). The development of the implied powers of the Constitutional Court can be described by three principles that follow from the necessity to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. First, no legal act may have immunity from constitutional review. Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the objects of constitutional review exercised by the Constitutional Court are, for example, amendments to the Constitution, legal acts adopted by a referendum, individual legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as legal acts of a non-normative (programme or conceptual) nature that are passed by the Seimas or the Government. If the Constitutional Court were precluded form verifying the legal acts not explicitly mentioned as objects of constitutional review carried out by it, it would be impossible to effectively ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, as this would create preconditions for "circumventing" the Constitution by adopting such legal acts whose constitutionality could not be verified by anyone (since, according to the Constitution, no other court, but only the Constitutional Court, may verify the constitutionality of legal acts passed by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government, as well as those adopted by a referendum of the Nation). In other words, preconditions would be created for denying the hierarchy of values entrenched in, and protected by, the Constitution, for amending the Constitution in violation of the procedure established therein, including the carrying out of individual anticonstitutional actions or adopting programme acts of any content, and laying down guidelines for the actions of state institutions that would not necessarily conform with the Constitution.

Šiame straipsnyje 1922 m. Lietuvos Valstybės Konstitucija, pasitelkus jos parengiamąją medžiagą, nagrinėjama trijų esminių demokratinius valstybės pagrindus atskleidžiančių konstitucinių principų – Konstitucijos viršenybės, pagarbos žmogaus teisėms ir laisvėms bei valdžių padalijimo – įtvirtinimo aspektais. Pabrėžiami jų įtvirtinimo pranašumai tuomečiu laikotarpiu, taip pat nurodomi jų įtvirtinimo trūkumai žvelgiant iš nūdienos perspektyvos. Argumentuojama, kad 1922 m. Konstitucijoje glūdi šiuolaikinės Lietuvos valstybės konstitucinių demokratinių tradicijų ištakos. Iš 1922 m. Konstitucijos galiojančioje Konstitucijoje buvo perimta parlamentinės respublikos tradicija, taip pat vertingiausi pirmiau išvardytų principų elementai, pakoreguoti 1922 m. konstitucinio reguliavimo trūkumai.

The article carries out an assessment of the "reunification of Crimea with Russia" from the point of view of contemporary international law and examines the arguments of Russian scholars who aim to justify the acts of Russia in Crimea. The article aims to identify the strategies that are employed in seeking to offer an interpretation of international legal norms that corresponds to the interests of the Russian Federation. The research shows that in the legal discourse a new definition is attached to a "people" as an entity entitled to secession and right to "remedial secession" becomes, in principle, absolute, i.e. the exercise of the right to "remedial secession" is justified not only on the grounds of an actual physical threat, but also on the grounds of vague ideological threats, or temporary political instability. Moreover, the scientific discourse on justifying the "reunification of Crimea with Russia" relies heavily on historical arguments that suggest restoring "historical justice" and reuniting historically united nations, and aims at diminishing the sovereignty of Ukraine and redefining it in such a way that enhances the scope of Russian sovereignty, while minimizing the sovereignty of post-Soviet states. The research suggests that consequently the current Russian legal discourse has become a political instrument used for constructing concepts and meanings necessary for the realization of Russia's geopolitical interests as Russian scholars tend to manipulate international legal concepts and combine legal and pseudo-legal reasoning and subsequently an alternative pseudo-legal reality is constructed.

The article examines the interrelationship between the constitutional identity of Lithuania and human rights protection. It is maintained that this interrelationship is apparent through two key aspects. First and foremost, respect for innate human rights in itself constitutes an inseparable part of the Lithuanian constitutional identity. Although the Constitutional Court has not so far directly expressed its position concerning the Lithuanian constitutional identity, the category of fundamental constitutional values, singled out by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 19 December 2012 and ruling of 24 January 2014, is very important in this respect. This category comprises values consolidated in Articles 1 and 18 of the Constitution, such as the independence of the state, democracy, the republican form of government, and the innate nature of human rights and freedoms. These values are indivisible from the Lithuanian constitutional identity, since creating and fostering an independent and democratic state that respects innate human rights is a Lithuanian historical and constitutional tradition. This tradition derives from the fundamental acts of the independence of the state, i.e. the Act of Independence of 16 February of 1918, the Declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, which was adopted in 1949 at the time of the occupation, and the Act of 11 March 1990. This is reflected in the first democratic Constitution of the State of 1922 and is consolidated in the current Constitution. In view of the historically consistent obligation to respect innate human rights, it can be stated that the protection of these rights has become a particular metanorm, expressing the essence of the Constitution as a social contract and supreme law.

The article examines the interrelationship between the constitutional identity of Lithuania and human rights protection. It is maintained that this interrelationship is apparent through two key aspects. First and foremost, respect for innate human rights in itself constitutes an inseparable part of the Lithuanian constitutional identity. Although the Constitutional Court has not so far directly expressed its position concerning the Lithuanian constitutional identity, the category of fundamental constitutional values, singled out by the Constitutional Court in its decision of 19 December 2012 and ruling of 24 January 2014, is very important in this respect. This category comprises values consolidated in Articles 1 and 18 of the Constitution, such as the independence of the state, democracy, the republican form of government, and the innate nature of human rights and freedoms. These values are indivisible from the Lithuanian constitutional identity, since creating and fostering an independent and democratic state that respects innate human rights is a Lithuanian historical and constitutional tradition. This tradition derives from the fundamental acts of the independence of the state, i.e. the Act of Independence of 16 February of 1918, the Declaration of the Council of the Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, which was adopted in 1949 at the time of the occupation, and the Act of 11 March 1990. This is reflected in the first democratic Constitution of the State of 1922 and is consolidated in the current Constitution. In view of the historically consistent obligation to respect innate human rights, it can be stated that the protection of these rights has become a particular metanorm, expressing the essence of the Constitution as a social contract and supreme law.

The article carries out an assessment of the "reunification of Crimea with Russia" from the point of view of contemporary international law and examines the arguments of Russian scholars who aim to justify the acts of Russia in Crimea. The article aims to identify the strategies that are employed in seeking to offer an interpretation of international legal norms that corresponds to the interests of the Russian Federation. The research shows that in the legal discourse a new definition is attached to a "people" as an entity entitled to secession and right to "remedial secession" becomes, in principle, absolute, i.e. the exercise of the right to "remedial secession" is justified not only on the grounds of an actual physical threat, but also on the grounds of vague ideological threats, or temporary political instability. Moreover, the scientific discourse on justifying the "reunification of Crimea with Russia" relies heavily on historical arguments that suggest restoring "historical justice" and reuniting historically united nations, and aims at diminishing the sovereignty of Ukraine and redefining it in such a way that enhances the scope of Russian sovereignty, while minimizing the sovereignty of post-Soviet states. The research suggests that consequently the current Russian legal discourse has become a political instrument used for constructing concepts and meanings necessary for the realization of Russia's geopolitical interests as Russian scholars tend to manipulate international legal concepts and combine legal and pseudo-legal reasoning and subsequently an alternative pseudo-legal reality is constructed ; Vilniaus universitetas

During the global economic crisis, many European countries faced the necessity to apply the austerity measures that involved the reduction of salaries, pensions and other social benefits paid by a state. Austerity has become a difficult challenge in particular to those states who have declared in their constitutions the social orientation of a state or even a social state. The Republic of Lithuania is one of those states: according to its Constitution, the State of Lithuania is socially oriented, it has to undertake certain commitments to the most vulnerable social groups.Lithuania was one of those states who has suffered from the most negative impact of the economic and financial crisis and who, therefore, has applied the drastic austerity measures. Thus, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania had in particular difficult task – while assessing the constitutionality of the austerity measures in the circumstances of a deep economic and financial crisis, to balance different constitutional values: stability of public finances and the social orientation of the State implying guarantees of social and economic rights. Considering this, one can see the experience of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in assessing austerity measures as unique and interesting at the European level.The subject of this article – the official constitutional doctrine formulated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the so-called austerity measures aiming to manage and to overcome economic and financial crisis within a state. The aim of the research is to identify and analyse the criteria of constitutionality of austerity measures. The research was conducted mostly by applying analytical, systematic, comparative and descriptive research methods.This article analyses the following criteria of constitutionality of austerity measures, which have to be observed respecting human rights and social orientation of the State, as consolidated in the Constitution: constitutionally justifiable basis of austerity measures, their necessity, temporal character, proportionality, as well as due regard to the limits of discretion of the legislature, the principles of social solidarity and non-discrimination, the duty to compensate certain losses. The article focuses on specific features of these criteria as far as they concern austerity measures. For example, the financial assessment of the situation in the State usually does not fall within constitutional jurisdiction; therefore, the Constitutional Court ought to abstain from assessing the compatibility of austerity measures with the first three criteria – constitutionally justifiable basis of austerity measures, their necessity and temporal character, i.e. the Court ought to rely on the assessment of the State economy made by the legislature (and the executive) and not to interfere into the matters of substance and expediency of decisions on economic policy. There are two specific aspects of the principle of proportionality in assessing the constitutionality of austerity measures, as indicated in the article: the first one is the requirement not to distort by the austerity measures the proportions of salaries and pensions established before their reductions; the second one is the requirement not to restrict other constitutional rights than those directly restricted by the austerity measures in question. One can read also about three specific requirements for constitutionality of austerity measures, which follow from the principles of social solidarity and non-discrimination: 1) overall and non-discriminative character of austerity measures; 2) the positive discrimination of the most vulnerable social groups; 3) the austerity measures cannot aim at the establishment of egalitarianism.The main conclusion made in this article is that the criteria of constitutionality of austerity measures, as formulated in the official constitutional doctrine of the Republic of Lithuania, are grounded on the general criteria of legality of the restrictions of human rights, as provided by international law, as well as they are in essence identical to the criteria of constitutionality of austerity measures which have been formulated by other European constitutional courts. Therefore, one may see a certain unity in diversity in this field, i.e. one of the elements of European constitutional identity. ; Šio straipsnio objektas – Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo suformuota oficialioji konstitucinė doktrina, susijusi su taupymo priemonėmis, kurios taikomos siekiant suvaldyti ir įveikti valstybėje kilusią ekonominę ir finansinę krizę. Išskiriami ir analizuojami šie taupymo priemonių konstitucingumo kriterijai, kurių turi būti laikomasi paisant Konstitucijoje įtvirtintų žmogaus teisių ir valstybės socialinės orientacijos: konstituciškai pateisinamas šių priemonių pagrindas, jų būtinumas, laikinumas, proporcingumas, taip pat įstatymų leidėjo diskrecijos ribų, socialinio solidarumo ir nediskriminavimo principų paisymas, tam tikrų praradimų kompensavimo pareiga. Pagrindinė straipsnio išvada yra ta, kad Lietuvos Respublikos oficialiojoje konstitucinėje doktrinoje suformuluoti taupymo priemonių konstitucingumo kriterijai yra pagrįsti bendraisiais žmogaus teisių ribojimo teisėtumo kriterijais, įtvirtintais ir tarptautinėje teisėje, taip pat yra iš esmės identiški kitų Europos konstitucinių teismų jurisprudencijoje suformuluotiems taupymo priemonių konstitucingumo kriterijams. Tai leidžia įžvelgti šioje srityje tam tikrą vienovę įvairovėje,t. y. vieną iš Europos konstitucinio identiteto elementų.

The article deals with the development of legal grounds of the European Union common defence policy in a draft Constitution for Europe. In order to identify trends in the legal regulation of the EU common defence policy, the author compares respective provisions of the draft European Constitution and the Treaty on European Union. The key Art. I-40 of the draft Constitution establishing specific provisions for implementing the common security and defence policy provides for significant changes, in comparison with the respective Art. 17 of the Treaty on European Union. Apart from that, the specific provisions of Art. I-40 of the European Constitution are developed by the more detailed provisions on the common security and defence policy which are contained in Section 2, Chapter II, Title V of Part III of the Constitution (from Art. III-210 to Art. III-214 thereof). Most of these provisions are new. However, they are based on the same principles, as stated in Art. 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Art. I-11(4), I-15(1) and I-40(1, 2) of the draft Constitution. Namely, under the Constitution, the common defence policy will remain an integral part of the common foreign and security policy and will continue to provide operational capabilities for the Union's external actions in a specific situation when diplomatic and economic actions will be insufficient in order to achieve the common foreign and security policy goals. As previously, the main aim of the common defence policy will be to increase civilian and military capabilities assigned for the implementation of the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking operations). The draft Constitution also preserves sufficient legal guarantees to ensure compatibility with the activities of the NATO and corresponding legal obligations of a number of Member States. On the other hand, some new provisions of the Constitution can be assessed as the reflection of efforts of some EU countries to make the common defence policy more autonomous with respect to the NATO and the USA. Some of them may even raise a danger of duplication of the NATO's activities. With regard to implementation of the Petersberg tasks, the provisions of the Constitution remains generally unchanged in comparison with those of the Treaty on European Union, except a few provisions updating the Petersberg tasks and strengthening the institutional framework of the common defence policy. The new missions, such as joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, were added to the range of Petersberg missions, in order to respond properly to the emerging new threats to the European security. In line with that, the solidarity clause is added by Art. I-42 which obliges the Member States to mobilise all instruments at their disposal in order to prevent terrorist threats and assist each other in case of disasters. The next novelty is that, in addition to the existent institutions of the common defence policy, the draft Constitution provides for the establishment of the European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency that will be subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Apart from the cooperation in the field of armaments, the Agency will also be responsible for supervision of the implementation by the Member States of their military capability commitments. On the one hand, that could significantly improve the fulfilment of the Union's defence policy objectives. On the other hand, there is a danger that the Agency can serve as one of the means for domination of certain Member States and, as a consequence, it can become a catalyst of different-speed and divided Europe in the field of defence policy. The subsequent novelty provided for in the draft Constitution is the possibility of the structured defence and military cooperation between certain Member States, which might be treated as a specific kind of enhanced cooperation. Despite of possible advantages of increase of the Union's military capability, this kind of cooperation could also result in a deeper division of Member States rather than a desired unity on the defence policy matters. ; Straipsnyje analizuojamos Sutarties dėl Konstitucijos Europai nuostatos, skirtos Europos Sąjungos bendrajai gynybos politikai. Šios nuostatos lyginamos su bendrąją gynybos politiką reglamentuojančiomis galiojančios Europos Sąjungos steigimo sutarties nuostatomis, įtvirtintomis Nicos sutartimi. Išryškinamos pagrindinės Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos teisinio reglamentavimo tendencijos Europos Konstitucijos projekte. Savo išvadoms pagrįsti, be lyginamojo, autorius taip pat taiko sisteminį, istorinį, teleologinį, loginį ir kitus tyrimo metodus. Pagrindinė autoriaus daroma išvada yra ta, kad Europos Konstitucijos projektas numato toliau stiprinti Europos Sąjungos bendrąją gynybos politiką jos autonomiškumo santykiuose su NATO didinimo linkme, nors ir iš esmės nekeičia šios politikos principų. Tokią išvadą lemia naujos, lyginant su galiojančia Europos Sąjungos steigimo sutartimi, Europos Konstitucijos projekto nuostatos, atspindinčios Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos institucijų stiprinimo bei struktūrinio karinio bendradarbiavimo plėtros tendencijas ir nustatančios galimybę valstybėms narėms prisiimti bendros gynybos įsipareigojimus. Pagal Europos Konstitucijos projektą taip pat sudaromos sąlygos Europos Sąjungai perimti visas Vakarų Europos Sąjungos funkcijas ir formaliai likviduoti šią organizaciją. Vis dėlto Europos Konstitucijos projekte išlieka pakankamos teisinės garantijos, kad Europos Sąjungos bendroji gynybos politika nepakeis NATO veiklos ir nepažeis valstybių, NATO narių, įsipareigojimų pagal Šiaurės Atlanto sutartį. Be to, dauguma naujų Europos Sąjungos bendrosios gynybos politikos nuostatų buvo suformuluotos siekiant veiksmingai reaguoti į naujus iššūkius tarptautinei taikai ir saugumui. Straipsnyje trumpai apžvelgiami ir Lietuvos dalyvavimo Europos Sąjungos bendrojoje gynybos politikoje pagrindai pagal nacionalinę teisę. Daroma išvada, kad Lietuvos nacionalinės teisės normos numato pakankamas sąlygas šaliai dalyvauti visose Europos Sąjungos ben-drosios gynybos politikos formose. Kita vertus, Lietuvai politiniu požiūriu gali būti netikslinga palaikyti visas galimas šios politikos raidos tendencijas.