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(Summary) n the last days of the Second World War, in the moments when the final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia were coming to an end, and the outlines of the future Cold War and post-war alliances were becoming clearer, the need to establish a peacetime armed force was imposed in front of the Yugoslav General Staff. An important segment in the establishment of the future armed forces was the organization and work methods of the military intelligence service. Previous war experiences, mostly based on the legacy of guerrilla military operations conducted by the partisan movement during the liberation and civil wars, could only be partially used in the process of peacetime formation of the military intelligence service. That is why it was necessary to create a new model that involved relying on national experiences, primarily the intelligence services of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War and the experience of the allied armies, especially the Soviet Red Army in the war conflict that was coming to an end. The study on the organization of the post-war military intelligence service with emphasis on the organization, scope of work and personnel of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army was prepared by Colonel Frane Biočić. Colonel Biočić's report contained the burden of the ideological and geopolitical environment in which it was written. Written near the end of the war in the conditions of the absolute triumph of the partisan movement under the leadership of the communists over the occupying, Quisling and rival anti-fascist forces in the liberation and civil war, it contained the undisguised glorification of the partisan war heritage, as well as the negation of the value of the experiences of the pre-war Yugoslav intelligence service, whose professional value was not only denied, but was already declared absolutely unusable due to open accusations against the professionalism and patriotism of its officers and associates. On the other hand, absolutely in accordance with the policy of close wartime alliance with the Red Army and projected post-war cooperation, harmonization with the Soviet intelligence model was forced, reliance on the Soviet war experiences, the Soviet assistance in training and education of intelligence personnel was requested, and close cooperation along military intelligence lines was planned between the Yugoslav and Soviet General Staff.

U radu se na osnovu dostupnih objavljenih i neobjavljenih arhivskih izvora prevashodno sovjetskog i jugoslovenskog porekla, kao i relevantne istoriografske i memoarske literature analizira pitanje postojanja sovjetskih namera za vojnu intervenciju u Jugoslaviji u vreme sukoba između nje i zemalja Informbiroa. Predstavljene su ekonomske i demografske okolnosti koje su uticale na kreiranje sovjetskog pristupa razvoju sopstvenih i "satelitskih" vojnih snaga. Posebno su razmatrane promena geopolitičkog položaja Jugoslavije usled sukoba s ranijim saveznicima i vojnog i političkog približavanja zapadnom svetu, kao i zapadna percepcija jugoslovenske vojne ugroženosti i sposobnosti jugoslovenskih oružanih snaga da se odupru eventualnoj sovjetskoj agresiji.

U radu se na osnovu dostupnih objavljenih i neobjavljenih arhivskih izvora jugoslovenskog i sovjetskog porekla, kao i relevantne istoriografske i memoarske literature analiziraju istorijske okolnosti i motivi koji su doveli do otpočinjanja jugoslovensko-sovjetskih trgovinskih pregovora početkom maja 1940. godine. Osvetljeni su tok razgovora u Moskvi, karakter zaključenog sporazuma i dometi međusobnih trgovinskih odnosa do izbijanja Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji u aprilu 1941. godine. Predstavljene su i reakcije zainteresovanih velikih sila, posebno Nemačke, Italije i Velike Britanije na jugoslovensko-sovjetsko ekonomsko i političko zbližavanje. Rad sadrži autorovu ocenu značaja ekonomskih pregovora kao uvoda u potpunu normalizaciju jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa. ; Based on available published and unpublished archival sources of Yugoslav and Soviet origin, as well as relevant historiographical and memoir literature, the paper analyzes the historical circumstances and motives that led to the opening of Yugoslav-Soviet trade negotiations in early May 1940. The course of the talks in Moscow, the character of the concluded agreement, and the scope of mutual trade relations until the outbreak of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, in April 1941, are highlighted. The reactions of the interested great powers-particularly Germany, Italy and Great Britainto the Yugoslav-Soviet economic and political rapprochement are also presented. The paper contains the author's assessment of the importance of economic negotiations as an introduction to the complete normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

U radu se, na osnovu neobjavljenih i do sada najvećim delom nepoznatih dokumentarnih izvora proisteklih iz rada sovjetske diplomatske službe, analizira pogled sovjetske diplomatije na posledice jugoslovenskog vojnog sloma tokom Aprilskog rata, karakter okupacione podele jugoslovenske teritorije s posebnim osvrtom na srpski nacionalni prostor, uspostavljanje okupacionog sistema, obrazovanje okupacionih upravnih organa, prve političke, ekonomske i represivne mere nemačkih vojnih vlasti, problemi u snabdevanju stanovništva, obnova razrušene infrastrukture i evakuacija diplomatskih misija iz Beograda. ; The paper analyzes the assessment of Soviet diplomacy regarding the consequences of the Yugoslav military breakdown during the April War, based on unpublished and largely unknown documentary sources resulting from the work of the Soviet diplomatic service, the character of the occupational division of the Yugoslav territory, with special reference to the Serbian national space, the establishment of an occupation system, education of the occupying governing bodies, the first political, economic and repressive measures of the German military authorities, problems in supplying the population, reconstruction of the wrecked infrastructure, and the evacuation of diplomatic missions in Belgrade.

U radu se na temelju do sada nepoznatih i nekorištenih dokumentarnih izvora sovjetskoga podrijetla predstavljaju i analiziraju stavovi sovjetske diplomacije prema uzrocima nastanka i okolnostima u kojima se formirala Nezavisna Država Hrvatska. U tekstu je prikazan sovjetski odnos prema samom činu njezina proglašenja, posljedicama koje je njezin nastanak imao na sudbinu jugoslavenske kraljevine i ulozi Italije i Njemačke u formiranju i prvim danima postojanja Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. Rad sadržava i pregled stavova Sovjetskoga Saveza prema hrvatskom pitanju u jugoslavenskoj državi međuratnoga perioda i sovjetskih diplomatskih ocjena međunarodnih razmjera hrvatskoga problema
u međuraću i prvim danima Drugoga svjetskog rata

U radu se na osnovu do sada nepoznatih i nekori-šćenih izvora sovjetskog porekla analizira pogled sovjetskog vojnog izaslanika u Beogradu generala Aleksandra Samohina na uzroke poraza Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije u kratkotrajnom Aprilskom ratu 1941. Rad sadrži pregled sovjetskih informacija i analiza o stanju u jugoslovenskoj vojsci i njenim borbenim kvalitetima uoči Drugog svetskog rata, vojnim priprema neposredno pred početak rata, borbenim dejstvima tokom Aprilskog rata i analizu brojnosti, jačine i pripremljenosti nemačkih vojnih snaga koje su učestvovale u napadu na Jugoslaviju. ; Soviet military attaché Major General Alexander Samohin analyzed the causes of the rapid military breakdown of the Yugoslav Kingdom in April 1941 and saw the main causes of its military defeat in a series of weaknesses of the Yugoslav armed forces, inaccurately assessing its physical strength at fiftyeight infantry, three cavalry and one motorized division, The technical inferiority of the Yugoslav Army, doctrinal weaknesses, inadequate war plans, outdated military thought, overt tactical forms, a weak organization of the command system and training, and absolute German dominance in the airspace determined the fate of the Yugoslav Army. In addition, he considered Yugoslavia a country where there was no unity of purpose in either the - government or the people, which was considered an agrarian country that had been under the dominant French and British political, military, and economic influence for many years. There was no strong military industry and an insufficient the amount of modern weapons and military equipment to effectively counter the well-equipped and organized German Army and operations ofa widespread "fifth column" element.

U radu su predstavljena sećanja komandanta Jadranskih trupa srpske vojske generala Dragutina Milutinovića na operacije srpske vojske na tlu Crne Gore 1918, sam čin proglašenja ujedinjenja Srbije i Crne Gore, pobuna protivnika načina na koji je ujedinjenje izvršeno, gušenje pobune i pokušaj normalizacije političkih i bezbednosnih prilika u Crnoj Gori. ; Serbia and Montenegro, as two modern Serbian states, striven for mutual state. Only, after the victory in the Balkan wars and with the establishment of a common border, the unification of the two states has become possible. The beginning of the First World War postponed the start of talks on the unification of the two Serbian states. During the first two war years, despite a series of political and dynastic disputes inherited from the previous period, Serbia took over the maintenance and supply of the Montenegrin army, as well as the planning of joint military operations. The decision of the Montenegrin government to capitulate and not carry out a part of the army from the country in 1916 has particularly aggravated the mutual relations. Since 1916, the unification plan has been re-activated. The unification was not questioned, but there was no concrete plan to implement it in the work itself. Part of the Montenegrins who were in the ranks of the Serbian army insisted on unconditional unification and detonation of the Petrović dynasty. With the breakthrough of the Thessaloniki front and the successful offensive by the Serbian and allied military forces towards Montenegro, the issue of unity has opened up. The armed uprising in Montenegro, the entry of Serbian troops into its territory, the collapse of the occupation order and the majority determination for unification, especially in the Montenegrin North, have led to the future development of events. Elections of regional representatives were an introduction to the Podgorica Assembly, which brought the unification act. The way of implementing the unification itself, as well as the number of supporters of the deposed King Nikola, opened the way for armed and political struggles in Montenegro over the next decade.

Soviet diplomacy interpreted Yugoslavia's position as a result of the process that happened from its origin and place and role in the new system of international relations guided by France and Great Britain. They thought - after the fall of France, Italy's entry into the war, and the growing German pressure on the Balkans - that Yugoslavia had found itself in a kind of foreign policy isolation and was forced to sign a series of unfavorable economic agreements with Germany. According to Soviet sources, the German influence was also manifested in the political sphere by the actions of prominently politically motivated politicians and journalists, as well as "numerous German agents." They viewed the policy carried out by the previous government as a "concession" policy, and its decision to join the Tripartite Pact as the result of German pressure and the inability to provide resolute resistance to German demands. The new government was seen as a conglomeration of representatives of various political ideas, still dominated by the supporters of the new course of Yugoslav foreign policy in relation to the members of the shadow government that found themselves in the new one. Soviet diplomacy worried about the position of Croatian politicians in the new government, since the leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party stood firmly in the position of joining Yugoslavia in the Tripartite Pact. The Soviets encouraged the measures taken by the Yugoslav Government to arrest politicians and journalists, remove pro-German officers from important command positions and mobilize the military. Regarding the further development of events, Soviet diplomacy estimated that the United Kingdom would strive to exploit the uprising in Belgrade in order to form a Balkan front, which would include Yugoslavia, Greece, and possibly Turkey with British support.

U radu se na osnovu dostupnih neobjavljenih i objavljenih arhivskih izvora, kao i istoriografske i memoarske literature, analizira svedočenje generala Svetomira Cvijovića o odbrani Smedereva novembra 1914, kao važan segment razumevanja istoriografske polemike o značaju boja, doprinosa pojedinih učesnika događaja pobedi srpske vojske i političkog porekla nastanka mita o presudnoj ulozi makedonskih regruta u borbenim dejstvima na Dunavu 1914. ; In the moments after the end of the Battle of the Drina, when the withdrawal of the main part of the operative part of the Serbian army to the Valjevske posts began, the command of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces, in anticipation of the final victory over the Serb army, decided to undertake a risky move related to the execution of the desant near Smederevo with the aim of mastering the bridge at the confluence of the Velika Morava and threats to the direction of the Velikomoravska Valley lead to the interior of Serbia. In the beginning, a desirable operation of the Austro-Hungarian army was favorable due to the effect of surprise and the use of weaker parts of the Serbian army. After clarifying the situation, collecting the majority of Serb forces in geographically dominant positions and arriving at fresh troops from the reserve of the Branicevo detachment, a successful counterattack was made, resulting in a complete defeat of the Austro-Hungarian units. The largest part of the Austro-Hungarian troops that failed to retreat across the Danube was captured. The counter-attack included two recruits coys from the Vardar Division, which in the following period were especially used for political and propaganda purposes. The reluctance of the merit of the Vardar regrutes for the victory of the Serbian army in that color in relation to the multiple number of troops of the third call successfully held by the Austro-Hungarian attack and then made up more than 90% of Serbian troops during the counter-attack that followed, opened a controversy among the participants of the events. The memories of the commander of "thirdliners" of Lieutenant Colonel Svetomir Cvijovic were given to former War Minister General Dusan Stefanovic in general with the necessary comments in order to shed light on the events at Smederevo in the autumn of 1914.

U radu se na osnovu objavljenih i neobjavljenih izvora jugoslovenskog, bugarskog, britanskog i sovjetskog porekla, kao i relevantne istoriografske i memoarske literature, analiziraju jugoslovensko viđenje rešavanja statusa Makedonije i politika velikih sila prema tom pitanju u završnim fazama Drugog svetskog rata i neposredno po njegovom završetku, do konačnih rešenja Mirovne konferencije u Parizu. ; The leaders of the Yugoslav communists tried to secure a leading position in the Balkans during the war. Macedonian territory, as a traditional scene of the conflict of interest among the Balkan countries, had a special significance for the Yugoslav, as well as for the Greek and Bulgarian side. Soviet Union - as a victorious great power of the Second World War, the ideological patron of the communist movement and the country that had special interests in the Balkans - tried to have a decisive influence on the regulation of the Macedonian question. Its attitude gradually affected the Yugoslav attitudes which ranged from the radical demands for full annexation of Macedonia, through signing of peace and friendship treaty with Bulgaria, to the final border delimitation among Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria, when Macedonia was divided among these three countries. At the same time, Soviet policy strove to calm relations with Bulgaria as a member of the Eastern Bloc, while the policy towards Greece was much harsher since the Soviets regarded Greece as an exponent of British policy in the Balkans. Final solution of the territorial dispute formally resolved Macedonian question regarding territory, but opened a new dimension of Cold War antagonisms related to the Yugoslav role in the Greek Civil War. Basically, the Macedonian issue was the subject of a dispute between Yugoslavia and Greece during the entire second half of the XX century.