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Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 2019. Kas yra filosofija? Vertė Daina Habdankaitė, Nijolė Keršytė. Vilnius: Jonas ir Jokūbas, 242 p. ISBN 978-609-8236-06-4

The article discusses the development of the Gaia Hypothesis as it was defined by James Lovelock in the 1970s and later elaborated in his collaboration with biologist Lynn Margulis. Margulis's research in symbiogenesis and her interest in Maturana and Varela's theory of autopoiesis helped to reshape the Gaia theory from a first-order systems theory to second-order systems theory. In contrast to the first-order systems theory, which is concerned with the processes of homeostasis, second-order systems incorporate emergence, complexity and contingency. In this respect Latour's and Stengers's takes on Gaia, even defining it as an "outlaw" or an anti-system, can be interpreted as specific kind of systems thinking. The article also discusses Haraway's interpretation of Gaia in terms of sympoiesis and argues that it presents a major reconceptualization of systems theory.

The article discusses the notion of the Anthropocene as a kind of anthropological machine, closely related to the regime of visuality. Giorgio Agamben points out that the anthropological machine is always an optical machine, which helps to induce visibility as an essential element of power. Similarly, Nicholas Mirzoeff discusses Anthropocene visuality as a technique which is always hierarchical and autocratic, helping to maintain the visualizer's material power. Mirzoeff suggests that the biopolitical effects of visuality can be confronted by "countervisuality", a strategy, which abandons visuality in order to achieve political equality. However, in this article I will argue that Anthropocene visuality should not be abandoned but rather reversed or redirected. In this regard, reversed visuality would mean not the replacement of the aesthetic with the political, but, on the contrary, the replacement of anthropocentric aesthetics with a different kind of aesthetics, which includes a non-human or not-quitehuman gaze. If Anthropocene visuality silently presumes that the place from which it represents will remain forever intact, then post-Anthropocene visuality demonstrates that the mechanisms of exclusion and subjection are easily interchangeable and that every living being can potentially bec ome "bare life".

[straipsnis ir santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba]Straipsnyje analizuojama Gilbert'o Simondon'o ontogenezės teorija, kuria siekiama tyrinėti būties tapsmą, arba genezę. Simondon'as teigia, jog filosofija turi analizuoti ne substancinius, išbaigtus ir sau tapačius individus, bet individuacijos procesus. Taip Simondon'as sukuria universalią individuacijos teoriją, kurią suvokia kaip perėjimą nuo ikiindividualios būklės prie individą sukuriančio individuacijos proceso, kuris savo ruožtu tampa naujos individuacijos pradžia. Galima teigti, jog Simondon'as ontologijos pagrindu laiko ne tapatybę, bet neatitikimą ir skirtumą, kurie verčia individus pereiti į naują egzistencijos fazę ar lygmenį. Taip individuacijos teorija tampa universalia metodologija, leidžiančia palyginti fizinius, biologinius, psichinius ir techninius individuacijos procesus. Simondon'o sukurta individuacijos,arba ontogenezės, teorija laikytina materialistine metodologija, kuri pagrindžia sąsajas tarp organinių ir neorganinių, žmogiškų ir nežmogiškų individų.

The essay analyses the paradox of human rights which is revealed in the works of Hannah Arendt, Jacques Rancière, and Giorgio Agamben. The notion of human rights is considered as a biopolitical apparatus, introducing a caesura between a living being and a political existence within the human itself. This division between animality and humanity in the human itself found in the concept of human rights resonates with the distinction between humanity and animality in philosophy. If classical thought – from Aristotle to Heidegger – postulates the distinction between man and animal, Agamben and Derrida insist that the animalization of man and the humanization of animal are the two sides of the same problem. After paraphrazing the problem in this way, the essay examines the philosophy of Roberto Esposito, who claims that all forms of life are equally important and immanent to themselves. By contrast to negative biopolitics, which is understood as the subjection of living beings to the power of norms and laws, Esposito seeks to create an affirmative biopolitics, where the norm is seen as the immanent rule that life follows to reach the maximum of its expression. Although such a notion of affirmative biopolitics may be considered as lacking political consequences, Esposito claims that by erasing the division between zoē and bios, or between naked life and political existence, we do not diminish our capacities to act in the political realm but, on the contrary, create the conditions for any being-in-common, which is the essence of the political. ; Straipsnyje analizuojamas žmogaus teisių paradoksas, atskleistas Hannah'os Arendt, Jacques'o Rancière'o ir Giorgio Agambeno darbuose. Žmogaus teisių konceptas veikia kaip biopolitinis aparatas, įdiegiantis žmogaus kaip gyvos būtybės ir žmogaus kaip politinio subjekto perskyrą. Ši gyvūniškumo ir žmogiškumo perskyra, atrandama pačiame žmoguje, rezonuoja su žmogiškumo ir gyvūniškumo klausimu filosofijoje. Klasikinė filosofija – nuo Aristotelio iki Heideggerio imtinai – postuluoja žmogaus ir gyvūno skirtingumą, o Agambenas ir Derrida teigia, kad žmogaus gyvūniškumas ir gyvūno humanizavimas yra tik dvi tos pačios problemos pusės. Toks klausimo performulavimas leidžia pereiti prie Roberto Esposito filosofijos, kurioje teigiamas visų gyvų būtybių lygiavertiškumas bei pačios gyvybės imanentiškumas. Priešingai nei negatyvioji biopolitika, kuri siekė pajungti gyvybę normai ir įstatymui, Esposito nori sukurti teigiančiąją biopolitiką, kurioje norma laikoma imanentiška taisykle, leidžiančia gyvybei siekti maksimalios išraiškos. Nors atrodytų, jog tokia teorija turi mažai ką bendra su politiškumo konceptualizavimu, Esposito teigia, jog būtent ribos tarp zoē ir bios, tarp nuogos gyvybės ir politinės egzistencijos, panaikinimas ne tik nesumažina galimybių veikti politinėje plotmėje, bet, atvirkščiai, yra bet kokio bendro buvimo sąlyga.

Straipsnyje analizuojamas žmogaus teisių paradoksas, atskleistas Hannah'os Arendt, Jacques'o Rancière'o ir Giorgio Agambeno darbuose. Žmogaus teisių konceptas veikia kaip biopolitinis aparatas, įdiegiantis žmogaus kaip gyvos būtybės ir žmogaus kaip politinio subjekto perskyrą. Ši gyvūniškumo ir žmogiškumo perskyra, atrandama pačiame žmoguje, rezonuoja su žmogiškumo ir gyvūniškumo klausimu filosofijoje. Klasikinė filosofija – nuo Aristotelio iki Heideggerio imtinai – postuluoja žmogaus ir gyvūno skirtingumą, o Agambenas ir Derrida teigia, kad žmogaus gyvūniškumas ir gyvūno humanizavimas yra tik dvi tos pačios problemos pusės. Toks klausimo performulavimas leidžia pereiti prie Roberto Esposito filosofijos, kurioje teigiamas visų gyvų būtybių lygiavertiškumas bei pačios gyvybės imanentiškumas. Priešingai nei negatyvioji biopolitika, kuri siekė pajungti gyvybę normai ir įstatymui, Esposito nori sukurti teigiančiąją biopolitiką, kurioje norma laikoma imanentiška taisykle, leidžiančia gyvybei siekti maksimalios išraiškos. Nors atrodytų, jog tokia teorija turi mažai ką bendra su politiškumo konceptualizavimu, Esposito teigia, jog būtent ribos tarp zoē ir bios, tarp nuogos gyvybės ir politinės egzistencijos, panaikinimas ne tik nesumažina galimybių veikti politinėje plotmėje, bet, atvirkščiai, yra bet kokio bendro buvimo sąlyga.

Straipsnyje analizuojamos biopolitikos sampratos, suformuluotos Michelio Foucault ir Gior­gio Agambeno darbuose. Foucault biopolitiką apibrėžia kaip galios ir gyvybės santykį, kuris istoriškai kinta: suvereno turimą galią pakeičia disciplininė galia, o pastarąją – biopolitika. Biopolitikos atsiradimą Foucault tiesiogiai sieja su kapitalizmo raida ir ekonominiais procesais, todėl politinę teoriją jis siūlo keisti politine ekonomija. Agambenas, priešingai, biopolitiką suvokia kaip kvaziontologinę sąlygą: jo manymu, biopolitinių kūnų produkavimas ir tą produkavimą pagrindžianti išimties būklė apibrėžia tiek senąsias imperijas, tiek šiuolaikines demokratijas. Toks išimtinai negatyvus biopolitikos suvokimas verčia klausti, kaip įmanoma pasipriešinti galiai ir kokios galimos tokio pasipriešinimo formos. Tiek Foucault, tiek Gilles'is Deleuze'as teigia, kad galiai priešinasi būtent tai, ką ji siekia pajungti, – pati gyvybė. Tačiau svarbu suvokti, jog biopolitinė galia ir gyvybinė galia yra visiškai kitokios prigimties, todėl yra nebendramatės. Taigi gyvy­bės galia turi būti apibrėžiama remiantis naujomis sąvokomis, kurios perimamos iš Deleuze'o filosofijos. Straipsnyje siekiama suformuluoti gyvybės filosofijos, arba biofilosofijos, pagrindines charakteristikas bei atskleisti, kaip įmanomas pasipriešinimas galiai.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: biopolitika, gyvybė, biofilosofija, Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze From Biopolitics to Biophilosophy: M. Foucault, G. Agamben,G. DeleuzeAudronė Žukauskaitė AbstractThe essay analyzes the notions of biopolitics in Foucault's and Agamben's works. Foucault defines biopolitics as the result of the relationship between power and life, which has been changing constantly throughout history: the sovereign power has been replaced by disciplinary power, and the latter has been replaced by biopolitics. Foucault connects the emergence of biopolitics with the development of capitalism and economical processes, and this is why he prefers to speak in terms of political economy rather than political theory. By contrast, Agamben interprets biopolitics as a quasi-ontological condition: he claims that the production of biopolitical bodies which is legitimated by the state of exception characterizes both archaic empires and contemporary democracies. These negative notions of biopolitics necessarily raise the question of how the resistance to biopolitics is possible. Both Foucault and Deleuze point out that when power takes life as the object of its manipulation, it is life itself which is turned against power. It is important to stress that biopolitical power and the power of life are not different poles of the same power but are of different nature. Thus the power of life needs to be conceptualized in different terms which are taken from Deleuzian philosophy. The article seeks to define these terms and conceptualize the philosophy of life or biophilosophy, and in this way tries to answer the question of how resistance to power is possible.Keywords: biopolitics, life, biophilosophy, Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze

The essay analyzes the notions of biopolitics in Foucault's and Agamben's works. Foucault defines biopolitics as the result of the relationship between power and life, which has been changing constantly throughout history: the sovereign power has been replaced by disciplinary power, and the latter has been replaced by biopolitics. Foucault connects the emergence of biopolitics with the development of capitalism and economical processes, and this is why he prefers to speak in terms of political economy rather than political theory. By contrast, Agamben interprets biopolitics as a quasi-ontological condition: he claims that the production of biopolitical bodies which is legitimated by the state of exception characterizes both archaic empires and contemporary democracies. These negative notions of biopolitics necessarily raise the question of how the resistance to biopolitics is possible. Both Foucault and Deleuze point out that when power takes life as the object of its manipulation, it is life itself which is turned against power. It is important to stress that biopolitical power and the power of life are not different poles of the same power but are of different nature. Thus the power of life needs to be conceptualized in different terms which are taken from Deleuzian philosophy. The article seeks to define these terms and conceptualize the philosophy of life or biophilosophy, and in this way tries to answer the question of how resistance to power is possible.

This article reconsiders the interface between politics and aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's work. Rancière claims that the unrepresentability in art in some specific cases is commensurate with the unthinkability of a political event. Rancière finds the paradigmatic example of such commensurability in Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah (1985). The discourse of the unrepresentable originates from the Kantian notion of the sublime and the subsequent modifications of this notion in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard displaces the sublime in the field of modern art, defining it as the art of negative presentation. This negativity refers both to the unrepresentable dimension in modern art and the unthinkable dimension of traumatic political events, such as the Holocaust. Contrary to this strategy of sublime adoration, Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman argue against the unrepresentable and claim the necessity "to stare at the unsayable". For example, Didi-Huberman in his Images In Spite of All provocatively rejects the formal choices of Lanzmann's Shoah and insists on the necessity to make or present images "in spite of all". In my article, I want to build on this controversy by introducing into it Michael Haneke's film The White Ribbon (2009), which plays on both sides: on the one hand, it uses the negative aesthetics of the sublime, very similar to that of Lanzmann's film, and on the other hand, it examines violence present at the core of our everyday life. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama Jacques'o Rancière'o aptarta sąsaja tarp nereprezentuojamos meno dimensijos ir nemąstomos politikos dimensijos. Paradigminiu tokios sąsajos pavyzdžiu Rancière'as laiko Claude'o Lanzmanno filmą Shoah. Nereprezentuojamumo sąvoka įtraukia mus į diskusiją su kantiškąja didingumo samprata ir tos sampratos modifikacijomis Jeano François Lyotard'o filosofijoje. Lyotard'as perkelia didingumo sampratą į moderniojo meno kontekstą, apibrėždamas jį kaip negatyvios prezentacijos meną. Šis negatyvumas reiškia tiek nereprezentuojamą dimensiją moderniajame mene, tiek nemąstomą tam tikrų politinių įvykių, pavyzdžiui, holokausto, dimensiją. Priešingai šiai didingumo adoravimo strategijai Giorgio Agambenas ir Georges'as Didi-Hubermanas teigia, kad nereprezentuojamumas sukuria patogų alibi, kuris atpalaiduoja nuo būtinybės gilintis į politines šių reiškinių priežastis. Knygoje Vaizdai nepaisant nieko Didi-Hubermanas provokatyviai atmeta formalius Lanzmanno filmo Shoah sprendimus ir atkakliai teigia būtinybę kurti ar prezentuoti vaizdus "nepaisant nieko". Straipsnyje ši prieštara sprendžiama pasitelkiant Michaelio Haneke's filmą Baltas kaspinas, kuriame įžvelgiama argumentų abiem ginčo pusėms.

This article reconsiders the interface between politics and aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's work. Rancière claims that the unrepresentability in art in some specific cases is commensurate with the unthinkability of a political event. Rancière finds the paradigmatic example of such commensurability in Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah (1985). The discourse of the unrepresentable originates from the Kantian notion of the sublime and the subsequent modifications of this notion in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard displaces the sublime in the field of modern art, defining it as the art of negative presentation. This negativity refers both to the unrepresentable dimension in modern art and the unthinkable dimension of traumatic political events, such as the Holocaust. Contrary to this strategy of sublime adoration, Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman argue against the unrepresentable and claim the necessity "to stare at the unsayable". For example, Didi-Huberman in his Images In Spite of All provocatively rejects the formal choices of Lanzmann's Shoah and insists on the necessity to make or present images "in spite of all". In my article, I want to build on this controversy by introducing into it Michael Haneke's film The White Ribbon (2009), which plays on both sides: on the one hand, it uses the negative aesthetics of the sublime, very similar to that of Lanzmann's film, and on the other hand, it examines violence present at the core of our everyday life.

This article reconsiders the interface between politics and aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's work. Rancière claims that the unrepresentability in art in some specific cases is commensurate with the unthinkability of a political event. Rancière finds the paradigmatic example of such commensurability in Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah (1985). The discourse of the unrepresentable originates from the Kantian notion of the sublime and the subsequent modifications of this notion in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard displaces the sublime in the field of modern art, defining it as the art of negative presentation. This negativity refers both to the unrepresentable dimension in modern art and the unthinkable dimension of traumatic political events, such as the Holocaust. Contrary to this strategy of sublime adoration, Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman argue against the unrepresentable and claim the necessity "to stare at the unsayable". For example, Didi-Huberman in his Images In Spite of All provocatively rejects the formal choices of Lanzmann's Shoah and insists on the necessity to make or present images "in spite of all". In my article, I want to build on this controversy by introducing into it Michael Haneke's film The White Ribbon (2009), which plays on both sides: on the one hand, it uses the negative aesthetics of the sublime, very similar to that of Lanzmann's film, and on the other hand, it examines violence present at the core of our everyday life.

This article reconsiders the interface between politics and aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's work. Rancière claims that the unrepresentability in art in some specific cases is commensurate with the unthinkability of a political event. Rancière finds the paradigmatic example of such commensurability in Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah (1985). The discourse of the unrepresentable originates from the Kantian notion of the sublime and the subsequent modifications of this notion in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard displaces the sublime in the field of modern art, defining it as the art of negative presentation. This negativity refers both to the unrepresentable dimension in modern art and the unthinkable dimension of traumatic political events, such as the Holocaust. Contrary to this strategy of sublime adoration, Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman argue against the unrepresentable and claim the necessity "to stare at the unsayable". For example, Didi-Huberman in his Images In Spite of All provocatively rejects the formal choices of Lanzmann's Shoah and insists on the necessity to make or present images "in spite of all". In my article, I want to build on this controversy by introducing into it Michael Haneke's film The White Ribbon (2009), which plays on both sides: on the one hand, it uses the negative aesthetics of the sublime, very similar to that of Lanzmann's film, and on the other hand, it examines violence present at the core of our everyday life.

This article reconsiders the interface between politics and aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's work. Rancière claims that the unrepresentability in art in some specific cases is commensurate with the unthinkability of a political event. Rancière finds the paradigmatic example of such commensurability in Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah (1985). The discourse of the unrepresentable originates from the Kantian notion of the sublime and the subsequent modifications of this notion in Jean-François Lyotard's philosophy. Lyotard displaces the sublime in the field of modern art, defining it as the art of negative presentation. This negativity refers both to the unrepresentable dimension in modern art and the unthinkable dimension of traumatic political events, such as the Holocaust. Contrary to this strategy of sublime adoration, Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman argue against the unrepresentable and claim the necessity "to stare at the unsayable". For example, Didi-Huberman in his Images In Spite of All provocatively rejects the formal choices of Lanzmann's Shoah and insists on the necessity to make or present images "in spite of all". In my article, I want to build on this controversy by introducing into it Michael Haneke's film The White Ribbon (2009), which plays on both sides: on the one hand, it uses the negative aesthetics of the sublime, very similar to that of Lanzmann's film, and on the other hand, it examines violence present at the core of our everyday life.