РОЛЬ ГЕРМАНИИ В ВОЕННОЙ МИССИИ ЕС «ЕСФОР ДР КОНГО»
Анализируется роль Германии в военной миссии Европейского союза в Демократической Республике Конго (2006) на предмет соответствия миссии национальным интересам, участия в формировании повестки дня и процессе принятия решений, участия в планировании и проведении операции, военного и финансового участия. Делается вывод о том, что лидерство ФРГ в операции было формальным, а ее роль в практике общей политики безопасности и обороны ЕС периферийна ; It is well known that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental component of European integration. It means that the CSDP is determined by the EU member states. Therefore understanding of the CDSP is conditioned by the understanding of the different member states positions. Many scholars argue that Germany being an EU driving force plays a leading role in the CSDP too. The author revises this thesis by analyzing German foreignpolicy behavior during one of the practical ESDP challenges the EU military mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUFOR RD Congo (2006). He finds out whether the mission met German national interests, to what degree Germany participated in the agendasetting and decision-making process, what Germany's military and financial contribution was. The author comes to a conclusion that Germany's role in the operation was twofold. On the one hand, it proved itself as a real leader nation by assuming the responsibility for planning and strategic management of the mission as well as contributing 1/3 of the military contingent and covering 1/5 of the expenses incurred. On the other hand, a practical dimension demonstrated Germany's weak points and secondary role played in the CSDP. The Congo mission was put on the European agenda by France and Belgium, not Germany. In contrast to the both ex-colonial powers, EUFOR RD Congo was not in Germany's national interest, but in spite of this Berlin got involved in the mission. The formal leadership and military participation resulted solely from the strong diplomatic and informal pressure exerted by partners. At the same time Germany's internal political controversy and difficult procedural questions considerably restrained preparation for the operation, threatened with its frustration and thereupon blocked its logical prolongation. German headquarters in Potsdam faced difficulties in planning and coordination of EUFOR RD Congo. German armed forces had problems with supplies and training of personnel, its practical contribution to general success was minimal inter alia owing to the national limitations of its application geography. The author concludes, that partners' as well as some scholars' expectations in relation to Germany's contribution to the CSDP are higher than German political willingness and real military potential.