Suchergebnisse

The process of the state separating from society that had taken place in European countries as far back as in the XIX century and provided legal frameworks for modern law states remains an issue of the future for Russia. Therefore neither public opinion nor the state (institutions) are unable to view each other "from outside". In such situation the routine set of questions of participation/non-participation of citizens in political life, the availability of interest in and possibility of such participation, etc., makes a researcher look for correlation between mass imagination and a world of fictitious, pseudo-political formations and categories. In order to understand the meaning of the findings received it is necessary to make it clear all the time what "politics" and "political activity" mean (in modern situation and public opinion), in what way mass participation in it is (or may be) expressed, there being no criterion of actual political participation in public opinion (both appropriate institutional basis and mass experience of whatever participation are lacking). For the majority of respondents power is associated mainly with particular public figures -the President, the government, local officials. Depersonalized institutions ("the state", "the law") come forward quite seldom. Respondents loyal to the present authorities more often demonstrate the wish to see effective officials as heads of the country, and the opposition share romantic notions about enthusiastic devotion to the people. Today's personalization of power is inseparably connected with the trend of depersonalizing the power bearers themselves. The principal foundation of the complex of the Russian citizens' attitudes towards power structures activities (lack of interest, unwillingness to participate, and possibility of deception) is made up of deeply rooted detachment of an ordinary person from the state affairs. It's not surprising that the supporters of the acting President pay more attention to the power activity ("is controlling.") than his opponents, but the differences in opinions are relatively insignificant. Both have one thing in common: control over authorities and mutual control of power and citizens are rarely mentioned, and mutual fraud is referred to most often. Consequently citizens' dependency on power proves to be to a great degree ostentatious, "sly". As for any under-institutionalized society the transition of power from one group to another in the history of our country of recent decades turns out to be an arduous ordeal which exposes and threatens the entire construction of power relations. ; The process of the state separating from society that had taken place in European countries as far back as in the XIX century and provided legal frameworks for modern law states remains an issue of the future for Russia. Therefore neither public opinion nor the state (institutions) are unable to view each other "from outside". In such situation the routine set of questions of participation/non-participation of citizens in political life, the availability of interest in and possibility of such participation, etc., makes a researcher look for correlation between mass imagination and a world of fictitious, pseudo-political formations and categories. In order to understand the meaning of the findings received it is necessary to make it clear all the time what "politics" and "political activity" mean (in modern situation and public opinion), in what way mass participation in it is (or may be) expressed, there being no criterion of actual political participation in public opinion (both appropriate institutional basis and mass experience of whatever participation are lacking). For the majority of respondents power is associated mainly with particular public figures -the President, the government, local officials. Depersonalized institutions ("the state", "the law") come forward quite seldom. Respondents loyal to the present authorities more often demonstrate the wish to see effective officials as heads of the country, and the opposition share romantic notions about enthusiastic devotion to the people. Today's personalization of power is inseparably connected with the trend of depersonalizing the power bearers themselves. The principal foundation of the complex of the Russian citizens' attitudes towards power structures activities (lack of interest, unwillingness to participate, and possibility of deception) is made up of deeply rooted detachment of an ordinary person from the state affairs. It's not surprising that the supporters of the acting President pay more attention to the power activity ("is controlling.") than his opponents, but the differences in opinions are relatively insignificant. Both have one thing in common: control over authorities and mutual control of power and citizens are rarely mentioned, and mutual fraud is referred to most often. Consequently citizens' dependency on power proves to be to a great degree ostentatious, "sly". As for any under-institutionalized society the transition of power from one group to another in the history of our country of recent decades turns out to be an arduous ordeal which exposes and threatens the entire construction of power relations.

Tension caused by "the problem of 2008" doesn't correspond at first sight to the extreme simplicity of the forthcoming electoral procedure with guaranteed outcome. But both the mechanism of preparation for such elections and their consequences are far from being simple. The key issue of the political transition which is about to happen is not the replacement of persons but the change (or lack of change) of socio-political regime of the present type. During recent year the society is offered the versions of exclusively conditional choice between "Putin" (the alternative of prolongation of the present President term), "other Putin" (an appointed successor) and "non-Putin" ("principally different" candidate, the opponent of the present President). The very fact of strict keeping in secret the name of already prepared person means therefore not only the full confidence of "the top" in the readiness of the subjects to accept any appointed person but also a fear of the elections procedure turning into a matter of public choice. The data of the recent survey allow us to compare the wishes of the respondents concerning the social environment from which a Presented should be elected and their suppositions as to from where V.Putin will choose his successor. For public opinion only two sources from which a successor may appear are actually important: V.Putin's environment and "independent politicians". But according to the majority of respondents' opinions V.Putin's scope of choice is still narrower: his immediate environment and much more seldom the officials from government or FSB. One can observe great discrepancies between mass wishes concerning the criteria of "a successor" choice on the one hand and the notions of how V.Putin will act on the other hand. For public opinion the main criteria are the moral qualities of a successor but V.Putin is expected to take into account first of all his confidence in and closeness to his favorite. The respondents readiness to accept forcedly V/Putin's choice doesn't mean the readiness to accept the criteria of such choice. The election campaign planned for March 2008 won't bring any unexpected events either to its organizers or to mass participants and its observers. But this procedure may mean only a moment in preparation of inevitable large-scale socio-historical changes. ; Tension caused by "the problem of 2008" doesn't correspond at first sight to the extreme simplicity of the forthcoming electoral procedure with guaranteed outcome. But both the mechanism of preparation for such elections and their consequences are far from being simple. The key issue of the political transition which is about to happen is not the replacement of persons but the change (or lack of change) of socio-political regime of the present type. During recent year the society is offered the versions of exclusively conditional choice between "Putin" (the alternative of prolongation of the present President term), "other Putin" (an appointed successor) and "non-Putin" ("principally different" candidate, the opponent of the present President). The very fact of strict keeping in secret the name of already prepared person means therefore not only the full confidence of "the top" in the readiness of the subjects to accept any appointed person but also a fear of the elections procedure turning into a matter of public choice. The data of the recent survey allow us to compare the wishes of the respondents concerning the social environment from which a Presented should be elected and their suppositions as to from where V.Putin will choose his successor. For public opinion only two sources from which a successor may appear are actually important: V.Putin's environment and "independent politicians". But according to the majority of respondents' opinions V.Putin's scope of choice is still narrower: his immediate environment and much more seldom the officials from government or FSB. One can observe great discrepancies between mass wishes concerning the criteria of "a successor" choice on the one hand and the notions of how V.Putin will act on the other hand. For public opinion the main criteria are the moral qualities of a successor but V.Putin is expected to take into account first of all his confidence in and closeness to his favorite. The respondents readiness to accept forcedly V/Putin's choice doesn't mean the readiness to accept the criteria of such choice. The election campaign planned for March 2008 won't bring any unexpected events either to its organizers or to mass participants and its observers. But this procedure may mean only a moment in preparation of inevitable large-scale socio-historical changes.

The characteristics of structural components of the processes taking place in the country remain the focus of researchers' attention and of public discussions. One is tempted to analyze and assess these components separately when reproaches (or expectations) are addressed to one of them: "power", "elite", "people", and interrelations of these phenomena remain in the background. The most important characteristic feature of all Russian elite groups is their orientation to the state. Neither socio-political crises nor the replacements of the regimes brought about principal changes in such state of the matters. In modern "elite" zone we may observe rather decreased level of self-identification and differentiation of specific interests and at the same time excess consolidation of elite and power structures. In the sphere of relations between elite structures and the masses during recent three hundred years one could observe the alternation of habitual and (at turning points) non-habitual forms of opposition, the elite having been practically invariably the support and conductor of power influence (protesting elite trends in the late XIX-th century or a hundred years later were acting rather as "counter-elites"). Recent time surveys show significant peculiarities of mass attitudes towards the Russian power in different epochs. Evaluations of the Soviet power properties by the electorates of modern political forces are evidently ideologically biased. Demonstratively critical evaluations of the present power are extremely loosely connected to the expressions of loyalty towards its institutions and bearers. ; The characteristics of structural components of the processes taking place in the country remain the focus of researchers' attention and of public discussions. One is tempted to analyze and assess these components separately when reproaches (or expectations) are addressed to one of them: "power", "elite", "people", and interrelations of these phenomena remain in the background. The most important characteristic feature of all Russian elite groups is their orientation to the state. Neither socio-political crises nor the replacements of the regimes brought about principal changes in such state of the matters. In modern "elite" zone we may observe rather decreased level of self-identification and differentiation of specific interests and at the same time excess consolidation of elite and power structures. In the sphere of relations between elite structures and the masses during recent three hundred years one could observe the alternation of habitual and (at turning points) non-habitual forms of opposition, the elite having been practically invariably the support and conductor of power influence (protesting elite trends in the late XIX-th century or a hundred years later were acting rather as "counter-elites"). Recent time surveys show significant peculiarities of mass attitudes towards the Russian power in different epochs. Evaluations of the Soviet power properties by the electorates of modern political forces are evidently ideologically biased. Demonstratively critical evaluations of the present power are extremely loosely connected to the expressions of loyalty towards its institutions and bearers.

A specific feature of the present Russian socio-political life is an oppressive feeling of the abcense of others opportunities of existence besides those that were socially recognized in various layers of the country population. This situation is getting particularly morbid with the approaching of the next political turning point formally connected with "Presidential problem 2008". Widespread interpretations of Russian mass consciousness disposition to monocentric patterns (that put the blame on "specific characteristics" of power, the people, elite, opposition, geo-political situation of the country, its "destiny", etc.) don't have explanatory power and serve eventually a justification of existing situation. According to the findings of recent surveys beliefs of the inevitability of some events in the XX-th century are relevant only for three moments in history: 1917 Revolution, World War II, and establishing the present political regime in Russia. The respondents tend to think inevitable (i.e. having no alternatives) first of all the events that are deeply rooted in people's social memory and, secondly, the events evaluated positively. The conditions of downfall and the alternatives to the state construction that had existed before 1991 are beyond the attention of public opinion. While discussing in recent times (including that in public opinion) the danger of the country disintegration the primary attention is paid to spatial division of the regions. However the key prerequisite of empires decays or post-empire constructions in the XX-th century was inability of their central regulative mechanisms normal functioning (or if we use an organic metaphor, the nervous, endocrine and other subsystems). The "inner" breakup preceded "the outer" one. During recent 20 years Russia has undergone three principally important political turning points: from "stagnation" to "perestroika" (M.Gorbachev), from "perestroika" to "radical reforms" (B.Yeltsin), from "radical reforms" to "stabilization" (V.Putin). Each turning point was a certain exit from the crisis of the preceding period. Therefore each new period seemed to be the negation of the preceding one. "Within" each of these periods alternative attitudes and directions even if observed didn't get the opportunity of open and influential expression. It's rightful to admit that some components of the mechanism of "alternative" changes will keep working in the coming political transition. Mass consciousness is mainly conservative in its loyal expectations and protest agitation since it is oriented at conventional patterns taken as a rule from the idealized past. But the pattern of a conservative origin is not identical to the back movement. Now the majority of Russian citizens believe continuation of V.Putin" Presidency or coming to power the successor chosen by him to be the most acceptable (or the least evil). At public opinion level the alternatives seem to be clearly designated but not filled either personally or politically. ; A specific feature of the present Russian socio-political life is an oppressive feeling of the abcense of others opportunities of existence besides those that were socially recognized in various layers of the country population. This situation is getting particularly morbid with the approaching of the next political turning point formally connected with "Presidential problem 2008". Widespread interpretations of Russian mass consciousness disposition to monocentric patterns (that put the blame on "specific characteristics" of power, the people, elite, opposition, geo-political situation of the country, its "destiny", etc.) don't have explanatory power and serve eventually a justification of existing situation. According to the findings of recent surveys beliefs of the inevitability of some events in the XX-th century are relevant only for three moments in history: 1917 Revolution, World War II, and establishing the present political regime in Russia. The respondents tend to think inevitable (i.e. having no alternatives) first of all the events that are deeply rooted in people's social memory and, secondly, the events evaluated positively. The conditions of downfall and the alternatives to the state construction that had existed before 1991 are beyond the attention of public opinion. While discussing in recent times (including that in public opinion) the danger of the country disintegration the primary attention is paid to spatial division of the regions. However the key prerequisite of empires decays or post-empire constructions in the XX-th century was inability of their central regulative mechanisms normal functioning (or if we use an organic metaphor, the nervous, endocrine and other subsystems). The "inner" breakup preceded "the outer" one. During recent 20 years Russia has undergone three principally important political turning points: from "stagnation" to "perestroika" (M.Gorbachev), from "perestroika" to "radical reforms" (B.Yeltsin), from "radical reforms" to "stabilization" (V.Putin). Each turning point was a certain exit from the crisis of the preceding period. Therefore each new period seemed to be the negation of the preceding one. "Within" each of these periods alternative attitudes and directions even if observed didn't get the opportunity of open and influential expression. It's rightful to admit that some components of the mechanism of "alternative" changes will keep working in the coming political transition. Mass consciousness is mainly conservative in its loyal expectations and protest agitation since it is oriented at conventional patterns taken as a rule from the idealized past. But the pattern of a conservative origin is not identical to the back movement. Now the majority of Russian citizens believe continuation of V.Putin" Presidency or coming to power the successor chosen by him to be the most acceptable (or the least evil). At public opinion level the alternatives seem to be clearly designated but not filled either personally or politically.

The article attempts to view the type of social man from the perspective of his psychological state. A usual state of man should be differentiated from agitation (stressed, extraordinary one). A person usually perceives social distance in terms of "close" and "distant". A person's withdrawing into his own "small" world is an important prerequisite both for his coping with social reality and for immersing himself in his own affairs and interests. During recent months, especially in convulsive political rhetoric after the events in Beslan (September 2004), variations of enemy image have acquired allegedly new meanings: as if after rather long, more than fifty years long intermission the issues of "a world plot" against our country, inner enemies, "traitors of Russia" have come to the surface of official life. This theme of "a world plot" is close for the most part to the elder age people of the "Soviet" training. Appeals for holding out against "a world plot" are evidently aimed not at the victory over enemy but at domestic consumption, at social mobilization for the sake of achieving some intra-political or even intra-clan objectives. The processes of transition from an agitated state of society to a usual one may be characterized as rutinization. The structure of these processes suggests re-evaluation of both pragmatic expectations and symbolic vestments of social action. Rutinization of the Soviet order led finally not to its stabilization but to weakening its foundations and further collapse. Both M.Gorbachyov's rule and B.Yeltsin's Presidency have brought about not rutinization but crises which were followed by changes in regimes types and in composition of ruling elites. Under the present conditions rutinization trends are combined with crisis turns in domestic, foreign, economical policies and with corresponding shifts in slogans and attitudes. The simplest and the most obvious behavior of ordinary man is adjusting. But neither its obviousness nor wide spreading makes this type of behavior the only possible one. Latent factors such as crisis or unjustified actions from "above" together with accumulating hidden irritation in "the bottom" may contribute to destroying the standard patterns of mass behavior. Mass rallies in various regions of Russia starting in January 2005 show that "unlikely" types of behavior turnout to be actual and meaningful. Recent Russian events attach special importance to the analysis of similar and differing features of mass actions in Georgia and Ukraine. In both cases the atmosphere of wide national and political mobilization provided psychological background and resource for mass action. "Common denominator" of situations in these countries may be considered a situation of "postSoviet impasse" characteristic of many countries of the Soviet legacy. Actions of mass protest all over Russia turned out to be a shock for the authorities and have significantly changed the situation in the country during a few weeks. Having accustomed to endure and adjust "an ordinary man" showed himself indignant and actively protesting for the first time during many decades. The point is that "privileges" inherited from the Soviet times or gained later are a key link in that silent "social contract" which provided relative stability and peace in a poor society of deficit, is that very "bone" which was thrown to the people by the regime that was not capable of providing the economy efficiency and a normal welfare level and got cheap and obedient labor force. Hasty and unprepared cancellation of the privileges combined with absence of modern economy, with the living standard lower than late Soviet one (1991) actually blows up this "social contract". The outcome is a wretched and socially dangerous travesty of liberal reforms compromising the power and liberalism. One of the most important consequences will be further ruin of first of all in the consciousness of ordinary man "indestructible unity of the party (power, President) and the people" in Russia. ; The article attempts to view the type of social man from the perspective of his psychological state. A usual state of man should be differentiated from agitation (stressed, extraordinary one). A person usually perceives social distance in terms of "close" and "distant". A person's withdrawing into his own "small" world is an important prerequisite both for his coping with social reality and for immersing himself in his own affairs and interests. During recent months, especially in convulsive political rhetoric after the events in Beslan (September 2004), variations of enemy image have acquired allegedly new meanings: as if after rather long, more than fifty years long intermission the issues of "a world plot" against our country, inner enemies, "traitors of Russia" have come to the surface of official life. This theme of "a world plot" is close for the most part to the elder age people of the "Soviet" training. Appeals for holding out against "a world plot" are evidently aimed not at the victory over enemy but at domestic consumption, at social mobilization for the sake of achieving some intra-political or even intra-clan objectives. The processes of transition from an agitated state of society to a usual one may be characterized as rutinization. The structure of these processes suggests re-evaluation of both pragmatic expectations and symbolic vestments of social action. Rutinization of the Soviet order led finally not to its stabilization but to weakening its foundations and further collapse. Both M.Gorbachyov's rule and B.Yeltsin's Presidency have brought about not rutinization but crises which were followed by changes in regimes types and in composition of ruling elites. Under the present conditions rutinization trends are combined with crisis turns in domestic, foreign, economical policies and with corresponding shifts in slogans and attitudes. The simplest and the most obvious behavior of ordinary man is adjusting. But neither its obviousness nor wide spreading makes this type of behavior the only possible one. Latent factors such as crisis or unjustified actions from "above" together with accumulating hidden irritation in "the bottom" may contribute to destroying the standard patterns of mass behavior. Mass rallies in various regions of Russia starting in January 2005 show that "unlikely" types of behavior turnout to be actual and meaningful. Recent Russian events attach special importance to the analysis of similar and differing features of mass actions in Georgia and Ukraine. In both cases the atmosphere of wide national and political mobilization provided psychological background and resource for mass action. "Common denominator" of situations in these countries may be considered a situation of "postSoviet impasse" characteristic of many countries of the Soviet legacy. Actions of mass protest all over Russia turned out to be a shock for the authorities and have significantly changed the situation in the country during a few weeks. Having accustomed to endure and adjust "an ordinary man" showed himself indignant and actively protesting for the first time during many decades. The point is that "privileges" inherited from the Soviet times or gained later are a key link in that silent "social contract" which provided relative stability and peace in a poor society of deficit, is that very "bone" which was thrown to the people by the regime that was not capable of providing the economy efficiency and a normal welfare level and got cheap and obedient labor force. Hasty and unprepared cancellation of the privileges combined with absence of modern economy, with the living standard lower than late Soviet one (1991) actually blows up this "social contract". The outcome is a wretched and socially dangerous travesty of liberal reforms compromising the power and liberalism. One of the most important consequences will be further ruin of first of all in the consciousness of ordinary man "indestructible unity of the party (power, President) and the people" in Russia.

The cataclysms of recent time force us to examine the nearest and more remote prospects in terms of possible or lost choice of orientations and the means of their achievement. In this situation the very discussion of choice issue becomes more and more vividly a desperate search of a possible way out of just another impasse. The collapse of out-of-date structures is followed by developing deadlocks, chimeras, dangerous new formations of "the old" type and the like phenomena. All versions of the events in Russia take place against a background and in the frameworks of contemporary world processes that have lost their "classical" certainty. One may find out principal kinship of present attacks at the centers of Western civilization under the slogans of violent Islam to "anti-West" revolts that had been shaking the world in the 20th century under other ideological slogans. They were based historically on collateral trends and byproducts of the processes of massivization and modernization turned against their mainstream. The chief principle characteristic of the present political period may be considered aggressive un-scrupulousness aimed at short-term practical success. The consequences are deep cynicism and all-embracing corruption of power structures that are demoralizing the entire society. Most probably about 2008 our country will face one more difficult political turning-point with uncertain consequences. ; The cataclysms of recent time force us to examine the nearest and more remote prospects in terms of possible or lost choice of orientations and the means of their achievement. In this situation the very discussion of choice issue becomes more and more vividly a desperate search of a possible way out of just another impasse. The collapse of out-of-date structures is followed by developing deadlocks, chimeras, dangerous new formations of "the old" type and the like phenomena. All versions of the events in Russia take place against a background and in the frameworks of contemporary world processes that have lost their "classical" certainty. One may find out principal kinship of present attacks at the centers of Western civilization under the slogans of violent Islam to "anti-West" revolts that had been shaking the world in the 20th century under other ideological slogans. They were based historically on collateral trends and byproducts of the processes of massivization and modernization turned against their mainstream. The chief principle characteristic of the present political period may be considered aggressive un-scrupulousness aimed at short-term practical success. The consequences are deep cynicism and all-embracing corruption of power structures that are demoralizing the entire society. Most probably about 2008 our country will face one more difficult political turning-point with uncertain consequences.

Ostentatious attention of the press and political officials to the "rating" results of mass surveys is a typical feature of the public style of recent time. Artificially exaggerated fears (or, on the other hand, as much groundless hopes) related to expectations of catastrophic changes of "ratings" alter this or that way do not at all help to understand the situation and possible ways of its development. Another paradoxical situation is stability of main parameters of survey data surprising for many observers. There are serious differences between social meanings of ratings of public opinion in pluralistic, competitive societies and in our today situation. The only significant rating of a leader (a president) carries a function of confirming his image in his own and mass representations. No positions determined clear enough can be seen behind ostentations indices of approval/trust which are the base of proper ratings. Significant part of those who "approve on the whole" the politics of V.Putin is ready to support him just conditionally and often because they see nobody else they can rely on. Even those who claim "complete trust" to the president share many doubts in correctness of the chosen path of forward movement of the country. Vagueness of the very criteria of "approval" makes an outward show of mass support of the rating at the same time depriving it a sense. Public opinion does not only notes failures and flops of the power in different spheres but often perceives the signs of general crisis of the whole system of trust and support in relation to power and leader formed after 1999. Mysterious (relative) stability of the president's ratings is explained by primacy of illusions and expectations from the favorite, by the mechanism of "redistribution of responsibility" between him and other holders of power (officials, government) and also by vagueness of the very criteria of mass approval and trust regarded earlier. These cause possibility of growing erosion (degeneration) of quality of "ratings" under surface of stably high indices. ; Ostentatious attention of the press and political officials to the "rating" results of mass surveys is a typical feature of the public style of recent time. Artificially exaggerated fears (or, on the other hand, as much groundless hopes) related to expectations of catastrophic changes of "ratings" alter this or that way do not at all help to understand the situation and possible ways of its development. Another paradoxical situation is stability of main parameters of survey data surprising for many observers. There are serious differences between social meanings of ratings of public opinion in pluralistic, competitive societies and in our today situation. The only significant rating of a leader (a president) carries a function of confirming his image in his own and mass representations. No positions determined clear enough can be seen behind ostentations indices of approval/trust which are the base of proper ratings. Significant part of those who "approve on the whole" the politics of V.Putin is ready to support him just conditionally and often because they see nobody else they can rely on. Even those who claim "complete trust" to the president share many doubts in correctness of the chosen path of forward movement of the country. Vagueness of the very criteria of "approval" makes an outward show of mass support of the rating at the same time depriving it a sense. Public opinion does not only notes failures and flops of the power in different spheres but often perceives the signs of general crisis of the whole system of trust and support in relation to power and leader formed after 1999. Mysterious (relative) stability of the president's ratings is explained by primacy of illusions and expectations from the favorite, by the mechanism of "redistribution of responsibility" between him and other holders of power (officials, government) and also by vagueness of the very criteria of mass approval and trust regarded earlier. These cause possibility of growing erosion (degeneration) of quality of "ratings" under surface of stably high indices.

1. Post-Soviet power mechanisms have been everywhere constructed out of the remnants of the Soviet social institutions, of organizational and personnel resources (party and economic, power, etc.) of the former order. The consequence has been forming up a number of authoritarian, pseudo-democratic, or "semi-Asian" (imitating historical patterns of Eastern despotic states) regimes characterized by personal power, fusing political structures with "close" big business, with regional and kinship clans, the corruption of all links of state mechanism being inevitable. The present "orange" and the like upheavals surrounding Russia irrespective of their national forms, degree of organization, successfulness, etc. confirm inevitability of substitution of all these "temporal" socio-political constructions with stable modern institutions. It is the necessity of such changes that is connected with demands for changes in the ruling elites. 2. ; 1. Post-Soviet power mechanisms have been everywhere constructed out of the remnants of the Soviet social institutions, of organizational and personnel resources (party and economic, power, etc.) of the former order. The consequence has been forming up a number of authoritarian, pseudo-democratic, or "semi-Asian" (imitating historical patterns of Eastern despotic states) regimes characterized by personal power, fusing political structures with "close" big business, with regional and kinship clans, the corruption of all links of state mechanism being inevitable. The present "orange" and the like upheavals surrounding Russia irrespective of their national forms, degree of organization, successfulness, etc. confirm inevitability of substitution of all these "temporal" socio-political constructions with stable modern institutions. It is the necessity of such changes that is connected with demands for changes in the ruling elites. 2.

Today's interest in the fortune of socio-political change that began about 20 years ago is connected not so much with conditionally "round" date (to be exact the changes had started in 1987) but with increasing public attention to modern significance and possible prospects for actual consequences of this event. Therefore it's reasonable to distinguish two different but interrelated aspects of this issue. First, "subjective" (represented in social consciousness and reflected in public opinion polls the memory of "perestroika" events). Second, "objective memory", e.g. actual heritage of changes in social reality, in social relations, processes, institutions. Viewing "perestroika" as a turning point in the country life one may point out two principal functions of this change: destructive one (also liberating) and constructive one. The outcomes of their realization are essentially different. The major success of transformation including those expressed by public opinion is destroying "the Soviet pattern, liberating life, politics and thinking from stereotypes" (unanimity of thought, infallibility, opposition to the whole world, etc.). In the beginning of transformations the old party-state machine was suitable for fulfilling "destructive" functions. The constructive objectives appeared to be much more difficult: there were no appropriate intellectual resources, nor necessary means for their efficient executing. Is it a "crawling" revenge"Perestroika" heritage had undergone a more dangerous trial in recent years (after 1999). The reason is particularly in that the bearers of reversible trends are not only the representatives of the "old" elite, but the structures and forces personifying the deeper collapse of the "Soviet" material, using certain achievements of "perestroika" times and further reforms (combined with the Soviet and pre-Soviet traditions of Great Power, arbitrary rule, personal power, etc.). After all, each epoch leaves after itself not only the traces of its successes or failures but also the products of dissociation (or "semi-dissociation") of the former epochs. In such situation the destructive heritage of "perestroika" is just insufficient. "Liberating" changes during "perestroika" did not result from intense struggle of some social forces or organizations. Independent of what good will or what inner collision in the ruling group became a stimulus for this, "liberty" was perceived by people as a gift from above and thus was devaluated in public opinion. People had "to pay" for the "present" later when "perestroika" achievements appeared to be threatened. "Glasnost"' (freedom of press and speech) has become habitual and is valued rather high even now. But nobody is actually ready not only "to go out in the streets" but at least claim their discord with persecution of independent mass media as well as with the attack at general election, etc. The major success of "perestroika" is the failure of conservative conspiracy ("putch") in August 1991. The country, the armed forces and even party structures proved to be incapable of following the conspirators. But that success also meant the collapse of the "party" mechanism for "perestroika" and the end of political activity of "the chief mechanic" M.Gorbachov. "Perestroika" has ended not in the defeat in the battle with conservative opponents or with uncontrollable adventurers but in exhausting its own resources. However the events of the former periods in our history had ended in the same way. ; Today's interest in the fortune of socio-political change that began about 20 years ago is connected not so much with conditionally "round" date (to be exact the changes had started in 1987) but with increasing public attention to modern significance and possible prospects for actual consequences of this event. Therefore it's reasonable to distinguish two different but interrelated aspects of this issue. First, "subjective" (represented in social consciousness and reflected in public opinion polls the memory of "perestroika" events). Second, "objective memory", e.g. actual heritage of changes in social reality, in social relations, processes, institutions. Viewing "perestroika" as a turning point in the country life one may point out two principal functions of this change: destructive one (also liberating) and constructive one. The outcomes of their realization are essentially different. The major success of transformation including those expressed by public opinion is destroying "the Soviet pattern, liberating life, politics and thinking from stereotypes" (unanimity of thought, infallibility, opposition to the whole world, etc.). In the beginning of transformations the old party-state machine was suitable for fulfilling "destructive" functions. The constructive objectives appeared to be much more difficult: there were no appropriate intellectual resources, nor necessary means for their efficient executing. Is it a "crawling" revenge"Perestroika" heritage had undergone a more dangerous trial in recent years (after 1999). The reason is particularly in that the bearers of reversible trends are not only the representatives of the "old" elite, but the structures and forces personifying the deeper collapse of the "Soviet" material, using certain achievements of "perestroika" times and further reforms (combined with the Soviet and pre-Soviet traditions of Great Power, arbitrary rule, personal power, etc.). After all, each epoch leaves after itself not only the traces of its successes or failures but also the products of dissociation (or "semi-dissociation") of the former epochs. In such situation the destructive heritage of "perestroika" is just insufficient. "Liberating" changes during "perestroika" did not result from intense struggle of some social forces or organizations. Independent of what good will or what inner collision in the ruling group became a stimulus for this, "liberty" was perceived by people as a gift from above and thus was devaluated in public opinion. People had "to pay" for the "present" later when "perestroika" achievements appeared to be threatened. "Glasnost"' (freedom of press and speech) has become habitual and is valued rather high even now. But nobody is actually ready not only "to go out in the streets" but at least claim their discord with persecution of independent mass media as well as with the attack at general election, etc. The major success of "perestroika" is the failure of conservative conspiracy ("putch") in August 1991. The country, the armed forces and even party structures proved to be incapable of following the conspirators. But that success also meant the collapse of the "party" mechanism for "perestroika" and the end of political activity of "the chief mechanic" M.Gorbachov. "Perestroika" has ended not in the defeat in the battle with conservative opponents or with uncontrollable adventurers but in exhausting its own resources. However the events of the former periods in our history had ended in the same way.

The wave of mass protest against the so called "monetization" of social privileges urges us to consider anew some issues of sociological analysis of contemporary Russian society. In this case we are witnessing the crisis that has deeply affected all the mechanisms of relations between the power and society. Russian people have enormous potential for social patience and adaptability. Extraordinary efforts were needed to paralyze such attitudes and encourage to mass actions just those who were the least expected to do this. The actions of the state power itself became such a factor. The first public reactions to the notorious law appeared to be extremely negative. Population dissatisfaction was great. The type of relationships between the power and population of the country that had been formed in the Soviet period was lost. Sympathetic attitude to protest actions is expressed by 70-80% of the respondents in all age groups. The data of May surveys show some decline in protest dispositions though they are spread much wider than a year ago. Negative reaction to "the reform" and sympathy with the protests prevail even among "Yedinaya Rossia" electorate. Voters of the most enlightened democrats "Yabloko" and SPS ("Soyuz Pravych Sil the Union of the Rightists) display conspicuously restrained reactions and dispositions. But the problem of providing the normal standard of living for the elderly and socially weak people may be solved only by knowledgeable "liberals". The wave of social protests that rose early in 2005 is evidently abating now. But in the near future its consequences will affect socio-political processes and public dispositions. ; The wave of mass protest against the so called "monetization" of social privileges urges us to consider anew some issues of sociological analysis of contemporary Russian society. In this case we are witnessing the crisis that has deeply affected all the mechanisms of relations between the power and society. Russian people have enormous potential for social patience and adaptability. Extraordinary efforts were needed to paralyze such attitudes and encourage to mass actions just those who were the least expected to do this. The actions of the state power itself became such a factor. The first public reactions to the notorious law appeared to be extremely negative. Population dissatisfaction was great. The type of relationships between the power and population of the country that had been formed in the Soviet period was lost. Sympathetic attitude to protest actions is expressed by 70-80% of the respondents in all age groups. The data of May surveys show some decline in protest dispositions though they are spread much wider than a year ago. Negative reaction to "the reform" and sympathy with the protests prevail even among "Yedinaya Rossia" electorate. Voters of the most enlightened democrats "Yabloko" and SPS ("Soyuz Pravych Sil the Union of the Rightists) display conspicuously restrained reactions and dispositions. But the problem of providing the normal standard of living for the elderly and socially weak people may be solved only by knowledgeable "liberals". The wave of social protests that rose early in 2005 is evidently abating now. But in the near future its consequences will affect socio-political processes and public dispositions.

Situation in Russian society after the elections of 2003-2004 requires detailed sociological analysis from several perspectives. These electoral campaigns that do not seem to bring about unexpected changes in the state institutions are highly interesting as they reveal the mecha nisms being formed up in recent years of function ing and maintenance of power structures, unifica tion of political field and leadership, employment of mass expectations, etc. up to social atmosphere of peri-political intrigues and manipulations. Having claimed political and civil freedoms in early 90-s of the XXth century Russia took a long and difficult course of forming up the democratic regime and searching the ways of its rooting in domestic soil. And it is this course that is endangered now. Each situation of the President's elections in Russia (1991, 1996, 200 and 2004) appeared to be unique taking into account not only the number of voters and of those who refuse to do it, but the character of social-political choice, expectations and overt and covert opposition of forces. The main intrigue of the 2004 elections became a super-task of providing the power succession for the next electoral cycle (up to 2008) or even further. The mechanism that provides non-alternative-ness of the present power structures and bearers has been established and is working now. And at last, this electoral cycle has undoubtedly shown the opportunities of "technological" manipulating all the participants of electoral process (voters, the elected ones, organizers, informants, etc.) far more obviously and on a far greater scale as compared to the elections of 1999-2000. Neither the recognition of the President's success in the previous years, nor the level of new expectations addressed to him can explain the principal peculiarity of past elections, their non-alternativeness. The key reason here is the mentioned above transition to non-political, administrative means of governing. ; Situation in Russian society after the elections of 2003-2004 requires detailed sociological analysis from several perspectives. These electoral campaigns that do not seem to bring about unexpected changes in the state institutions are highly interesting as they reveal the mecha nisms being formed up in recent years of function ing and maintenance of power structures, unifica tion of political field and leadership, employment of mass expectations, etc. up to social atmosphere of peri-political intrigues and manipulations. Having claimed political and civil freedoms in early 90-s of the XXth century Russia took a long and difficult course of forming up the democratic regime and searching the ways of its rooting in domestic soil. And it is this course that is endangered now. Each situation of the President's elections in Russia (1991, 1996, 200 and 2004) appeared to be unique taking into account not only the number of voters and of those who refuse to do it, but the character of social-political choice, expectations and overt and covert opposition of forces. The main intrigue of the 2004 elections became a super-task of providing the power succession for the next electoral cycle (up to 2008) or even further. The mechanism that provides non-alternative-ness of the present power structures and bearers has been established and is working now. And at last, this electoral cycle has undoubtedly shown the opportunities of "technological" manipulating all the participants of electoral process (voters, the elected ones, organizers, informants, etc.) far more obviously and on a far greater scale as compared to the elections of 1999-2000. Neither the recognition of the President's success in the previous years, nor the level of new expectations addressed to him can explain the principal peculiarity of past elections, their non-alternativeness. The key reason here is the mentioned above transition to non-political, administrative means of governing.

The findings of the last wave of the survey on the program "The Soviet Man" provide an opportu nity for a more careful elaboration of self-identifica tion issues, both in substance and methodology as pects. Identification is analyzed as a person's selfidentification in social environment (communities, systems of groups, and role functions), as well as in the system of social action types (behavioral types). Almost twenty years after the reformation of the Soviet society had begun a person's self-identification remains a difficult issue. "New" (modern, democratic) basis for his self-designation, not to say of self-assertion, hasn't been formed up. Therefore the features of the Soviet man still mark the real starting point, if not demonstrative one. This tendency is reinforced by official search for the "Soviet" legitimization through symbols, style, governing methods. Inherent in the Soviet era, the mechanism of "negative" self-assertion through disparaging the images of "enemy" or "generalized alien" retains its importance. However mass consciousness which mainly follows official politics lead is marked by growing alienation from the authorities and the state, and identification with their values looks cunning, ambiguous. A man is forced to look for the protection of the authorities but doesn't want to serve them. ; The findings of the last wave of the survey on the program "The Soviet Man" provide an opportu nity for a more careful elaboration of self-identifica tion issues, both in substance and methodology as pects. Identification is analyzed as a person's selfidentification in social environment (communities, systems of groups, and role functions), as well as in the system of social action types (behavioral types). Almost twenty years after the reformation of the Soviet society had begun a person's self-identification remains a difficult issue. "New" (modern, democratic) basis for his self-designation, not to say of self-assertion, hasn't been formed up. Therefore the features of the Soviet man still mark the real starting point, if not demonstrative one. This tendency is reinforced by official search for the "Soviet" legitimization through symbols, style, governing methods. Inherent in the Soviet era, the mechanism of "negative" self-assertion through disparaging the images of "enemy" or "generalized alien" retains its importance. However mass consciousness which mainly follows official politics lead is marked by growing alienation from the authorities and the state, and identification with their values looks cunning, ambiguous. A man is forced to look for the protection of the authorities but doesn't want to serve them.

In interpreting the data of public opinion polls comparing the attitudes of "the majority" and "the minority" seems most simple and commonplace: the majority supports, disagrees, trusts, disapprove, etc.; the minority is naturally of the opposite opinion. Meanwhile the experience proves these constructions to be artificial and even dangerous, able to mislead both the researchers and practical data users. In socio-practical aspect the notions "the majority" and "the minority" rarely acquire actual meaning for the society on the whole, only in general elections or referendum with dichotomy choice. In any case the acting force is not "the majority" or "the minority" but a structure, organization, institution, united group. Mass functions in any societal structures and processes are support, approval, agreement with the given pattern or direction. Only the structures and groups comprising quantitative "minority" may be diverse, heterogeneous, inwardly organized. During "perestroika" (transition) period "the Soviet" pattern of interaction between social structure components was still working: quasi-united political elite and obedient, sometimes ecstatically obedient "majority". In the following period of disappointments and confrontations (1993-1999) in the absence of socio-political field the state power remained the main "player". The side-effect of the series of bargains and confrontations.was keeping up the atmosphere of social rights and freedoms during the 90s. But that was also the source of weakness and unreliability of such rights. That was proved not once by the following events. By 1999 social preferences looked like expectations of "strong power" which would rely on the army and security service. However lack of conspicuous outward competitor to non-alternative power structures doesn't lead to "unanimous approval". But this may be considered a significant difference between the present imitation pattern of mass support of the leader and the totalitarian one. Where there is no significant minority in social life, where the voice of an individual is not heard, there is no "majority" either. All types of tyrannies and dictatorships in the remote and recent past could get the support of the crowd (though they relied not upon the crowd but on the organized layer of praetorians, opritchniks, etc.). There can be neither minority, nor majority in a crowd, enraged, exalted or scared. One may either behave like "all the others" or be crushed by them. ; In interpreting the data of public opinion polls comparing the attitudes of "the majority" and "the minority" seems most simple and commonplace: the majority supports, disagrees, trusts, disapprove, etc.; the minority is naturally of the opposite opinion. Meanwhile the experience proves these constructions to be artificial and even dangerous, able to mislead both the researchers and practical data users. In socio-practical aspect the notions "the majority" and "the minority" rarely acquire actual meaning for the society on the whole, only in general elections or referendum with dichotomy choice. In any case the acting force is not "the majority" or "the minority" but a structure, organization, institution, united group. Mass functions in any societal structures and processes are support, approval, agreement with the given pattern or direction. Only the structures and groups comprising quantitative "minority" may be diverse, heterogeneous, inwardly organized. During "perestroika" (transition) period "the Soviet" pattern of interaction between social structure components was still working: quasi-united political elite and obedient, sometimes ecstatically obedient "majority". In the following period of disappointments and confrontations (1993-1999) in the absence of socio-political field the state power remained the main "player". The side-effect of the series of bargains and confrontations.was keeping up the atmosphere of social rights and freedoms during the 90s. But that was also the source of weakness and unreliability of such rights. That was proved not once by the following events. By 1999 social preferences looked like expectations of "strong power" which would rely on the army and security service. However lack of conspicuous outward competitor to non-alternative power structures doesn't lead to "unanimous approval". But this may be considered a significant difference between the present imitation pattern of mass support of the leader and the totalitarian one. Where there is no significant minority in social life, where the voice of an individual is not heard, there is no "majority" either. All types of tyrannies and dictatorships in the remote and recent past could get the support of the crowd (though they relied not upon the crowd but on the organized layer of praetorians, opritchniks, etc.). There can be neither minority, nor majority in a crowd, enraged, exalted or scared. One may either behave like "all the others" or be crushed by them.

The research carried out during recent years reveal the significance of his torical frames of references for the Russians national selfidentification. Claims on historical self-identification are addressed mainly towards times "immemorial", mythologi cal. Long-term observations of mass historical memory within the research program mentioned allow us to draw a conclusion about high stability of its principal char acteristics, the structure of both events and personages. The central (axis) event in humanity history is still considered by mass consciousness to be the Victory in 1945 and scientific and space achievements of the 50-s and early 60-s as its continuation. There is nothing equal to this event in mass historical memory especially after the ideas about 1917 October revolution have faded. Another frame of references for structuring historical time is defined by a set of personages whose significance is still recognized by mass consciousness. The presentation of historical frames of references (in literature, education, etc.) remains the field of fierce confrontations, censure prohibitions, contrivances and hypocrisy, both deliberate and hidden. Such aspirations don't receive direct support as yet in contemporary public opinion. But public opinion is not capable of resisting the hidden pressure, the more so if it is enforced by the authority of a popular political figure and especially if it is done under the disguise of returning to habitual long-established patterns. The attitude towards isolation and opposition of the native country to the rest of the world is undoubtedly among such patterns as has been already mentioned. ; The research carried out during recent years reveal the significance of his torical frames of references for the Russians national selfidentification. Claims on historical self-identification are addressed mainly towards times "immemorial", mythologi cal. Long-term observations of mass historical memory within the research program mentioned allow us to draw a conclusion about high stability of its principal char acteristics, the structure of both events and personages. The central (axis) event in humanity history is still considered by mass consciousness to be the Victory in 1945 and scientific and space achievements of the 50-s and early 60-s as its continuation. There is nothing equal to this event in mass historical memory especially after the ideas about 1917 October revolution have faded. Another frame of references for structuring historical time is defined by a set of personages whose significance is still recognized by mass consciousness. The presentation of historical frames of references (in literature, education, etc.) remains the field of fierce confrontations, censure prohibitions, contrivances and hypocrisy, both deliberate and hidden. Such aspirations don't receive direct support as yet in contemporary public opinion. But public opinion is not capable of resisting the hidden pressure, the more so if it is enforced by the authority of a popular political figure and especially if it is done under the disguise of returning to habitual long-established patterns. The attitude towards isolation and opposition of the native country to the rest of the world is undoubtedly among such patterns as has been already mentioned.

One of the constant themes of a researcher's reflection is reassessment of his own experience, means and categories of research. One task is connected with the necessity of a deeper analysis of the subject studied (society, public opinion), the other one is the inevitable re-comprehending of a researcher's position. It is only by evaluating the events and one's own notions in a certain retrospective that it may be possible to detach safely enough a researcher's attitudes from interests and illusions of the time. During recent decade and a half such events and collisions have taken place that had not been expected even by the most attentive observers, nor by domestic and foreign specialists. As far as public opinion is concerned the surveys have discovered unexpected properties of social dispositions and attitudes: credulity, short-term ability for mobilization, readiness to be deceived and be satisfied by little, personalization of expectations, passive patience. For the purposes of public opinion analysis it seems reasonable to trace mainly the functions of groups that exercise specific influence: opinion leaders, elites, layers and structures of mass society that were universally spread in the second half of the last century. During the transition from the "Soviet" to the "Russian" pattern of a person's identification a certain shift has occurred to identification mechanisms of a "lower", more traditional character. The idea that social science (in this case, the sociology of public opinion) serves "the interests of society" is but a fascinating metaphor. Under modern conditions the representatives of "social interests" are power groups and those around them, various service organizations, etc. Another danger to the position of a social researcher comes from the marketing trend of subordinating the researcher's interests to the particular demands of consumer market, including social, political, ideological ones, etc. ; One of the constant themes of a researcher's reflection is reassessment of his own experience, means and categories of research. One task is connected with the necessity of a deeper analysis of the subject studied (society, public opinion), the other one is the inevitable re-comprehending of a researcher's position. It is only by evaluating the events and one's own notions in a certain retrospective that it may be possible to detach safely enough a researcher's attitudes from interests and illusions of the time. During recent decade and a half such events and collisions have taken place that had not been expected even by the most attentive observers, nor by domestic and foreign specialists. As far as public opinion is concerned the surveys have discovered unexpected properties of social dispositions and attitudes: credulity, short-term ability for mobilization, readiness to be deceived and be satisfied by little, personalization of expectations, passive patience. For the purposes of public opinion analysis it seems reasonable to trace mainly the functions of groups that exercise specific influence: opinion leaders, elites, layers and structures of mass society that were universally spread in the second half of the last century. During the transition from the "Soviet" to the "Russian" pattern of a person's identification a certain shift has occurred to identification mechanisms of a "lower", more traditional character. The idea that social science (in this case, the sociology of public opinion) serves "the interests of society" is but a fascinating metaphor. Under modern conditions the representatives of "social interests" are power groups and those around them, various service organizations, etc. Another danger to the position of a social researcher comes from the marketing trend of subordinating the researcher's interests to the particular demands of consumer market, including social, political, ideological ones, etc.