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This essay aims to focus on the specific features —both historical and constitutional— of three European microstates: the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the Republic of San Marino. It tackles this subject under a Comparative Legal approach, insofar as they fit into the standards of European democratic and social Constitutionalism, in view of their upcoming EU Association Agreement (on which the European Parliament adopted its Recommendations, February 2019). Its joint undertaking lies on four considerations. Firstly, they are all European States; and yet, hardly ever seen as such by the European Scholarly writings, not even by their closest neighbouring partners. Secondly, it is interesting to highlight their common features (European legal culture, small dimension, legal and political heritage that have proved resilient to upheavals all around), while singling out their uniqueness, leading to conclude that each of them is one of a kind their own way. Thirdly, all three microstates are included in a currently ongoing negotiating process, aimed to tighten their links with the EU acquis by means of a future EU Association Agreement (which is not the case of Liechtenstein, nor the Vatican City). As to this procedure, the European Parliament shall have its final say on the outcome and its entry into force (art.218 TFEU). And fourth: getting to know better these three microstates can also compensate a persisting lacuna, which is meaningful, at the light of intense crossborder links, with Spain (case of Andorra), France and Italy (case of Monaco), and Italy (case of its enclaved Republic of San Marino). ; Este artículo acomete una aproximación a las especificidades histórico-constitucionales de tres microestados europeos: Principado de Andorra, Principado de Mónaco y República de San Marino. La aborda desde el Derecho comparado y desde su común encuadramiento en las categorías del constitucionalismo europeo democrático y social, pero también a la vista de su futuro Acuerdo de Asociación con la ...

As one of the consequences of the protracted EU crisis aroused by the 2009 Great Recession —the deepest and the longest ever throughout the European process—, both the EU and its Member States have witnessed a growing concern about democratic backsliding and fundamental rights backlashes. Since both the Lisbon Treaty and the ECFR entered into force (December 2009, the EU Institutions have developed new strategies to reinforce and strengthen their ability to test Member States Law making standards as to their due respect to common constitutional values and principles, enshrined in art. 2 TEU («Copenhagen Criteria»). By doing that, they have unfolded as well new instruments to prevent, control and correct potential risk of backward steps at the Member States National level, be it via constitutional or via legal reforms. Hungary and Poland are paramount cases, in as much as they have called for: extrajudicial actions (Rule of Law Mechanism); infringement procedures by the Commission (art.258 TFEU), and EP Resolutions calling both the Commission and the Council to initiate art.7 TEU. This Paper examines recent developments in the sphere of Rule of Law, in view of extending its scope to a new Policy Cycle on Rule of Law, Democracy and Fundamental Rights, encompassing overall and regular scrutiny of all of the Member States by means of objective indicators, as a way to overcome the limits (and unlikely outcome) of the so-called «nuclear option» of art. 7 TEU. It builds on the proposal of linking access to EU Funds and budgetary benefits with full compliance with Rule of Law, Democracy and Rights EU standards. This Article focuses mainly on Poland. It adds to an overview and assessment of the latest ECJ rulings on Polish Judicial reforms led by the far conservative ruling Party (PiS), deemed to be incompatible with EU Law. It ends with conclusive remarks on the need on the need of making progress in the European path to multilayer constitutionalism and binding European Law above «national identity». ; Como una de las ...

Desde los primeros capítulos de la construcción europea con el Tratado de Roma (1957) que cumple 60 años, la jurisprudencia dictada por el Tribunal de Justicia ha sido determinante para la dimensión constitucional del ordenamiento comunitario. En una secuencia de decisiones históricas, el TJ ha afirmado su primacía, eficacia vinculante y su unidad garantizando su interpretación y aplicación uniforme, pero también, sobre todo, los derechos fundamentales dimanantes de las tradiciones constitucionales comunes como fuente del Derecho europeo (principios generales). Esta doctrina se consolida en Derecho positivo, al fin, con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa (TL) en 2009, incorporando el TUE, el TFUE, y, relevantemente, la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la UE (CDFUE) con el «mismo valor jurídico que los Tratados» y, consiguientemente, parámetro de validez de todo el Derecho derivado, así como de enjuiciamiento de la compatibilidad de la legislación de los EE.MM con el Derecho europeo.La doctrina del TJUE sobre derechos fundamentales ha sido su proyección sobre la protección de datos en el marco de los derechos a la vida privada, a la privacidad frente a la transferencia electrónica de datos y al acceso a la tutela judicial de estos derechos (art. 7, 8 y 47 CDFUE). En ella conjuga los principios de reserva de ley (respetando su contenido esencial) y de proporcionalidad y necesidad de las medidas que les afecten. Pero, además, esta doctrina ha adquirido un impacto decisivo en la articulación jurídica de la relación transatlántica entre la UE y EEUU, confrontando los estándares de protección de datos a ambos lados del Atlántico e imponiendo garantías de un «nivel de protección adecuado» para los ciudadanos europeos. Este artículo examina el impacto de dos recientes sentencias relevantes del TJ —Asunto Digital Rights Ireland (2014) y Asunto Schrems (2015)— sobre el Derecho derivado (Directiva de Conservación de Datos de 2006, Directiva de Protección de Datos de 1995, y Decisión de «adecuación» de la Comisión Europea de 2000) y sobre instrumentos de Derecho internacional (Acuerdo Safe Harbour) entre la UE y EEUU. Impone, como consecuencia, no sólo una negociación que repare las deficiencias detectadas en ambas resoluciones sino una actualización del Derecho europeo (nuevo Data Protection Package en 2016) y una novedosa Ley federal de EEUU que por primera vez ofrece a los ciudadanos europeos acceso al sistema de recursos judiciales ante los tribunales estadounidenses en la defensa del derecho a la protección de datos (Judicial Redress Act, 2016).Right from the first very chapters of the European construction under the Treaty of Rome (1957), which turns 60 this year 2017, the jurisprudence by the Court of Justice has truly been decisive to shape the constitutional dimension of the European Community legal order. In a series of historical decisions, the CJEU has affirmed its primacy, its binding efficacy and unity, while guaranteeing its uniform interpretation and implementation. But it has also, above all, enshrined the fundamental rights resulting from the common constitutional traditions as a source of European Law (i.e general principles). This legal doctrine has been ultimately consolidated in positive Law, finally, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TL) in 2009, incorporating the TEU, the TFEU and, most notably, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) with the «same legal value as the Treaties». Charter Fundamental Rights have turned to be, consequently, a parameter for examining the validity of secondary EU legislation, as well as for scrutinizing and reviewing the standard of compatibility of the national legislation of EU Member States with European law. The legal doctrine of the ECJ on fundamental rights has been particularly relevant in its impact on the data protection in the framework of the rights to privacy, privacy with regard to the electronic data transfer, and access to judicial protection of these rights (art. 7, 8 and 47 CFREU). It combines the principles of reservation of law (in due respect of its essential content) as well as proportionality and necessity for legislative measures that might affect them. But, moreover, this doctrine has had a decisive impact on the legal articulation of the so-called transatlantic partnership between the EU and the US, confronting data protection standards on both sides of the Atlantic and imposing guarantees of an «adequate level of protection» for all European citizens. This paper explores the impact of two recent relevant decisions by the ECJ — its rulings on Digital Rights Ireland case (2014) and on the Schrems case (2015) — upon the secondary EU legislation (Data Retention Directive of 2006, Data Protection Directive of 1995, and the «adequacy» Decision of the European Commission of 2000), as well as upon International Law instruments (Safe Harbour Agreement) between the EU and the US. It imposes, as a consequence, not only a negotiation that remedies the shortcomings detected in both decisions, but also a compelling updating of European law itself (new Data Protection Package in 2016) and a new US federal law, which, for the first time ever, provides European citizens with access to judicial remedies in U.S. Courts in defending their right to data protection (Judicial Redress Act, 2016).

Durante las legislaturas europeas 2009-2014 y 2014-2019 la UE viene asistiendo al desafío planteado por los alarmantes signos de deterioro y retroceso de la democracia en la UE. No por casualidad esta tendencia ha coincidido con la inmersión de la Unión en la peor crisis de su historia, que arrancó en 2008 y ha venido en llamarse la «Gran Recesión» de la UE o la «glaciación» europea. Hungría ha sido durante este período el caso más paradigmático de las derivas antidemocráticas -restricciones del pluralismo político e informativo, de la independencia judicial y de la jurisdicción del TC- experimentadas por países de la UE. Pero, recientemente, Polonia ha dado muestras de un deterioro igualmente preocupante. ; During the European legislatures 2009-2014 and 2014-2019 the EU has witnessed the challenge posed by the alarming signs of deterioration and decline of democracy in the EU. Not by chance this trend has coincided with the immersion of the Union in the worst crisis in its history that began in 2008 and has been called the «Great Recession» of the EU or the European «glaciation». Over this period Hungary has been the best example of democratic backsliding in the EU but Poland has shown an equally worrying deterioration lately. ; 142 ; 101 ; 42

Durante las legislaturas europeas 2009-2014 y 2014-2019 la UE viene asistiendo al desafío planteado por los alarmantes signos de deterioro y retroceso de la democracia en la UE. No por casualidad esta tendencia ha coincidido con la inmersión de la Unión en la peor crisis de su historia, que arrancó en 2008 y ha venido en llamarse la «Gran Recesión» de la UE o la «glaciación» europea. Hungría ha sido durante este período el caso más paradigmático de las derivas antidemocráticas -restricciones del pluralismo político e informativo, de la independencia judicial y de la jurisdicción del TC- experimentadas por países de la UE. Pero, recientemente, Polonia ha dado muestras de un deterioro igualmente preocupante. ; During the European legislatures 2009-2014 and 2014-2019 the EU has witnessed the challenge posed by the alarming signs of deterioration and decline of democracy in the EU. Not by chance this trend has coincided with the immersion of the Union in the worst crisis in its history that began in 2008 and has been called the «Great Recession» of the EU or the European «glaciation». Over this period Hungary has been the best example of democratic backsliding in the EU but Poland has shown an equally worrying deterioration lately.