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IN A SENSE UNINTENDED BY THE AUTHORS, THESE TWO CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS PRESENT A STORY WITHIN A STORY. BOTH RATIONAL DECISION MAKING AND DECISIONS IN CRISIS ARE STRIKING EFFORTS TO UNDERSTAND THE DECISION-MAKING SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS OF A KEY ACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST IMBROGHO-ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, THE AUTHORS STRIVE TO EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION MAKING CHOICES AGAINST CURRENT INSIGHTS OFFERED BY NATIONAL AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORKS. AS WELL, THOSE ANALYSES REVEAL IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF DECISION-MAKING CHOICE BY THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES. THEY THUS SHOW THE STATE OF THE ART AS IT EXISTS, AND THEY PROVIDE CLUES OF WHERE THE FIELD MUST MOVE IN THE FUTURE. WHILE THESE ARE CLOSELY RELATED BOOKS, THEY ARE NOT IDENTICAL. NEITHER METHODOLOGICALLY NOR SUBSTANTIVELY DO THEY COVER THE SAME GROUND. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECTS OF READING BOTH STUDIES, AT LEAST THE RESPECTIVE COVERAGE OF THE 1967 CRISIS, IS THAT FREQUENTLY ONE WONDERS IF HE IS READING ABOUT THE SAME CRISIS AT ALL. THIS IS EVEN MORE DISTURBING WHEN ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT DATA AND ADVICE WERE OFFERED WILLINGLY BY MICHAEL BRECHEN TO THE AUTHORS OF THE OTHER STUDY. FOR INSTANCE, BRECHER FINDS THE HOLOCAUST SYNDROME A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDINAL PRISM OF MAJOR ACTORS IN 1967, YET STEIN AND TANTER FAIL EVEN TO MENTION IT AS A FACTOR IN THEIR BOUNDED RATIONALITY PRESENTATION.