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The EU Whistleblower Directive, adopted in 2019, shifts whistleblowing in the European Union from a marginal issue to a world leading example of empowering public voices. What explains this shift? The EU Whistleblower Directive cannot be understood without an inquiry into its legislative background. The latter also sheds new light on EU law-making practice, particularly how public participation can have a considerable influence and how the Commission steers legislation, to abide by principles of conferral and subsidiarity, when primary law is silent on its legislative powers. Central in this article is the legal assessment of the EU Whistleblower Directive. The article, however, seeks to go a step further. Drawing on a range of incremental legal developments in whistleblowing, it offers the first sustained account of what it argues has become a field of law of its own – EU whistleblower law.

In the COVID-19 pandemic, whistleblowers have become the essential watchdogs disrupting suppression and control of information. Many governments have intentionally not disclosed information or failed to do so in a timely manner, misled the public or even promoted false beliefs. Fierce public interest defenders are pushing back against this censorship. Dr Fen and Dr Wenliang were the first whistleblowers in China to report that a new pandemic was possibly underway, and ever since, numerous other whistleblowers around the world have been reporting on the spread of the virus, the lack of medical equipment and other information of public interest. This paper maps the relevant whistleblowing cases in China, the USA and Europe and shows that many whistleblowers are initially censored and face disciplinary measures or even dismissals. At the same time, whistleblowing during the COVID-19 pandemic has drawn public attention to the shortcomings of institutional reporting systems and a wider appreciation of whistleblowers as uniquely placed to expose risk at early stages. Ultimately, whistleblowing as a means of transparency is not only becoming ever less controversial, but during COVID-19 it has become the "remedy" to censorship.

In the COVID-19 pandemic, whistleblowers have become the essential watchdogs disrupting suppression and control of information. Many governments have intentionally not disclosed information or failed to do so in a timely manner, misled the public or even promoted false beliefs. Fierce public interest defenders are pushing back against this censorship. Dr Fen and Dr Wenliang were the first whistleblowers in China to report that a new pandemic was possibly underway, and ever since, numerous other whistleblowers around the world have been reporting on the spread of the virus, the lack of medical equipment and other information of public interest. This paper maps the relevant whistleblowing cases in China, the USA and Europe and shows that many whistleblowers are initially censored and face disciplinary measures or even dismissals. At the same time, whistleblowing during the COVID-19 pandemic has drawn public attention to the shortcomings of institutional reporting systems and a wider appreciation of whistleblowers as uniquely placed to expose risk at early stages. Ultimately, whistleblowing as a means of transparency is not only becoming ever less controversial, but during COVID-19 it has become the "remedy" to censorship.

This monograph offers a uniquely comprehensive and in-depth legal account of official secrets in the European Union. It critically analyses their implications for oversight and fundamental rights. Based on forty interviews with practitioners and other stakeholders, it offers an understanding of the practices of official secrets and provides a critical and much-needed perspective on how parliamentary, judicial and administrative oversight institutions deal with access to classified material and the dilemma of oversight to concurrently ensure secrecy necessary for EU security policies and openness needed for democratic processes and fundamental rights. The book discerns shifts in institutional practice of oversight at the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union that disproportionately favour secrecy and the protection of classified documents while creating serious limitations to open democratic deliberations and access to justice, and delivers new insights on the EU's development as a security actor as well as its autonomy from Member States, showing how rules on official secrets were a means for the EU to gain more autonomy in external security cooperation.

"When EU Heads of States and Governments unanimously gave the European Commission a mandate to negotiate the EU–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on 17 June 2013, they understood that these talks would become the leitmotiv of a new era in EU trade policy. However, few people would have guessed that it would primarily be because of transparency."The public demands for more transparent EU negotiations have significantly increased, especially with regard to the EU–US negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. For many pundits transparency in negotiations comes as a surprise, as the candid statement by the Commissioner's Malmström cabinet member illustrates, since traditionally EU negotiations almost exclusively take place behind closed doors and with almost no public disclosure of documents. Scholars have also noted how 'remarkable' the TTIP negotiations are for the fact that the negotiating directives were publically released, which was not a common practice before, leading someMembers of European Parliament to initiate adjudication for public disclosure of documents.

The lack of transparency in European Union (EU) decision-making and integration has been a long-standing concern in academic and public debate. Perhaps paradoxically, parliamentary oversight of executive power in the EU is also increasingly taking place behind closed doors. This closed oversight results from internal rule-making and interinstitutional agreements established by the European Parliament and executive actors without a public debate and is primarily aimed at safeguarding EU official secrets. This paper examines the role of the European Parliament in oversight in the context of EU executive secrecy. The paper argues that, although the European Parliament asserts its prerogatives for gaining access to EU official secrets, its current practice of closed oversight does not facilitate public deliberation. The European Parliament is yet to make serious efforts to develop its public deliberation function and, in doing so, to also bring attention to possible extensive secrecy practices.

In 2015, the General Court's Rules of Procedure introduced for the first time an EU closed evidence procedure that allows the use of closed or semi-closed evidence, i.e. reliance on evidence that is not, or not fully, disclosed to the applicant. This article shows that the EU closed evidence procedure does not comply with the requirements of the ECHR where even the essence of the evidence is kept from the applicant. It also identifies procedural ambiguities where compliance with the ECHR depends on the interpretation of the Rules by the GC.The article further argues that as the Rules were not introduced through publicly debated law, but were drafted and developed mostly behind closed doors, they lack democratic legitimacy.

This thematic issue shows how the interplays of secrecy and transparency have been a salient driver of institutional politics in EU foreign affairs. It offers a critical reading of the most recent developments in EU's international negotiations, an analysis of case law and empirical insights on public and institutional access to information. The Issue provides an interdisciplinary understanding of how information flows affect and are affect by the EU's institutional balance through synergising perspectives from the fields of political science, public administration and law. This editorial outlines the central questions raised in this thematic issue and highlights its main findings.

International negotiations are an essential part of the European Union's (EU) external affairs. A key aspect to negotiations is access to and sharing of information among the EU institutions involved as well as to the general public. Oversight of negotiations requires insight into the topics of negotiation, the positions taken and the strategies employed. Concurrently, however, some space for confidentiality is necessary for conducting the negotiations and defending EU interests without fully revealing the limit negotiating positions of the EU to the negotiating partner. Hence, attaining a balance between the necessities of oversight and confidentiality in negotiations is the subject of a dynamic debate between the EU institutions. This paper provides a joint analysis on EU oversight institutions' position on transparency in international negotiations. We set out to answer whether parliamentary, judicial and administrative branches of oversight are allies in pursuing the objectives of transparency but also examine when their positions diverge.

International negotiations are an essential part of the European Union's (EU) external affairs. A key aspect to negotiations is access to and sharing of information among the EU institutions involved as well as to the general public. Oversight of negotiations requires insight into the topics of negotiation, the positions taken and the strategies employed. Concurrently, however, some space for confidentiality is necessary for conducting the negotiations and defending EU interests without fully revealing the limit negotiating positions of the EU to the negotiating partner. Hence, attaining a balance between the necessities of oversight and confidentiality in negotiations is the subject of a dynamic debate between the EU institutions. This paper provides a joint analysis on EU oversight institutions' position on transparency in international negotiations. We set out to answer whether parliamentary, judicial and administrative branches of oversight are allies in pursuing the objectives of transparency but also examine when their positions diverge.