"The peaceful protests that erupted in the southern Syrian City of Dar'a in March 2011 sparked a protracted protest movement that has now entered its second year. These uprisings have been met with fierce repression by the regime, which has until recently rejected all regional and national demands for a halt to the violence, instead offering cosmetic political reforms, for example, in the form of a political parties law and a new constitution. Thus far, the regime has been able to shield itself from a more substantive political transition process in large part because of the absence of a unified Syrian opposition. Although the Syrian uprising has created the political opportunity for the formation of multiple Syrian opposition groups, they have, to date, been unsuccessful in uniting under one common organizational framework. Rather, as the uprising continues, more and more groups claiming to represent the opposition have emerged, creating disunity, conflict, and mistrust between the different opposition groups. In this paper, the author asks the following question: What are the factors behind fragmentation in the Syrian opposition? Here, the author makes three claims. First, the presence of external and internal (inside/ outside) opposition groups has impeded coordination among different political actors and the formation of a cohesive, organized framework for the mobilization of the opposition. The dynamics behind inside/ outside divisions are complex, and include the lack of trust between different political actors and the inability of external based groups, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC), to affect political change on-the-ground. Following this latter point, the second claim made here is that the lack of popular representation among the protestors has contributed to fragmentation. This has created a legitimacy deficit that has multiple implications both domestically and internationally. On the one hand, their lack of popular representation has allowed the regime to avoid including these groups in a political transition process. On the other hand, this deficit has also prevented the international community from providing its full political and material support to the opposition. The legitimacy deficit is important to understanding fragmentation since it has discouraged Opposition groups from centralizing their coordination. To some degree, the legitimacy deficit is a product of failed political strategies. The final claim advanced here concerns the competing political strategies of opposition groups. Opposition groups have been confronted with key strategic questions since the uprising began, including questions of violence or non-violence, negotiation with the regime or not, as well as whether to support military Intervention. The political strategies adopted vis-a-vis these strategic questions have placed various Opposition groups in tension with one another and have contributed to their fragmentation. The most obvious example here is of groups that emerged, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to exercise violence against the regime. These groups have caused major splits with those, such as the Local Coordination Committee (LCC), who advocate non-violence. Despite the political opportunity provided by the Syrian uprising, there remains no cohesive opposition. Rather, the opposition remains weak and fragmented. This fragmentation is reflected in the multiple splits between groups and the lack of coordination on key strategic issues. These divisions have negatively affected the possibilities for affecting political change in Syria and have worked to shield the regime from demands for a political transition process." (author's abstract)
In: Orient: deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur des Orients = German journal for politics, economics and culture of the Middle East, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 64-69
International Relations scholarship posits that legitimacy, authority and violence are attributes of states. However, groups like Hizballah clearly challenge this framing of global politics through its continued ability to exercise violence in the regional arena. Surveying the different and sometimes conflicting interpretations of state-society relations in Lebanon, this book presents a lucid examination of the socio-political conditions that gave rise to the Lebanese movement Hizballah from 1982 until the present. Framing and analysing Hizballah through the perspective of the 'resistance society'; an articulation of identity politics that informs the violent and non-violent political strategies of the movement, Abboud and Muller demonstrate how Hizballah poses a challenge to the Lebanese state through its acquisition and exercise of private authority, and the implications this has for other Lebanese political actors. An essential insight into the complexities of the workings of Hizballah, this book broadens our understanding of how legitimacy, authority and violence can be acquired and exercised outside the structure of the sovereign nation-state. An invaluable resource for scholars working in the fields of Critical Comparative Politics and International Relations
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Framing and analysing Hizballah through the perspective of the 'resistance society'; an articulation of identity politics that informs the violent and non-violent political strategies of the movement, Abboud and Muller demonstrate how Hizballah poses a challenge to the Lebanese state through its acquisition and exercise of private authority, and the implications this has for other Lebanese political actors. An essential insight into the complexities of the workings of Hizballah, this book broadens our understanding of how legitimacy, authority and violence can be acquired and exercised outside.
The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which was set up through UN Security Council Resolution 1757 to investigate, indict and prosecute those responsible for the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, is advancing a series of regional and global geopolitical interests. We focus on the structure of the tribunal and its exceptional nature within international law, examining the extent to which the STL's so-called unique features and the process through which it emerged expose its role in representing the interests of regional and global geopolitical actors, effectively internationalizing both the prosecution of the assassination and the issue of Hezbollah's disarmament within the discourse of the 'war on terror'. We also take up the question of Lebanese sovereignty and the extent to which the STL shifts between challenging and altogether disregarding this issue in a manner not unusual in the context of historical trends within international law justifying the colonial tendencies of great powers. We contextualize the STL within broader trajectories in international law, with specific reference to Carl Schmitt's 'challenge of imperial conquest and land acquisition', such as exceptionalism and the colonial genealogy of international law. We then discuss the extent to which the STL enunciates the geopolitical interests of powerful regional and global actors, unpacking the so-called unique features of the STL that reflect its exceptional character. Throughout our analysis, we argue that the STL and its manifestation of contemporary discourses of insecurity play a highly significant role in the international disregard for Lebanese sovereignty and the delegitimization of most domestic political actors, including Hezbollah.