Suchergebnisse

The study examines the impact of bureaucratic corruption, economic freedom, and e-government readiness on the probability of having in place transactional e-government or Web-enabled transactions for public services. The study uses a logistic regression model and aggregate data on a cross-section of countries to investigate this relationship. The principal finding of the study is that a high level of a country's corruption reduces the probability of having transactional e-government whereas the presence of economic freedom and high levels of e-government readiness enhance such probability.Keywords: Corruption, Transactional E-Government, E-Government Readiness, Economic Freedom

SummaryThis study examines the extent of assortative mating for education in Northern Sudan and urban Khartoum. More males than females were found at higher levels of education. Increasingly, people tend to marry persons of equal educational level, but the unequal educational opportunities for males and females have led to the emergence of educational exogamy in which members of different educational levels are more likely to marry from the adjacent educational category than from distant categories. The increasing level of education for both sexes, and especially for females, may in part explain the rising trend in age at marriage.

This article focuses on the relationship between marital timing on the one hand and marriage and residential types on the other within the context of urbanization in a developing country. We develop a framework that recognizes the complex nature of the changing socio-economic and socio-cultural factors under periods of rapid social change and socio-economic differentiation. We demonstrate both theoretically and in terms of an empirical example that marital timing could change independent of changes in marriage forms and extended residence. The role of education in influencing positively marital timing need not be mediated through the dissolution of traditional marriage types and residential forms, and ages at first marriage could rise independent of changes in these institutions.

Osmanlı Devleti, Filistin'indeki hakimiyetini yitirme sebeplerinin başında, Siyonistlerin bölgede kurdukları gizli örtüler gelmektedir. Bunlar; karmaşık, gizli ve Filistin başta olmak üzere Osmanlı'nın toprak bütünlüğünü tehdit edecek niteliği taşıyan istihbari örgüt özelliğine sahiptiler. Hashomer da Filistin'de kurulan bu tür gizli Yahudi örgülerinden en önemlilerinden biridir. Tıpkı diğer Siyonist örgütler gibi bölgeyi kontrol altında tutmak amacıyla 1909 yılında Filistin'de kurulmuş olan silahlı oluşumlardan biridir. Çalışmada; 1909 yılından Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na uzanan süreçte bu örgütün kuruluşu ve yaptığı bazı faaliyetler ele alınmaktadır.

ABSTRACTCrisis is a concept that has a long history; it has come to denote moments of rupture and to foreground life and death decisions necessary for its resolution. The recent deployment of the concept in broad social, economic and political spheres has not only given rise to an industry of crisis management but has also established it as a framework through which to conceive, survive and reconstruct the world. The politics of crisis and the power of crisis narratives determine who is responsible for the crisis, who are its victims, who are its casualties and, inevitably, what policies need to be adopted and, later, institutionalized, in order to 'fix' the crisis and its outcomes. This article examines the politics of crisis narratives and situates the contributions to this Debate within larger debates on crisis under capitalism. These contributions employ the COVID‐19 experience as a lens to examine how moments of crisis allow economic and political elites to displace the blame for the crisis and its structural causes away from themselves and to institute policies which maintain the status quo, limit the scope for alternatives to emerge, and foreclose debates on fundamental questions of power relations which, inevitably, reproduce the conditions for future crises.

This contribution coins the term indefatigable worker as a lens to examine the concerted efforts by state and capital forces, since the early 20th century, to devise methods aimed to reduce mental and physical fatigue among the workforce in order to guarantee the productivity and economic health of the nation. Different interventions have targeted the worker's body from the early 20th century factory labourer to the more fragmented workforce under neoliberal capitalism and finally to the locked-down Covid-19 Zoom participant. Interestingly, each intervention was triggered by the onset of one global economic crisis or the other but cloaked in the benevolent garb of workers' welfare. Ostensibly putting the well-being of the worker at the heart of this seemingly technical, ideology-free regime aims to make it difficult for workers to resist attempts to help them cope with fatigue and to challenge the conditions which cause their physical and mental stress in the first place.

Every month, the B.C. government provides Income and Disability Assistance to over 200,000 residents on a day known as Welfare Wednesday. Using data on alcohol sales and drug crimes in Vancouver, I find that the arrival of Welfare Wednesday leads to a significant increase in alcohol purchases and drug-related crimes, suggesting that recipients spend a sizable portion of their welfare income quickly after receiving rather than budget for the entire month. I argue that the structure of the provincial welfare system exacerbates the problem and makes it more difficult for recipients to break the cycle of poverty.

Every month, the B.C. government provides Income and Disability Assistance to over 200,000 residents on a day known as Welfare Wednesday. Using data on alcohol sales and drug crimes in Vancouver, I find that the arrival of Welfare Wednesday leads to a significant increase in alcohol purchases and drug-related crimes, suggesting that recipients spend a sizable portion of their welfare income quickly after receiving rather than budget for the entire month. I argue that the structure of the provincial welfare system exacerbates the problem and makes it more difficult for recipients to break the cycle of poverty.