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AbstractA health system has three key stakeholders, the State—at national and subnational levels—the health service providers and the citizens. In most settings and especially in peacetime, these stakeholders are typically well-defined. In contrast, during conflict and crisis as well as during ceasefire and post-conflict peacebuilding, stakeholders in the health system are often more diverse and contested. Health systems in such settings tend to be more decentralised, de facto—often in addition to de jure decentralisation. Despite much debate on the potential benefits of decentralisation, assessing its impact on health system performance remains difficult and its effect is open to dispute in the literature. This narrative synthesis aims to support efforts to assess and make sense of how decentralisation impacts health system performance in fragile and post-conflict countries—by synthesising evidence on the impact of decentralisation on health system performance from six country case studies: Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal. The impact of decentralisation on health system performance is optimised when combining centralisation (e.g., the benefits of central coordination in improving efficiency) with decentralisation (e.g., the benefits of local decision making in improving equity and resilience). The findings may inform efforts to think through what to centralise or decentralise, the impacts of those choices, and how the impact may change over time as countries go through and emerge from conflict—and as they go through and recover from the Covid-19 pandemic and prepare for future pandemics.

One constant refrain in evaluations and reviews of decentralization is that the results are mixed. But given that decentralization is a complex intervention or phenomenon, what is more important is to generate evidence to inform implementation strategies. We therefore synthesized evidence from the literature to understand why, how and under what circumstances decentralization influences health system equity, efficiency and resilience. In doing this, we adopted the realist approach to evidence synthesis and included quantitative and qualitative studies in high-, low- and middle-income countries that assessed the the impact of decentralization on health systems. We searched the Medline and Embase databases via Ovid, and the Cochrane library of systematic reviews and included 51 studies with data from 25 countries. We identified three mechanisms through which decentralization impacts on health system equity, efficiency and resilience: 'Voting with feet' (reflecting how decentralization either exacerbates or assuages the existing patterns of inequities in the distribution of people, resources and outcomes in a jurisdiction); 'Close to ground' (reflecting how bringing governance closer to the people allows for use of local initiative, information, feedback, input and control); and 'Watching the watchers' (reflecting mutual accountability and support relations between multiple centres of governance which are multiplied by decentralization, involving governments at different levels and also community health committees and health boards). We also identified institutional, socio-economic and geographic contextual factors that influence each of these mechanisms. By moving beyond findings that the effects of decentralization on health systems and outcomes are mixed, this review presents mechanisms and contextual factors to which policymakers and implementers need to pay attention in their efforts to maximize the positive and minimize the negative impact of decentralized governance.

BACKGROUND: The available data on routine immunization in Nigeria show a disparity in coverage between Northern and Southern Nigeria, with the former performing worse. The effect of socio-cultural differences on health-seeking behaviour has been identified in the literature as the main cause of the disparity. Our study analyses the role of supply-side determinants, particularly access to services, in causing these disparities. METHODS: Using routine government data, we compared supply-side determinants of access in two Northern states with two Southern states. The states were identified using criteria-based purposive selection such that the comparisons were made between a low-coverage state in the South and a low-coverage state in the North as well as between a high-coverage state in the South and a high-coverage state in the North. RESULTS: Human resources and commodities at routine immunization service delivery points were generally insufficient for service delivery in both geographical regions. While disparities were evident between individual states irrespective of regional location, compared to the South, residents in Northern Nigeria were more likely to have vaccination service delivery points located within a 5 km radius of their settlements. CONCLUSION: Our findings suggest that regional supply-side disparities are not apparent, reinforcing the earlier reported socio-cultural explanations for disparities in routine immunization service uptake between Northern and Southern Nigeria. Nonetheless, improving routine immunisation coverage services require that there are available human resources and that health facilities are equitably distributed.

AbstractUnderstanding how health systems respond to shocks has become a pressing need to strengthen response efforts. With already fragmented and disrupted health services, fragile and conflict affected [FCA] countries are more vulnerable to shocks. Previous studies have focused more on conceptualizing health system resilience rather than how health systems [especially in FCA countries] respond to or are resilient to acute shocks. To understand how health systems in FCA countries respond to the shocks and what influence their responses, we conducted a review of the literature published between January 2011 and September 2021 on health system responses to acute shocks in FCA countries. We searched Medline, Embase, Scopus, Jester and Google Scholar – 60 empirical studies in FCA countries on response to sudden, extreme, and unanticipated shocks were included in the review. We found that health systems in FCA countries responded to acute shock using absorptive, adaptive, or transformative capacities. These capacities were mediated by four dimensions of context; knowledge, uncertainties, interdependence, and legitimacy. In addition, we identified the cross-cutting role of community involvement [and its self-evolving nature], frontline workers, and leadership capacity. To our knowledge, this is among the first reviews that focus on FCA country health systems responses to acute shock. By highlighting enabling and constraining factors to each type of capacity, this study provides important lessons and practical strategies from FCA countries on how to absorb, adapt and transform in response to acute shocks – thus promoting health system resilience globally.

[Extract] The Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013–2016) triggered a renewed interest and sense of urgency about global health security. A surge of reports and publications ensued, examining various aspects of emerging infectious disease outbreaks. In 2016, Olivero and colleagues published a biogeographical approach mapping favourable conditions that facilitated the Ebola outbreak, in terms of environmental factors and the presence of potential host animals.1 Constructing biological vulnerability maps has value to guide preparations for future emerging infectious disease outbreaks, especially in low-income and middle-income countries. But perhaps more important is the need to develop similar 'vulnerability maps' to capture the ability of health systems to prevent or respond to major infectious disease challenges. Without a health system vulnerability map, or the public availability of the data to generate it, efforts to achieve global health security in relation to emerging infectious disease outbreaks will likely be limited and post hoc, rather than pre-emptive and strategic. Unfortunately, the revived interest in global health security has not been matched with commensurate action. In 2014, the G7 (Group of Seven) endorsed the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a partnership of governments and international organisations with the goal of accelerating the achievement of the core disease outbreak preparedness and response capacities as required by the International Health Regulations, but progress has been limited.

The posting and transfer of health workers and managers receives little policy and research attention in global health. In Nigeria, there is no national policy on posting and transfer in the health sector. We sought to examine how the posting and transfer of frontline primary health care (PHC) workers is conducted in four states (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna) across Nigeria, where public sector PHC facilities are usually the only form of formal health care service providers available in many communities. We conducted in‐depth interviews with PHC workers and managers, and group discussions with community health committee members. The results revealed three mechanisms by which PHC managers conduct posting and transfer: (1) periodically moving PHC workers around as a routine exercise aimed at enhancing their professional experience and preventing them from being corrupted; (2) as a tool for improving health service delivery by assigning high‐performing PHC workers to PHC facilities perceived to be in need, or posting PHC workers nearer their place of residence; and (3) as a response to requests for punishment or favour from PHC workers, political office holders, global health agencies and community health committees. Given that posting and transfer is conducted by discretion, with multiple influences and sometimes competing interests, we identified practices that may lead to unfair treatment and inequities in the distribution of PHC workers. The posting and transfer of PHC workers therefore requires policy measures to codify what is right about existing informal practices and to avert their negative potential. © 2016 The Authors The International Journal of Health Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Since the mid-1980s, the national health policy in Nigeria has sought to inspire community engagement in primary health care by bringing communities into partnership with service providers through community health committees. Using a realist approach to understand how and under what circumstances the committees function, we explored 581 meeting minutes from 129 committees across four states in Nigeria (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna). We found that community health committees provide opportunities for improving the demand and supply of health care in their community. Committees demonstrate five modes of functioning: through meetings (as 'village square'), reaching out within their community (as 'community connectors'), lobbying governments for support (as 'government botherers'), inducing and augmenting government support (as 'back-up government') and taking control of health care in their community (as 'general overseers'). In performing these functions, community health committees operate within and through the existing social, cultural and religious structures of their community, thereby providing an opportunity for the health facility with which they are linked to be responsive to the needs and values of the community. But due to power asymmetries, committees have limited capacity to influence health facilities for improved performance, and governments for improved health service provision. This is perhaps because national guidelines are not clear on their accountability functions; they are not aware of the minimum standards of services to expect; and they have a limited sense of legitimacy in their relations with sub-national governments because they are established as the consequence of a national policy. Committees therefore tend to promote collective action for self-support more than collective action for demanding accountability. To function optimally, community health committees require national government or non-government organization mentoring and support; they need to be enshrined in law to ...

One of the consequences of ineffective governments is that they leave space for unlicensed and unregulated informal providers without formal training to deliver a large proportion of health services. Without institutions that facilitate appropriate health care transactions, patients tend to navigate health care markets from one inappropriate provider to another, receiving sub-optimal care, before they find appropriate providers; all the while incurring personal transaction costs. But the top-down interventions to address this barrier to accessing care are hampered by weak governments, as informal providers are entrenched in communities. To explore the role that communities could play in limiting informal providers, we applied the transaction costs theory of the firm which predicts that economic agents tend to organise production within firms when the costs of coordinating exchange through the market are greater than within a firm. In a realist analysis of qualitative data from Nigeria, we found that community health committees sometimes seek to limit informal providers in a manner that is consistent with the transaction costs theory of the firm. The committees deal not through legal sanction but by subtle influence and persuasion in a slow and faltering process of institutional change, leveraging the authority and resources available within their community, and from governments and NGOs. First, they provide information to reduce the market share controlled by informal providers, and then regulation to keep informal providers at bay while making the formal provider more competitive. When these efforts are ineffective or insufficient, committees are faced with a 'make-or-buy' decision. The 'make' decision involves coordination to co-produce formal health services and facilitate referrals from informal to formal providers. What sometimes results is a quasi-firm-informal and formal providers are networked in a single but loose production unit. These findings suggest that efforts to limit informal providers should seek to, among other things, augment existing community responses.

With one billion people on the move or having moved in 2018, migration is a global reality, which has also become a political lightning rod. Although estimates indicate that the majority of global migration occurs within low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), the most prominent dialogue focuses almost exclusively on migration from LMICs to high-income countries (HICs). Nowadays, populist discourse demonises the very same individuals who uphold economies, bolster social services, and contribute to health services in both origin and destination locations. Those in positions of political and economic power continue to restrict or publicly condemn migration to promote their own interests. Meanwhile nationalist movements assert so-called cultural sovereignty by delineating an us versus them rhetoric, creating a moral emergency.

With one billion people on the move or having moved in 2018, migration is a global reality, which has also become a political lightning rod. Although estimates indicate that the majority of global migration occurs within low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), the most prominent dialogue focuses almost exclusively on migration from LMICs to high-income countries (HICs). Nowadays, populist discourse demonises the very same individuals who uphold economies, bolster social services, and contribute to health services in both origin and destination locations. Those in positions of political and economic power continue to restrict or publicly condemn migration to promote their own interests. Meanwhile nationalist movements assert so-called cultural sovereignty by delineating an us versus them rhetoric, creating a moral emergency.