Suchergebnisse

We try to think the relationship between memory, historical cultures, and history teaching in the contemporary world. First, we discuss the analysis of the contemporary world developed by Jörn Rüsen, Christian Laville, François Hartog, and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht. Therefore, we describe the historical horizon within which the history teaching - as a part of historical culture - is challenged to answer several historical demands, such as the tension democratization/ethnocentrism and the relationship sense/presence in production and orientation of historical statements.

Sterling balances were a major issue from the point of view of British policy makers. They amounted to £3,555 million in mid-1945 corresponding to almost seven times British pre-war yearly exports. Egyptian sterling balances were importante as Egypt was the second holder of such balances only behind India. Moreover, the Egyptian case has not been adequately dealt in the literature. This is partly explained by the fact that Egypt was excluded from the Sterling Area as a result of the 1947 negotiations with Britain. The strategic interest in the control of the Suez canal did not diminish after the war and provided the main justification to maintain at a very high cost 80,000-100,000 British troops stationed in the Canal Zone. This required not less than £20 million of yearly British military expenditures. Successive complications led the Suez crisis of 1956 and the end of British influence in Egypt and in the Middle East. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on the war and the initial post war period up to the visit to Cairo of Wilfrid Eady, of the Treasury, and Cameron Cobbold, of the Bank of England, on their return from India in early 1947. The next section is a detailed discussion of the successive negotiations involving Egyptian sterling balances between 1947 and 1959. Section III analyses the main issues involved in the negotiations: sterling and dollar releases, cancellation and inflation in the creditor economy, gold guarantees and the interest rate on balances. The following section is on international comparisons of Egypt with other significant sterling balance holders: Argentina, Brazil, India and Portugal. Egyptian losses with the delay in releases and consequent erosion by inflation, low interest rates and sterling devaluation are assessed. It concludes with an evaluation of the Egytian case in contrast with other sterling balance holders.

The British war effort in the Second World War depended on US Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances by other countries, including the Empire. By the end of the war outstanding balances were equivalent to 60 per cent of British net receipts under Lend‐Lease. Of the total sterling balances, about a third was accumulated by India. This article seeks to evaluate the costs incurred by India in the reduction of balances after the war. The accumulation of balances and their use to repatriate India's sterling debt is described. British efforts to convince India to accept a partial cancellation of the balances are analysed, singling out the crucial role of Keynes. The negotiations after independence are detailed, including releases, transfers to Pakistan, settlement of pensions, purchase of military stores, and gold sales. The possible contribution of British divestment to reduce outstanding balances is assessed. The Indian case is compared with those of other holders, such as Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt. The links between the accumulation of sterling balances and inflation are considered. In the end there was a significant reduction in the purchasing power of sterling balances, but not for the reasons anticipated by London.

The British war effort in the Second World War depended on United States Lend Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances by neutrals, some of which would become belligerents and by the Empire. In the end of the war sterling balances corresponded to 60% of British net receipts under Lend Lease and were 15% higher than total Marshall Plan grants in 1948-52. Of the total sterling balances, about 40% were accumulated by India. This paper seeks to evaluate the costs incurred by India in the process of reduction of these balances after the war. The sources of accumulation of balances are examined and the use of the balances to repatriate India´s sterling debt is described. The issue of a British counterclaim entailing a partial cancellation of Indian balances is considered. British efforts to convince India to accept a partial cancellation of the balances are analyzed singling out the crucial role of Keynes in defining British policy The AngloIndian sterling balance negotiations after independence are detailed, including the disposal of balances through releases, transfer of assets to Pakistan, settlement of pensions, purchase of military stores and British gold sales. The possible contribution of British divestment to reduce outstanding balances is assessed, The Indian case is compared with those of other sterling balance holders such as Portugal, Brazil and Argentina. The links between the accumulation of sterling balances and inflation in India are considered. In the end there was a significant reduction in the purchasing power of sterling balances but not for the reasons anticipated by London.

The British effort in the Second World War required massive external financing which depended on Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances. Indebtedness in sterling balances corresponded to almost 38 per cent of this total at the end of the war. Portuguese sterling balances, although a small share of the total, were important because of pre‐emptive purchases, especially of wolfram, and because of the 'gold clause' which was to be applied to outstanding balances. Portugal's willingness to finance British purchases contrasts with the requirement of German payments in goods or cash for their purchases in Portugal. The settlement of Portuguese sterling balances in August 1945 was singular as it preceded the Anglo‐American settlement of December 1945 which had important consequences for sterling balance holders, as the US insisted that the US$3.75 billion loan should not be used to settle British war debts. Postwar settlement of British debt through a long‐term loan from Portugal to Britain contrasts with settlements that involved the sale of British assets. Salazar's concerns about the postwar international position of Portugal, the Portuguese Empire, and the survival of the Portuguese regime are relevant in explaining his pro‐British stance during and after the war.

SUMMARYInternal rates of return of Brazilian loans floated between 1824 and 1931 fell below those of British and US government consols and bonds only for some of the loans floated after the beginning of the twentieth century. Higher volatility of yearly rates of return was rewarded by higher returns for all Brazilian Federal loans. Their spreads over consols in 1824–1943 are compared to those of Argentina and Chile and of Brazilian state and municipal loans for 1888–1930. In spite of some deterioration over time, Brazilian loans had a better performance than suggested by the literature, especially in the 1920s.

This paper's main concern is to assess which "industrial policies" would be meaningful for Latin America nowadays. The first section considers definitions of "industrial policies" and their nature in the past. The second section centers on national growth experiences that may serve as paradigms for LAC economies. Section 3 is on economies which are growth paradigms and on their relevant policies. Section 4 is on present multilateral constraints on "industrial policies", especially in the case of subsidies and trade-related investment measures, as these have been considerably tightened as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The following section analyses the link between macroeconomics and "industrial policies" both in relation to limitations imposed by macroeconomic instability on industrial policy and to how growth depends on the cost of investment on both micro and macroeconomic factors. Section 6 analyses industrial policy alternatives. The paper concludes with section 7 which is on policy recommendations seeking to improve criteria to pick winners where market failures are especially costly.

This paper is divided in nine sections. A short introduction puts the subject matter in perspective in the context of the FTAA negotiations. Section 1 deals with obstacles to a successful conclusion of the FTAA both in Mercosur - especially in Brazil. The following section considers briefly how notions about reciprocity and balance of concessions have been applied in multilateral negotiations and how they may be adjusted in the case of negotiations involving free trade areas. The following two triads of sections refer to the United States (sections 3, 4 and 5) and Brazil (sections 6, 7 and 8). Sections 3 and 6 analyze in both economies how protectionist interests are distributed from the point of view of sectors affected and of their location (states and, for the United States, congressional districts). The relative importance of export interests by state is gauged in sections 4 and 7. The relative net balance of protectionist and export interests is evaluated in sections 5 and 8 under different assumptions in an effort to cope with the limitations of the measures used. Section 9 concludes.

This paper analyses Brazilian multilateral commercial diplomacy first in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1947 and 1994, then in the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 1999. Participation in the GATT and the WTO has traditionally occupied an important position in the Brazilian agenda, but not always for the same reasons. The historical section is followed by an appraisal of Brazilian long-term multilateral commercial diplomacy in the GATT and the WTO, and in the final section the way ahead is pointed out. (Polit Externa/DÜI)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the similarities and contrasts of strategies adopted by the larger South American economies - Argentina, Brazil and Chile - in dealing with the problems raised by the fall of their export revenues coupled with the almost complete interruption of the inflow of foreign capital in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The characteristics of foreign indebtedness of these countries in the late 1920s and the ways the external shock affected their balance of payments from 1928-29 to 1933-34 are also considered. Their differentiated adjustment processes including debt adjustment schemes adopted during the 1930s and early 1940s are compared. Permanent debt settlements are described and discussed. Finally, it considers the links between growth performance of these countries and differentiated foreign debt policies.

This paper examines the similarities and contrasts of strategies adopted by the larger South American economies - Argentina, Brazil and Chile - in dealing with the problems raised by the fall of their export revenues coupled with the almost complete interruption of the inflow of foreign capital in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The characteristics of foreign indebtedness of these countries in the late 1920s and the ways the external shock affected their balance of payments from 1928/29 to 1933/34 are also considered. Their differentiated adjustment processes including debt regulation schemes adopted during the 1930s and early 1940s are compared. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

This paper is the first draft of section 2 of a long chapter on The Economy of Brazil, 1928-1980 to be included in volume 11 of the Cambridge History of Latin America edited by Leslie Bethell. The 1928-1980 chapter shall include a first section on structural change between 1928 and 1980. The three following sections will cover economic policy in a chronological perspective covering 1928-1945, 1945-1964 and 1964-1980. The striking feature of the Brazilian economy during the first Vargas period was its ability to recover quite rapidly from the consequences of the 'great depression'. To the conventional expenditure-switching policies related to a massive devaluation of the mil-réis must be added the reinforcing effects of exchange and import controls. But the important role of previously installed capacity in explaining the timing and strength of recovery underlines the limits of structural change which occurred in the 1930's. The structural characteristics of Brazilian trade, and more specifically the trade surplus with the United States, increased Brazil's bargaining power in the 1930's as, especially after the United States commitment to multilateralism after 1934, there was a marked unwillingness by the United States to use its commercial leverage to constrain Brazil to adopt specific policies which would favour US interests. Brazil exploited this advantage in relation to many aspects of its policies. Perhaps the most important was the ambiguity of its stance on compensation trade with Germany. There was much of a snowball effect in the position concerning the Brazilian foreign debt contracted during the Old Republic. It was an achievement to reach a permanent agreement with creditors in 1943, even if this was eased by the artificial accumulation of reserves which resulted from the constraints on imports. The 1930-45 period was of important innovation in the field of rent-seeking in addition to coffee support and high tariff. The economics of the foreign exchange wedge between export and import rates became a vital aspect of economic policy in Brazil at least until the mid-1960's. The proliferation of normative sectoral agencies, many of them with ample regulatory mandate, created important sources of inefficiency. But in many instances the government opted for public ownership because there was no interest by the private sector. Macroeconomic policy, which had been under reasonable control for most of Vargas' first period, deteriorated considerably in the last years of the war with a high rate of inflation and a grotesquely overvalued exchange rate.

Se describen los sectores financieros de los paises del Mercosur y se comparan sus esquemas normativos, senalando las marcadas asimetrias que existen en lo relacionado con los esfuerzos de desreglementacion, asi como en las regulaciones referidas a la integracion financiera en la economia mundial. Se considera que la falta de convergencia de las politicas macroeconomicas continuara creando tensiones en el Mercosur y que la mejor forma de coordinacion podria surgir de la adopcion de politicas monetarias y fiscales sostenibles en las economias de los paises miembros, enfatizando la estabilidad de los precios. En este sentido se plantean algunos escenarios posibles. (Integr Comer/DÜI)