Exclusionary Politics and Organized Resistance
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 341-363
ISSN: 1556-1836
25 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 341-363
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: Journal of peace research, Band 56, Heft 5, S. 724-734
ISSN: 1460-3578
In recent years, scholars of various forms of conflict involving revolutionary and militant organizations (such as terrorism, civil war, and nonviolent contestation) recognized that arbitrary organizational categories and typologies often leave large-N studies incomplete and biased. In moving away from nominal categorical boundaries that produce such selection biases and looking to a more generalized conception of resistance organizations, I constructed an original dataset that aims to bridge the gap between conflict literatures. Transcending traditional classifications, the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations dataset (REVMOD) consists of over 500 resistance organizations operative sometime between the years 1940 and 2014 and includes a diverse array of types of resistance organizations – many of which utilize a multitude of tactics, operate in various conflict contexts, and/or confront numerous target types. The dataset documents organizational attributes, allies, and adversaries at annual intervals (organization-years), making reliable time-series analyses possible. Tracking variables like organizational outcome-goal type and degree of achievement, political capacity, leader/s, constituent identity group, violence and demonstration levels, size, organization aliases, and several others, REVMOD breaks new ground in the collection of information on resistance organizations and can spur countless studies. A preliminary data analysis demonstrates that differences in organizational political capacity explain variation in resistance outcomes generally and in particular contexts such as civil war, terrorism, and nonviolent revolutions. REVMOD provides a unique opportunity to develop a new research paradigm for resistance studies that employs large-N empirical analyses to uncover generalities between different forms of political contention in the contemporary era, as well as to better understand why and how distinct resistance processes may produce specific outcomes.
In: The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 407-411
ISSN: 2152-0852
In: Journal of peace research, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 180-196
ISSN: 1460-3578
Suicide attacks continue to plague a multitude of conflict zones. However, the scholarly literature on the phenomenon has yet to produce a theory that explains why militant organizations at different stages of development, facing dissimilar enemies, and situated in unique conflict environments adopt suicide attacks. Moreover, the suicide-attack phenomenon now presents an intriguing puzzle. While most militant organizations fail to achieve their core political ends or 'outcome goals', organizations that employ suicide attacks are even less likely to succeed. Still, organizations have adopted suicide attacks at increasing rates. Given their ineffectiveness in precipitating outcome-goal success, why do organizations continue to adopt suicide attacks? Like all organizations, militant organizations share two common aims: (1) to survive and (2) to achieve outcome goals. As martyrdom operations often fulfill the ideological or cultural expectations of certain identity groups, representative organizations may adopt suicide attacks to expand constituent support or enhance status within a particular political landscape. Further, organizations can conduct suicide attacks to signal ideological solidarity with fellow militant organizations. This article analyzes an original large-N dataset of militant organizations alongside an original database of over 5,000 suicide attacks, and evaluates numerous case examples. The results demonstrate that militant organizations across regions and over time have adopted suicide attacks in order to gain supporters, promote organizational longevity, and boost or preserve status.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 180-196
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 666-683
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The Middle East journal, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 268-286
ISSN: 1940-3461
In: The Middle East journal, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 268-286
ISSN: 0026-3141
World Affairs Online
In: Studies in conflict & terrorism, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 135-161
ISSN: 1057-610X
World Affairs Online
In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 135-161
ISSN: 1521-0731
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 666-683
ISSN: 0022-3816
World Affairs Online
In: Middle East quarterly, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 13-20
ISSN: 1073-9467
In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 232-247
ISSN: 1521-0731
In: Studies in conflict & terrorism, S. 1-34
ISSN: 1057-610X
In: Cooperation and conflict: journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 365-387
ISSN: 1460-3691
The literature on political violence emphasizes two main ways that militant organizations 'win': eliminating the adversary outright or coercing the adversary into making concessions. While most do not win in this way, some organizations that fail to win go on to achieve their goals in post-conflict political competition. What explains variation in the post-conflict political success of militant organizations that did not achieve their organizational goals on the battlefield? In this study, we run the first large- n empirical analysis of the phenomenon. Our empirical results show that organizational size and wartime lethal capacity positively predict the political success of militant organizations that did not win on the battlefield. Other plausibly related features of militant organizations, such as their united wartime front or coherent ideology, do not predict eventual political success. Additionally, we investigate the case of Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional in El Salvador and present marginal effects analyses—further illustrating the effects of a legacy of violence and organizational size on post-conflict political success.