Suchergebnisse

L'informalité comprend le secteur et l'emploi informel, dont la pérennité est avérée et l'effet cyclique peu identifié. La théorie dualiste originelle recouvre à la fois la résorption et la persistance de l'informalité. La persistance résulte d'une segmentation du marché du travail qui se manifeste par des écarts de revenus malgré la mobilité des travailleurs. L'impact des politiques de formalisation est modéré et plus prononcé pour la régularisation des entreprises que pour l'extension de la protection sociale des travailleurs. Classification JEL : E26, J24, J46, J64

International audience ; The Non-Observed Economy (NOE) vs. the shadow economy remains a controversial issue. Illegal, underground and informal activities encapsulated within the NOE/shadow economy display large discrepancies throughout the European Union. First, a tractable taxonomy of the aforementioned market activities is designed according to both definition and scope, whereupon a wide spectrum of estimation methods applies. Second, direct measurements provided by tax audits, household informal expenditure and labour market surveys provide piecemeal information regarding such unobserved activities; a cross-section survey issued from a unique questionnaire applied to all European countries in 2007 and again in 2013 deserves special attention. Third, indirect macroeconomic measurements are drawn from discrepancies on the market for goods and services on the money market and on the labour market, whereas the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators-multiple causes) method carves the trends of the shadow economy (hereafter SE). Fourth, the estimates of the EU shadow economy drawn from the DYMIMIC model are compared with the assessment of the NOE according to national accounts adjustments; the relevance of major determinants of the NOE/shadow economy-tax burden as well as the characteristics of the informal workforce, is discussed.

International audience ; The Non-Observed Economy (NOE) vs. the shadow economy remains a controversial issue. Illegal, underground and informal activities encapsulated within the NOE/shadow economy display large discrepancies throughout the European Union. First, a tractable taxonomy of the aforementioned market activities is designed according to both definition and scope, whereupon a wide spectrum of estimation methods applies. Second, direct measurements provided by tax audits, household informal expenditure and labour market surveys provide piecemeal information regarding such unobserved activities; a cross-section survey issued from a unique questionnaire applied to all European countries in 2007 and again in 2013 deserves special attention. Third, indirect macroeconomic measurements are drawn from discrepancies on the market for goods and services on the money market and on the labour market, whereas the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators-multiple causes) method carves the trends of the shadow economy (hereafter SE). Fourth, the estimates of the EU shadow economy drawn from the DYMIMIC model are compared with the assessment of the NOE according to national accounts adjustments; the relevance of major determinants of the NOE/shadow economy-tax burden as well as the characteristics of the informal workforce, is discussed.

International audience ; Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism. ; La justice sociale est-elle congruente avec la démocratie ? L'utilitarisme et l'économie du bien-être sont-ils compatibles avec le libéralisme politique ? Des désaccords saillants entre économie du bien-être et philosophie politique concernent le choix des principes de justice d'une société démocratique, et la pérennité de celle-ci demeure une question ouverte. Le théorème d'Arrow établit l'impossibilité d'une fonction de bien-être social issue des préférences individuelles. L'utilitarisme de la règle d'Harsanyi fonde la fonction de bien-être sur l'utilité espérée. La théorie contractualiste de la justice de Rawls affirme la priorité du juste sur le bien. La théorie du choix social de Sen récuse la compatibilité du principe de Pareto avec le libéralisme politique.